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1
In Dialogue with Thucydides
ften when reading Thucydides, I ask myself: what does ThucydidesOhimself think? Does he endorse this argument? Should I compare
these two situations? Why has he withheld his own judgment? The
premise of this book is that these reactions are the result of deliberate
strategies on the part of Thucydides. Of course, at times Thucydides is at
the reader’s side, explaining, judging, tying together passages, events, and
arguments (1.1.1, 1.23.6, 1.55.2, 2.65, 3.82–83). But the reader also
encounters a reticent and less intrusive side of Thucydides as this author-
itative presence recedes.
The goal of this book is to examine Thucydides’ techniques of presenta-
tion and the effects of those techniques on the reader’s experience. Indeed,
it will be valuable to approach the History in part from the perspective of the
reader’s experience, for the History is an interactive work in which
Thucydides invites the reader to juxtapose one argument with another,
compare speech and narrative, and test maxim against a particular episode.
There is what we might call a dialogic quality to his presentation that is
found not only in the pairs of speeches which respond to one another; the
narrative itself raises questions and encourages the reader to pursue multiple
lines of possible action and consequence. The History lives as an interactive
text by putting the reader in a position to confront arguments, make con-
nections, and—vicariously—decide the best course of action. There are four
main features to this book’s analysis: Thucydides’ method of presenting
speech and narrative, the reader’s experience, Thucydides’ view of history,
and Thucydides’ position in the context of oral and written culture. In this
introductory chapter, I would like to present these areas of inquiry before
turning in the second chapter to a more in-depth examination of
Thucydides’ narrative techniques and the reader’s tasks.
The first feature in the History to be explored is Thucydides’ presentation
of speech and narrative. This general approach has been labeled “narratol-
ogy” (with its attendant “narrator,” “narratee,” “analepsis,” “prolepsis,” etc.),
3
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but regardless of the terminology, the focus is upon the method of presenta-
tion of the history. There is nothing revolutionary about observing the
effect of the narrator conveying certain information or of a figure such as
Pericles interpreting past events or anticipating the future. This approach
basically examines how the author presents events and speeches to the
readers of the text. Such analysis means paying attention to who perceives
or interprets an event—who “focalizes” it. The narrator may recount what
happens, a character may describe something, but sometimes within the
narrative, events are presented from the perspective not of the narrator, but
from the perspective of one of the characters. When the narrator presents
events through a character’s perceptions, thoughts, emotions, or words,
this is referred to as “embedded focalization.” Narrative analysis also stud-
ies many other features, such as the ordering of events, the juxtaposition
of speech and narrative, and flashbacks and foreshadowings that link ear-
lier and later events to the situation being described.
The second feature I explore is the effect of Thucydides’ presentation
on the reader. That is, we may approach the History on the one side in
terms of the narrator’s decisions to present, withhold, and comment, and
from the opposite perspective we may explore the reactions and experi-
ences of the reader. Thucydides often encourages his reader to adopt the
position of figures within the work and to view matters from several per-
spectives. To the extent that readers are able to view past events in this
manner, the overall effect is a feeling of open-endedness in terms of possi-
ble responses, and alternative argument and action.
The reader then encounters an interactive, participatory type of litera-
ture in which Thucydides expects his reader to play an active, intellectu-
al role. White comments:
The text is like the world itself . . . Thucydides’ purpose . . . [is not] to pre-
sent a narrative of events and to explain them . . . [but] by reduplicating
them in clarified and intensified form will force upon the reader the diffi-
culties Thucydides himself faces . . . the experience of this text is like an
experience of the world.1
Thucydides appeals to the reader’s involvement by bringing written liter-
ature as close as possible to the live, extemporaneous, face-to-face debate
of Greek politics. The audience is engaged in a unique way that we might
term “dialogic” rather than “dogmatic.”
At several points in this book, I have found it profitable to compare
Thucydides and Plato: this is the first occasion. What Thucydides has
4 Chapter 1
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accomplished is analogous to Plato with respect to the function of the
work itself. The works of Plato, in particular, the early, “aporetic” Platonic
dialogues, are left in an important sense without resolution. If Euthyphro’s
definitions of piety are inadequate, for example, the reader is implicitly
invited to join in and continue that search. The History and the Platonic
dialogues share this special quality of eliciting the reader’s engagement.
Thucydides presents an implicit model for thinking about one of the
reader’s most important tasks. At pivotal points in the History
Thucydides emphasizes the activity by statesmen and historians of jux-
taposing, comparing, and extrapolating—captured by the Greek term
eikazein (1.9–10, 1.138, 4.36). Thucydides also claims that in the future,
events comparable to those from the past may take place (1.22.4).
Passages such as these offer a model for the engaged reader: just as states-
men, historians, and citizens must draw connections between past events
and the present or between argument and possible courses of action,
Thucydides encourages his reader’s engagement in extrapolation and
conjecture (eikazein) with respect to both past and future: readers must
project themselves into the past and view what is past to them as part of
an indeterminate future.2 At some level, the reader knows that every-
thing described in the History has already taken place. Nevertheless, we
may distinguish between the retrospective reader who understands
where various events are leading and the engaged reader who experi-
ences an atmosphere of contingency.
A possible motivation for the ultimate form of Thucydides’ project—
especially his means of presentation—was that he was striving to produce
an alternative way to address his fellow Athenians, for participation in
civic affairs was no longer available to him.3 When Thucydides was sent
into exile in 424 BCE, he could no longer point out the proper course of
action or warn of mistaken policy in the assembly. Exile cut him off from
these opportunities for civic engagement. Yet even in exile Thucydides
strove to engage his fellow citizens and his fellow Greeks, but now it was
no longer in a living, face-to-face conversation; rather it was in a written
medium, aimed at both a more immediate audience (Athenians and other
Greeks ca. 400 BCE) and a more distant audience—as suits “a possession
forever.”4 I will explore the events of Thucydides’ life and their possible
effects on his work more fully in chapters 9 and 10.
The third feature is Thucydides’ view of the past which grows out of this
atmosphere of open-ended contingency. I will argue that because the read-
er is encouraged to adopt the position of figures within the History and view
what has already happened as part of an indeterminate future, we come to
5In Dialogue with Thucydides
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appreciate the radical nature of Thucydides’ non-teleological history.
Thucydides repeatedly indicates—both implicitly and explicitly—how
events might have taken another direction: there is nothing inevitable
about the course of history. A consequence of Thucydides’ sort of presen-
tation is that readers may also view the past from this perspective.
Alternative scenarios proliferate in Thucydides’ work. The History is
continually raising possibilities, revealing alternatives, and considering
hypothetical situations in order to emphasize the contingent nature of the
events of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides’ presentation reveals that
events are not governed by divine guidance; history has no ultimate goal
(we might contrast both Homer and Herodotus).5 This, of course, does not
mean that certain things are not likely to take place, but the open-ended-
ness of Thucydides has not, in my view, been sufficiently recognized.
Flory notes that explicit counterfactual hypotheses occur with compa-
rably high frequency only in the work of Homer and Thucydides, and
thinks these hypotheses mark Thucydides’ “style of speculation as a signif-
icant peculiarity of the History.” Flory concludes that Thucydides:
shows us that, in fact, the sequence of events is not inevitable, for the out-
come of a battle often hinges upon tiny and unpredictable accidents.
When Thucydides looks back on the war that Athens lost, he sees that
defeat might have been only the result of a concatenation of trivial
mishaps beyond human control.6
At times authorial comment and foreshadowing indicate the ultimate
direction of events—or indeed the outcome of the war itself—yet along the
way Thucydides constantly emphasizes choices and decisions which may
have led to other outcomes. While Flory analyzes explicit hypotheses
expressed in the historian’s own voice, Thucydides utilizes diverse means
for suggesting alternative scenarios in both speech and narrative. We have
much to learn about Thucydides’ view of history by applying Flory’s
insights more broadly.7
Up to now I have been speaking about the reader’s experience and the
reader’s engagement, but the matter is not so simple. The fourth and final
feature for examination is Thucydides’ special role in the transition from
a predominantly oral culture in fifth-century Athens to a more literate
culture. The issue here is in part that of reception: how Thucydides’ work
would have been made accessible to other Greeks. Thucydides’ History
may be regarded as a pivotal work that seeks to recreate the earlier world
of spoken argument, yet it does so as a text that may be read and reread.
6 Chapter 1
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While the History may be explored in terms of narrative analysis, this
method needs to be adapted to a work that, in part, may have been heard
rather than read. Ultimately I will argue that Thucydides’ intended audi-
ence includes both readers and auditors.
In order to locate Thucydides’ position on the oral-written continuum
in terms of sources, composition, and reception, I would like to provide a
brief sketch of orality and literacy in ancient Greece. There are three sig-
nificant stages for our survey: primary orality (pre-750 BCE), various
stages of proto-literacy (750–400 BCE), and the period of alphabetic
dependency (400 BCE and after). The first period, often called the “Dark
Ages” of Greece, was a 450-year period (1200–750 BCE) when no system
of writing existed. Greeks still spoke about the past, but they did so in part
by means of an oral poetic tradition handed down from one generation of
singers to the next. This was a tradition in which the composition, per-
formance, and reception of heroic stories was undertaken without the aid
of any system of writing. This does not mean that the tales told were unso-
phisticated, yet these stories are lost to us because they were never written
down—the technology of writing simply did not exist.8
In Archaic Greece (beginning in the eighth century BCE), the Greek
alphabet was invented (based on the Phoenician syllabary). This writing
system has continued in use till today (including the Romans’ adaptation
of it that pretty much constitutes our familiar 26-letter alphabet).
Although from the mid-700s BCE the alphabet existed in the ancient
Greek world (extending in the east to coastal Asia Minor and in the west
to Italy and Sicily), scholars have distinguished between different stages of
literacy. For example, even though the alphabet existed in Homer’s own
lifetime (during the 700s), the Iliad and the Odyssey are very much prod-
ucts of that oral tradition from the Dark Ages (whether Homer himself was
literate or not remains a controversial question).9
This second stage might be characterized as a mixed period distinguished
by various degrees of proto-literacy that lasted until about 400 BCE.10 The
alphabetic system was employed for dedicatory, proprietary, legal, and funer-
ary inscriptions as well as for the recording of epic, lyric, and dramatic verse.
In the fifth century the Athenians’ large maritime empire required extensive
use of documents, including correspondence, record-keeping, and court
business (among Athenians and also between Athenians and their subject
city-states).11 Yet even though a new technology—the alphabetic writing
system—existed throughout this period (750–400 BCE), the culture
remained a predominantly oral culture. That is, the mindset of poets, politi-
cians, and thinkers remained to a large degree an oral mindset for 350 years
7In Dialogue with Thucydides
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or more. While the songs of Homer, Sappho, and Pindar were recorded—
written down by someone on papyrus—the primary access to these works by
the vast majority of the population was by the ear (they heard them) rather
than by the eye. This was also true of the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles,
and Euripides that were performed at the festival of Dionysus as well as the
speeches of the Athenian statesman Pericles, heard live and out loud in the
Athenian assembly.
The third stage, beginning right around the year 400 BCE, has been
called the era of alphabetic dependency or alphabetic literacy. For the first
time poets and thinkers composed works that were intended to be read by
their audiences (readers) rather than heard. We see this new sensibility
also reflected in the court system in which written documents of a witness’
testimony supplanted the spoken words of that witness; also lawsuits had
to accord with written law. Robb concludes: “By the early fourth century,
writing and documents manifestly are becoming a presumption of the daily
functioning of the courts and of legal procedures.”12
Robb also argues that in Aristotle’s Lyceum in the mid-fourth century
“educational activity . . . indisputably centered around its characteristic
texts.”13 By this time the transition to a book-reading public (however
elite) was complete. There is much else to be said, but I trust that this
admittedly sketchy and simplified survey provides a context for the inno-
vations of Thucydides.
A pivotal work analyzing the transition from the second stage of proto-
literacy to the third stage of alphabetic literacy is Preface to Plato (1963)
by Eric Havelock whose interest lies in the classical period (fifth and
fourth centuries BCE). Havelock argues that it was not until Plato in the
fourth century that someone recognized the potential—and the prob-
lems—of writing for a reading public. Although forty years ago this was an
extremely controversial idea, it has now become largely accepted that dur-
ing this second period from roughly 750–400 BCE there was a long, grad-
ual shift from an audience that learned by hearing, memorizing, and
reciting spoken discourse to a perhaps relatively select audience that
would read and reread written texts.
Plato grew up in a fifth-century oral culture, but he augurs a new era by
his reflections on written literature. Allow me to briefly describe the situ-
ation Plato faced. Someone would ask a question: Is Pericles wise? The
answer given might well be based on a recollection of earlier literature,
often a passage from Homer (what Havelock calls “the Homeric encyclo-
pedia”). In Plato’s Republic (from the second quarter of the fourth centu-
ry), the figure of Socrates is still complaining that “Homer educated Hellas
8 Chapter 1
Morrison_CH1_2nd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:42 PM  Page 8
. . . and people live their entire lives according to this poet” (Rep. 606e).
Havelock argues that the “cultural situation described by Plato is one in
which oral communication still dominates all the important relationships
and valid transactions of life.”14 According to Havelock, part of Plato’s
response to this situation was a new type of discourse (dialectic), but he
also developed his philosophy of the “forms” (ideai). The true reality—the
forms—was unchanging, immaterial, and knowable, unlike the words of
the poets that could be twisted to suit a particular context. Plato’s “ideas”
were fixed and absolute—like writing—and provided a new way for think-
ing about the world. Robb describes Plato’s role:
To appreciate Plato in the context of his time requires our seeing him as
both the great heir of a still dominantly oral culture—in place by habit or
preference, not technological necessity—and simultaneously its destroyer.
. . . [Plato] finally destroyed the cultural situation in which for most peo-
ple, high and low, important knowledge was transmitted across genera-
tions orally, in performances.15
But was Plato the first to recognize the drawbacks of a primarily oral cul-
ture? Was he the first to anticipate the potential of writing? I would like to
go back one generation to that of Thucydides. The dates of the composition
of Thucydides’ History are certain: 431–ca. 400 BCE (1.1, 5.26). In view of
this fact, the intellectual climate of Thucydides’ lifetime may help us to posi-
tion the History in its cultural context. Thucydides (465?–ca. 400 BCE) was
also raised in fifth-century Athens which consisted primarily of an oral cul-
ture. In the law courts and political assemblies, at the dramatic festivals,
even encountering Socrates in the agora, intellectual exchange took place
orally in a live, face-to-face, and often spontaneous manner. The Sophists
dazzled the public by presenting display pieces; they also offered instruction
for how to be successful in public speaking contests. This was very much a
“performance culture.” Yet in the fourth century, we find the beginnings of
a reading culture, in which literature and ideas were composed in writing for
a reading “audience.” Thucydides sits on the cusp of that transition from a
predominantly oral culture to the beginnings of a new self-awareness for lit-
erature that was meant to be read.
One of the fascinating aspects of Thucydides’ History is that it is a writ-
ten text, yet it still recreates the dynamism of oral exchange.16 The quali-
ty of “engagement” found in Thucydides’ work mentioned above derives
in part from the innovative nature of this work. That is, this work still
retains the habits and practices of the oral culture Thucydides grew up in
9In Dialogue with Thucydides
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yet he, like Plato, also had a sensitivity and self-awareness of written liter-
ature’s potential. Thucydides was, I believe, engaged in a project—analo-
gous to what Plato did for philosophy—by challenging the ways in which
Greeks thought about the past. And like Plato’s creation of a “literary”
Socrates, Thucydides has recreated the political arena in Greece with
respect to fifth-century oral debate and to military strategy and battle.17
Both Thucydides and Plato, the first two great authors of Attic prose, were
responding to the same conditions of restricted literacy in essentially the
same period. Thucydides obviously intended his written work to address a
contemporary audience in some manner and he seems to have anticipat-
ed, at least in part, an audience of listeners.
By exploring the History from this perspective, I hope to bring
Thucydides into the debate surrounding the long transition from orality to
literacy in Ancient Greece. Thucydides deserves greater attention for his
self-conscious reflections on the issues of oral and written sources, presen-
tation, and reception. Preceding Plato by a generation, he grandly pro-
nounces that his work will be a “possession for all time” (1.22.4). This
suggests an awareness of the capacity of a written work to transcend the
moment in ways that ephemeral speech and performance cannot.18 The
result is that my method of exploring Thucydides’ presentation of speech
and narrative is basically a narratological approach but we must under-
stand the unique features of its compositional structure in terms of the cul-
ture of the historian’s own time and place. The reception of Thucydides’
work—by both readers and auditors—will be addressed in the final two
chapters.
These are the four features I will explore: the presentation of speech and
narrative, the reader’s experiences, Thucydides’ view of history, and
Thucydides as a transitional figure between oral and literary culture. I am
not advancing a single overarching thesis. One thing I have learned is that
it is a mistake to try to reduce Thucydides’ complex work to a single argu-
ment. In fact, Thucydides himself apparently delights in setting up a the-
sis and then later undermining that argument by showing its weaknesses
and inconsistencies. Whatever success I have had in grappling with
Thucydides has come when I have focused on particular problems or spe-
cific events: this is the path I will follow in this book.
Many scholars have influenced my interpretation of Thucydides. I have
already mentioned Havelock, Flory, and Robb. Regarding Thucydides’ narra-
tive, works by Connor, Hornblower, de Jong, Rood, and Stahl have also been
especially valuable.19 Provocative work on Plato’s dialogues by Blondell and
Hershbell offers many insights relevant to the interactive, “dialogic” nature
10 Chapter 1
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of Thucydides’ work.20 Concerning contingent history—and against seeing
the past as inevitable—Flory is joined by Bernstein, Ferguson, Gould, Stahl,
and Varnadoe.21 Regarding oral culture and literacy in antiquity, I should
mention the scholarship of Edmunds, Harris, Ong, and Thomas.22
In addition to such scholarly works, a major influence upon my analy-
sis has been my own personal experience, in reading, probing, and teach-
ing Thucydides. As teachers know, the words of Thucydides’ (and Plato’s)
texts—both in substance and style—are ideal prompts for discussion that
can lead to conflicting interpretations of what Thucydides is up to. This is
no accident; rather, Thucydides has adopted a means of presenting the war
so that the reader plays a role in testing, analyzing, and extrapolating.
The organization of this book is as follows. Chapter 2 presents a fuller dis-
cussion of how Thucydides’ techniques force readers to become active partic-
ipants in assessing and anticipating events. These basic techniques—multiple
perspective, authorial reticence, and episodic structure—engage both the “ret-
rospective” reader and the “engaged” reader, who is encouraged to relive the
past as though the outcome were still in doubt.
In “Part Two. Participatory, Punctuated, and Retrospective History:
Corcyra, Plataea, and Melos,” chapters 3, 4, and 5 will examine how
Thucydides’ presentation of particular city-states encourages different
sorts of participation on the reader’s part. Chapter 3 analyzes “participato-
ry history,” in which Thucydides encourages the reader to consider events
in the Corcyrean conflict from the perspective of the participants
involved; indeed, we come to appreciate how Thucydides presents actions
and argument in such a way that the reader may re-experience them and
become engaged with questions, such as the “inevitability” of the war. In
chapter 4, the city of Plataea offers an excellent example of “punctuated
presentation,” as Thucydides links speech and narrative across separate
episodes. Especially important are the ways in which early action leads to
later consequences and the manner in which speakers reinterpret past
events. Chapter 5 argues that the true significance of Athens’ conflict
with Melos may be best understood in terms of “retrospective” engage-
ment, for the reader is led back to earlier juxtapositions of speech and
event which offer “lessons” pertinent to this particular conflict. Each
city—Corcyra, Plataea, and Melos—offers a different sort of challenge to
the reader. Certainly Part Two is not comprehensive: I have selected what
I believe to be representative examples of Thucydides’ presentation of
cities’ arguments, actions, and the consequences of those actions.23
In “Part Three. Argument and Reverberation: Comparison, Maxim,
and Metaphor,” chapters 6, 7, and 8 explore how rhetorical language pre-
11In Dialogue with Thucydides
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sents a different sort of challenge to the reader. Chapter 6 explores the
comparison between cities and individuals that raises questions about the
behavior, character, and interaction of cities. In chapter 7, we find that
maxims often bridge the gap between domestic politics and international
conflict. Chapter 8 focuses on Thucydides’ use of metaphorical phrases,
such as “Athens, the tyrant-city,” which suggest comparisons for the read-
er’s investigation. Thucydides’ work as a whole—even though indis-
putably unfinished—achieves a kind of unity due to these recurrent
comparisons, maxims, and metaphors.
In “Part Four. Biography and Reception,” chapter 9 considers
Thucydides’ explicit claims and probable motivations for his work, while
reflecting upon the events in his own life. Chapter 10 explores the recep-
tion of his work, for both readers and auditors—ancient and modern—are
addressed by the History. In chapters 3 through 8, I refer to Thucydides’
“reader” and the sort of engagement available to a reading audience. Since
this may differ from how Thucydides envisioned the reception for his
work, these final chapters examine the ways in which Thucydides, while
privileging his own work as written—and therefore superior to oral dis-
course—invites the engagement of both readers and auditors.
My intended audience includes scholars and specialists in ancient his-
tory, philosophy, politics, and literature, yet I hope that my discussion will
also interest those studying the transition from orality to literacy in the
ancient world. I have attempted to shed new light on many important pas-
sages and themes in Thucydides so that undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents in history and classics may find particular chapters useful to their
study and research. With these readers in mind, all passages are presented
either in English (with key Greek phrases inserted) or in Greek with an
English translation following.
While exploring Thucydides’ presentation and his techniques, I hope
to offer a greater appreciation of his innovations. Thucydides reveals his
own awareness of doing something novel. Indeed, he presents a new way
of viewing the past, seeks to present accurately speeches and events,
claims everlasting value for his work, and suggests the advantages of writ-
ten over oral communication. Thucydides recognized that it is possible to
transcend one’s own immediate circumstances—the here and now—but it
is impossible to do so if you go to the agora, the Pnyx, or the Theater of
Dionysus. To transcend the moment with words, you must use words that
will live beyond your own lifetime. Thucydides’ phrase, “a possession for-
ever” (kth=ma& te e0j ai0ei/–1.22.4), suggests a broad conception of his “tar-
get” audience, not limited to the immediate postwar Greek world. He
includes us, too, as modern readers.24
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2
The Reader’s Task
he goal of this chapter is to examine in greater depth how Thucydides’ Tunusual sort of presentation forces readers (and auditors) to become
active participants. Thucydides achieves this effect by using several inter-
related techniques, in particular, multiple perspective, authorial reticence,
and episodic structure. The major effects are a balanced presentation and
the absence of rhetorical and military closure that induce the reader to take
on an active role. Before turning to techniques and effects, I will speak
briefly about focalization and the reader, who is encouraged to engage in
extrapolation and conjecture (eikazein) with respect to both the past and
future. Subsequent chapters will present detailed analyses of specific con-
flicts and arguments. My larger goal in this book is to understand
Thucydides’ authorial strategies and to recover the experience of reading
the History, though I reiterate that in the final two chapters I will consid-
er the reception by both readers and auditors.
In the introductory chapter I mentioned the value of the concept of
“focalization.” In general terms, focalization means that Thucydides
chooses to present actions or experiences from a particular point of view.
Primary focalization refers to the presentation of events through the per-
spective of the narrator. Yet frequently Thucydides introduces secondary
(or embedded) focalization when events are seen through the eyes of those
involved.1 Thucydides may explicitly signal such secondary focalization by
indicating an intellectual or emotional experience of an individual or
group within the History: “they noticed,” “wanting . . . ,” “fearing . . . ,”
etc. To be sure, at times Thucydides merely describes what someone does
or what happens and there is no heightened sense that we are meant to
view that event from the point of view of someone involved. Such passages
often convey a more objective and distant feel. Quite frequently, howev-
er, Thucydides chooses to invite us to view the action from the point of
view of a particular figure or group; indeed, his success in engaging his
reader in large part derives from such embedded focalization.2
13
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It may be useful to distinguish such “intellectual” or “psychological”
focalization of perception and emotion from what we might call “rhetori-
cal” focalization. When Thucydides presents speeches (or speeches report-
ed in the third person), he is also offering us the perspective of those
involved—that is, it is a type of secondary focalization. Yet a speech is a
more public way of presenting someone’s perspective and contrasts signif-
icantly with the more private and internal perceptions and emotions men-
tioned above. When speeches present a point of view, there is an
objectivity to the words spoken—whether the report is direct or indi-
rect—while with psychological focalization, Thucydides allows us to “get
into the character’s head” with more private intellectual and emotional
focalization.3
In addition to discussing focalization, I should consider the reader’s
task. For the purposes of analysis in chapters 3–8, I will limit my discussion
to the hypothetical reader constructed from Thucydides’ text. This read-
er, implied by the History, reads the narrative and speeches as Thucydides
has structured them. While it is possible to distinguish a first-time reader
from a re-reader or a modern reader from an ancient one, I would like to
employ the idea of a double perspective for this implied reader.4 On one
side, it is possible for the reader to enjoy a leisurely, distant view by look-
ing at events in retrospect: this first perspective is that of the “distant” or
“retrospective” reader, who knows the course of the war in outline, with
the Athenian defeat in 404 providing the terminus towards which events
are headed. There is, however, a second viewpoint: the engaged perspec-
tive. We find Thucydides employing techniques that produce a vivid, par-
ticipatory experience for the “engaged” reader.5 From this perspective, the
reader must respond actively in contemplating past possibilities and
potential future events.
I acknowledge that retrospective readers may still be “engaged” in some
sense and that readers with a more “immediate” perspective may still ana-
lyze the situation. And at some level, every reader is simultaneously aware
of both aspects. Nevertheless, the distinction between the distant and
engaged reader may prove useful, provided we remain cognizant of how the
reader is led to switch back and forth between these two perspectives.6 At
times, Thucydides encourages a more distant or passive mode by overtly
connecting one sequence, episode, or event with another, but much more
commonly finding those connections and juxtaposing relevant passages
remains the task of the reader.7 This forces the reader to participate active-
ly in creating the meaning of the History. For example, when Cleon says
that the Athenian empire is a tyranny, the reader should hear the near-echo
14 Chapter 2
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of Pericles (3.37.2; cf. 2.63.2). Because of the interruption (3 years and
some 50 pages)—and Thucydides’ failure in book 3 explicitly to highlight
this echo—when this “significant reminiscence” occurs, it is the reader’s
task to connect the two sections, compare the contexts, and judge whether
the same idea is being expressed and how such a metaphor might apply to
the new situation.8 In the Corcyrean conflict (1.24–55) explored in chap-
ter 3, the reader may juxtapose ideas and themes from this episode 
with (a) earlier sections of the History (the Preface, Archaeology and
Methodology–1.1–23); (b) later sections of book 1 and the war books
(2–8); and (c) the circumstances of the reader’s own experience and world.9
As I have mentioned above, in chapters 3–8 when I refer to Thucydides
and the reader (or auditor), strictly speaking I mean the narrator and the
implied or hypothetical reader. I limit my initial analysis to contemplating
the implied reader’s experience in order to lay the basis for our apprecia-
tion of Thucydides’ History. I am not overly fond of jargon (“narratee” still
makes me wince), and my feeling is that theoretical distinctions are valu-
able only as a means to an end. Yet positing an implied reader with a dou-
ble perspective and employing the concept of focalization will bring us
closer to our goal. The important point is that when Thucydides and read-
ers (or auditors) are mentioned in chapters 3–8, these entities are recon-
structions based on the text. Having said this, I am extremely interested
in the historian’s life and times and in actual readers, both ancient and
modern. I will turn to the historian’s biography and the experience of actu-
al flesh and blood readers in chapters 9 and 10. But until then I believe
analyzing the experience of the hypothetical reader implied by the text will
be a productive way to approach the diverse challenges of Thucydides’
History.10 Without being too loose in terminology, I will do my best to
write in a reasonable and accessible way.
To return to the double lens of the reader: when Thucydides demands
an engaged, participatory attitude on the part of the reader, in a sense, he
is asking the reader to suspend previous knowledge of subsequent events.
The effect is that readers at some level are able to project themselves into
the past situation as constructed by Thucydides. Thucydides can be espe-
cially effective in recreating past events, offering the reader an opportuni-
ty to “relive” that particular situation. Connor describes this aspect of
Thucydides’ text as “experiential” or “participatory,” and characterizes
him as “a writer who keeps drawing his readers into the narrative of events
until they feel they are themselves present, actually experiencing them.”11
Of course, such an experience is vicarious; nevertheless, this is a deliber-
ate effect of Thucydides’ techniques.
15The Reader’s Task
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The best model for both engaged and distant readers may be found in
Thucydides’ description of what historians and politicians are able to do.
Concerning the engaged reader, Thucydides praises statesmen who have
the capacity to see likenesses, extrapolate from present evidence and cir-
cumstances, and attempt to foresee the probable course of events. He
uses the word eikazein and related words: “to compare” and “to make
conjectures on the basis of comparisons.”12 For example, the statesman
Themistocles successfully looks to the future, anticipating the impor-
tance of walls for Athenian autonomy (1.90–91), the potential for the
Piraeus as a port (1.93.3), and the link between sea power and Athenian
dominance (1.93.3–4). Summing up his ability, Thucydides calls
Themistocles “the finest at forecasting” (a!ristoj ei0kasth/j–1.138.3).13
To the extent that engaged readers project themselves into the situations
Thucydides presents, they too can extrapolate from past contexts and
anticipate later events.14
Alternatively, in contemplating our task as retrospective readers, we
should note that in some situations the reader’s labor is not unlike that of
the historian. In the Archaeology, Thucydides reasons that accounts of
the Greeks journeying to Troy might serve as a basis for approximating the
scope of previous expeditions. “We must make reasonable conjectures
[ei0ka&zein de\ xrh/] from this expedition about other expeditions before that
time” (1.9.4).15 In this instance the historian uses Homeric evidence to
establish a view of the capabilities of military ventures in early Greece.
Surely in the year 431 Thucydides himself engaged in the process of con-
jecture (eikazein) toward the future. At the start of the war, he “expected
(elpisas) the war would be great and more noteworthy to record (axiologo-
taton) than previous wars” (1.1.1). In a sense, Thucydides has challenged
his reader to take on the labor which he, as historian, has taken up in
attempting to discover what actually happened. Thucydides’ address to
the reader in 1.22 (with its many purposes) follows his discussion of the
historian’s labor to find the truth in spite of bias and inaccuracy. Others,
such as poets and political orators, do not rigorously examine accounts of
the past. For his part, Thucydides has found that participants in recent
events do not say the same thing due to favoritism or (lapses of) memory
(eu0noi/aj h2 mnh/mhj–1.22.3). An awareness of inconsistent accounts,
untested variants, and the labor necessary to uncover the truth offers a pic-
ture of what the historian must contend with. By the same token, the
History we encounter—with its multiple perspective and other chal-
lenges—forces the reader to negotiate some of the same problems which
the historian has had to confront.
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Morrison_CH2_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:43 PM  Page 16
The reader’s reward will be a type of wisdom. Yet if my work is judged use-
ful (ophelima) by as many as wish to look clearly at both past events and
those in the future which, in accordance with human nature, will be sim-
ilar and will resemble past events, that will suffice. (1.22.4)
Thucydides suggests that his retrospective reader may gain a clear under-
standing of the past, and that this understanding offers something useful:
he postulates the idea of repetition of the same sorts of events in the
future. But the apprehension of such similar situations requires a facility
for judgment and comparison (eikazein)—the same intellectual and imag-
inative capacity Thucydides has implied is necessary for historians. The rel-
evance for us is that Thucydides has set up a dynamic situation and
challenged his readers to engage in the activities of extrapolation, conjec-
ture, and prediction—both from the engaged perspective (that of the par-
ticipants) and from the distant perspective (that of the historian).16
I now turn to the techniques found in the History which offer this spe-
cial type of experience for the reader. A number of features are essential
for constructing what I broadly call the recreation of the political arena of
fifth-century Greece. First, we find that Thucydides employs multiple per-
spective in both speech and narrative. In the Corcyrean conflict (1.24–55),
for example, both Corcyra and Corinth present arguments; as the internal
audience, the Athenians offer a third perspective. The reader is implicitly
asked to view that conflict from these three points of view and needs to be
critical of what is said in speeches, evaluating whatever claims are made.
We find speech and narrative structured in such a way as to encourage us
to adopt diverse points of view: actively from Corcyrean and Corinthian
perspectives and deliberatively from the position of Athens.
In thinking about the experience of reading this text, I have found use-
ful Yunis’ notion of “instructional rhetoric,” which, Yunis argues, renders
the governing body “capable of autonomous, conscientious decision-mak-
ing.”17 This political exchange suggests a model for reading the text of
Thucydides. A politician may instruct his citizens concerning the best pol-
icy; so, according to Yunis, Thucydides “instructs his readers about
Athenian policy through Pericles’ speeches.”18 The reader’s critical evalu-
ation of the speeches will lead to a more knowledgeable position from
which to think about politics, conflict, and war. By actively analyzing the
speeches, the reader may be in a better position (like Themistocles or
Pericles) to judge what can or should be done in a particular situation.
Evidently Thucydides has decided that to achieve such an appreciation,
the reader must be exposed to more than one viewpoint.19
17The Reader’s Task
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We also find multiple perspective in Thucydides’ presentation of action
in the narrative. He frequently switches points of view, allowing the read-
er to see how the battle of Sybota (1.44–55), for example, was experienced
by several of the participants through the use of secondary or embedded
focalization. I would suggest that the equivalent of the viewpoints offered
in paired speeches (rhetorical focalization) is the multiple perspective on
action found in the narrative (intellectual or emotional focalization). One
of the ways in which Thucydides makes his history “useful” (opheli-
ma–1.22.4) for his reader is by refraining from offering a single, authorita-
tive account of events.20 Thus in both speech and narrative the reader is
invited to see events from the point of view of the participants: speakers,
audience, soldiers, politicians, and others.
Simply offering multiple perspectives by itself does not guarantee the
reader’s active involvement; such engagement is also promoted by author-
ial reticence. It has been noted that Thucydides frequently refrains from
commenting upon or judging speech and narrative—he is very sparing in
intruding his opinions.21 He generally does not actively promote one group
over another. He tells us “The Plataeans spoke . . . ,” “The Thebans spoke
. . . ,” “The Athenians made the following decisions. . . .” Yet he neither
openly condemns either set of speakers for inconsistent or fallacious argu-
ments, nor does he explicitly endorse, say, the voting of the Athenians. As
a result, the feature of multiple perspective coupled with authorial reti-
cence activates the evaluative capacities of his audience; the reader must
step in to assess the validity of claims and to judge the diplomatic and mil-
itary strategies employed. In fact, Thucydides’ audience would be familiar
with such authorial reticence, for it is also found in Homer. As Aristotle
says in the Poetics:
Among Homer’s many other laudable attributes is his grasp—unique
among epic poets—of his status as a poet. For the poet himself should
speak as little as possible, since when he does so he is not engaging in
mimesis . . . Homer, after a short preamble, at once “brings onto stage” a
man, woman, or some other figure. (Poetics ch. 24, 1460a5–11)22
Although at times Thucydides goes a long way toward distancing himself
from poets (e.g., 1.21; cf. 2.41.4), both Homer and Thucydides exemplify
the principle articulated by Aristotle regarding restraint in explicit autho-
rial commentary.
One effect of Thucydides’ use of multiple perspective and authorial ret-
icence is what might be called a balanced presentation. Because Thucydides
18 Chapter 2
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offers differing perspectives, the reader gets the impression of an equitable
presentation. This does not mean that Thucydides is totally disinterested;
he does not “objectively” present only the events themselves. There is, of
course, a careful process of selection and placement that creates a variety
of intellectual and emotional experiences for the reader. In many conflicts,
however, we are told both sides’ motivations before argument and action;
each side is given equal opportunity to put forward an argument; battles
are viewed from the perspectives of the various sides involved.
Thucydides’ section on methodology anticipates such an equitable
approach. Flory has argued that when Thucydides characterizes his histo-
ry as lacking what is often translated as “the romantic element” or “the sto-
rytelling element” (to\ muqw~dej–1.22.4), we should understand the
expression in a political sense. In this context, to\ muqw~dej means patri-
otic stories, “stories which exaggerate and celebrate the glories of war.”23 If
this interpretation is right, Thucydides is warning us early on that he will
be avoiding chauvinism; he will offer no biased or exaggerated stories of
Athenian patriotism—or of any other city-state. By using multiple per-
spective and reining in his own opinions, Thucydides strives to achieve an
evenhanded presentation.
Another effect of Thucydides’ type of presentation is a lack of closure in
rhetorical and military conflict. In speech, the arguments do not general-
ly achieve a satisfying conclusion. While some decision is reached (to
make an alliance, to declare war, etc.), the issues brought up are not dealt
with definitively. One such issue is the relevance of morality to foreign pol-
icy. The Athenians consistently argue against cities acting justly toward
one another and de Ste. Croix endorses this view as revealing Thucydides’
own beliefs.24 This viewpoint, however, is only a part of a dialogue. The
historian allows opposing viewpoints to be expressed, but seldom passes
judgment in his own voice. From a sophistic point of view, it is possible to
argue persuasively both sides of the argument, and it may well be true that
a fixed, authoritative perspective—a single view—would oversimplify
such complex situations.25 This is in the nature of dialogue, at least in
Thucydides’ use of it. My point is that because such issues are not resolved
wholly one way or the other, because Thucydides refrains from comment-
ing on the validity of these arguments, the reader is forced to consider
both arguments, to inspect the consequences of following one course of
action rather than the other, and ultimately is left with a deeper under-
standing of the complexities of the political situation and the rhetoric
which attempts to describe it. If there is to be any resolution, it is the read-
er who must provide it.26
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We find a similar situation regarding the narrative, although here we
must assess this lack of closure from both a local and a more distant per-
spective. From a local perspective—in the context of each narrative
episode—when Thucydides offers no commentary, it is the reader who must
assign significance to the various events presented. Of course, Thucydides
implies that certain facts are significant by including those facts and not oth-
ers, but seldom will he remark “this is important,” or “the significance of the
following is . . . .”27 Lack of closure may here be better recast as “lack of guid-
ance” on Thucydides’ part. Again the reader must actively evaluate. From a
more distant perspective—when an episode is set in the broader context of
the entire History—we find a different type of absence of closure, one that
requires a different sort of involvement for the reader. Thucydides generally
does not make explicit connections between one episode and a later one—
even one deserving comparison because of cause and effect, the same par-
ticipants, or similar (or significantly reversed) contexts. In chapter 4, I will
examine how the four separate episodes involving Plataea present many
challenges to the reader, in part due to Thucydides’ lack of guidance con-
cerning the significant connections between these episodes. The Corcyrean
conflict is unusual in that Thucydides explicitly links this dispute to the out-
break of the war, that is, Thucydides tells us how this section relates to the
war which book 2 presents (1.23.6, 1.55.2; cf. 1.146). Still in 1.24–55 the
speeches and narrative are typical in that Thucydides does not draw explic-
it connections between a particular argument or strategy in this episode and
other parts of the History, even though such features reverberate in a vari-
ety of ways throughout this work.28
Another way to describe the History is to characterize it as “episodic” or
“punctuated,” deriving from the entrances and exits of the major partici-
pants, central issues, and striking metaphors in various conflicts. By “episod-
ic” I do not mean the sort of thing Aristotle discusses in the Poetics where
he criticizes the lack of unity in many works (see Poetics ch. 17, 1455b13; cf.
ch. 8, 1451a16–35). The extraordinary thing about Thucydides’ History—in
spite of the fact that it is clearly unfinished and does not bring us down to
the end of the war in 404—is that its design is immensely rich because of
the way it engages the reader by building links from early sections to later
ones: echoes and reminiscences are integral to the ethos of the work, regard-
less of the abrupt end in the year 411. Given the often pejorative sense of
“episodic” (and “annalistic” does not do much better), perhaps a better label
is “punctuated history”: Thucydides presents one episode after another, each
as a discrete point or unit (punctum), yet each is related to other events and
ideas in a multitude of ways.29
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With regard to figures and city-states, the larger movement of
Thucydides’ History follows what we might call “presentation, interruption,
and resumption”—that is, punctuated history. After key figures or cities
appear and play their roles on center-stage (presentation), Thucydides then
shifts his attention to a new context without telling us, for example, the
aftermath in Corcyra (interruption). The chronological framework that fol-
lows winter and summer, year by year, inevitably makes the reading experi-
ence fragmentary or “punctuated” in this sense. Only in reaching the events
of the year 431 or 427 do we learn what happened in Corcyra after 433
(resumption).
The effects of this strict chronology—an organizational decision on
Thucydides’ part—are tremendous. Each figure, each city, each idea—
once introduced—is not kept continually before our eyes. Due to the fact
that so many of these figures, cities, and themes inevitably return at some
later point in the History, each episode retains a “to-be-continued” feel. It
is incumbent upon the reader to keep track of the details and circum-
stances. The issues raised in the speeches, and the strategies and maneu-
vers described in the narrative will reappear with relevance outside the
original context. Although in a local sense rhetorical and military conflicts
receive some sort of provisional pause, the figures and ideas return later in
the work in other situations: the reader must be in a position to juxtapose
those later sequences with the earlier episodes. Now that we have consid-
ered Thucydides’ techniques—multiple perspective, authorial reticence,
and episodic structure (or punctuated presentation)—and the common
effects of balanced presentation and avoidance of closure, let us examine
specific conflicts involving Corcyra, Plataea, and Melos.
21The Reader’s Task
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PART TWO
PARTICIPATORY, PUNCTUATED, AND
RETROSPECTIVE HISTORY:
CORCYRA, PLATAEA, AND MELOS
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3
The Corcyrean Conflict (1.24–55)
et us now examine the Corcyrean conflict. The analysis of chapters L 3–5 concerns multiple perspective and authorial reticence—and the
effects of these techniques—with a focus on particular city-states.
Thucydides’ account of the Corcyrean conflict (1.24–55) serves in many
ways as a programmatic introduction to the complexities of rhetoric and
action found in the History.1 With the reader viewing the situation from
the perspective of the speakers and audience during the speeches at
Athens and from that of the combatants during the battle of Sybota,
Thucydides uses this first extended episode to present the world of politi-
cal discourse, deliberation, and battle. The Corcyrean conflict may be
viewed as programmatic for a number of reasons: it is the first episode with
a pair of speeches; Thucydides ties this episode directly to the outbreak of
the war; certain questions, such as morality’s relevance to foreign policy,
are introduced here for the first time; and, most importantly, it is here that
Thucydides establishes what the reader’s role is to be throughout the
History.
I should begin by acknowledging a special debt to two articles: Connor’s
“Narrative Discourse in Thucydides” (1985) and Arnold’s “The Persuasive
Style of Debates in Direct Speech in Thucydides” (1992).2 Connor
attempts to answer the question: Why do we believe Thucydides’ account?
What makes the History so persuasive and compelling? His answer points
to three aspects: first, the Archaeology offers a demonstration of his histor-
ical method; second, Thucydides successfully “replicates the intractability
of historical experience” by his use of multiple perspectives in narrating
events; and third, Thucydides creates an “experiential” or “participatory”
type of narrative. Whereas Connor examines the narrative, Arnold focus-
es on speeches and seeks to demonstrate that “Thucydides creates for his
readers an experience analogous to that which would have been experi-
enced by an audience listening to political oratory.”3 By building on these
insights, I hope to show how speech and narrative constitute two integral
25
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parts of Thucydides’ recreation of the political arena of fifth-century
Greece. For all the significance of Thucydides’ Archaeology and Statement
of Method (1.2–23), the “participatory” dimension of the History begins
with the Corcyrean conflict. It is only with the introduction of speeches
that the reader must address the ways in which speech and narrative con-
firm and undermine each other, as the historian’s voice now alternates and
competes with that of his characters in speech.4
For purposes of analysis, it will be valuable to divide Thucydides’
account of the Corcyrean conflict into three sections: (1) Background and
Conflict (1.24–31.3); (2) Speeches and Assemblies (1.31.4–44); and (3)
Further Conflict: the Battle of Sybota (1.45–55). In the first section,
Thucydides guides us by providing background information as well as sev-
eral explanations for certain decisions and events. The first section does
not demand “participation” from the reader in the same way as the subse-
quent two sections: the narrative is simply less intense, lacking dramatic
detail about the perceptions and emotions of the participants. Thucydides’
second section offers full-fledged “participatory” history of one type,
employing multiple perspective in the paired arguments of the debate.
With the battle of Sybota, a rapid succession of focalized experiences—the
emotional and perspectival reactions of the participants—contrasts
sharply with the opening section.
Background and Conflict (1.24–31.3)
In this opening section I begin by noting the sort of facts and events
included. My particular interest is in Thucydides’ selectivity regarding
which events receive explanation and how detailed that explanation is.5
The three Greek cities of Epidamnus, Corcyra, and Corinth provide the
focus.6 Thucydides begins with Epidamnus: its location, the circumstances
of its colonization, its subsequent growth, and the ongoing civil war.
Thucydides tells us that Corcyra established the city although a
Corinthian, Phalius, served as founder (oikistes) with Corinthians among
the settlers (1.24.2). When civil war arises in Epidamnus, the people
(demos) expel the oligarchs and, finding themselves under pressure, send
to Corcyra for help. This diplomatic cry is ignored (1.24.4–7). The
Epidamnians’ second move is to consult the Delphic oracle, which endors-
es the idea of sending to Corinth. Corinth’s promise of aid (and the arrival
in Corcyra of the oligarchical exiles) triggers the Corinthian conflict with
Corcyra (1.25–26.2; cf. 1.26.3).
26 Chapter 3
Morrison_CH3_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:43 PM  Page 26
In the opening two and a half paragraphs (1.24–26.2) Thucydides pre-
sents geographical information, as well as historical background which
both reaches back several hundred years and covers up-to-date political
conflict. The relationships between the cities—especially “mother-city”
(metropolis) and colony—are sketched out.7 The divine element plays a
role in two instances: the Epidamnian ambassadors are suppliants to
Corcyra in the temple of Hera (1.24.7); and the oracle of Apollo advises
the Epidamnians to set up the Corinthians as “leaders” (hege-
monas–1.25.1). The restrictions are clear as well: in part this simply means
a lack of detail. We find no dates other than the very vague “before the
present war” (pro\ tou=de tou= pole/mou–1.24.5).8 For the first five chapters
(1.24–28), no individuals other than Phalius are mentioned. We may con-
trast the absence of named individuals here with Thucydides’ discussion of
Agamemnon, Minos, and the tyrants in the Archaeology. One effect early
on in this conflict is that the communities appear to discuss, act, and fight
as collectives: “the Corinthians say . . .” “the Corcyreans perceived . . . .”
This apparent unity within cities is of course belied by the fact that
Epidamnus, for example, is split between popular and oligarchical factions.
This tension between the ideal of a united polis and factionalism operates
repeatedly in the History for the cities of Plataea, Mytilene, Corcyra,
Thebes, Samos, and Athens.9
While the focus is very much on information and action rather than
argument or justification, the following items do receive explanation. (a)
Thucydides tells us that an ancient custom specified that a Corinthian—
that is, someone from the metropolis of Corcyra—serve as founder of
Epidamnus for the Corcyreans (kata_ dh\ to\n palaio\n no/mon–1.24.2). (b)
Civil war in Epidamnus was caused, “it is said,” by the barbarian war on
the mainland (1.24.4).10 (c) The Epidamnians originally send to Corcyra
because it was their metropolis (w(j mhtro/polin ou]san–1.24.6). (d)
When the Epidamnians “realize” (gnontes–1.25.1) that no help is forth-
coming, they send to the oracle. As Lang points out, Thucydides has
adopted the Herodotean practice of concisely indicating motivation by a
participle.11 (e) We are not told why the Corcyraeans reject the
Epidamnian supplication, but an extensive account is given explaining
the Corinthians’ decision to help Epidamnus. It was just (kata_ . . . to\
di/kaion), the Corinthians believed, for them to intervene because
Epidamnus was as much their colony as it was the Corcyraeans’ (1.25.3).12
A second factor was Corinthian hatred of Corcyra due to Corcyra’s lack of
respect for Corinth (1.25.3–4). Such were the “causes for complaint”
(enklemata–1.26.1) which motivated the Corinthian intervention in
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Epidamnus.13 Overall we see that the items which receive explanation are
predominantly political, having to do with metropolis and colony, civil war,
diplomatic entreaty, and Corinth’s decision to help another city.14
To pick up the narrative thread: Corcyra sends ships and makes an
overture to Epidamnus; this is rejected and a siege ensues (1.26.3–27). As
the Corinthians learn of the siege, we find that the number of Greek cities
involved greatly increases: Megara, Pales on Cephallonia, Epidaurus,
Hermione, Troezen, Leucas, Ambracia, Thebes, and Elis all play a role
(1.27.2).15 The Corcyreans object that the problems in Epidamnus have
nothing to do with Corinth; still they are willing to go to arbritration.
Corcyra and Corinth could mutually choose Peloponnesian cities to act as
arbitrators and the colony would go to whichever side the arbitrators
decided; or, the Corcyreans suggest, the matter could be referred to
Delphi. The Corinthians, however, want Corcyra to lift the siege before
they go to arbitration, but the Corcyreans insist that the Corinthian expe-
dition must withdraw before they lift the siege (1.28). These efforts at
negotiation fail.16 The battle of Leucimme follows (435 BCE), with
Corcyra claiming victory and setting up a trophy; on the same day the city
of Epidamnus negotiates a surrender to Corcyra (1.29–30). Out of anger,
the Corinthians begin a shipbuilding enterprise.17 The Corcyreans hear of
this and decide to approach the Athenians in order to gain allies. The
Corinthians in turn also send ambassadors to dissuade the Athenians from
joining with Corcyra and its navy (1.31).
In his book Athens and Corcyra, Wilson remarks that “it is a great pity
that Thucydides tells us practically nothing about the sea-fight [of
Leucimme].”18 It is true that there is a quantitative leap in terms of vivid
detail from this battle to Thucydides’ recreation of the battle of Sybota
in the third section. Still in paragraphs 1.26.3–31.3 we note some speci-
ficity with regard to geography, the names of generals, and the numbers
of ships and men. This account allows us to some extent to visualize the
strength of forces, the terrain, and the actual individuals involved, yet
all diplomatic exchange continues to be told briefly in the third person
(e.g., 1.28, 1.29.5; cf. 1.24.6).19 That is, Thucydides chooses not to
include speeches in the early phases of the conflict; he waits until
Athens is approached after the first battle. Yet even without the inclu-
sion of speeches, this opening episode offers us a paradigm: failed nego-
tiation leads to war. In miniature, the proposals and counterproposals
made by Corcyra and Corinth immediately before the fight anticipate the
failure in the rest of book 1 to find a negotiated settlement (by arbitra-
tion or otherwise) between the Athenians and the Spartan alliance. As
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Thucydides has structured the narrative leading up to war, Pericles’ final
words of book 1 are a plea for arbitration (1.144–145); book 2 begins the
war narrative.
We also observe that in this first section there is virtually no mention
of Athens and Sparta. Thucydides’ decision to begin with Epidamnus
nicely demonstrates the connection between a remote and apparently
irrelevant city and the larger alliances of Athens and Sparta.20 A second
sort of rationale—not preempting the first—follows Flory’s interpretation
of to\ muqw~dej discussed in chapter 2 (1.22.4). If Thucydides is claiming
that he will not tell exaggerated patriotic stories, his choice to start some-
where other than Athens or Sparta may indicate his decision to avoid
opening the “causes of war” section with a situation which would
inevitably trigger some sort of emotional response.21 Beginning the narra-
tive with a major conflict featuring either Athens or Sparta would be like-
ly to provoke fifth-century animosities. In the second section the
Athenians listen, in the third they become involved, but Thucydides
begins far from the centers of power.
Thucydides expects the reader to know a few basic facts: where the
Ionian Gulf and Apollonia are (1.24.1, 1.26.2), what god resides in Delphi
(1.26.1–2; cf. 1.26.4). On the whole, however, Thucydides appears to be
offering mostly general background information necessary to welcome
even a relatively unknowledgable reader into the story.22 In the second and
third sections, the demands increase as the level of encouragement for the
reader’s involvement rises. In this first section, however, we do not find
vivid “experiential” history. Thucydides has prepared us for the looming
conflict with the following in place: the main “actors” are cities; the
details concern political and military matters; the fullest explanation con-
cerns the Corinthian decision to become involved; and one model with
later relevance shows unsuccessful negotiations leading to war.
Speeches and Assemblies (1.31.4–44)
In the second section, Thucydides presents two speeches addressed to the
Athenians: the Corcyreans argue for an alliance with Athens (1.32–36);
the Corinthians argue against such an alliance (1.37–43). It is here that
Thucydides begins his fully vivid recreation of one aspect of the political
arena: the world of political discourse (in the third section Thucydides
offers an “experiential” account of battle). The key ingredients of this
recreation are multiple perspective and authorial reticence. Thucydides
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keeps the presentation evenhanded by offering two perspectives: the read-
er is able to appreciate the situation in 433 from both the Corcyrean and
Corinthian points of view.23
This recreation is made to feel rather open-ended because Thucydides
is sparing in making authorial comments. For example, in introducing the
speakers, Thucydides briefly indicates the motivation of each side, but
makes no comment between the two speeches other than to note the
change of speakers (1.31.2–31.4; 1.37.4). We find no authorial judgement
as to the validity of the claims made until Thucydides comments on
Athenian motivation and reasoning.24 Still the structure encourages the
reader not only to appreciate the complexities of the situation but also to
examine critically the two arguments from the perspective of 433 BCE.
That is, there is a sense in which the reader is put into the position of the
Athenians. Like them, readers are not called on to articulate an argument
of their own, but must listen, assess, and—by extension—make a decision.
While at one level Thucydides’ readers know war will come, by offering
speeches with little comment he provokes the engaged reader to judge the
merits of both speeches and ponder the consequences of Athenian action
as though looking ahead from the year 433. While we are not actually
hearing these two speeches in 433, Thucydides has structured the narra-
tive in such a way as to encourage us to adopt these diverse points of
view—both actively from Corcyrean and Corinthian perspectives and
from the reactive and deliberative stance of Athens.
Because Thucydides offers multiple perspectives (with paired speeches
and in his account of the battle of Sybota), the reader is able to appreciate
the various points of view of the key cities. But more is asked of the reader.
Once put in those positions, the reader needs to be active, engaging in the
process of “extrapolation” (eikazein). Based on the present situation, what
is likely to happen? From the perspective of 433 (as recreated by
Thucydides), what is the probable course of events? The engaged reader
must contemplate Athens’ best move. Thucydides drives home the impor-
tance of the reader’s role by not anticipating in speech or narrative the
actual decision of Athens. The reader’s engagement is provoked not only
by multiple perspective and lack of authorial comment; in this case, the out-
come comes as a surprise in terms of the preceding text. After the speech-
es, the Athenian assembly at first accepts the Corinthians’ argument and
votes to reject an alliance (symmachia) with Corcyra; a second meeting on
the next day, however, determines that a defensive alliance (epimachia)
with Corcyra would be the best course of action (1.44.1). Neither Corcyra
nor Corinth mentioned the possibility of a defensive alliance.
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In thinking of this entire episode as a kind of test for the engaged read-
er, we find two viewpoints put forth; authorial comment comes only at the
end. The issue between Corcyra and Corinth concerns whether—given the
problem of Epidamnus and previous treaty obligations—Athens should
make an alliance with Corcyra. The two arguments are vigorously put for-
ward, aiming to persuade or dissuade the Athenians.25 However persuasive
and cogent each argument is, the Athenians apparently must choose one
alternative over another: either ally with Corcyra or not.26 The reader
comes to learn, however, that speeches from cities who potentially have
much to gain may skew a third city’s options into an “either/or” situation;
in fact, more flexibility is possible.27 The Athenians adopt an option not
expressed by Corinth or Corcyra. The reader has been in no way prepared
in the speeches for a defensive alliance, and thus is alerted to the possibil-
ity of imaginative (and more moderate) diplomacy. One lesson is that it
may be necessary for the reader to go beyond what is said in the speeches
to reach a decision best advancing one’s own interests. This is an example
of how the reader is encouraged to be engaged by anticipating a variety of
choices. The active reader should be asking whether there are choices
other than the alternatives Corcyra and Corinth present. A passive read-
er—like unimaginative citizens in the Athenian assembly—will be left
with a more limited and less advantageous set of options.28
So much for a quick overview of the speeches from the reader’s point of
view. This first set of speeches also introduces the reader to a broad spec-
trum of issues, some of which have not yet been articulated in the History.
There are four broad areas: the first three touch on justice, advantage, and
relations between cities (treaties, etc.); the fourth concerns interpreting
the past and anticipating the future. Each topic is significant in a different
way. For example, the topic of justice is one that has not been anticipated
in any way until this point of the History. The reader has not been pre-
pared to think of foreign policy in moral terms until the speeches begin.
The fourth category of looking to the past and future may well bear upon
the reader’s experience of reading history. That is, interpretation of the past
and anticipation of the future may be seen as relevant to Athens in think-
ing about a potential alliance with Corcyra—Athens must ruminate on the
past and try to foresee the future—yet these skills of interpretation and
anticipation are necessary for the engaged reader of Thucydides’ History. I
will comment briefly on the first three topics, and then explore at greater
length this fourth issue.29
Both sides insist that considerations of justice should lead the
Athenians to follow their recommendation. The Corcyreans begin each of
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their first three paragraphs with the idea of justice (including the first
word spoken in the History): “It is ‘just’ [dikaion], since we have done no
previous service to you and have no treaty in effect, to make especially
clear . . . what advantage will come to Athens” (1.32.1; cf. 1.33.1, 1.34.1).
The Corcyreans’ more persuasive appeal may be their offer of a large navy
(an appeal to Athenian self-interest), yet they begin by trying to show
themselves as victims of injustice.30 The Corinthians find it necessary to
begin their speech by responding to these accusations of injustice made by
the Corcyreans. The Corinthians feel no less strongly that justice resides
on their side, for it is the Corcyreans who have “acted from evil motives
[kakourgia], not for good [arete]; Corcyra wanted no allies because her
actions were wrong [adikemata] and she was ashamed to call in others to
witness her deeds” (1.37.2). If the Athenians refrain from the proposed
alliance, according to the Corinthians, they would avoid joining the
Corcyreans in committing injustice (i3na mh\ cunadikw~sin); better to let
them alone be guilty of injustice (o3pwj kata_ mo/naj a)dikw~si–1.37.4).31
I would emphasize that from the reader’s perspective, these speeches are
significant in raising the issue of justice at all. The reader has had no
preparation for moral issues in the first 31 chapters of book one, and for
the first time the reader needs to think about the relationship between jus-
tice and foreign policy.32 White offers an intelligent reading of the impor-
tance of justice—or at least justification—in foreign policy.
[Although] it is not particularly important to Athens that what she does
actually be right . . . it is important that she be able to claim it is right. . . .
While the talk about expediency is meant to persuade the Athenians
directly to a particular course of action . . . the talk about justice . . . is meant
to demonstrate what can be said in the future for and against the justice of
the recommended courses of action. . . . The arguments are in this sense less
about justice than about justifiability.33
This reading may be cynical, calling into question whether morality has
any true relevance to foreign policy, but it fits Thucydides’ comments at
1.44. When he tells us which factors actually influenced the second
Athenian decision, they were matters of self-interest: naval strength and
trade routes (1.44.2–3). As part of the reader’s introduction to the rhetor-
ical world of international negotiations, we find that even if moral con-
siderations are not essential for motivation, such appeals are important for
providing a set of justifications for Athenian action.34
The second area of appeal is self-interest. Both sides argue that Athens
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would benefit from either forming or refraining from the proposed
alliance. Such appeals are more compelling in the Corcyreans’ speech.
The first sentence of the Corcyreans couples justice with advantage, for
they wish to show “what advantages [ksumphora] will come to Athens”
(1.32.1). The specific gains are two: first of all, Corcyra’s navy will make
Athens stronger (1.35.5). When war comes (and they insist it will)
Athens will be the stronger side with two of three major navies (1.33.2,
1.36.1–3).35 A second specific advantage is the “most profitable” (ksym-
phorotaton) location of Corcyra, for it is on the way to Italy and Sicily
(1.36.2). Corinth’s best response concerning Athenian self-interest
appears to be a redefinition of advantage recommending caution:  
“to/ te ga_r cumfe/ron e0n w{| a!n tij e0la&xista a(marta&nh| ma&lista
e3petai.”
“Advantage goes to him who makes the fewest mistakes.” (1.42.2)
The mistake here apparently is to think that war will come when it instead
lies uncertainly in the future (the likelihood of war is discussed below).36
A third set of issues concerns relations between cities, such as founda-
tion ties, treaties, alliances, and the notions of “friendship” and “enmity”
between cities.37 Concerning relations between colony and “mother-city,”
Corinth makes two particularly weak claims: first, they call Epidamnus
“their colony” ( 0Epi/damnon h9mete/ran ou]san–1.38.5) when it is at best
more of a joint colony (1.24.2). Second, they make the false analogy
between (1) the Samian revolt of 440 and Athens’ right to punish its own
allies (ksymmachous–1.43.1) and (2) their standing in 433 with regard to
Corcyra. Although Corcyra is not an ally, the Corinthians claim the same
right to deal with the Corcyreans as the Athenians have to deal with cities
within the empire.38 Of greatest urgency regarding the interpretation of
treaties is whether an Athenian alliance with Corcyra would violate the
treaty between Athens and Sparta from 446. Is Corcyra eligible to join
either side? The Corcyreans argue:
“lu/sete de\ ou0de\ ta_j Lakedaimoni/wn sponda_j dexo/menoi h9ma~j
mhdete/rwn o1ntaj cumma&xouj.”
“In receiving us into an alliance you will not be breaking the treaty since
we are allies to neither side.” (1.35.1)
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Corinth responds that the spirit of the 446 treaty precludes cities not
originally involved (tw~n a)gra&fwn po/lewn) from joining an alliance
simply for the freedom to wrong others (1.40.2–40.3).39
We also find the language of friendship and enmity characterizing rela-
tions between cities.40 These speeches introduce concepts relevant not
only to how cities relate to one another but also to how they may rhetor-
ically envisage such relationships which involves hierarchy, obligation,
and maintaining treaties (also not anticipated earlier).41 These three
issues—justice, advantage, and international relations—confront the
reader in this first experience of diplomatic discourse. Thucydides’ presen-
tation of views from two opposing sides offers the reader an appreciation
both of the past isolation and current goals of Corcyra, and of Corinth’s
insistence on the spirit if not the letter of the treaty still in effect. The read-
er’s engagement also flows from a need to weigh the validity and force of
opposing claims in order to arrive at some sort of assessment as to which
argument is stronger on which particular points. The reader as addressee
(that is, in the position of the Athenians) is better able to view these argu-
ments with a specific question in mind—what should Athens do? That is,
Thucydides has contextualized these problems: while the distant reader
may consider these issues in terms of their abstract or general validity, the
engaged reader must apply these ideas to a specific case.
Of particular interest in these speeches is the fourth area of dispute:
consideration of the past and the future. These remarks are not only rele-
vant to the immediate situation, but may apply more generally toward the
act of reading, specifically interpreting and learning from the past and
anticipating the future. The arguments in these speeches do not straight-
forwardly reflect Thucydides’ own ideas; rather, views about the impor-
tance of the past and the possibility of anticipating the future are
advanced in dynamic fashion for the reader.42 These speeches help the
reader explore different ways of interpreting the past and of conjecturing
(eikazein) about what the future may hold.
Both the Corcyreans and the Corinthians raise the idea of teaching and
learning. At the first and most obvious level this refers to the Athenians
understanding the issues. The Corcyreans wish to “teach” (anadidak-
sai–1.32.1) the Athenians the advantages of an alliance with Corcyra.43
The Corinthians, too, find it necessary that the Athenians “learn” (maqei=n
xrh/—1.40.1) why it is not just for them to join the Corcyreans in an
alliance.44 This is a case where the reader needs to think about how learn-
ing from the past may be relevant to this conflict. In these speeches we find
echoes of terminology and criteria invoked in Thucydides’ remarks in the
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Archaeology and Method, such as the importance of clarity and the role
of evidence. The Corcyreans assert that the Corinthians’ injustice is clear
(w(j de\ h0di/koun safe/j e0stin–1.34.2–34.3); we recall Thucydides’
remarks that his audience should consist of those wishing clearly to under-
stand the past (to\ safe\j skopei=n–1.22.4).45 The Corcyreans also intro-
duce Corinth’s treatment of Corcyra as “evidence” (tekmerion) of how the
Corinthians would behave toward the Athenians (1.34.3). Such terms are
familiar to readers of the early sections of the History which are presented
in Thucydides’ own voice.46 In this self-referential way, these echoes call
upon the reader to examine the clarity of argument in these two speeches
and to assess the type of evidence the Corcyreans and Corinthians intro-
duce—set against the standards explicitly proposed by the historian. Are
the arguments sufficiently clear with adequate evidence to support making
or abstaining from a treaty with Corcyra?
Each speech presents a different view of the past; neither is disinterest-
ed; both are polemical and self-serving. In recalling the past help (euerge-
sia) they have given the Athenians, the Corinthians cite past events as a
basis for present decisions and anticipations of the future.47 When the
Samians revolted, Corinth supported Athens and refused to assist the
revolting city (1.40.5). Even earlier—before the Persian War—the
Corinthians aided the Athenians with twenty ships against Aegina
(1.41.2). That is, the Corinthians would have the Athenians base their
decision regarding Corcyra on past service (selectively adduced) received
from Corinth. In part, this is an example of traditional Greek morality—
after you receive help from your friends, you should return the favor48; in
part, the point concerns the relevance of history for the Corinthians, who
see the past as critical in determining present action. Given their past iso-
lation, the Corcyreans are more interested in the future, but they too feel
they must explain their past, most prominently those actions which in ret-
rospect are seen to be mistakes. “What once appeared to be wisdom [h9
dokou=sa h9mw~n pro/teron swfrosu/nh] now appears as lack of foresight
and a source of weakness [nu=n a)bouli/a kai\ a)sqeni/a fainome/nh]”
(1.32.4).49 Their previous policy of non-alliance and isolation has come to
be seen as “an error of thought” (do/chj . . . a(marti/a|—1.32.5). The
Corinthians argue from their own past actions for Athenian quiescence,
but the problem is they do not have much to offer Athens now. The
Corcyreans have no past favor to cite as precedent, but lay greater empha-
sis on the future with the promise of a navy.
In a sense, these conflicting views of the past stand as two models 
for the value of history. The Corinthians use their past actions to set
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precedents, to establish a relationship, and in this case to seek recom-
pense for previous favors. This view of the past implies a continuity and
a structure that help guide subsequent actions. Upsetting this view is the
problem of unpredictability and error. Situations change; people make
mistakes. What appeared to be a good idea at one time (Corcyrean neu-
trality, for example) looks less desirable in a new light. After citing their
previous errors, the Corcyreans go on to say that if the Athenians think
war will not come, the Athenians are making a mistake (gnw&mhj
a(marta&nei–1.33.3). The Corcyreans prefer their vision of a future in
which Athens joins them and they would then repay the Athenians for
helping them: the Corcyreans’ “historical” precedent lies with future
actions on both sides.50
Both speeches cannot simply be read as offering instructions to the
reader: the speeches are not authorial statements and, in addition, we find
inconsistency related to past and future. The Corcyreans’ argument may
be seen as emphasizing human inability to anticipate the future: they have
made mistakes in the past and characterize the Athenians’ potential rejec-
tion of their offer as such a mistake. Yet paradoxically it is the Corcyreans
who maintain a definite vision of the future: war will come; the Athenians
will benefit from their navy. If the Athenians do not join them, they pre-
dict, the Athenians will look back on this in retrospect as an error in judg-
ment. They even argue that if war comes, their proposed alliance will
bring no danger or expense (a!neu kindu/nwn kai\ dapa&nhj didou=sa
e9auth/n–1.33.2).51 Based on the previous mistakes of their past behavior,
however, the Corcyreans do not have much to recommend themselves as
reliable prognosticators. The Corinthians on the other hand look confi-
dently to the past as a guide to action. Yet they now insist that:
“to\ me/llon tou= pole/mou . . . e0n a)fanei= e1ti kei=tai.”
“The coming of war still lies in uncertainty.” (1.42.2)
The Corinthians are also trying to have it both ways. They argue that
an Athenian alliance with Corcyra would bring about war instead of peace
(1.40.2), yet this will presumably happen in what they label the “uncer-
tain” future. Such contradictions complicate the reader’s assessment of
each speech’s recommendations. The reader becomes wary of basing deci-
sions on the advice either of someone who has made mistakes in the past
but is now certain of what will come, or of someone who argues the future
is uncertain but that a particular action will bring war.52
36 Chapter 3
Morrison_CH3_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:43 PM  Page 36
Lying behind all this talk of past and future, of precedent and mistake, is
the issue of whether war will come. Is the future course of events inevitable?
Thucydides structures his narrative and speeches in such a way that his read-
er certainly knows that war will come. The markers are obvious. The sub-
ject of his history—the greatest war that has ever taken place—is
announced by Thucydides at the opening of the History (1.1); immediately
before the Corcyrean conflict he catalogues the suffering and upheaval
caused by this war: exile, civil war, famine, disease (1.23). He even goes so
far as to cite the conflict over Epidamnus as one of the two immediate caus-
es of the war (1.23.6; cf. 1.55.2). The reader knows in advance that war will
come. In tracing the steps leading up to war in his book ANAGKH in
Thucydides, Ostwald cites de Romilly: “the narrative is so compelling that
the reader cannot envision the events happening in any other way.”53 We
must conclude that one aspect of this early reading experience is a clear real-
ization on the retrospective reader’s part that war will come.
But there is another side—that of the engaged reader. In spite of
Thucydides’ references to the impending war, one question we as readers
confront in sections 1.33–43 is the issue of whether war was inevitable. For
the first time in the History Thucydides is not simply telling us what hap-
pened or why; instead in the speeches he has introduced arguments from
two cities as part of his recreation of the political discourse of that time.
The perspectives of those two sides advance as the authorial presence
recedes. There is a sense in which, by “reliving” these speeches of 433, the
engaged reader is able to consider anew the question of what may be about
to happen. If war were inevitable, the Athenians would want the
Corcyrean navy. But would an Athenian alliance with Corcyra help pre-
cipitate a war which is not imminent?54 From the perspective of 433, what
should the Athenians have done? Thucydides’ prior announcements
about Athenian growth and Spartan fear notwithstanding, he has recon-
structed the scenario in such a way that we need to rethink that very ques-
tion. For thirty-one chapters Thucydides has determined our view of
events in an authoritative, almost omniscient manner; that guidance now
ends. As Arnold says, “even in the narrative the knowledge that the read-
er has of the outcome of the war at times ironically strains against 
the apparent line of the author’s argument.”55 This is the first of 
many instances where contemplating the experience of the speakers
(Corcyreans and Corinthians) and the internal audience (the Athenians)
instructs us as readers—in fact, it shows us how to be engaged readers. By
adopting the viewpoints of the participants, we are in a position to regain
the atmosphere of a contingent future.56
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Thucydides’ vivid recreation of the political arena offers us a sense that
what is actually past to us (the war) still lies ahead in an indefinite future.
I would argue that this is one of the defining features of Thucydides’
History. In sections such as this, Thucydides induces the reader to project
himself or herself into the past and view the situation from that time
frame.57 At one level, the reader knows war will come; at another, the
reader is asked whether it had to happen as it did. Our engagement with
Thucydides’ work goes beyond seeking to understand the past. This sec-
tion—something like an experiment run for the reader under controlled
conditions—offers us training in the process of extrapolation and conjec-
ture (eikazein). In this case, extrapolation consists of seeing the possibili-
ties that had existed—not only what actually happened but what might
have happened but did not.58 Of course, in some sense we see (or foresee)
the end result, yet the reader is being asked to some degree to suspend pre-
viously acquired knowledge in order to contemplate the options available
to Athens in 433.
In his book On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace, Kagan
notes that the later vote of the Spartans to go to war was not decided by a
large majority (1.87). “We may deduce that not everyone thought the war
was inevitable . . . not everyone thought it was necessary.”59 He goes on to
explore alternatives which might have been pursued and remarks that “at
each step [in the events leading to war] it is clear that the decisions were
not preordained . . . any assertion that war was inevitable after the Thirty
Years’ Peace of 446–45 does not arise from the evidence but must be
imposed a priori.”60 It is possible to read Thucydides, that is, and not agree
with his conclusion that Athenian growth and Spartan fear “forced the
war” (a)nagka&sai e0j to\ polemei=n–1.23.6). The idea that war could have
been avoided runs counter to this announcement of Thucydides, yet the
narrative is sufficiently open-ended to suggest viable alternatives in 433
that at least might have postponed irreparable discord. In fact, Athens’
decision to form only a defensive alliance with Corcyra may be seen as a
moderate response, aimed at diffusing potential escalation of this con-
flict.61
The Corcyreans’ and Corinthians’ remarks on past and future do not
represent Thucydides’ own opinions. These ideas are part of his recon-
struction of diplomatic dialogue which bears on how to view past and
future. Arguments in the speeches may fit with the narrative elsewhere, at
times even reinforcing authorial comments. When the Corcyreans assert
that war will come because of Spartan fear (1.33.3), this clearly echoes
Thucydides’ own statements (1.23.6); nevertheless, Thucydides uses the
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two views of the future advanced by Corcyra and Corinth to deepen our
understanding of the complex situation in 433. What in hindsight appears
to have been unavoidable exists in an uneasy tension with the vividly con-
tingent atmosphere of this “participatory” recreation. To the extent we put
ourselves in the position of the Athenians in 433, we must look ahead
from that perspective and ask not only was war inevitable but what actions
might have resolved these international disputes. This is always an issue
when reading history. Did what happened have to happen? Were there
other options?62 Thucydides himself offers no authoritative statement but
leaves the issue open. Although we know the war took place, these
speeches call into question the inevitability of that war. Part of
Thucydides’ project is to represent the past as present so that the reader
may anticipate later historical events—past to the reader but subsequent
to 433—as lying in an uncertain future. The reader—like the statesman or
member of the Athenian assembly—must extrapolate (eikazein).
Further Conflict: The Battle of Sybota (1.45–55)
In this third section we look at narrative focusing on a single battle, in a
sense the narrative equivalent of the speeches just examined. Thucydides
uses multiple focalization or points of view to represent how the
Corcyreans, Corinthians, and Athenians experienced the battle. There is
an even-handedness to the extent that these cities are all given serious
attention; the effect for the reader is a vivid recreation of events. As we
saw, the speeches were open-ended in that Thucydides did not pass judg-
ment regarding the claims made in the speeches: the reader must become
involved and weigh the disputed issues. The narrative in section 1.45–55
is open-ended in another sense. Thucydides does not assign significance to
each event as it takes place, preferring to present these events in a way
which allows the reader to seek what is most important. As seen from a
distant perspective, the task of juxtaposition (a facet of eikazein) obliges the
reader to make connections between this episode and other sections of the
History, although in this opening conflict Thucydides explicitly reminds
the reader of how this sequence fits into the larger course of events
(1.55.2).
Following the Athenians’ second assembly, ten ships are sent with a dif-
ficult set of instructions. They are not to break the treaty by attacking
Corinth but are to help the Corcyrean fleet if it is attacked. We are given
greater detail (names of generals, numbers of ships, and geography),
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although dating is still vague (“not much later” [ou0 polu\ u3steron]–1.45.1).
The fleet led by Corinth numbers 150 ships—90 of them are
Corinthian; the Corcyrean fleet of 110 ships is now supported by the 10
from Athens (1.47). This battle is much more fully described than that
of Leucimme.63
There are thirteen embedded (or secondary) focalizations in paragraphs
1.48–53, that is, passages in which events are presented from the perspec-
tive of a figure or group involved. Thucydides switches from one perspec-
tive to another showing what each side experienced. First the battle array
is described. The Athenians are on the far right flank supporting the three
squadrons of the Corcyreans. Opposing them are the Megarians and
Ambracians on the right wing, and (facing the Athenians) the
Corinthians on their left wing (1.48).64 The first focalization is a paired
focalization: “When they [the Corinthians and the Corcyreans] saw each
other, they lined up opposite to one another” (w(j de\ katei=don
a)llh/louj–1.48.3). Section 1.49 describes the general character of the
battle which was “very similar to a land battle” (pezomaxi/a|  de\ to\ ple/on
prosferh\j ou]sa–1.49.2).65 The second embedded focalization begins
broadly (“confusion and disorder reigned everywhere”–1.49.4), but
resolves into another double outlook or paired focalization. The
Athenians imposed fear on the Corinthians, as the Athenian generals
themselves feared the prohibition from fighting ordered by Athens (fo/bw|
me\n parei=xon . . . dedio/tej–1.49.4).66 Thucydides has already offered the
reader the perspectives of the Corcyreans, Corinthians, and Athenians
during the speeches. Now with the unfolding of battle, Thucydides puts the
reader into the position of the various combatants by indicating percep-
tions and emotions.
Third, the Athenians find that attempting to defend Corcyra is a deli-
cate business. In the chaotic fighting, the Athenians try to frighten any-
one approaching the Corcyreans; as difficulties facing the Corcyreans
grow, the Athenians support them more aggressively (1.49.4–7). Soon the
Athenians, “seeing the Corcyreans pressed” (o9rw~ntej tou\j Kerku*
rai/ouj piezome/nouj–1.49.7) are drawn in, and fight openly against the
Corinthians.67
Thucydides switches perspective more rapidly now. A fourth view:
the Corcyreans panic, thinking they will not make it to land
(deisantes–1.50.4). We return, in a fifth view, to the Corinthians, who
attempt to follow up their initial success, but an additional twenty ships
from Athens appear dissuading further action. Thucydides emphasizes the
suddenness of the appearance of the twenty Athenian ships from the per-
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spective of the Corinthians, who take fright, thinking there may be more
ships. This leads to a withdrawal (e0capi/nhj . . . katido/ntej . . . dei/san-
tej–1.50.5–51.1). In a sixth view, the Corcyreans are surprised at the
Corinthian retreat until they see the ships arriving (e0qau/mazon . . . pri\n
. . . i0do/ntej–1.51.2). They, too, are struck with fear, thinking the addi-
tional ships are the enemy; soon they come to recognize them as Athenian
and seek harboring for the night as battle comes to an end (e0fobh/qhsan
. . . e1gnwsan–1.51.5).
Thucydides has introduced six embedded focalizations (for the three
central participants) with swift changes in 1.48–51.68 While Thucydides’
recreation of the arena of political discourse requires the reader to exam-
ine paired arguments, his recreation of this sea-battle builds on both objec-
tive factors—the number of ships, geography, strategy, and tactics—and on
the deliberative and emotional experience of the combatants who plan,
watch, act, and are struck with fear and surprise. While certainly selective,
Thucydides’ recreation is designed to make the reader’s experience closer
to that of the participants. This is brought home most powerfully by
Thucydides’ decision to deprive the reader of foreknowledge that a second
Athenian contingent of twenty ships is on its way. Neither the
Corinthians nor the Corcyreans knew of this and experience surprise—
shared by the first-time reader—and fear. In a way this is the narrative
equivalent of the third option adopted by Athens regarding the Corcyrean
alliance. In that case there had been no advance notice in the speeches of
Athens’ decision to make a defensive alliance. Both the Athenian deci-
sion there (1.44) and the sudden arrival of a second Athenian contingent
in this section introduce the ingredient of the unexpected; there is no way
for the first-time reader to anticipate such outcomes based on the History
alone. Again we may see this as “training” for the reader. During speeches
the reader should always be asking whether there are options other than
the ones presented. For the narrative, the reader recognizes that the course
of battle cannot be accurately predicted, for the participants are often not
fully cognizant of the resources each side may draw on. Given the appar-
ently exhaustive description at 1.47–1.48, the arrival of twenty first-class
ships hits the reader even harder. Thucydides’ deliberate suppression of
this later Athenian decision to send reinforcements implies the need for a
flexible type of anticipation on the reader’s part.69
On the following day we again find changing perspectives. (7) The
Athenians and Corcyreans, wanting to know if there will be further battle
(boulo/menoi ei0de/nai ei0 naumaxh/sousin–1.52.1), sail into the harbor
where the Corinthian fleet has retreated for the night. Then we turn to
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(8) the Corinthian perspective: they fear that the Athenians think the
treaty has been broken and will prevent them from sailing away
(dediotes–1.52.2–3). A dialogue ensues. (9) In addressing the Athenians (a
rhetorical focalization) and ignoring the Corcyreans, the Corinthian
envoys argue that the Athenians have committed an injustice (adikia) and
have broken the treaty. Here Thucydides gives a brief speech in a few sen-
tences (1.53.2). (10) The Corcyreans (presented in the third person)
shout out, calling for the death of the envoys.70 (11) The Athenians
respond to Corinth, insisting that they did not begin the battle: “We are
not beginning a war, O Peloponnesians, nor are we breaking the treaty. We
came to help our allies, the Corcyreans” (1.53.4). It is noteworthy that the
first words of the Athenians in the History are a response to charges that
they have committed injustice and have broken a treaty. This provides an
initial template for the first book, further expanded with the Corinthian
charges at the first gathering of the Peloponnesian allies (1.69 ff.).71 The
Corinthians then journey home and the Corcyreans retrieve corpses.72
Here, too, the perspective of all three cities are presented, two in direct
speech and one reported in the third person.
Thucydides’ use of multiple perspective to present battle is analogous to
the two speeches in the debate: just as both Corinthians and Corcyreans
are able to voice their arguments, so in the narrative the battle experience
is presented from several sides. Such use of multiple viewpoint is under-
lined by the fact that two trophies were set up: each side had the opinion
that it had won the battle of Sybota and indeed Thucydides expresses for
each side a rationale for claiming victory with two final embedded focal-
izations. (12) The Corinthians feel they were victorious in the sea-battle
in capturing over a thousand prisoners and sinking approximately seventy
ships (1.54.2). (13) While sinking only thirty ships, the Corcyreans forced
the Corinthian retreat (1.54.2).73 Again we note the equitable balance of
Thucydides’ presentation.74 Still the battle is not decisively won by either
side—if both could claim victory, it does not resolve much of anything.
Nevertheless, it leads to a great war. The closing paragraph reemphasizes
the point Thucydides began with: this was the first cause (aitia) of the war
for the Corinthians against the Athenians, as the seabattle with the
Corcyreans took place while a treaty was in effect (e0n spondai=j–1.55.2;
cf. 1.68.4).
Considered in the context of the History as a whole, the Corcyrean
conflict exemplifies the episodic or punctuated nature of Thucydides’
work. Corcyra, Corinth, and Athens play major roles in this episode—
both in debate and in the battles which take place off the coast of north-
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western Greece—yet in section 1.56 Thucydides breaks off without saying
what happens later in Corcyra and shifts his attention to Potidaea. As
Wilson remarks, “The importance of the Corcyrean navy to Athens is not
in any way followed up.”75 As time passes, Corinth, Corcyra, Athens,
Sicily, Italy, and the importance of navies will all return to our attention.
Most importantly, the issues raised in the speeches—justice, advantage,
and abiding by treaties—will reappear with application to other situations.
Thucydides has introduced points of controversy which—although in a
local sense receive a sort of provisional resolution—recur later in the
work. The reader must be in a position to recall and juxtapose the argu-
ments of those other episodes with this early sequence. This is the task to
be explored in chapter 4 with a focus on Plataea.
In this chapter I have tried to show that, for all the significance of
Thucydides’ Archaeology and Statement of Method (1.2–23), the “par-
ticipatory” dimension of the History begins with the Corcyrean conflict.
While Thucydides explicitly links this opening episode with the coming
of war in 431, he becomes more reticent with such comments as the
History unfolds and the reader’s task becomes proportionately more
demanding.
43The Corcyrean Conflict (1.24–55)
Morrison_CH3_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:43 PM  Page 43
4
Punctuated History: 
The Case of Plataea
he previous chapter examined Thucydides’ introduction of participatoryThistory to the reader. We now turn to punctuated history, which derives
from Thucydides’ chronological framework. While we could track various
cities through the History, such as Corcyra, Athens, or Syracuse, in this chap-
ter we will examine the presentation of Plataea: how Thucydides explores this
city, interrupts and shifts his focus, and then later returns. What happens to
Plataea does not significantly affect the outcome of the war, yet Thucydides
begins book 2—after his proclamation of the war’s inauguration—with the
Theban invasion of Plataea.1 This chapter analyzes the role of this minor city
that takes on paradigmatic importance for understanding punctuated history
with respect to the following: the way in which past actions lead to later con-
sequences; the rhetoric which describes and reinterprets previous action; the
manner in which Plataea—in terms of its situation and choices—is implicit-
ly compared with Mytilene, Corcyra, Melos, and Athens; and finally the abil-
ity to compare and extrapolate (eikazein), especially from the perspective of
the Plataeans who must look ahead to an uncertain future.2 Once more
Thucydides highlights the open-ended future by demonstrating how deci-
sions and chance events lead to outcomes that were not inevitable.
There are four extended passages focusing on Plataea: the Thebans
enter the city at the start of the war (431 BCE—2.2–6); Sparta offers to
allow Plataea to remain neutral, and then puts the city under siege (429
BCE–2.71–78); 212 Plataeans escape (428 BCE—3.20–24); and after the
city surrenders, the Plataeans and Thebans debate the Plataeans’ fate
before Spartan “judges” (427 BCE—3.52–68). Badian calls this a “tragedy
in a prelude and three acts.”3 To be sure, the whole sequence culminates
in the execution of the inhabitants and the destruction of the city.
Thucydides establishes links between early episodes and later ones in a
variety of ways, most obviously by using the city of Plataea as a connect-
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ing thread. These passages in turn present a new task for the reader who is
challenged to follow the city in different stages of its historical develop-
ment, gauge early words and actions with those found later in the History,
and tie early action and rhetoric with later consequences. After examin-
ing each section in its own context, I will turn to Thucydides’ overall pre-
sentation of Plataea in the History, seeking to retrieve those aspects of the
reader’s task that are most important for understanding Plataea’s role.
My analysis of these four episodes explores tensions between: (1) goal
and outcome; (2) knowledge and ignorance; and (3) choices and forced
decisions. The issue of comparison and extrapolation is also prominent,
both implicitly and explicitly. The first tension is created by the articula-
tion of goals at the beginning of each episode set against the actual out-
comes. Often, of course, there is a disjunction between the various
participants’ intentions and the ultimate result of a particular sequence of
events. Figures in Thucydides’ History are invariably disappointed: the
Thebans fail to gain control of Plataea in 431; the Spartans fail to burn the
city in 429. Indeed, the successes of the Plataeans in the first three sec-
tions—regaining control of their city, the avoidance of conflagration for
Plataea, and the nighttime escape—depend upon desperate action, luck,
and the aid of the elements. It seems more than coincidence that in the
first three sections, fortuitous “interventions”—rain, wind, and a new
moon—play such an important role in assisting the Plataeans. While
another Greek might attribute such narrow escapes to the gods,
Thucydides may only be suggesting that factors such as the weather are
unpredictable and at times favor the more vulnerable side. These first
three positive outcomes contrast sharply with the execution in 427 (3.68),
which comes to be viewed as almost inevitable—even by the Plataeans
themselves.4
In addition to goals and outcomes, a second tension concerns knowl-
edge and ignorance of events each set of participants has. Thucydides
often highlights these viewpoints by the use of embedded (or secondary)
focalization. Perhaps the dominant experience of figures in both sections
1 and 3 is that of misperception or lack of knowledge, when events do not
proceed as planned or anticipated. Certainly in the first episode the
Plataeans (other than the pro-Theban Plataeans) were totally unaware of
Theban plans to enter the city. As Thucydides notes, there was no guard
set (fulakh=j ou0 prokaqesthkui/aj–2.2.3); some Plataeans were outside
the city walls, for they did not expect trouble in times of peace (oi[a
a)prosdokh/tou kakou= e0n ei0rh/nh| genome/nou–2.5.4). Once the Thebans
are inside, the Plataeans at first mistakenly think there were more
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Thebans than there actually were. The Thebans wrongly think that it
would be easy to persuade the Plataeans to capitulate and attempt to come
to an agreement with the populace. Later the advantage gained from supe-
rior knowledge and unanticipated aggression shifts from the Theban plot-
ters to the Plataean resistance; in this case, the Plataean plan works
successfully (2.3–4). In the third section, the Plataean escape is also
grounded in surprise, misdirection, and confusing the besieging army.
Degrees of knowledge range along the spectrum from total ignorance (of
the Plataeans on the eve of the Theban invasion) to conspiratorial action.
This theme of misperception and lack of knowledge, however, operates
not only for Thebes, Plataea, and Athens, but also at the level of the read-
er’s own experience.5 In general, the reader learns various facts of which
the participants are unaware, as Thucydides exploits the possibilities of
dramatic irony. But Thucydides not only effectively uses focalization to
show how—at different times—participants experienced the events and
encourages the reader to adopt the position of the participants6; at times,
the reader’s perspective is manipulated. For example, at 2.5.5–6,
Thucydides suggests that the Plataean herald reports what was actually
agreed upon when, in fact, he has only presented the Thebans’ version of
the “negotiation” between the second contingent of the Thebans and the
Plataeans who have just regained control of their city.
Based on goals and varying levels of knowledge, particular decisions are
made. For example, unexpected invasions and escapes occur in episodes 1
and 3. In the second section, negotiations appear pretty flexible; in the
fourth section, the options dwindle to death or deception (and death).
Whenever choices are made, they grow out of limited information—a nar-
row perspective—but also out of the human incapacity accurately to fore-
tell later events. The reader must ask: Were such errors inevitable? To
what extent were these events and their consequences unpredictable?
Were there viable alternatives to those taken? Plataea resists Archidamus’
overtures in episode 2, based on an Athenian promise of rescue, which is
not fulfilled. Should the Plataeans in 429 have counted on such a promise?
Was the Athenian promise even made in good faith? More generally we
need to examine later consequences of Theban and Plataean action. Once
the Thebans entered Plataea, could anything have prevented war? And
how should we describe the entry of these 300 Thebans—as forced entry
or as a response to an invitation? When Plataea becomes Thucydides’
focus in two sections of book 3, as retrospective readers, we need to recall
the decisions and actions made at the start of the war. Goals and outcomes
are dependent in large part on the participants’ perspectives and their
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sense of viable choices. We should not view these various tensions—goal
and outcome, knowledge and ignorance, choices and forced decisions—as
discrete and unrelated. Nevertheless, these categories will be useful for
purposes of analysis.
The issue of comparison and extrapolation (eikazein) is relatively open-
ended. Of the three levels of analysis—local (the passage itself), distant
(comparing one section with another), and extratextual (comparing an
episode in Thucydides’ History with events outside the history), compari-
son of the four Plataean episodes constitutes a type of distant analysis. Part
of the reader’s task is to make connections between these four passages and
other sections of the History based on thematic connections (such as the
option of neutrality, linking Plataea to Corcyra and Melos) and with cities
in comparable situations (Plataea’s affinities with Athens and Mytilene).
The retrospective reader is asked to recollect earlier sections when
engaged with the later narrative. We discover a movement from actions
presented in pure narrative to speeches in sections 2 and 4; a shift from var-
ious choices offered early on to the Plataeans to severely restricted options;
and the role of chance and the elements unexpectedly aiding the
Plataeans ultimately reduced to total despair.
Plataea and the Beginning of the 
Peloponnesian War (2.2–6)
Let us turn to the first episode. The lack of speeches in this opening sec-
tion means that Thucydides will present a particular sort of drama for the
reader’s experience. Rather than grappling with the complexities of argu-
ment and counterargument, the reader becomes more of a spectator to a
drama, holding a position of knowledge superior to that of the participants
involved. Thucydides has recreated the events by combining objective
facts with the deliberations and emotional experience of the participants.
Thucydides begins the first section (2.2–6) from the perspective of the
pro-Theban Plataeans and the Thebans who enter the city; then we are
shown the shock and subsequent resistance of the Plataeans; Thucydides
later shifts outside the walls to the perspective of the Theban contingent
that knows little of what is going on within Plataea; the Athenians give
advice on the basis of only limited information; finally the herald is sent
to deliver a message, only to learn on arrival that his advice arrives too late.
Yet throughout this first section, Thucydides provides such vivid detail
that the reader is able also to take an engaged perspective.
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Thucydides is very restrictive as to what he includes in his narrative,
yet he does supply information about the motivation of various partici-
pants.7 The Thebans themselves, anticipating (proidontes) war, wanted to
control Plataea since it was always hostile (diaphoron) to them, even in
peace (2.2.3). Once the invading force has apparently gained control, the
Plataeans surrender, in part because the Thebans took no violent measures
toward anyone (ou0de\n e0newte/rizon–2.3.1). Yet the majority of Plataeans
(tw~| ga_r plh/qei) did not wish to revolt from Athens (2.3.2). While the
preliminary step of entering the city is successfully achieved, the pro-
Theban Plataeans and the Thebans fail to maintain control of Plataea;
only after the year 427 (the fourth episode) do the Thebans finally take
full control of Plataea.
Thucydides employs eleven embedded or secondary focalizations in
section 2.2–6 describing the first event triggering the war in 431 BCE. The
first focalization occurs in connection with the invitation for the Thebans
to enter the city. Thucydides indicates the pro-Theban Plataean faction’s
three goals: personal power, the death of their enemies, and bringing
Plataea into the Theban sphere of influence (2.2.2). Second, there is a
change of plan when the Thebans ignore the advice of the pro-Theban fac-
tion and call an assembly. They think it would be easy to come to an agree-
ment with the Plataeans (nomi/zontej . . . r9a|di/wj–2.2.3–4). The
Thebans’ goal has not changed, but there is an alteration in the means pur-
sued to achieve that outcome.8 Thucydides reports the herald’s announce-
ment:
gnw&mhn d 0 e0poiou=nto khru/gmasi/ te xrh/sasqai e0pithdei/oij kai\ e0j
cu/mbasin ma~llon kai\ fili/an th\n po/lin a)gagei=n kai\ a)nei=pen o9 kh=ruc,
ei1 tij bou/letai kata_ ta_ pa&tria tw~n pa&ntwn Boiwtw~n cummaxei=n,
ti/qesqai par 0au9tou\j ta_ o3pla.
[The Thebans] issued a proclamation in reasonable terms, aimed at lead-
ing the city into a friendly arrangement; and their herald proclaimed that
anyone wishing to be an ally in accordance with the ancestral practice of
all Boeotians should ground his arms with them. (2.2.4; cf. 2.3.4)
A question arises concerning perspective of this second focalization: is it
the Thebans who find the terms “reasonable” (epitedeiois) or is this
Thucydides’ authorial comment?
Third, Thucydides lets us experience the shock the Plataeans feel 
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(h1|sqonto . . . e0capinai/wj–2.3.1).9 The sudden entrance of the Thebans
causes fear (katadeisantes) and confusion, as the Plataeans believe
(nomisantes) that there are more Thebans within the city than in fact
there are (2.3.1). Continuing the narrative from the Plataeans’ perspective,
Thucydides tells us that they then noticed (katenoesan) there were not so
many Thebans and they began to orchestrate a night attack by cutting
through walls and setting up barricades (2.3.2–3). (4) The Thebans rec-
ognize the trap (oi9 d 0 w(j e1gnwsan e0chpathme/noi) and attempt to repel
the attack, but then out of fear (ephobethesan) they flee through the city
(2.4.1–2). Thucydides provides considerable detail in recreating this noc-
turnal chase.
e1peita pollw~| qoru/bw| au0tw~n te prosbalo/ntwn kai\ tw~n gunaikw~n
kai\ tw~n oi0ketw~n a#ma a)po\ tw~n oi0kiw~n kraugh=| te kai\ o0lolugh=|
xrwme/nwn li/qoij te kai\ kera&mw| ballo/ntwn, kai\ u9etou= a#ma dia_
nukto\j pollou= e0pigenome/nou, e0fobh/qhsan kai\ trapo/menoi e1feugon
dia_ th=j po/lewj, a!peiroi me\n o1ntej oi9 plei/ouj e0n sko/tw| kai\ phlw~|
tw~n dio/dwn h[| xrh\ swqh=nai kai\ ga_r teleutw~ntoj tou= mhno\j ta_
gigno/mena h]n.
Then there was a tremendous uproar from the men who were attacking
them, and shouting and yelling from the women and slaves on the roofs,
who hurled down stones and tiles; at the same time it had been raining
hard all night. Finally in a panic [the Thebans] turned and fled through
the city, most of them clueless as to which way to go in the darkness and
mud in order to escape (for it was also a moonless night at the end of the
month). (2.4.2)
With vivid mention of shouting, rain, tiles hurled down from roofs, and
the darkness of the night, Thucydides recreates the Thebans’ desperate
circumstances. He contrasts the bewildered Thebans (who are “clue-
less”–apeiroi) with the experienced Plataeans who know their ways around
in their own city (e0mpei/rouj de\ e1xontej–2.4.2).10
Subsequent events are then recounted. An unnamed Plataean shuts the
gate by which the Thebans entered (2.4.3). Various groups of Thebans
jump to their death or die in scattered groups. Some escape with the help
of an axe given by an anonymous Plataean woman, but this leads to (5) a
quick Plataean point of view: not many Thebans escaped, “for [the
Plataeans’] perception was quick [ai1sqhsij ga_r taxei=a e0pege/neto]”
(2.4.4). Most of the Thebans retreat to a large building. The Plataeans see
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them within (horontes) and deliberate whether to burn the building with
those inside or follow another course of action (2.4.6). The Thebans sur-
render and Thucydides shifts to the scene outside the city walls.
We might note at this point the unforced decisions by the Thebans (to
invade, to invite the Plataean populace into an alliance, and to surrender
rather than fight to the death) and by the Plataeans (to resist and to pon-
der the means of slaughtering the Thebans). Thucydides presents each of
these actions as autonomous and in response to desire and circumstance.
With respect to chance events that might have turned out otherwise, we
are about to learn that the Thebans only “just” manage to cross the
Asopos River (molis–2.5.3). If the river had been a bit more flooded, they
never would have made it to Plataea at all.
(6) After viewing events from the perspective of the Thebans and
Plataeans within the city, events are now focalized by a second contin-
gent of Thebans approaching Plataea. The Theban troops receive news
of what has happened, learning (eisthonto) that some Thebans have died
and others have been taken prisoner (2.5.1–4). They consider seizing
the Plataeans still in the countryside outside the city walls (2.5.4). (7)
Suspecting (hypotopesantes) such a seizure, the Plataeans within are
fearful (deisantes). At 2.5.5 we see things from the Plataeans’ perspec-
tive.
oi9 de\ Plataih=j e1ti diabouleuome/nwn au0tw~n u9potoph/santej
toiou=to/n ti e1sesqai kai\ dei/santej peri\ toi=j e1cw.
While [the Thebans] were still discussing it, the Plataeans suspected that
this [the Theban plan to seize Plataeans outside] was what they might do
and feared for the safety of those outside the walls. (2.5.5)
The next thing we read is that the Plataeans send out a herald, who says
that what the Thebans did in peace was sacrilegious (ou1te . . .
o3sia–2.5.5) and that they should not harm the Plataeans outside the
city.11
kh/ruka e0ce/pemyan para_ tou\j Qhbai/ouj, le/gontej o3ti ou1te ta_
pepoihme/na o3sia dra&seian e0n spondai=j sfw~n peira&santej kata*
labei=n th\n po/lin, ta& te e1cw e1legon au0toi=j mh\ a)dikei=n:  ei0 de\ mh/, kai\
au0toi\ e1fasan au0tw~n tou\j a!ndraj a)poktenei=n ou4j e1xousi zw~ntaj:
a)naxwrhsa&ntwn de\ pa&lin e0k th=j gh=j a)podw&sein au0toi=j tou\j
a!ndraj.
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They sent a herald to the Thebans, saying that this attempt to seize their
city in time of peace was contrary to divine sanction; they told them not
to harm those who were outside. If they did, the Plataeans said that they
would kill the Thebans whom they held as prisoners. If, on the other
hand, the Thebans would withdraw from their land, the Plataeans would
give the prisoners back to them. (2.5.5)
The previous section indicated a shift in focalization: the Plataeans sus-
pected that the Thebans had plans to seize the Plataeans outside the
walls (the first half of 2.5.5). Because there is no explicit indication that
the focalization has changed, the next section—the second half of
2.5.5—appears either to be objectively told (with Thucydides as sole
focalizer) or to be a continuation of events as seen from the Plataean per-
spective (the seventh focalization). The reader is given the impression
that this section is an objective description of the herald’s speech. (Note
the similarities to the herald’s speech given in the third person at 2.4.4
quoted above.)
But Thucydides has misled his reader. The account of what the herald
tells the Thebans is the Theban account, given presumably after the fact.
That is, this is very much a secondary focalization, as Thucydides presents
what was said from the Theban point of view. Thucydides now reveals
this:
Qhbai=oi me\n tau=ta le/gousi kai\ e0pomo/sai fasi\n au0tou/j:  Plataih=j
d 0 ou0x o9mologou=si.
The Thebans say this and swear to it, but the Plataeans do not agree.
(2.5.6)
Subsequently we learn the Plataean account. They maintain they did not
promise to give back the prisoners; they swore no oath, but said they
would negotiate after the Plataeans were released.
What Thucydides has done is to introduce an eighth focalization from
the Theban point of view—their version of what the herald said (2.5.5)—
without alerting the reader to this shift in perspective. Then a ninth view-
point gives the Plataean account (2.5.6). Nevertheless, the reader has
been led to believe that the account of the herald is objective (or presented
from the Plataean point of view). This striking instance of manipulation
on Thucydides’ part has the effect of unsettling the reader’s experience.12
According to the conventions of Thucydides’ presentation, he generally
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lets the reader know when a shift in perspective has taken place. Yet here
Thucydides manipulates these conventions and disrupts the illusion of
confidence the reader may feel at this critical point (2.5.5–6). Much like
the ambushed Plataeans—or, later, like the Thebans within the city, who
are themselves the target of a surprise attack—the reader is misled as to
what was actually happening, or whose perspective is being presented. In
fact, Thucydides never indicates which account—the Theban or the
Plataean—is accurate.13
From 2.5.7–6, we find more factual description, as Thucydides presents
the subsequent sequence of events. The Thebans outside the city leave;
the Plataeans bring their property and people into the city, and then kill
the 180 Theban prisoners. They send a message to Athens and the
Athenians immediately arrest all Boeotians in Athens. This is not a ques-
tion of perspective: these events are presented more objectively. (10) At
this point, we shift to the perspective of Athens, learning of the
Athenians’ advice (keleuontes–2.6.2) that the Plataeans should do nothing
until they consult Athens. Thucydides emphasizes the Athenians’ lack of
knowledge, telling us that they knew nothing of the prisoners having been
put to death (ou) ga\r h)gge/lqh au)toi=v o#ti teqnhko/tev ei]en . . . kai_ tw=n
u#steron ou)den h!|desan. ou#tw de ou)k ei)do/tev oi(  )Aqhnai=oi e)pe/stel*
lon–2.6.3). (11) The final view is that of the anonymous Athenian her-
ald who arrives in Plataea to discover that the Theban prisoners had been
put to death (eure–2.6.3). The Athenians then send supplies and men to
Plataea and Thucydides shifts from this episode to the preparation for
war.14
Part of extrapolation and comparison concerns connecting this episode
(2.2–6) to the rest of the History. In this broader context we should first
note that Thucydides uses this episode to mark the beginning of the
Peloponnesian War, the greatest war ever to affect the Greek world.
Thucydides raises the anticipation of war for the reader in book 1; this now
receives fulfillment, although the prominent roles Thebes and Plataea
play have not previously been anticipated.15 In contrast to the various
causes of the war presented in book one, the Plataean episode is the first
engagement, the trigger that sets the war in motion. In paragraph 2.2
Thucydides offers various means of dating this beginning, yet the tempo-
ral setting is wholly subordinate to the act of the 300 armed Thebans
entering the city of Plataea. Thucydides notes that with the Theban inva-
sion, the treaty has now clearly been broken (lelume/nwn lamprw~j tw~n
spondw~n–2.7.1; cf. 2.10.1). Later the first Peloponnesian invasion of
Attica will be defined as taking place on the eightieth day after the
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Plataean episode (2.19.1). This opening incident of the war is significant
not only because it marks the start of the war, but also because in retro-
spect this action bears on later control of Plataea and the overall respon-
sibility for the war itself.16
This first section is also important due to what has immediately pre-
ceded it: not only the dating (2.2.1), but also the close of book one which
includes Pericles’ offer of arbitration and the lack of a Spartan response
(1.143–146), and the articulation of Pericles’ war strategy which express-
es the idea that the Athenians should think of themselves as islanders
(nesiotai–1.143.5). This idea of “Athens as an island” has crucial conse-
quences for their ally Plataea. The Athenians are powerful at sea, but they
do not aid landlocked Plataea later in the war (the Athenians do send
troops and supplies in 431–2.6.4). Although Thucydides may be implicit-
ly contrasting the landlocked Plataeans with Athenian “islanders,” in
some ways the experiences of Plataea and Athens are quite similar.
Following the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica, Athens is repeatedly put
under attack—a crisis Plataea will undergo in the years 429–427. Both are
in a defensive position behind walls, as citizens and property are brought
within and their land is ravaged (2.5.7, 2.14, 2.21–22; cf. 2.71.1). The 
difference is that the Plataeans, as they later put it, are “mainlanders”
(epeirotai–3.54.4). I will return to the significance of this juxtaposition
after examining episodes 2 and 3.
Plataea and the Offer of Neutrality (2.71–78)
We now move to the second section in the History where Plataea plays a
major role, specifically their negotiations with the Spartan King
Archidamus and the resulting siege of Plataea. There is virtually no men-
tion of Plataea between the spring of 431 (2.6) and the spring of 429
(2.71). For 64 chapters all we have heard of Plataea is that it was one of
Athens’ allies (in the catalog at 2.9.4) and that part of the Boeotian forces
went to Plataea, rather than Athens (2.12.5). That is, until we encounter
Plataea in 2.71, there has been little intervening comment concerning
what happened there after the Athenian herald arrived to find out that the
180 Theban prisoners had been put to death and that Athens subsequent-
ly sent men and supplies (2.6.4).17
For the purposes of analysis, this episode may be divided into two parts.
In the first part we have five short speeches: two by the Plataeans, three
by Archidamus (the earlier Plataean episode contained only narrative).
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The second half of this section is pure narrative with seven focalizations
as Thucydides describes the efforts of the allied Peloponnesian and
Boeotian forces to take the city. Topics of particular interest in this passage
include: the expectations of participants, the range of choices offered to
the Plataeans, the viability of those choices, and Archidamus’ critical role
as a negotiator. It is significant that the effect of the siege is to cut off
Plataea from the rest of the Greek world; we also find an implied compar-
ison between Plataea and Athens.
The choices as envisioned by participants are limited by expectations,
including the expectation at the beginning of this section that the
Peloponnesian force will invade Attica once again rather than Plataea.
The Greeks (and perhaps the first-time reader) may expect that in the
summer of 429, the Peloponnesians would once again invade Attica.
Thucydides begins with the usual pattern:
tou= d 0 e0pigignome/nou qe/rouj oi9 Peloponnh/sioi kai\ oi9 cu/mmaxoi e0j
me\n th\n  0Attikh\n ou0k e0se/balon, e0stra&teusan de\ e0pi\ Pla&taian.
In the coming summer, the Peloponnesians and their allies into Attica did
not invade, but marched against Plataea. (2.71.1)
It is not until the negative (ouk) that Thucydides makes clear that this year
the Peloponnesian forces would not invade Attica, but instead would
march against Plataea. I will return below to the idea of Plataea as a “sur-
rogate” Athens.
The goal of the Peloponnesians and Boeotians is to remove Plataea as
an Athenian ally. Archidamus suggests that neutrality is all they wish. In
the fifth speech, he says, “We have not come for empire (arche) nor will
we now act unjustly (adikos) to this land” (2.74.2). The Plataeans suspect
that the Theban goal is the enslavement of Plataea (e0pi\ doulei/a||| th~|
h9mete/ra|–2.71.3). The Plataeans hope to survive and ideally maintain
their autonomy.
Yet the contingent future contains several options for the Plataeans.
Indeed, Archidamus shows considerable flexibility in suggesting various
options as he attempts to avoid forcing Plataea into an either/or situation.
Most importantly, Archidamus has thought up novel ways of getting
around the apparent alternatives that Plataea must either fight with or
against the Spartans. The Spartan king argues that if the Plataeans do not
wish to join Sparta and its allies to help liberate Greece, they could
become a neutral state.
54 Chapter 4
Morrison_CH4_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:43 PM  Page 54
“h9suxi/an a!gete nemo/menoi ta_ u9me/tera au0tw~n, kai\ e1ste mhde\ meq 0
e9te/rwn, de/xesqe de\ a)mfote/rouj fi/louj, e0pi\ pole/mw| de\
mhdete/rouj.”
“Remain at peace and join with neither side, but receive both as friends
and wage war against neither.” (2.72.1)
Such an arrangement would be acceptable to Sparta. Archidamus should
be recognized as an innovator for his flexibility: he is willing to offer the
Plataeans more than one choice.18
In the third speech (given in direct discourse), Archidamus tries
another improvised solution. The Plataeans could turn the city of
Plataea—all their households and property—over to Sparta, mark the
boundaries and count the trees, and leave the territory during the war.
Then, when the war ends, the Plataeans might come back and everything
would be returned to them. For a second time, Archidamus shows his
skills as a negotiator by avoiding the appearance of forcing the Plataeans
into accepting or rejecting a narrow range of demands. Here he offers the
option of putting the city into “receivership” until the war comes to a
close. Archidamus emphasizes his efforts to come up with a reasonable
solution (prokalesa&menoi ga_r polla_ kai\ ei0ko/ta–2.74.2). The appar-
ent abundance of options voiced here contrasts sharply with the narrow
path Plataea must follow in book 3 when they surrender their city to the
Spartans.
According to the Plataeans, the threatening action of Sparta is unjust
and unworthy of the Spartans and their ancestors. The Plataeans advance
the idea that justice and precedent based on duty to one’s ancestors lead
to the same position: Plataea must be allowed to determine its own foreign
policy. In particular, the Plataeans use the past to argue for “comparable”
behavior from the Spartans in the current situation. Plataea’s idea of just
action is related to past Panhellenic enterprises, freedom, and the gods.
They recall Pausanias’ liberation of Greece when Xerxes was repulsed. In
joining together in common danger, the Greeks sacrificed in Plataea’s
agora to Zeus, the god of Freedom (Zeus Eleutherios). Pausanias called upon
his allies to allow Plataea to live independently (au0tono/mouj oi0kei=n) and
to refrain from unjust action leading to slavery (strateu=sai/ te mhde/na
pote\ a)di/kwj e0p au0tou\j mhd  ) e0pi\ doulei/a|–2.71.2). The Plataeans argue
that the past deeds of Pausanias should be seen as setting the standard
against which later Spartans should act.19
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“ou0 di/kaia poiei=te ou0d ) a!cia ou1te u9mw~n ou1te pate/rwn w{n e0ste/, e0j
gh=n th\n Plataiw~n strateu/ontej.”
“It is not just nor is it worthy of you or your fathers to invade the land of
the Plataeans.” (2.71.2)
The Spartans’ fathers (patres) guaranteed Plataean independence and sov-
ereignty, yet the Spartans are now acting in contrary fashion. Justice, the
oaths of Spartan ancestors, and sacrifices to the gods all urge the Spartans
to reconsider their actions against Plataea. The Plataean peroration appeals
to the gods as witnesses and to the oaths sworn by both Spartan and
Plataean: the Spartans should continue to honor Pausanias’ original deci-
sion (kaqa&per Pausani/aj e0dikai/wsen–2.71.4). The Plataeans imagina-
tively reconstruct the past to argue for their own autonomy.
Archidamus in turn argues that the Spartans’ actions are consistent
with the tradition of their ancestors. The current war itself is being fought
for the sake of freedom.
“paraskeuh/ te tosh/de kai\ po/lemoj gege/nhtai au0tw~n e3neka kai\ tw~n
a!llwn e0leuqerw&sewj.”
“This army has been raised and the war itself has broken out in order to
free them [that is, the Greeks who fought for freedom against Xerxes] and
others like them.” (2.72.1)
What the Plataeans have said is fine; the problem, according to
Archidamus, lies in the fact that their actions do not match those sentiments
(h2n poih=te o9moi=a toi=j lo/goij–2.72.1). That is, setting word against
action, Archidamus finds the Plataeans’ words noble, but their actions fail
to match that nobility. Archidamus answers almost every appeal of the
Plataeans with a counterargument. Regarding the claims to justice, he
asserts that just acts should match just words. As a representative of free-
dom and autonomy, Pausanias guides united Greek action now no less than
previously (kaqa&per ga_r Pausani/aj u9mi=n pare/dwken–2.72.1). In his
last speech, returning once more to the idea of justice Archidamus calls
upon the gods and heroes of the land.
“ou1te nu=n, h1n ti poiw~men, a)dikh/somen: prokalesa&menoi ga_r polla_
kai\ ei0ko/ta ou0 tugxa&nomen.  cuggnw&monej de\ e1ste th=j me\n a)diki/aj
kola&zesqai toi=j u9pa&rxousi prote/roij, th=j de\ timwri/aj tugxa&nein
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toi=j e0pife/rousi nomi/mwj.”
“Nor will we be acting wrongly now [adikesomen], if we do anything; for
although we have offered many reasonable proposals, we have failed.
Grant that those who were the first to do injustice be punished for it and
that those lawfully [nomimos] seeking retribution obtain it.” (2.74.2)
At this point the Spartans make preparations for war.
Three strategic issues are linked to this scenario: Why has Sparta
invaded Plataea? Were the options voiced by Archidamus and the
Athenian promise for aid given sincerely? And—whatever the answer to
the second question—what was the likelihood of Athenian aid?
First, why did Sparta invade Plataean territory instead of Attica in 429?
One view, expressed by Connor, is that Archidamus and the Spartans had
“in effect, been defeated.” After failing to force a land battle with Athens,
they move on to Boeotia. Yet Connor views both enterprises as challenges
to the Periclean strategy, by tempting the Athenians to engage in a land
battle.20 Perhaps Archidamus is showing his inventiveness as a military
strategist by trying to provoke a land war in a new way. Kagan points to
three factors for the march on Plataea: Theban pressure, the thoroughness
of the destruction in Attica from the previous year, and danger of infec-
tion from the plague. While all these motivations may play a role, the way
in which Thucydides orders his opening (“into Attica, they did not invade
. . .”) suggests that Plataea has become in a sense a surrogate target in place
of Athens.21
The second issue concerns the sincerity of what both Archidamus and
Athens tell the Plataeans. Kagan says that both offers are “a charade.” The
Spartan “offer had been made impossible by the unprovoked attack,” yet
later he qualifies this assertion: in 429 the Plataeans “could have yielded
on reasonable terms had not Athens held her [Plataea] to the alliance and
promised help.”22 After consulting with Athens, the Plataeans reject the
various offers of Archidamus (alliance, neutrality, receivership), having
obtained a promise that Athens would help the Plataeans (2.73.3). Kagan
believes that the Athenian promise “must reflect the momentary ascen-
dancy of the war party . . . the promise was honestly intended, but it could
not be kept.” Badian is quite skeptical: the Athenians’ guarantee was a
“formal promise of aid which they well knew they would not be able to
give.”23
Regardless of the sincerity of Archidamus’ or the Athenians’ promises,
a third related issue concerns the likelihood of Athenian aid to Plataea.
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The Plataeans invoke their past relationship with Athens: “our [Plataean]
fathers swore oaths never to do violence (mhde\n newteri/zein) to the
alliance with Athens” (2.73.3). What should the Plataeans have reckoned
as their best decision? The Plataeans are forced to extrapolate from past
and present circumstances in order to anticipate the likelihood of several
future possiblities. Rusten argues that “given Pericles’ strategy of aban-
doning the Attic countryside . . . the town [of Plataea] was doomed.”
Kagan calls the strategy which required Athenian assistance for land-
locked Plataea “untenable.”24 From the first-time reader’s perspective,
there is no clear answer; rather, we are left up in the air. The question of
Plataea’s best choice is not definitively answered. The engaged reader is put
into the Plataean position of weighing these alternatives, ignorant of what
lies ahead.
The Plataeans apparently expected to get help from the Athenians.
Although Thucydides does not report the exchange between the
Plataeans and the Athenians in Athens, the Athenians appear to have
reassuringly emphasized the past, vowing similar aid in the future.
Promises are made, but the specifics are never addressed: how will the
Athenians come to help the land-locked Plataea? There is a brief, sober-
ing note in the middle of the second Mytilenian section that Salaethus
offers to lead the Peloponnesians away from Plataea, but he is put to death
by the Athenians (3.36.1). No explicit comment by Thucydides links this
decision to Athens’ previous guarantee of aid.
In the second half of this section, Thucydides presents the Peloponnesian
attempt to take Plataea. Seven focalizations are used to describe the activi-
ties of attack and defensive maneuver in pure narrative.25 We view these
undertakings very much from the perspective of the participants. The plans,
the emotions, and—significantly—the expectations of what is likely to hap-
pen are focalized by the Spartans and their allies on one side and by the
Plataeans on the other.
(1) The Spartans and their allies go to work, by bringing wood from
Cithaeron, “expecting (elpizontes) to take the city very quickly” (2.75.1).
They work continuously day and night.26 (2) The Plataeans then see
(horontes) what is happening and put up their own wall, attempting to
make it equally high. They also consider demolishing part of their wall near
the Peloponnesian mound (2.75.4–6).
(3) The Peloponnesians perceive (aisthomenoi–2.76.1) the activity of
the Plataeans and begin measuring and filling up gaps with clay. (4) We
then switch to the Plataean perspective and their digging of a mine inside
their city out to a spot under the Peloponnesian mound as they remove
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material from under the mound. (5) Thucydides comments that the
Peloponnesians knew nothing of this (kai\ e0la&nqanon e0pi\ polu\ tou\j
e1cw–2.76.2). (6) Still the Plataeans fear (dediotes–2.76.3) that with their
relatively low numbers they will not hold out against the more numerous
Peloponnesians and their allies. That is, the Plataeans’ expectation
appears to confirm the Spartans’ anticipation that Plataea will soon be
taken (2.75.1). The Plataeans then come up with a plan (prosepechu=ron
to/de). They stop building “the large structure opposite their ramp” and
from the tall wall build an inner wall in a crescent shape to offer protec-
tion, with the intention that if the big wall were taken, this inner struc-
ture would hold out (2.76.3).27
(7) Out of fear (tou\j Plataia~j e0fo/bhsen–2.76.4), the Peloponnesians
construct new “devices” (mechanas), by setting up beams and a chain. The
Peloponnesians find that their contrivances have no effect, and believe
(nomisantes) that they will not take the city with their current plans (2.77.1).
Before preparing for a siege (periteichisin), however, they attempt to burn the
city by throwing flaming material into the city. That is, their goal remains to
take Plataea—if possible—without the expense of a siege (ei1 pwj sfi/sin
a!neu dapa&nhj kai\ poliorki/aj prosaxqei/h–2.77.2). The wind causes a
big flame as they expected (o3per kai\ h1lpizon oi9 e0nanti/oi)—note that this
is from the perspective of “the enemy.” The phrase “so great a flame” (kai\
e0ge/neto flo\c tosau/th o3san–2.77.4) raises the reader’s expectations of
Peloponnesian success. Thucydides goes out of his way with a hypothetical
comment to emphasize how close danger came.
pneu=ma/ te ei0 e0pege/neto au0th=| e0pi/foron, o3per kai\ h1lpizon oi9 e0nanti/oi,
ou0k a2n die/fugon.
If a wind had come up and carried the fire around it, as the enemy expect-
ed, [the Plataeans] would not have escaped. (2.77.5)
But rain comes, “it is said,” and puts out the fire (2.77.6). We appreciate
how fortuitous circumstances may lead to significant outcomes: here, the
lucky appearance of rain saves a city.28
Thucydides himself does not in any way anticipate the failure of the
Peloponnesians’ efforts. We are made to experience this frenetic activity
as ongoing; Thucydides encourages us to project ourselves back into the
events as they unfold.29
Thucydides then shifts to Plataean concerns: women, children, and
elders are sent to Athens (2.78.3; cf. 2.6.4). Four hundred Plataeans
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remain besieged with 80 Athenians, 10 women, and 100 on kitchen duty
(sitopoioi). Thucydides emphasizes that these are the only ones within the
city, in part rounding off the section with provisional closure, in part
preparing for events in 428–427.
tosou=toi h]san oi9 cu/mpantej o3te e0j th\n poliorki/an kaqi/stanto, kai\
a!lloj ou0dei\j h]n e0n tei/xei ou1te dou=loj ou1t 0 e0leu/qeroj...toiau/th me\n
h9 Plataiw~n poliorki/a kateskeua&sqh.
Such was the total when they set up the siege, and no one else was with-
in the walls, neither slave nor free . . . . This was the sort of siege set
up against the Plataeans. (2.78.4)
At 2.79 Thucydides shifts to separate business in the northern Aegean.
That is, we leave Plataea in this state until the next year (early in book
3).30 It is significant that by the end of this section, the Peloponnesian
siege effectively shuts Plataea off from the rest of the Greek world. Unlike
Athens, with its navy, maritime trade, and exchange of information by
sea, Plataea is cut off both from what happens and from what is said—in
particular, political and diplomatic discourse, such as that found in the
Mytilenian debate.
We may make connections between section 2.71–78 and other passages
in different ways. First, we find a wide range of topics introduced in the
five speeches. Similar to the Corcyrean and Corinthian speeches discussed
in chapter 3, here we also encounter the issues of justice, relations
between cities—and the possibility of neutrality—and interpreting the
past and anticipating the future. In addition, we find the topics of freedom,
slavery and independence, and appeals to the gods and local heroes.
Archidamus’ flexibility may remind the reader of the Athenians’ action in
433, when they came up with an option (a defensive alliance) not envi-
sioned in either the Corcyreans’ or the Corinthians’ speeches. Whether
Archidamus’ offers were made in good faith, the impression Thucydides
gives is that the Plataeans could have chosen from among an array of
options: they were free to decide.
Second, the situation of Plataea may be compared and contrasted with
that of Athens. The Peloponnesians prepared to ravage the land (e1melle
dh|w&sein th\n gh=n–2.71.1, 2.73.1), much as they did in Attica (2.12.5).
Note especially the Athenian advice reported by the Plataean heralds:
60 Chapter 4
Morrison_CH4_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:43 PM  Page 60
“a)ll ) a)ne/xesqai kai\ gh=n temnome/nhn, ei0 dei=, o9rw~ntaj kai\ a!llo
pa&sxontaj o3ti a@n cunbai/nh|.”
“Endure your land being ravished also, if it is necessary, watching and suf-
fering whatever else happens.” (2.74.1)
That is, what happens to Plataea evokes what has been happening to the
Athenians on the Attic peninsula (cf. 2.19–21). The crucial difference, of
course, is that landlocked Plataea is utterly cut off after the siege begins,
while Athens has access to the outside world with its navy.31
In looking to the future the Plataeans expect Athenian help to arrive.
The reader, too, must exercise his or her judgment to determine the like-
lihood of such a rescue. In the fourth speech, addressing the Plataean cit-
izens, their ambassadors point to justice and the relationship established
between Athens and Plataea—this is an appeal to history. The Athenians
have never previously abandoned them when in trouble.
“ 0Aqhnai=oi/ fasin e0n ou0deni\ u9ma~j proe/sqai a)dikoume/nouj ou1te nu=n
perio/yesqai, bohqh/sein de\ kata_ du/namin.”
“The Athenians say that they have never ignored us in trouble before and
they will not now overlook us, but will come to our aid with force.”
(2.73.3)
The Plataeans receive assurances about the future: the Athenians will
help them “with force” (kata_ du/namin). There is a promise of full
Athenian support against the siege, yet there is no attempt later to prevent
or to relieve the siege. Only the miraculous rain saves the city from being
burned.32
The Plataean Escape (3.20–24)
We now turn to book three where Plataea figures in two episodes: the escape
from Plataea, and the debate before Spartan “judges” which leads to the
remaining Plataeans’ execution. These third and fourth sections offer a
study in contrasts: action and words, success and failure, surprise and pre-
dictability. The precarious situation of the Plataeans in 428–427 is clearly a
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result of the Plataean decision to reject Archidamus’ offers and the unful-
filled Athenian promise of aid (both made in 429–2.73.3). Then Plataean
desperation—and no sign of help—lead to bold successful action.33 This is
also the third of the Plataean episodes in which chance and the elements aid
the Plataeans. For once, a successful outcome matches their goal of escape.
In some ways the third episode is a mirror image of the first episode at
the opening of the war: in the first episode, there was an unexpected
nighttime attack by the Thebans; here, there is a surprise event at night,
but instead of an invasion there is an escape, balancing the entrance of the
Thebans in 431. Although besieged, the Plataeans now have the advan-
tage of surprise and superior knowledge. These third and fourth sections
are also intertwined with the Mytilenian revolt and the Mytilenian debate
at Athens (3.2–19, 3.25–50). The significance of this implied comparison
will be addressed below, but let us first examine sections 3 and 4.
Two choices apparently face the Plataeans: wait for help or act boldly.
Yet the Plataeans despair of gaining aid from the Athenians.
a)po\ tw~n Aqhnw~n ou0demi/a e0lpi\j h]n timwri/aj ou0de\ a!llh swthri/a
e0fai/neto.
There was no expectation of rescue from Athens, nor did any other means
of survival appear. (3.20.1)
The Plataeans decide to risk an escape (3.20.1). Planning is critical to suc-
cess, but we also find assistance from the elements. The ice, wind, and
magnitude of the storm on the evening of their venture are all essential to
the escape (3.23.5).34
Regarding knowledge and perspective, the escape is presented mostly
from the Plataean point of view. The Plataeans are in a superior episte-
mological position: they calculate the height of the surrounding walls by
observation; they know (eidotes) that the battlements would be deserted on
a cold, wet night (3.22.3; cf. 3.21.4); in the midst of the escape, when the
besieging army brings torches, the Plataeans could see the 300 enemy
troops better than they themselves could be seen, which puts them in a
better position to launch arrows and javelins (e9w&rwn ma~llon . . . au0toi\
de\ e0n tw~| a)fanei= o1ntej h[sson dia_ ta_j lampa&daj kaqewrw~n*
to–3.23.24)35; on their way to Thebes, they see (e9w&rwn) the
Peloponnesians on the road to Cithaeron toward Athens, but are not seen
themselves (3.24.1). This contrasts, of course, with the ignorance of the
Peloponnesian and Boeotian besiegers: misperception frustrates the
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besieging army and aids the brave escapees. Describing the construction of
the two projections (periboloi), Thucydides indicates the besiegers’ goals of
keeping the Plataeans trapped and of preventing the arrival of outside
help, in case Athens sends any (3.21.1).36 The Peloponnesian and
Boeotian focalizations generally reflect mistaken belief and confusion.
Time and again Thucydides indicates the superior knowledge of the
Plataeans in contrast to the Peloponnesians and Thebans outside. The
Peloponnesians and Thebans know nothing of the plan to escape. Note
Thucydides’ use of dramatic irony.
e1peita prose/meican [oi9 Plataih=j] tw|~| tei/xei tw~n polemi/wn la&&qo*
ntej tou\\j fu//lakaj, a)na_ to\ skoteino\n me\n ou00 proido//ntwn au00tw~~n,
yo//fw|| de\\ tw~~|| e00k tou== prosie//nai au00tou\\j a)ntipatagou=nteoj tou=
a)ne/mou ou00 katakousa&&ntwn.
Then [the Plataeans] reached the wall of the enemy without the guards
noticing, for they did not see them in the darkness and they did not hear any
noise of them coming due to the wind blowing the other way. (3.22.1)
In addition to not hearing or seeing the Plataeans, the outside army did
not know what the situation was.
[to\ stra&topedon] ou0 ga_r h1|dei o3ti h]n to\ deino\n skoteinh=j nukto\j kai\
xeimw~noj o1ntoj.
[The army] did not know what the danger was in the dark night with the
storm in progress. (3.22.5)
To add to the enemies’ confusion, the Plataeans remaining behind manip-
ulate the expectations and countermeasures of the besieging army. They
set up a diversion on the opposite side of the city from the escape, “so that
the Peloponnesians and Boeotians would least have an idea of the
Plataean plan . . . [and would be] at a loss in figuring out what was happen-
ing” (a)ll 0 e0n a)po/rw| h]san ei0ka&sai to\ gigno/menon–3.22.5). In antici-
pating the use of Theban fire signals to send for help, the Plataeans within
set up so many signals that the Theban message is unclear from a distance
and no help is sent (3.22.7–8). Finally, when the Plataean escapees head
toward Thebes rather than to Athens, they succeed in anticipating the
Thebans’ belief (nomizontes) that the Plataeans would not advance into
enemy territory (3.24.1).
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The overall plan goes extremely well.37 Still, we must note the differ-
ence between the escaping Plataeans and those Plataeans left behind, who
remain cut off from the outside world and know nothing about anyone’s
escape or survival (tw~n me\n gegenhme/nwn ei0do/tej ou0de/n–3.24.3). In fact,
the Plataeans who turned back before scaling the towers give the false
report that no one survived. Only at daybreak when asking to bury the
Plataean corpses, do the Plataeans learn the truth (ma&qontej de\ to\
a)lhqe/j–3.24.3).38 The reader is in a superior position: while linked espe-
cially to the escaping Plataeans, the reader appreciates the confusion of
both the Boeotians and Plataeans who remain behind.
Another aspect of this episode concerns comparison and extrapolation,
best captured by the Greek term eikazein, a combination of comparison,
improvization, and extrapolation. Here this skill is treated thematically:
this episode presents us with an exercise in eikazein at several levels. First,
a successful escape for the Plataeans depends upon successful guessing and
approximation. In order to construct ladders of the appropriate height, the
Plataeans must approximate the height of the outside walls by counting the
number of bricks at a distance.39
th\n me\n ou]n cumme/trhsin tw~n klima&kwn ou3twj e1labon, e0k tou=
pa&xouj th=j pli/nqou ei00ka&&sai to\ me/tron.
They took the measurement of the ladders in this manner, and approxi-
mated the distance from the thickness of a brick. (3.20.4)
This contrasts with the Peloponnesians and their allies, who must attempt
to guess what has happened (a!llo ti nomi/santej to\ gigno/menon ei]nai
h2 to\ o1n ei00ka&sai to\ gigno/menon–3.22.5–6). Their mistaken beliefs aid the
Plataeans in escaping. As I have suggested in previous chapters, the abili-
ty of statesmen and historians (and, by extension, readers) to improvise and
conjecture is essential both for understanding the past and for anticipat-
ing the future. In this section, Thucydides calls our attention to ways in
which it is possible to succeed or to fail in the difficult art of extrapolation
(eikazein). This skill means survival for the escaping Plataeans (their lad-
ders are high enough to reach the towers); the besiegers’ failure to figure
out what might be happening allows the escapees to continue on to safe-
ty.
At a different level, the reader is being implicitly asked to compare and
contrast the Plataean escape described here with other parts of the History.
First, we may compare this situation to that of the first two Plataean
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episodes. During the invasion of 431, rain played a role in increasing the
difficulties for the Thebans chased through town (2.4.2); then rain put out
the blaze set by the Peloponnesians (2.77.6). Just as the Thebans waited
for a moonless night in the first section, so here the Plataeans await a dark
and stormy night for their escape (3.22.1). To be sure, Thucydides makes
no connection between rain and divine aid, but we may easily compare
such lucky events favoring Plataea in the first, second, and third sec-
tions—all in sharp contrast to the fourth episode where not only do the
Athenians bring no aid, but no other “miraculous” rescue saves the
Plataeans who are put to death by the Spartans.40
The Plataean Debate (3.52–68)
The fourth episode in which Plataea plays a major role is presented after
the Mytilenian crisis has been “resolved” with the execution of a thousand
leaders of the Mytilenian revolt. As Thucydides has structured the narra-
tive, the Plataeans then surrender their city to Spartan “judges” (dicastai—
3.52.2, 3.52.3, 3.53.1).41 Upon request, the Plataeans are allowed to
address the Spartans at length, the Thebans reply, and the Spartan then
execute the Plataeans.
This fourth section consists of two speeches with a narrative frame,
contrasting with the third section. While the third section offers success-
ful Plataean action, the fourth presents the unsuccessful words of the
Plataeans. In contrast to various options earlier, the Plataeans are now
wholly reduced to begging for their lives. The outcome is predictable—
even as viewed by the Plataeans in their speech—in the sense that the only
choices left apparently are those expressed in the two arguments. Neither
the Spartan “dicasts” nor anyone else improvises by articulating even a
third possibility.42 Also in contrast to the three earlier sections, there is no
unexpected rescue by the elements or the Athenians to save the Plataeans.
The goal of the Plataeans—faced with a choice of starvation or surren-
der (3.52.1)—is survival, perhaps living in exile or as prisoners until a
truce.43 In response, the Thebans speak out of fear that the Spartans may
give in (3.60); clearly they seek control of Plataea and vengeance for the
death of the Theban prisoners at the start of the war (3.66.3; cf. 2.6). The
Spartans’ motivations are more apparent to the reader than to either the
Plataeans or the Thebans. At first they ask a brief question of the
Plataeans (“Have you done any good for the Spartans and their allies in
the present war”–3.52.4), but decide to allow a longer speech. At the end
65Punctuated History: The Case of Plataea
Morrison_CH4_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:43 PM  Page 65
of the episode, their goals boil down to courting Theban favor for the
future in an effort to win the war, rather than paying any gratitude to
Plataea for past actions (3.68.4).44
Ultimately the Thebans are successful: the Plataeans are not saved,
more than 200 Plataeans and 25 Athenians are put to death, and the
women are enslaved. Hornblower comments on this tragic precision
(akribeia): “how little use that long-standing alliance [with the Athenians]
was to the Plataians.”45 The Spartans gain the help of the Thebans, for they
are “useful” (ophelimous–3.68.4; cf. 3.56.4, 3.58.1). Megarian refugees and
pro-Spartan Plataeans then settle the city for a year; later the city is razed,
and the land is leased out to Thebans. Of course, if Thucydides were strict-
ly annalistic (as he sets out in his program), he would wait until his
account of the year 426 to mention the razing of Plataea (3.68.3).46
Regarding knowledge and focalization, the bulk of this section consists
of rhetorical focalization in the two speeches, yet the frame outside the
speeches deserves mention. Most striking is Plataean ignorance about
Spartan motivations, the Spartans’ idea of justice, and political discourse
current at this time. The Plataeans in the besieged city do not know what
the reader has learned: that the Spartan goal is to have Plataea surrender,
rather than taking it by force, so that when they eventually make a treaty
with Athens, Plataea would not have to be restored to the Athenian
sphere of influence (mh\ a)na&dotoj–3.52.2).47 While Thucydides makes
Sparta’s motivations available to the reader, the fact that these motivations
are not apparent to the Plataeans surely heightens the pathos. In the coda,
Thucydides does reveal the Spartan motivation: they believed that by
Pausanias’ treaty, they could have expected neutrality from the Plataeans.
This looks back to episode 2 (3.68.1; cf. 2.72.1). This explicit retrospec-
tive link connects the present consequences to those earlier decisions:
before the siege an offer of neutrality was made but was rejected by the
Plataeans; now the Spartans feel they are released from any treaty obliga-
tions (ekspondoi).48
The Plataeans certainly seem to have misunderstood the Spartans’ initial
offer. Before giving themselves over to the Spartans, the Plataeans assume
that no one will be “unjustly” condemned (para_ di/khn–3.52.2–3); they
expect “fairness” (to\ i1son) from the dicasts, yet this turns out to be a mis-
take (hemartekamen–3.53.1).49
A more intricate pattern—at a larger scale of presentation but also
based on contiguous episodes—is the “interweaving” of two or more
episodes, with Thucydides’ presentation of the Mytilenian revolt and the
events concerning Plataea in book 3. First, Thucydides presents an
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episode of speech and narrative concerning Mytilene (3.2–19); there fol-
lows a narrative account of the escape of 212 Plataeans (3.20–24); then
Mytilene’s surrender leads to the Athenian debate (3.25–50); finally,
Plataea’s surrender brings on the debate before the Spartan “judges”
(3.52–68). In his presentation, Thucydides links and contrasts the cities
of Mytilene and Plataea in a number of ways. Both cities are put under
siege and later surrender. In one case, an Athenian ally, Mytilene, revolts:
as an island, no help reaches it from Sparta (a land power). In the other
case, an Athenian ally is loyal but landlocked, so that no help arrives
from Athens (a sea power).50 Thucydides might have presented these
conflicts in several ways—the Corcyrean conflict (1.24–55) occurred
over several years, but was presented without interruption. Alternation of
the two cities in book 3 (with a reminder of Plataea at 3.36.1) reveals a
conscious pattern designed to contrast the situations in an overt manner
for the reader.51
One effect of this pattern is to highlight the fact that the Plataeans
have been cut off from the world of the Peloponnesian War, not only in a
literal sense, but also rhetorically. They have not been “privy,” as the read-
er has been, to the Mytilenian debate which has just been presented to the
reader. Diodotus proclaims morality to be irrelevant to foreign policy
(3.44.4), yet the Plataeans are unaware of such a principle. A similar situ-
ation occurs later in the History, when the Athenian garrison at Oenoe is
tricked into turning over their position to the Thebans, “for they knew
nothing on account of being besieged [kai\ ou0k ei0do/tej ou0de\n dia_ to\
poliorkei=sqai]” (8.98.3). As Thucydides sets up the contrast, we note
the sharp divergence between the Plataeans’ appeals to “conventional”
moral ideas and Diodotus’ more “realistic” ideas about expediency to the
exclusion of justice.52 The Plataean and Theban speeches look to the past
and employ the language of the lawcourt, yet this contrasts not only with
the Spartan decision (based on the Thebans’ usefulness to them) but also
with Diodotus’ rejection of Cleon’s claim that justice and advantage may
be combined when determining foreign policy.
Let us turn to the two speeches. According to the Plataeans, the three
most important issues are their past actions and an expected reciprocity;
traditional conceptions of justice, law, and Panhellenic religion; and ram-
ifications for the future.
The first issue the Plataeans raise is the significance of the past. In con-
nection with past service, the Plataeans point to two incidents. They have
helped Greece both when fighting the Persians and when they aided the
Spartans during the Helot revolt after an earthquake at Ithome (3.54.5).
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The Plataeans keep returning to their service during the Persian war: they
proved to be “brave” (agathoi–3.54.3); the Persians posed a danger to all
the Greeks (3.54.4; cf. 3.56.4); the Plataeans served the cause of Greece
(3.59.4). The Plataeans invoke the name of Pausanias: they fought with
Pausanias and had a friendship with him (3.54.4, 3.58.5; cf. 2.71.4). They
recall their joint service with the ancestors of those Spartans who
inscribed the names of the Plataeans on the tripod on Delphi (3.57.2; cf.
3.59.1); the tombs of Spartan ancestors are buried on Plataean soil (3.58.4;
cf. 3.59.2). In summary, the Plataeans characterize themselves as “bene-
factors of Greece [h9mw~n tw~n eu0ergetw~n th=j 9Ella&doj]” (3.57.1; cf.
3.58.3, 3.59.1).53 In appealing to their past service, the Plataeans evident-
ly see these actions as relevant to the current situation: their past bravery
against Xerxes merits special consideration in the present war. In part, this
suggestion is based on what we might call traditional morality. Because the
Plataeans have previously helped Greece in general and the Spartans in
particular—because they have performed service as benefactors (euerge-
tai)—the Spartans are obliged to repay such service by sparing their lives
now. It is just to help friends in their hour of need and to balance the cur-
rent miscalculation now (h9mw~n th=j nu=n a(marti/aj) against their previ-
ous action (3.56.5).54
In addition to recalling the past, the Plataeans also bring up a broader
moral appeal by invoking justice, law, and religion. The Plataeans charac-
terize themselves as acting justly. They wish to put forth their “just differ-
ences” towards the Thebans, the Spartans, and the other Greeks (di/kaia
. . . dia&fora–3.54.1; cf. 3.56.5).55 Also the Spartans have not suffered
injustice (or harm) from the Plataeans (ou0k a)dikei=sqai u9ma~j–3.54.2; cf.
3.55.2, 3.59.1).56 In fact, if the Spartans are friends (philoi), it is the
Spartans who have wrongly marched against the Plataeans (hamar-
tanein–3.54.2). The Thebans, however, are accused of injustice for seizing
the city of Plataea during peacetime in the midst of a sacred festival
(3.56.1). Connected with the question of justice is that of responsibility:
here the Plataeans attribute their decision to make their alliance with
Athens to the Spartans: “you are responsible [h9mei=j de\ ai1tioi]” (3.55.1).57
Beyond appealing to the conventional morality of “friendship,” the
Plataeans invoke laws that bind all people and are honored by the Greeks.
The Plataean action against the Theban prisoners who had invaded in 431
is justified in terms of self-defense, a universal law established for all.
“e0timwrhsa&meqa kata_ to\n pa~si no/mon kaqestw~ta.”
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“We avenged ourselves according to the law [nomos] established for all.”
(3.56.2)58
In the current situation, the Spartans should respect the Plataeans as sup-
pliants. The “law” of the Greeks forbids the killing of suppliants. 
“o3ti e9ko/ntaj te e0la&bete kai\ xei=raj proisxome/nouj (o9 de\ no/moj toi=j
3Ellhsi mh\ ktei/nein tou/touj).”
“You took us who were willing and holding out our hands [as suppliants]
(and the law for the Greeks is not to kill such people).” (3.58.3)59
At the end of their speech, the Plataeans shift from supplication to invok-
ing the gods.
“h9mei=j te, w(j pre/pon h9mi=n kai\ w(j h9 xrei/a proa&gei, ai0tou/meqa u9ma~j,
qeou\j tou\j o9mobwmi/ouj kai\ koinou\j tw~n 9Ellh/nwn e0pibow&menoi,
pei=sai ta&de.”
“And we, as is appropriate and as the need impels us, beseech you to be
persuaded of this, as we invoke the gods whose altars we share and are com-
mon to [all] Greeks.” (3.59.2)60
The ideas of justice, law, the gods, and helping friends (who have done you
a good turn) are wholly missing from Spartan thinking—at least concern-
ing the question they ask both before and after the speeches and accord-
ing to the motivations attributed to the Spartans by Thucydides. This
array of moral concepts is also excluded by Diodotus as irrelevant to for-
eign policy. But again, the Plataeans are unaware of this.61
Relevant to these moral, legal, and religious ideas are the issues of free-
dom and slavery in geopolitical terms. Freeing Greece, the Plataeans
argue, should not be accomplished by the destruction of Plataea (“Don’t
enslave what was freed”–3.58.5). The final words of the Plataeans are:
“Don’t free the rest of Greece, but destroy us” (3.59.4).
In addition to dwelling on the past in terms of conventional morality
and of what they define as legal and religious norms, the Plataeans also look
to the future.62 They have little to promise Sparta in a material sense;
instead they ponder the sort of reputation the Spartans will acquire. This
depends upon the actions they take.
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“proske/yasqe/ te o3ti nu=n me\n para&deigma toi=j polloi=j tw~n
9Ellh/nwn a)ndragaqi/aj nomi/zesqe: ei0 de\ peri\ h9mw~n gnw&sesqe mh\ ta_
ei0ko/ta (ou0 ga_r a)fanh= krinei=te th\n di/khn th/nde, e0painou/menoi de\ peri\
ou0d' h9mw~n memptw~n), o9ra~te o3pwj mh\ ou0k a)pode/cwntai a)ndrw~n
a)gaqw~n pe/ri au0tou\j a)mei/nouj o1ntaj a)prepe/j ti e0pignw~nai, ou0de\
pro\j i9eroi=j toi=j koinoi=j sku=la a)po\ h9mw~n tw~n eu0ergetw~n th=j
9Ella&doj a)nateqh=nai. deino\n de\ do/cei ei]nai Pla&taian Lakedai*
moni/ouj porqh=sai, kai\ tou\j me\n pate/raj a)nagra&yai e0j to\n
tri/poda to\n e0n Delfoi=j di' a)reth\n th\n po/lin, u9ma~j de\ kai\ e0k panto\j
tou=  9Ellhnikou= panoikesi/a| dia_ Qhbai/ouj e0calei=yai.”
“And reflect that now you are regarded by most Greeks as an example of
upright qualities; but if you reach a decision about us that is not right (for
you will not be judging this case in obscurity, as men of renown judging us
who are not contemptible), beware of their abhorrence that an unseemly
decision about good men was upheld by you, their betters, and that spoils
from us, benefactors of Greece, would have been dedicated in the common
shrines. And it will seem monstrous for the Spartans to destroy Plataea,
that your fathers recorded the city on the tripod at Delphi for its bravery
while you will erase it in its entirety from Greek civilization for the sake
of the Thebans.” (3.57.1–2)63
The consequence of Sparta’s condemnation, the Plataeans claim, is that
other Greeks will certainly take notice with public opinion condemning
the actions of Sparta.64
With its emphasis on how past action is relevant to present circum-
stances, there is a retrospective quality to the Plataeans’ speech. Yet in
reinterpreting the past and anticipating the future, the Plataean endeavor
to show how past, present, and future interconnect.65 This results from
comparison and extrapolation (eikazein) within their speech. Because ear-
lier sections of Thucydides’ History—such as the Theban invasion at the
opening of book 2—are presented once again in a new light (first narra-
tively, now rhetorically), the reader is also asked to make connections
between past actions, present circumstances, and the current reinterpreta-
tion of those past actions.
In speaking about the past, the Plataeans are attempting to offer a new
perspective on earlier events. At 3.56, for example, there is a long series of
“then” and “now,” where earlier situations contrast with the present
dilemma.66 The overall effect is to propel the reader to also contrast ongo-
ing events with previous situations.
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“kai/toi ei0 nu==n u9mi=n w)fe/limoi dokou=sin ei]nai, polu\ kai\ h9mei=j kai\ oi9
a!lloi  3Ellhnej ma~llon to//te o3te e0n mei/zoni kindu/nw| h]te.  nu==n me\n ga_r
e9te/roij u9mei=j e0pe/rxesqe deinoi/, e00n e00kei//nw|| de\ tw~| kairw~|, o3te pa~si
doulei/an e0pe/feren o9 ba&rbaroj, oi3de met 0 au0tou= h]san.  kai\ di/kaion
h9mw~n th=j nu==n a(marti/aj, ei0 a!ra h9ma&rthtai/ ti, a)ntiqei=nai th\n to//te
proqumi/an:  kai\ mei/zw te pro\j e0la&ssw eu9rh/sete kai\ e00n kairoi==j oi[j
spa&nion h]n tw~n 9Ellh/nwn tina_ a)reth\n th=| Ce/rcou duna&mei
a)ntita&casqai, e0ph|nou=nto/ te ma~llon oi9 mh\ ta_ cu/mfora pro\j th\n
e1fodon au9toi=j a)sfalei/a||||| pra&ssontej, e0qe/lontej de\ tolma~n meta_
kindu/nwn ta_ be/ltista.”
“Though if the Thebans seem useful to you now, in the past at a time when
you were in greater danger, we and the other Hellenes were much more
useful. Now you are in a position to take the offensive and to make others
fear you; but in those days, when the foreign invader threatened us all with
slavery, Thebes was on his side. It is just, therefore, for us to set any errors
now—if we have committed any—against our valor then. You will find
that our merits greatly outweigh our faults, and that they were shown at a
time when it was rare to find courage among the Greeks opposed to the
might of Xerxes, and when all the greater praise was given to those who,
instead of meeting the invasion by acting in the interest of their own safe-
ty, were willing to dare the noblest actions in the midst of danger.”
(3.56.4–5)
According to the Plataeans, similar actions—both past and present—
should be gauged by the same standard. What the Plataeans accomplished
in the past on behalf of the Greeks—for the sake of freedom—is now used
to “enslave” the Greeks.
“w{n h9mei=j geno/menoi kai\ timhqe/ntej e0j ta_ prw~ta nu=n e00pi\\ toi==j
au00toi==j de/dimen mh\ diafqarw~men, 00Aqnhai//ouj e99lo//menoi dikai//wj
ma~~llon h22 u99ma~~j kerdale//wj. kai//toi xrh\\ tau00ta__ peri\\ tw~~n au00tw~~n
o99moi//wj fai//nesqai gignw&&skontaj, kai\ to\ cumfe/ron mh\ a!llo ti
nomi/sai h2 tw~n cumma&xwn toi=j a)gaqoi=j o3tan ai0ei\ be/baion th\n xa&rin
th=j a)reth=j e1xwsi kai\ to\ parauti/ka pou u9mi=n w)fe/limon
kaqisth=tai.”
“We, who were among these [who dared in the midst of danger] and held
in the highest honor, now fear that we will be destroyed by the same con-
duct by choosing the Athenians justly rather than yourselves for gain. And yet
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consistency ought to be prominent when you make comparable decisions about
comparable situations, and you ought to believe that there is no expedien-
cy except when what is perhaps to your immediate advantage is also estab-
lished by continuing to keep firm your gratitude for the courage of those
who were good allies.” (3.56.6–7)
If in the past the Plataeans chose rightly in fighting Xerxes, then for
choosing rightly now and not deserting the Athenians—without regard for
advantage—they should not be penalized. A brave ally should be able to
count on gratitude.67 The Plataeans’ speech advances the idea that even
though the current situation may differ from a time when Greeks opposed
Persians, the Plataeans have acted in a similar way. Consistent action in
two situations implies comparison and, according to the Plateans, a reduc-
tive prescription: the same rule should apply in all situations.
We now turn to the speech of the Thebans who respond to this by
emphasizing shifting circumstance. Yet before addressing the issues of past
conduct—in historical and moral terms—the Thebans begin by challeng-
ing the need for the Plataeans to speak beyond answering the Spartans’
original brief question (3.61.1; cf. 3.52.4–5).68 Because the Plataeans have
spoken at length and brought accusations against the Thebans and
defended themselves (kathgori/a . . . a)pologi/a), the Thebans must
offer a refutation (elengkos–3.61.1). Two points should be made here. First,
the Thebans raise the question not only of what is allowable in discourse,
but whether debate is even needed to decide the fate of the Plataeans.69
This anticipates the more severe limits on discourse imposed by the
Athenians upon the Melians (5.89).70 Second, the Thebans—like the
Plataeans—make extensive use of legalistic language (kategoria, apologia,
adikia, hekon/akon, etc.). That is, both the Thebans and the Plataeans
make rhetorical appeals to law and justice; the Spartans’ ultimate decision,
however, is based on the usefulness of Theban cavalry and troops
(3.68.4).71
In addressing the past, the Plataeans focused on only two incidents—
the Persian war and their help during the Helot uprising—yet the
Thebans range more broadly. In chronological order, the Thebans men-
tion: (1) the founding of Plataea; (2) the Persian War; (3) the battle of
Coronea; (4) the Theban “entrance” into Plataea in 431; and (5) Theban
action in the Peloponnesian War.72 That is, the Thebans consider more
incidents from the past in their argument, evidently feeling that the
Plataeans have been excessively selective. The Thebans’ interpretation of
the past contrasts sharply with that of the Plataeans.
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(1) The Thebans begin with the founding of the city of Plataea, which
was established by Thebans. Despite this, when in danger the Plataeans
turned to Athens and caused harm to Thebes. The Thebans emphasize the
Plataean transgression of their ancestral customs (parabai/nontej ta_
pa&tria –3.61.2). Their first charge is that the Plataeans violated their
local (i.e., Boeotian) affinities.
(2) In turning to Plataean and Theban action during the Persian War,
the Thebans do not dispute that the Plataeans fought against the Persians,
but they are more interested in the motivation behind these actions. The
Plataeans have just asserted that “we alone of the Boeotians” (mo/noi
Boiwtw~n) resisted the Persians (3.54.3), but the Thebans throw the
Plataeans’ phrase “we alone” (monoi) back at them.73 According to the
Thebans, the Plataeans chose not to “collaborate with the Persians” or
“medize,” because the Athenians did not. That is, the Plataeans modeled
their behavior on that of the Athenians.74 While the Plataeans have
argued that they are acting justly as they did during the Persian war, the
Thebans turn this supposed consistency against the Plataeans. They agree
that the Plataeans are behaving in the same way, but then give that behav-
ior a new name: the Plataeans always “atticize” or “collaborate with
Athens” (attikismon–3.64.5).75 Plataean motivation is suspect.
Part of the reader’s task is to see how well each speech answers or antici-
pates the charges of the other speech. The Plataeans’ “uniqueness” (monoi) is
only one of many examples. The Thebans also respond to the Plataeans’
claims regarding their role as benefactors of Sparta, taking responsibility for
behavior, the proper treatment of suppliants (the Plataeans now, the Theban
prisoners in 431), and the question of which city should function as an exam-
ple (Sparta or Plataea–3.57.1, 3.67.6).76 Note that the Thebans do follow the
spirit of the Plataeans’ speech to this extent: the charges made against Thebes
are answered as though this were a courtroom. After all, “judges” (dicastai) are
listening to these arguments, waiting to pronounce judgment.
Concerning the issue of independent action, one must be autonomous
to be considered guilty. In their defense, the Thebans maintain that dur-
ing the Persian War their city was not in control of itself (autokrator);
rather a faction of oligarchs (dunasteia) dominated the city, which is “clos-
est to tyranny” (3.62.3).77 The city was wrong but not guilty (ou0d  ) a!cion
au0th=| o0neidi/sai w{n mh\ meta_ no/mwn h3marten–3.62.4).
Plataean aid during the helot revolt is apparently ignored by the
Thebans.78 (3) Once the Thebans are governed by law, their behavior
becomes more defensible. Their defeat of Athens at Coronea is seen as
advancing the cause of freedom:
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“ei0 maxo/menoi e0n Korwnei/a| kai\ nikh/santej au0tou\j h0leuqerw&samen
th\n Boiwti/an kai\ tou\j a!llouj nu=n proqu/mwj cuneleuqerou=men.”
“If we fought and defeated the Athenians at Coronea and freed Boeotia,
we now are also eagerly freeing others with you.” (3.62.5)
(4) The question of the Theban invasion of Plataea is delayed. (5) During
the current war the Thebans have also joined in the liberation of Greece
(ksuneleutheroumen–3.62.5). The Thebans are on board now, fighting for
freedom (3.63.1). So much for the Theban apologia in response to Plataea’s
charges against them.79
By framing the issues as they do, the Thebans get around the question
of reciprocity and obligation for past good deeds. They ignore Plataea’s
past help to Sparta; Thebes’ alliance with Persia is “spun” in terms of lack-
ing independence of action, for they claim they were not in control of
their own city. The Thebans now, however, are helping Sparta and deserve
its favor. They also lead Sparta to focus on the future advantages of main-
taining the alliance with Thebes.
The Plataeans have accused the Thebans of injustice and appealed to
law and religion. In their interpretation of the past, the Thebans examine
what justice and injustice are, what factors are relevant, and who is truly
guilty by focusing on injustice and independent action. There are four
parts to the Theban counterargment.
First, the question of willing versus unwilling: the Thebans unwillingly
acted with the Persians, but the Plataeans “willingly and not under com-
pulsion” (e9ko/ntej kai\ ou0 biazo/menoi) joined the Athenians against the
rest of Greece (3.63.2). The Plataeans have not been acting in self-
defense; they are now guilty. The Thebans, however, were not responsible
(aitioi) for past injustice (adikia).80
Second, they indirectly address Plataea’s service to Sparta and Greece.
The Thebans argue that if it is shameful (aischron) to betray benefactors,
it is still more shameful and more unjust (ai1sxion kai\ a)dikw&teron) for
Plataea to betray all Greece.81 If what the Thebans have done is bad,
Plataean conduct has been even worse, for they have now joined Athens
as accomplices to injustice (toi=j a)dikou=sin a!llouj cunergoi\
kate//sthte–3.63.3–4).
Third, while the issue of willing versus unwilling carries a legalistic
tone, a separate issue is that of ideology.82 Past actions are not as important
as the agenda underlying these actions. The Plataeans are guilty of fol-
lowing the Athenian political program, captured by the term attikismon,
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perhaps coined here for the first time as a parallel with medismon. If the
Thebans “medized,” that is, “collaborated with Persia” during the earlier
war, the Plataeans are doing something just as bad now: they are “atticiz-
ing” or “collaborating with the Athenians.”83 The motivation for Plataean
action during the Persian war is the same as the motivation for their
actions now: they would follow the Athenians anywhere. Rather than the
Plataeans being pardoned for their past action, they must stand or fall with
Athens. The Plataeans left their earlier alliance and joined in the enslav-
ing of Greece with Athens (ksugkatedoulousthe); they have done this will-
ingly—no one forced them (cf. 3.64.3).
Fourth, Plataea had the option of remaining neutral before the city was
put under siege, but rejected the offer. This, the Thebans argue, reveals the
true nature of the Plataeans (3.64.4). The past (good) deeds of the
Plataeans were not in line with their actual character (ou0 prosh/konta);
the Plataeans may have presented an appearance of virtue (andragathian),
the Thebans argue, but Plataean action (doing “evil”—kakon—to Greeks)
makes them justly hated by the Greeks.
Returning to their own defense, the Thebans respond to the charge
that they entered Plataea in 431 while there was a truce in effect (e0n
spondai=j) during a sacred period (hieromenia). The Thebans quibble on
the meaning of “injustice” (adikia).
“We would have committed injustice, if we had arrived and fought and laid
waste your land; but did we commit injustice if your men willingly invit-
ed us? . . . They were citizens, they opened the gates as friends, they were
restoring our kinship [suggeneian].” (3.65.2–3)
The different views of past action here—action narrated by Thucydides in
the first Plataean episode—raise a number of difficult issues, one of which
is who speaks for a community: a faction, the leaders, or a majority of cit-
izens?84 If some Plataeans did invite the Thebans into Plataea, is this truly
an “invasion”?
If crimes took place, the Thebans argue, all of them—three in num-
ber—were committed by the Plataeans. The Plataeans broke the agree-
ment (ksumbasis) they made with the Thebans in the agora (2.2.4–3.1);
they put the Theban prisoners of war to death; and they violated their
oath not to kill the prisoners. It was the Thebans who were killed “ille-
gally,” stretching out their hands as suppliants, while, as the Thebans later
say, the Plataeans are now not truly suppliants.85
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“e1nnoma ga_r pei/sontai kai\ ou0xi\ e0k ma&xhj xei=raj proisxo/menoi,
w#sper fasi/n, a)ll ) a)po\ cumba&sewj e0j di/khn sfa~j au0tou\j para*
do/ntej.”
“For they will suffer by the laws and are not holding out their hands [as
suppliants] coming from battle, as they claim, but they surrendered them-
selves for judgment by agreement.” (3.67.5)
The Thebans accuse the Plataeans of deserving punishment for their
crimes (3.66.3). The Thebans assert that their demand for vengeance is
“more holy” than the plea of the Plataeans (o9siw&teron titimw*
rhme/noi–3.67). Whatever the Plataeans were like in the past, they are
worse now and thus are deserving of double the penalty (diplasi/aj
zhmi/aj–3.67.2).86 The Thebans insist that emotion is irrelevant to deci-
sion-making: in this case, the Plataeans should not be aided by feelings
such as compassion or pity (olophurmo, oikto–3.67.2).87 Pity is appropriate
in cases of undeserved suffering; bringing punishment to those who
deserve it, such as the Plataeans, should bring rejoicing (epichartoi–3.67.4).
While the Plataeans may point to the graves of their Plataean ancestors,
this consideration is outweighed by the young Thebans who died in 431
and the Theban ancestors who brought Coronea over to the Spartan side
(3.67.3).
And what of the future? The Plataeans had asked the Spartans to con-
sider what would happen to the Spartans’ reputation if the Plataeans were
put to death. The Spartans’ task, according to the Thebans, is to defend
the law which was broken by Plataea, give “deserved favor” (xa&rin
di/kaian) to Thebes, and make an example of the Plataeans to all Greeks
(paradeigma–3.67.6).88 Punishing the Plataeans will demonstrate that it is
by deeds which men should be judged, rather than by words. In fact—
returning to an idea raised at the beginning of their speech—for good
deeds, a short report is sufficient; for mistakes, words merely serve as a
“cloak” (prokalummata–3.67.6; cf. 3.61.1).89
There is a nagging question for the reader: since the Spartans base their
decision on advantage (3.68.4), why has Thucydides included speeches at
all? Does this not render moot much that both the Plataeans and Thebans
argue for? As Hornblower notes, for all the forensic language, this is not a
trial. In chapter 3.68, “the Spartans simply repeat their original question
as if the speeches had never been delivered at all.”90 Macleod sees one pur-
pose to the speeches: “The history, like the tragedy, illustrates the
inevitable fraudulence of moral argument in war and politics.”91 In his
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Rhetoric, Aristotle argues that while forensic rhetoric seeks just outcomes,
deliberative debate seeks advantage. Though Thucydides precedes
Aristotle, he raises questions about such boundaries: the rhetoric of both
speeches belongs to the forensic courtroom, yet the outcome is determined
by expediency.92
Conclusion
Thucydides has used the city of Plataea as an obvious marker to define four
stages in this sequence of action and argument. At this point we should
explore the various ideas, motifs, and situations connected to Plataea’s role
in the History. We may begin by comparing and contrasting material from
the fourth Plataean episode with earlier Plataean episodes. The sequence
moves from all narrative in the first section to a full set of speeches in the
fourth. In the first three episodes focusing on Plataea, unpredictable
weather or luck arrived in time to save Plataea; in the fourth, neither allies
nor “supernatural” aid arrive at all. As the Plataeans see it, the Spartans
are their only hope (h9 mo/nh e0lpi/j–3.57.4).93 The Plataeans ask the
Spartans to be their saviors (soteras–3.59.4). Such pleas are rejected.
With regard to the first incident, we are given new information in this
fourth episode from the Plataeans. We learn that the invasion in 431 took
place at the sacred time of month (3.56.2). More significantly, when the
Plataeans appeal to the law of all Greeks not to kill suppliants (3.58.3; cf.
3.56, 3.59.2), we should recall their actions against the Theban prisoners
executed at 2.5.7. Were the Thebans suppliants? If so, have the Plataeans
themselves violated the very principle they cite here? Are the Plataeans
truly suppliants in 427? If so, does the earlier Plataean action permit the
Spartans to deal harshly with them now? The Thebans surrendered to the
Plataeans after invading their city. The Plateans have surrendered them-
selves to the “judgment” of the Spartans. Thucydides sets up the situation
so that the reader recalls the earlier incident, seen now in the light of two
competing interpretations.
With regard to the second episode, the Thebans recall the Plataeans’
opportunity to “opt out” of the war—they could have remained neutral
(3.64.3; cf. 2.74). Thucydides himself says that the Spartans believe the
Plataean rejection of this offer frees them from earlier obligations toward
Plataea (3.68.1). When in book 3 the Plataeans anticipate the probable
success of convincing the Spartans to spare their lives, they appeal to
Pausanias (3.58.5) and invoke the Spartans’ ancestors’ graves (3.59.2). Yet
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the Plataeans (and the reader) should recall that an earlier Plataean
attempt to evoke Pausanias and the battle of Plataea did not succeed
(2.74.2). At that time, Archidamus had a ready answer to the Plataeans’
appeals. How is the situation in 427 different? Is a similar argument likely
to have different results now?94
In the third episode, the Plataeans executed their escape successfully;
here their words are unsuccessful. That is, in action they were almost
wholly successful with only a single casualty (3.24.3); their appeals to the
Spartans now are totally unsuccessful: more than two hundred Plataeans
are executed. The Plataeans have made choices in the past: to kill the
Thebans prisoners (2.4.6, 2.6.1); to reject Archidamus’ offers (2.72–74);
to escape (3.20–24); and finally to hand over their city to the Spartan
judges (3.52). They must now abide by the consequences of these actions.
The fourth episode also has links to other speech and action in the
History, most prominently the Mytilenian debate and narrative. As
Connor notes: the “first part of the third book develops a parallelism
between the events on Lesbos and the continuing siege of Plataea”; he
then enumerates an extensive list of parallels which promotes this com-
parison.95 In book 3, Thucydides has structured the narrative in such a way
that we are asked to compare the Plataeans’ plight with that of the
Mytilenians. There is also rhetorical responsion. The labeling of the
Spartans as “judges” (dicastai) recalls the point disputed by Cleon and
Diodotus concerning whether justice is the goal of the Athenian assembly,
and to what extent the members of the assembly should think of them-
selves as being in a courtroom.96 After the relevance of justice to foreign
policy has been explicitly debated in the Athenian assembly—which, in a
close vote, endorses Diodotus’ recommendation—it is striking to find both
the Plataeans and Thebans appealing to justice in their speeches. For
example, the Plataeans ask whether the Spartans would actually choose
their own immediate “advantage” (chresimon) and ignore their obligation
to Plataea for past actions.97
“ei0 ga_r tw~| au0ti/ka xrhsi/mw| u9mw~n te kai\ e0kei/nwn polemi/w| to\ di/kaion
lh/yesqe, tou= me\n o0rqou= fanei=sqe ou0k a)lhqei=j kritai\ o1ntej, to\ de\
cumfe/ron ma~llon qerapeu/ontej.”
“If you are going to take as your standards of justice your own immediate
advantage and their hostility toward us, you will clearly not be true judges
of right, but rather servants of advantage.” (3.56.3)
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The Spartans will be seen not to be “true judges” (ou0k a)lhqei=j kritai\
o1ntej); rather they will have chosen advantage (to\ cu/mferon) over the
right thing (tou= o0rqou).
Noting that both speeches in the Plataean debate are “filled with the
language of justice and piety,” Connor says the effect is that the speeches
emphasize:
the discrepancy between the real world and an ideal world in which such
appeals would be effective . . . [we are left with the] ineffectiveness of
promises, of oaths, of obligations to friends and benefactors, indeed of any-
thing except triumphant, dominant self-interest or advantage.98
Macleod remarks that the Spartans “still make a show of their reputed
virtue by allowing a kind of trial, whose apparent purpose is to establish
guilt or innocence (52.2, 53.4). But this trial is a travesty of legal forms.”99
The Plataean argument insists that if they are executed, the Spartans are
not true judges, yet the immediately preceding debate over Mytilene has
called into question the validity of morality for foreign policy. This may be
seen as a clear example of how “dated” the Plataeans are. The effect of a
two-year siege has cut them off from what passes for effective argument.
On the questions of alliance and neutrality, past action and future advan-
tage, we find thematic connections between the Plataean and Corcyrean
debates. The reader may well recall the first debate in the History where
these issues were originally voiced (1.33–43). The Corinthians argued that
their past service to the Athenians should induce the Athenians to reject
the proposed alliance with Corcyra, who could point to no such past service.
The Corcyreans could only promise future advantages (somewhat like the
Thebans in this case, from the Spartan perspective). The Athenians then
acted in terms of self-interest (1.44); now during wartime the Spartans act
in the same way.100
Along these lines, there is an obvious point to make. Thucydides uses
paired speeches for the Corcyrean and the Plataean debates to recreate for his
readers (and auditors) the experience of hearing competing arguments that
would have been familiar to a late fifth-century Athenian audience. That is,
the arguments are modeled on oral discourse found in the Athenian assem-
bly and courtrooms. With its emphasis on guilt, responsibility, and punish-
ment (or acquittal), the Plataean debate in particular evokes forensic speech.
A significant distinction is that rather than individuals speaking, Thucydides
presents the cities of Plataea and Thebes as unified communities functioning
as defendants and prosecutors—as in the Corcyrean debate.101
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Other connections are implicitly suggested. We have already compared
and contrasted this episode with the situation of the Mytilenians in book
3. The Mytilenian revolt is triggered by a Spartan promise to receive
Lesbos as an ally, yet the Spartans fail to provide aid (3.25–35). Despite
their impressive strength on the sea (3.18–19), the Athenians cannot
reach Plataea. Thucydides has once again drawn the contrast of the
Peloponnesian strength on land with that of the Athenians at sea.102
In the next chapter I will look at Melos and return to the question of neu-
trality—for both Melos and Plataea. I would close now with one other jux-
taposition already mentioned: namely, Plataea’s situation in comparison
with that of Athens. Both have their territory invaded and are put under
attack; the Peloponnesian forces move “not to Attica but to Plataea” (2.71).
The points of comparison with Athens include siege and defensive strategy.
When, however, the Plataeans refer to themselves as “mainlanders” (epeiro-
tai–3.54.4), we note a stark contrast: in Pericles’ war strategy the Athenians
are asked to think of themselves as “islanders” (nesiotai–1.143.5). There are
enough similarities between the two situations to see a connection, but the
contrasts—Athenian access to the sea, a powerful navy, etc.—distinguish
Plataea and also serve to highlight their mistake in trusting Athenian
promises of help in all circumstances.103
Thucydides’ presentation of Plataea offers us an example of punctuated his-
tory. When each episode breaks off and Thucydides fails to connect an early
passage to a later one, the reader’s task is to make those connections. The flip
side, that is, of the historian’s structuring of the narrative with presentation,
interruption, and resumption, is the task of juxtaposition on the reader’s part.
As we read and reread, we come to appreciate the interconnectedness of this
work: the arguments and events which are presented early in the work are
later echoed, adapted, and transformed. The reader needs actively to create
such links. An aspect of conjecture and extrapolation—a part of eikazein, ety-
mologically—is to find the “similarity” or “likeness” (eikon) episode A shares
with episodes B, C, or D. The reader may develop a facility for juxtaposition
and application in other contexts by keeping track of the various figures,
cities, conflicts, and arguments which arise—in this case, we have focused on
Plataea.104 Because Thucydides’ modern audience consists of readers, such
juxtapositions are physically and intellectually feasible: a reader may return
to compare an earlier section (available on papyrus roll, codex, or CD) from
a more distant, retrospective perspective. To the extent that Thucydides’
original audience may have included readers and auditors, juxtaposition and
comparison may have been most effectively accomplished by a group. I will
discuss such a scenario in chapters 9 and 10.
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5
Historical Lessons in the 
Melian Episode
his chapter on the Melian episode (5.84–116) focuses on the Texperience of the reader, yet this is a case where we ought to distin-
guish between multiple experiences of the text. On the one hand, the
first-time reader may assume an engaged perspective, viewing the conflict
from the perspective of the figures involved. Indeed, dialogue is a particu-
larly useful form for securing such an engagement. Yet this episode may also
be viewed productively from the more distant stance of the retrospective
reader. While I will not ignore the experience of the engaged reader, I will
be emphasizing the significance of the retrospective vantage point.
Thucydides calls attention to the Melian episode by its unique form: it
presents the only extended dialogue in the History. This chapter argues
that in addition to this unusual feature, a second aspect—both unusual
and insufficiently noted—is that both sides’ arguments offer the type of
instruction which is parallel to that offered by Thucydides to his reader.1
These connections are implicit and are best appreciated by the re-reader
(or second-time auditor). Indeed, by considering the experience the read-
er has gained from the earlier books of the History, we are able to uncov-
er and appreciate the lessons of history relevant to this confrontation.
The Athenians attempt to teach the Melians what the reader has already
learned in the History: that in spite of the conventional appeals found in
diplomatic discourse, cities base their decisions on expediency. For their
part, in seeking to persuade Athens to allow them to remain neutral, the
Melians must be able to refer to both past action and future possibility.
Although the Athenians say such discussion is out-of-bounds, here, too,
the reader appreciates the importance of what the Melians try to do, for
a second lesson of the History is that statesmen—and citizens—must con-
sider the past and speculate about the future. By setting what the
Athenians and the Melians say and do in the broader context of
81
Morrison_CH5_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:44 PM  Page 81
Thucydides’ History and applying the lessons of the first five books (some
of which has been analyzed in chapters 3 and 4), the reader is in an excel-
lent position to evaluate argument and action.2 Thucydides’ employment
of a novel format helps to drive home the lessons that the reader is
expected to have learned from considering the History as a whole. In
essence, the Athenian-Melian exchange has become a kind of test case
for the reader, asking how much the reader has learned by the end of five
books.
Much of scholarly opinion concerning this conflict insists that the
reader must make a choice. The Melians may be seen as victims, as de
Romilly argues:
The choice is obvious, as far as sympathy is concerned. The Melians are
presented as having a very vivid sense of their independence ([5.]100);
they act justly (104) and courageously (113): all these features are com-
pliments for Thucydides when he can apply them to Athens. Similarly, he
takes care to secure the reader’s sympathy for the Melians by frequently
recalling the cruel situation in which they are placed, and the fact that
they have right on their side.3
Alternatively, the Athenians—if amoral—may be thought of as merciful
in their quest to avoid bloodshed. Bosworth goes so far as to label this
approach of the Athenians “humanitarian.” Rather than simply overpow-
ering the small city, he contends, Athens gives the Melians the opportu-
nity to save themselves:
Harsh as [the Athenians’] language undoubtedly is . . . it has a humanitar-
ian end, to convince the Melian oligarchs of the need to capitulate and
save themselves and the commons the horrors of a siege. If they acted sen-
sibly, there would be no bloodshed, or even damage to property.4
This problem of interpretation arises from the authorial reticence of
Thucydides, who withholds judgment and commentary. Thucydides omits
any explicit judgment about the prudence or morality of Melos or Athens.
Never in his own voice does Thucydides call the Athenians evil or clever,
nor does he ever label the Melians foolish or brave.5 This reticence, of
course, is almost universal throughout the History: as Westlake notes,
Thucydides seldom renders an explicit judgment of individuals, groups, or
their decisions.6
In the end, each side fails to persuade the other; neither Athens nor
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Melos wins the argument. One effect of the dialogue form and the lack of
rhetorical resolution is that a balance is created between the claims of the
Melians and the Athenians. I find myself endorsing Wasserman’s assess-
ment from almost sixty years ago:
Thucydides uses the form of the dialogue to make his readers listen to the
arguments from both sides. Both his Athenians and his Melians so con-
vincingly advance their points that either side has been taken mistakenly
as his mouthpiece, while in reality both parties are intended to be seen
together to give the complete picture.7
The failure of either side to convince the other reflects both strengths and
weaknesses in each side’s arguments. Only a retrospective reading of the
dialogue will allow us, as readers, accurately to assess both arguments and
the reasons for the Melians’ and Athenians’ failure to persuade one
another.8
Goals
Let us begin by juxtaposing the goals of each side with possible conse-
quences. Early on, the Melians express their apprehension regarding war,
if they are in the right and do not give in to Athens, or slavery, if the
Athenians are persuasive (5.86). Much of the discourse thereafter consists
of the Melians arguing to maintain their neutral status, or to evoke images
of a successful resistance with help from Sparta or the gods. There are
three apparent avenues for Melos: to give in and “join” Athens (that is,
become subject allies), to remain neutral, or to resist. Clearly the third
option of resistance is more open-ended and dangerous: it is an all-or-
nothing decision, leading to success or destruction.9 The first two possible
outcomes—acquiescence or neutrality—can result only from negotiation.
On the Athenian side, there appear to be the same three options from
the opposite perspective: persuade the Melians, allow them to remain neu-
tral, or attack. (Neutrality is dismissed, but theoretically the Melians could
prove persuasive.) But before considering these choices from the
Athenian point of view, we should emphasize the significant option of dis-
course itself. The military situation has put the Athenians in a position to
attack immediately, but they choose to discuss the situation with the
Melians first. If they begin an assault and Melos resists, the city could be
destroyed with its value to Athens diminished. We may conclude that the
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Athenians initiate the dialogue with a single goal in mind: to gain control
of an intact city and rule Melos “without toil” (aponos–5.91.2).10 In light
of this, we should recognize that while the Athenians have the option of
attacking and putting the city under siege, the very fact that they are talk-
ing at all implies that they would prefer to persuade the Melians.
Rules for Discourse
Each side fails to convince the other: the Melians do not acquiesce; the
Athenians reject neutrality.11 Why? As we turn to a detailed analysis of the
arguments in the dialogue, we note the importance of rules regarding how
to proceed. The failure of each side derives partly from a rejection of
exploring all possibilities in discussion. Let us examine the various restric-
tions placed on context and discussion, concerning audience, format, and
subject. First, as the dialogue is not spoken before a majority of citizens,
the spokesmen—that is, the interlocutors—for the Melians are just a few
of their citizens who hold office (5.84.3).12 According to the Athenians,
this advances the Melians’ interests in at least two ways:
“o3pwj dh\ mh\ cunexei= r9h/sei oi9 polloi\ e0pagwga_ kai\ a)ne/legkta
e0sa&pac a)kou/santej h9mw~n a)pathqw~sin.”
“So that a majority of citizens may not hear a continuous speech—at the
same time attractive and immune from cross examination—and be
deceived.” (5.85)
The audience is restricted—the majority (hoi polloi) are not addressed.
Without the majority of the Melians, who may favor accommodation with
Athens, the small set of Melians involved concentrates its energies on the
goal of neutrality.13 A second and related restriction is that—in contrast to
all previous speeches14—the Athenians propose a point-by-point discus-
sion, allowing for immediate response. This is justified in part by reference
to the deceptive power of set speeches (5.85).15 From the reader’s perspec-
tive, not only is the format of dialogue striking, but we must also reckon
with what the Athenians say about long speeches, namely, that they are
deceptive because they are “attractive and immune from cross examina-
tion” (e0pagwga_ kai\ a)ne/legkta–5.89). This must cause some uneasiness
for the reader, who is now forced to revisit the previous speeches within
the History in an entirely new light.16 To what extent have the speeches
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from the first five books been deceptive? When have they been manipula-
tive? In what sense are they unanswerable or irrefutable? Thucydides has
highlighted the choice of format for this discussion by raising the question
as to whether the dialogue form is actually a better way to arrive at the
truth.17 By criticizing set speeches, Thucydides is able to privilege dialogue
over extended speech at this point of the History. This may also be seen as
advice to employ dialogue when the audience discusses the History (yes,
more of this in chapters 9 and 10—I realize that by now expectations for
these chapters must be quite high).
Besides concerns of audience and format, the third stipulation estab-
lished by the Athenians imposes severe restrictions upon what is “allowed”
to be explored. The encounter between Athens and Melos, as Thucydides
has structured it, is not a military contest; rather it is rhetorical. A dialogue
would appear to grant both sides equal standing, but the fact that Athens
has insisted that the discussion follow a prescribed route reduces the
advantages Melos may gain from a point-by-point discussion.18 The range
of subjects is not open-ended, as the Athenians continually try to elimi-
nate certain topics from discussion. Nonetheless, the dialogue format
tremendously helps the Melians, who are able to make repeated efforts to
redefine and restructure the discourse in order to allow for a broader range
of exchange. If the Athenians had laid out the ground rules in a first set
speech, there could have been no Melian response. The dialogue form not
only permits Melos to challenge Athenian assertions, but it also allows
them to call into question and resist the rules of discussion as laid down by
the Athenians. Purely from the Melian point of view, the first two stipu-
lations (small audience and dialogue form) are sufficiently advantageous to
allow them to neutralize the third restriction regarding admissible topics.19
Advantage, Not Justice: The Athenians’ Lesson
Let us survey how Athens restricts the range of allowable issues. Early 
in the dialogue when the Melians say that if they are in the right
(perigenome/noij me\n tw~| dikai/w|–5.86) war will come, the Athenians
immediately insist that the discussion is only about the survival (soteria) of
the city of Melos.20
“Ei0 me\n toi/nun u9ponoi/aj tw~n mello/ntwn logiou/menoi h2 a!llo ti
cunh/kete h2 e0k tw~n paro/ntwn kai\ w{n o9ra~te peri\ swthri/aj
bouleu/sontej th=| po/lei, pauoi/meq a!n: ei0 d e0pi\ tou=to, le/goimen a!n.”
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“If you have met to weigh your suspicions about the future or for any other
reason except to deliberate concerning the safety for your city on the basis
of the present circumstances as you see them, we would stop; but if that
[the safety for your city] is the reason, we would speak.” (5.87)
In part, the Athenians object to “suspicions about the future” (discussed
below), but it also appears that the Melians’ mention of justice (5.86)
leads the Athenians to threaten to cut off dialogue entirely: the Melians
must limit discussion to the issue of survival. The Athenians themselves
rephrase this restriction in a number of ways: only the issues of survival,21
safety,22 reasonable expectation,23 and the disparity between strong and
weak are relevant.24 That is, the Athenians attempt to collapse a large
number of potential topics for discussion into one basic idea: the contin-
ued existence of Melos.25
The Athenians consider off-limits any mention of justice, fine deeds,
freedom, shame, and the past or future. Regarding justice, the Athenians
openly say:
“ (Hmei=j toi/nun ou1te au0toi\ met  o0noma&twn kalw~n, w(j h2 dikai//wj to\n
Mh=don katalu/santej a!rxomen h2 a))dikou//menoi nu=n e0pecerxo/meqa,
lo/gwn mh=koj a!piston pare/comen, ou1q u9ma~j a)ciou=men h2 o3ti
Lakedaimoni/wn a!poikoi o1ntej ou0 cunestrateu/sate h2 w(j h99ma~~j ou00de\\n
h00dikh//kate le/gontaj oi1esqai pei/sein.”
“Then we on our side will use no fine phrases to furnish a lengthy, uncon-
vincing speech ourselves about having a right to rule because we defeated
the Persians, or attacking now because we were wronged. We do not expect
you to think you will persuade us by saying that you are colonists of Sparta
and have not joined them in war, or that you have never done us any harm.”
(5.89)
Any mention of justice (dikai/wj, a)dikou/menoi, ou0de\n h0dikh/kate) is
rejected. The idea that justice is irrelevant to foreign policy recurs promi-
nently in the History—this is explored more fully in the Mytilenian
debate.26 Here Athens argues that justice must yield to self-interest (5.90,
5.104); the only law (nomos) is the law of ruling where one is strong (ou[
a@n krath=| a!rxein–5.105).27 There are other issues which the Athenians
declare out of bounds. When the Melians insist that they are “still free”
(e1ti e0leuqe/roij) and it would be “cowardly and base” (pollh\ kako/thj
kai\ deili/a–5.100) if they submitted to Athens, the Athenians respond
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that the issue is not goodness or shame (a)ndragaqi/aj . . . ai0sxu/nhn
–5.101), but rather survival (soteria–5.101). In fact, to be defeated—and
yet survive—is “not unseemly” (ou0k a)prepe/j–5.111.4).28
Remarkable throughout is the utterly frank way in which the
Athenians address the Melians.29 Yet a lesson lies here, for the reader—
with the advantage of having read the History—recognizes the disparity
between speech and action. Previously in the History when one city has
attempted to persuade another in diplomatic discourse, the usual practice
is to invoke justice, honor, and the glorious deeds of the past, in addition
to the advantages to be gained.30 The audiences of such speeches at the
very least hear that a particular course of action has both strategic and
moral implications. We have seen this in the Corcyrean and Corinthian
speeches in book 1 and the Plataean debate in book 3 (chapters 3 and 4).
And yet, as Thucydides demonstrates, cities make decisions on the basis
of advantage. For example, the Athenians bring the Corcyreans into a
defensive alliance due to their navy and the important route to the west
(1.44.2–3). Although the rhetoric in the Plataean debate is laden with
moral language, Sparta executes the Plataeans because the Thebans were
“useful” (ophelimous–3.68.4).31 By pointedly indicating after speeches
what the actual motives were, Thucydides highlights the “disconnect”
between the rhetoric of justice found in debates and the decisions them-
selves which are based on expediency. What is so unusual about the
Melian dialogue is that the Athenians have called into question a whole
set of basic appeals normally used in diplomatic discourse. Andrewes
comments:
Thucydides distorts his political picture by leaving out arguments which
may have seemed superficial to him but played a practical part in per-
suading fifth-century assemblies to their decisions. The still starker exclu-
sion of o0no/mata kala& [“fine phrases”] from the Dialogue is a still more
violent distortion. The danger of stripping away the pretences, attractive
as the attempt may be to a critical historian, is that with them you strip
away the actual incentives which decide the ordinary man’s vote.32
Yet this is precisely what the Athenians have done. They have stripped
away the elevated appeals to country, honor, and justice. How are we to
explain this attempt to narrow the discussion?
We have just referred to the way in which Thucydides frequently jux-
taposes diplomatic discourse in speech (which includes moral language)
with the actual bases for decisions as recounted in the narrative (which are
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offered exclusively in terms of expediency). Given this backdrop, we may
view what the Athenians are doing here—arguing that the discussion
must be restricted to advantage and survival—as a kind of instruction for
the Melians which is analogous to what Thucydides teaches the reader of
his History. Of course, such lessons are introduced in a particular context
and may not be applied simplistically to all other situations. Here, howev-
er, it is evident the Athenians are attempting to teach the Melians what
the reader has already learned: that decisions are based on considerations
of advantage, not elevated sentiments or a rosy picture of the past. If the
Melians are hoping to affect the outcome of the current conflict, they
need to limit their discussion to factors that will actually influence the
Athenians. The rest is superfluous.33 On this reading, even the third
restriction on permissible topics may be seen as having Melian interests at
heart. In the end the Athenians fail to teach the Melians this lesson. Such
a lesson, however, must be taken seriously, because by this point of the
History the reader has already witnessed how decisions are made. What
Athens says to the Melians should strike the reader as accurate. When the
Melians fail to limit their argument to the topics of safety and advantage,
this ultimately dooms their attempt to persuade the Athenians to allow
them to remain neutral.
Before turning to the Melians’ arguments, we should note the distance
created between the reader and the Melians. In one sense, the reader may
be fully engaged, actively trying to assess and supplement the arguments of
both sides, but in another sense there is a marked gap between what the
reader knows and what the Melians insist on doing. To the extent that by
reading Thucydides’ History the reader has “experienced” the war, the
reader is now better versed in the ways of the world than the Melians,
whose survival depends upon a sounder appreciation of Realpolitik. In this
case, the Melians appear to be unaware of the gulf between diplomatic dis-
course and actual decision-making. Thucydides’ History not only makes
this distinction clear, but uses Melos to illustrate the danger of failing to
distinguish between moral appeals and prudent decisions. The effect is one
of strong dramatic irony and pathos.34
Redefining Advantage: The Melians’ Argument
Let us now turn to the Melians’ arguments as they try to dissuade Athens
from attacking. Clearly the Melians have a difficult task. They are out-
matched in terms of military power; all they have are words and argu-
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ments, yet even here they face restrictions.35 In a variety of ways, howev-
er, the Melians redefine or simply disregard Athenian limitations on pos-
sible discourse. We might think the Melians would do better to speak
directly, as the Athenians do, and to limit their remarks to matters of
expediency. To this extent, they have failed to learn the lesson of the
Athenians—and of Thucydides’ History. In one area, however, the
Melians offer valuable advice, namely, in their discussion of past and
future, a lesson which the Athenians fail to appreciate.
The Melians begin by trying to redefine the concept of justice (which
the Athenians will not allow) in terms of advantage (which the
Athenians prize).36
“ [Hi me\n dh\ nomi/zome/n ge, xrh/simon a0na&gkh ga&r, e0peidh\ u9mei=j ou3tw
para_ to\ di/kaion to\ cumfe/ron le/gein u9pe/qesqe mh\ katalu/ein u9ma~j to\
koino\n a)gaqo/n, a)lla_ tw~| ai0ei\ e0n kindu/nw| gignome/nw| ei]nai ta_ ei0ko/ta
kai\ di/kaia,37 kai/ ti kai\ e0nto\j tou= a)kribou=j pei/santa& tina w)fe*
lhqh=nai.”
“Then we at least believe it an advantage [xrh/simon]—necessarily, since
you require us to speak of expediency [to\ cumfe/ron] apart from justice [to\
di/kaion]—that you should not destroy a universal good [to\ koino\n
a)gaqo/n]—but that at all times there should be such a thing as fairness and
justice [ta_ ei0ko/ta kai\ di/kaia] for those in danger and that it should be
permissible to find help by an argument that falls short of precision.”
(5.90)
This is not so much collapsing justice and advantage, as it is pointing out
the advantages of justice.38 Even the Athenians, the Melians suggest,
might find themselves in a situation where the concept of justice is valu-
able. Part of the Athenians’ response is a lack of concern for the empire’s
demise—they willingly take on this risk—but the Athenians’ other point
is that the Melians are speculating about the future. The Athenians wish
to speak only about the present, in terms of advantage to their empire and
the survival of Melos (5.91). The Melians then ask how it could be advan-
tageous (chresimon) for them to accept slavery (douleusai–5.92). The
Athenians respond that “we would assess as profit” (kerdai/noimen a!n) not
being destroyed (5.93).
The Melians attempt to equate justice with advantage and slavery with
disadvantage. The Athenians reject these equations, countering that sur-
vival is an advantage and not being annihilated is profit.39 At this point
89Historical Lessons in the Melian Episode
Morrison_CH5_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:44 PM  Page 89
the Athenian restriction holds: the only accepted coin is advantage. The
question for Melos is whether survival is enough of an advantage to relin-
quish autonomy—perhaps an advantage in itself—yet their continued
efforts at debate indicate that mere survival is not enough of an advantage
for them to sacrifice their independence.
But restricting discussion to advantage is not irrelevant to the
Athenians. Where does their advantage lie? The Melians, who raise this
issue, argue that if safety (asphaleia) is the highest goal of the Athenians,
the Athenians may be less “safe” (that is, in a less advantageous position)
by attacking Melos, for this would encourage other neutral powers to turn
away from Athens, thus helping Athens’ enemies (5.98). The Athenians
respond that—as for now—neutral mainlanders are not as threatening as
Melos. 
“We do not consider dangerous states on the mainland [epeirotai] due to
their liberty, for their precautions against us will be a long time in coming
[pollh\n th\n diame/llhsin]. We do consider dangerous islanders like your-
selves, who are outside the empire [nhsiw&taj. . . a)na&rktouj], and sub-
jects who have already [h1dh] become exasperated by our empire’s
constraints. These are the people who are most likely to act in a reckless
manner [tw~| a)logi/stw|] and to bring both themselves and us into fore-
seeable danger.” (5.99)
We have already learned that the Melians are not like other islanders,
because they are not willing to follow Athens (ou0k h1qelon u9pakou/ein
w#sper oi9 a!lloi nhsiw~tai–5.84.2). Athens finds the Melians threaten-
ing, as “islanders . . . outside the the empire” (nhsi/wtaj. . .
a)na&rktouj–5.99), and, as a naval power (naukratoron–5.97, 5.109), can-
not allow Melos to remain neutral. To this extent, it is the island status of
Melos that concerns Athens. Neutral islands make Athens appear weak,
thus encouraging reckless attacks (5.97, 5.99). Yet although the
Athenians distinguish between immediate threat and what may occur at
some point in the future, they imply that if neutrals on the mainland pose
no immediate threat, they may be disregarded. Only the here and now is
important.
The Melians have attempted to redefine justice and safety by consider-
ing the advantages of morality and neutrality; they hypothesize a potential
“turning of tables” by sketching out the future consequences of Athenian
action. Given the Athenian response, the Melians then begin to resist the
Athenians’ rhetorical restrictions. While such resistance is ultimately
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unsuccessful in persuading Athens, the Melians’ arguments at 5.100ff.
amount to a nullification of the original stipulations on permissible dis-
course. The Melians revert to appealing to moral concepts, such as shame
(5.100), freedom (5.112), and justice.40 For example, “Nevertheless we
trust in chance from god not to be defeated, as righteous men who stand
in opposition to unjust ones [o3sioi pro\j ou0 dikai/ouj]” (5.104). By resist-
ing the Athenians’ “rules,” the Melians are able to raise a broader range of
issues than the Athenians are willing to address. This does not affect the
short-term outcome: the Spartans do not help; Athens is victorious with
its siege; Melos is destroyed. Although the Athenians win militarily, how-
ever, their prohibitions fail to constrain the Melians’ words. As “masters of
the sea” the Athenians are successful; as “masters of discourse” they can-
not control the Melians.41 In countering and nullifying Athenian restric-
tions, the Melians raise an important issue: the long-term consequences of
Athenian policy.42 Let us now turn to the significance of pondering histo-
ry and the future.
Past and Future: A Lesson of Thucydides’ History
The Melians’ goal in the dialogue is to persuade the Athenians to allow
their neutral status. Yet it appears that if the Melians are to be successful,
they have to deal with past events and future possibilities—with what
Thucydides’ History itself addresses. We recall that early in the dialogue the
Athenians threaten to stop the discussion if the Melians speculate about
the future (5.87). In her discussion of the Thebans’ speech in book 3,
Arnold remarks that “while the Spartans in effect deny the relevance of
the past, in the Melian dialogue the Athenians reject the relevance of the
future.”43 In fact, the dialogue is more complex: we find that both Athens
and Melos discuss not only the present but also the past and future, albeit
in extremely restricted ways.
The Athenians apparently assert the irrelevance of the past. They will not
be introducing recollections of their victory over the Persians and their right
to empire; in turn, however, they do not wish to hear about the Melians’
innocence (5.89). Past actions, the Athenians maintain in this passage, are
not applicable to the current confrontation.44 Elsewhere, however, the
Athenians themselves do look to the past. At the end of the dialogue, they
remind the Melians that they have never previously given up a siege out of
fear of other powers (5.111.1). The Athenians’ characterization of the cau-
tious behavior of the Spartans (5.105.3–4, 5.107, 5.109) is evidently based
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on the past—certainly the reader has noted incidents prior to 416 which sup-
port this (for example, the Spartans fail to assist the Mytilenians in their
attempted revolt—3.25–33). That is, they selectively recount the past in
order to persuade Melos. The Athenians’ apparent rejection of discussing
past and future is stated broadly; they do not want events concerning justice
or innocence brought up. The past, however, is relevant for the Athenians
when it concerns power and action. The Melians themselves disregard this
prohibition concerning the past, basing their final rejection of Athens on
history, specifically their seven hundred years of freedom (5.112).
Both Athens and Melos present extremely restricted visions of the past.
This narrowness results from each side’s refusal to acknowledge issues the
other side introduces. Melos has no response to the Athenians’ character-
ization of past Spartan action—which the reader knows to a large extent
to be accurate. By failing to acknowledge the significance of previous cau-
tion and tentativeness on the part of the Spartans, the Melians put them-
selves in a poor position to determine the chances of their receiving future
aid. On the other side, by refusing to allow shame, justice, or freedom into
the discussion, the Athenians ignore an essential component of how the
Melians define themselves in terms of their own history.
We also find each side making fine distinctions regarding the future.
The Melians equate action with hope and inaction with despair.
“kai\ h9mi=n to\ me\n ei]cai eu0qu\j a)ne/lpiston, meta_ de\ tou= drwme/nou e1ti
kai\ sth=nai e0lpi\j o0rqw~j.”
“And for us to yield immediately is to give up hope, but with action there
is still the hope of success.” (5.102)
The Melians look ahead to a variety of possibilities. Aid may come from
Sparta in the future (5.104, 5.106, 5.108, 5.110, 5.112.2); the Athenian
empire may fall (5.90, 5.98, 5.110); the gods may intervene (5.104,
5.112.2).45 In support of the likelihood of successful military resistance are
chance, hope, and the idea that the Spartans will take on the risk.46 The
Spartans may even, the Melians speculate, attack Athenian land (5.110).
At first the Athenians say they are dismissive of thinking about the
future. Hope is expensive (e0lpi/j . . . da&panoj ga_r fu/sei) and belongs
to the “invisible future” (e0pi\ ta_j a)fanei=j) in a category containing
prophecies and oracles (5.103).47 In part, this is a rhetorical move on the
Athenians’ part. By cutting off objections the Melians might raise, they set
the rules of the debate in such a way that their victory is guaranteed. The
92 Chapter 5
Morrison_CH5_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:44 PM  Page 92
Athenians characterize the Melians’ speculation as “senselessness” (to\
a!fron–5.105) and denigrate their claim to foresee the future more clear-
ly than what is actually in front of them.
“ta_ me\n me/llonta tw~n o9rwme/nwn safe/stata kri/nete, ta_ de\ a)fanh=
tw~| bou/lesqai w(j gigno/mena h1dh qea~sqe.”
“You consider the future as clearer than what is before your eyes, and in
using wishful thinking you already look on the unforeseeable as taking
place.” (5.113)
Throughout the dialogue the Melians attempt to get the Athenians to think
about the possible consequences of their action (neutrals allying themselves
with Sparta, Sparta coming to help, divine intervention, the fall of the
empire)—not as certainties, but as plausible contingencies which should
influence Athenian decision-making.48 The Melians ignore Athenian limits on
discussion, but the Athenians reject contemplation of these future scenarios.49
Two points should be made. First, the Athenians themselves fail to
observe their own restriction on future speculation. In fact, the Athenians
find their own vision of the future worth contemplating. The Athenians
assume that if the Melians resist, the city will be destroyed (pro\ tou= ta_
deino/tata paqei=n–5.93)50; the Melians may hope for Spartan aid but the
Spartans will never arrive (5.105, 5.107).51 While shutting out the alter-
native scenarios of the Melians, the Athenians advance an optimistic set
of possibilities promoting their own interest. Just as the Athenians have
failed to “teach” Melos the importance—even the necessity—of arguing in
terms of advantage, so the Melians have failed to “teach” Athens the value
of recollecting the past and contemplating future contingencies.52
A comparison between the Melian Dialogue and a Socratic dialogue
offers an instructive parallel. Any dialogue—as a means of communication,
exploration, and persuasion—has the potential to raise questions which
may bring the interlocutor to realize his or her own misconceptions. Yet
the only side to ask questions is that of Melos. In part, this reflects the
reluctance of the Athenians to take on the role of learner; they evidently
think their only purpose is to teach.53 Subsequently, they fail to pay ade-
quate attention to issues the Melians raise.
The second and more important point has to do with the value of history
and the possibility of conjecturing usefully about the future. Macleod criti-
cizes the selective vision of Athens, commenting that the Athenians’ “refusal
to look into the future is far removed from the foresight (pronoi/a) which
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characterizes the Thucydidean statesman.” Contemplating what may tran-
spire is what “Diodotus conceives to be the object of political deliberation.”54
In both speech and narrative of the History, probing attention is given to the
importance of the past and the ability to plan for the future—we have seen
this especially in the case of Plataea and its trust in future Athenian aid.55
From the reader’s perspective—at this point in the History—saying that the
past is irrelevant goes against the entire spirit of Thucydides’ work: history is
useful, similar sorts of things may happen in the future, study of the past may
lead to learning (see especially 1.22.4).56 Just like Thucydides’ readers, politi-
cians, generals, citizens—and here, the Athenians and the Melians—must
contemplate the future and consider whether the consequences of a particu-
lar action may lead to any advantage.
It is one thing to argue that a particular consequence is unlikely and
give reasons for such a conclusion. At least Archidamus (1.80–85) and
Pericles (1.140–44) give a rationale for their strategies and try to account
for the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing side. But to make such a
blanket dismissal of the future as irrelevant, as Athens does here, is clear-
ly condemned by what Thucydides himself has already emphasized in his
work. The reader has learned to consider both the short- and long-term
effects of decisions and actions. For example, the Plataeans’ actions—exe-
cution of the Theban prisoners in 431 (2.5.7) and their rejection of the
Spartan offer of neutrality in 429 (2.72–74)—are used against them in
427, leading to their execution (3.66–67, 3.68.1). In the Melian episode,
however, the Athenians are interested only in the short term. More gen-
erally then, from the first five books of Thucydides’ History, the reader is
able to appreciate lessons concerning not only moral language and practi-
cal decision-making, but also the significance of the past and the necessi-
ty of anticipating the future. Thus the reader is sensitive to the Melians’
“pig-headedness”57 in insisting on moral sentiments, as well as Athens’
misguided neglect of past and future. By contrasting how Athens and
Melos argue and behave with what is taught in the preceding sections of
the History, the retrospective reader recognizes the inflexibility of Melos
and the recklessness of Athens.58 Let us turn now to other significant con-
nections the Melian episode has with the History.
Parallels and Contrasts with Melos
Beyond the general lessons of Thucydides’ History, scholars have seen a
great many connections between the Melian episode and other specific sit-
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uations, arguments, and themes from the History. While Thucydides never
explicitly tells us the significance of the Melian episode, the retrospective
reader is encouraged to engage in juxtaposition and comparison concern-
ing the context and motifs introduced in the Melian episode. In addition
to the relevance of Mytilene and Plataea,59 many have viewed the signifi-
cance of Melos in connection with the subsequent narrative, in particular,
regarding the Sicilian expedition in books 6–7, the defection of allies
(8.2ff.), and the end of the war in 404 (see Xen. HG 2.2.3). 
Immediately after Athens takes Melos, Thucydides turns his attention
to the Sicilian expedition at 6.1. Like Melos, Sicily is an island, although
much larger and more powerful.60 The Athenians are successful with
Melos, whereas they meet with unprecedented disaster in Sicily.61
Cartwright comments on the sequence of Melos followed by Sicily: “a
minor victory is followed by a major defeat, both arising from the same
cause, a paradoxical aspect of Athenian power revealed by the dialogue: in
some ways it limits, rather than enlarges, Athenian freedom of action.”62
Connor notes: “the reader knows that another island, Sicily, will soon
overcome an Athenian attack . . . [Athens, like Melos, is] forced to rely on
hope, chance, and speculation about the gods” (esp. 7.77.4).63
Once again in the case of Sicily, we might say that the Athenians reck-
lessly dismiss a serious consideration of future possibilities. Scholars who
make these connections are fully engaged in a process of comparison, jux-
taposition, and extrapolation (captured by the Greek word eikazein).64 The
retrospective reader is encouraged actively to participate in these very
exercises, for Thucydides’ use of self-reference within his History stimulates
such juxtapositions. I would like to focus upon one particular issue crucial
to the Melian episode: neutrality.
Thucydides himself calls attention to the neutral status of Melos at
5.84.2:65
a)lla_ to\ me\n prw~ton ou0dete/rwn o1ntej h9su/xazon, e1peita w(j au0tou\j
h0na&gkazon oi9 0Aqhnai=oi dh|ou=ntej th\n gh=n, e0j po/lemon fanero\n
kate/sthsan.
But at first [the Melians] remained neutral toward both sides, but then
when the Athenians pressured them by ravaging their land, they became
engaged in open war. (5.84.2)66
This passage and earlier mentions of Melos in the History raise several
questions. First, was Melos neutral or hostile to Athens in 416? When war
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began in 431, Thucydides indicated that Thera and Melos were the only
Cycladic islands not allied with Athens (2.9.4). In 426, Nicias took sixty
ships and two thousand hoplites to Melos. Thucydides observed that the
Melians did not wish to submit to Athens; after ravaging their land, the
Athenians sailed away (3.91.1–2).67 In 431, Melos was neutral; five years
later, it resisted an Athenian attack of short duration. Before the con-
frontation in 416, Melos appears to have had little involvement in the war.
Yet when Thucydides says that the Melians “were forced to come to open
war” (e0j po/lemon fanero\n kate/sthsen–5.84.2), to what occasion is he
referring? Apparently not to 416, for the Athenians have not yet begun
hostilities; they send ambassadors before attacking (5.82.3).68 Does the
open hostility refer to the raid of 426?69 If so, is Melos still hostile in
416–ten years later? How then can it claim neutrality? Could Melos pos-
sibly have resumed neutrality—perhaps in 421 with the peace of Nicias?
But if so, why does Thucydides omit any indication of this?70
The salient point, I think, is that in the incident from 416—as pre-
sented by Thucydides—the Athenians do not adduce earlier conflicts they
have had with Melos. Presumably they could have used the resistance of
the Melians in 426 as an excuse for their aggression, but they choose not
to do so. In part, this removes the dialogue somewhat from its historical
context, and gives it a more universal meaning.71 But from the reader’s per-
spective, knowledge of that previous conflict heightens an awareness of
Athens’ utter disregard of past action, as Thucydides shows the forces—
and blindness—which drive Athens on. Thucydides apparently has pre-
sented this conflict in such a way as to show that even if Melos were
completely and unambiguously neutral, Athens would still act to incorpo-
rate the island.72 By this point Athens no longer needs recourse to past hos-
tility to explain its own aggressiveness—the will to power is its own
driving force and no longer needs further justification.73
This is borne out by the Melians’ argument as well. In rejecting sub-
mission and yet desiring to avoid war, the Melians say they hope that
Athens will allow them to remain neutral. They even offer a definition of
neutrality:
“w#ste h9suxi/an a!gontaj h9ma~j fi/louj me\n ei]nai a)nti\ polemi/wn,
cumma&xouj de\ mhdete/rwn, ou0k a@n de/caisqe;”
“Would you not accept us keeping the peace, friends instead of enemies,
and allies of neither side?” (5.94)
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The Melians raise the specter—if Athens besieges them—of other neutrals
joining Sparta, thus strengthening Athens’ enemies (5.98). That is, the
Melians try to fit their goal of neutrality into the Athenian set of values,
which is apparently limited to power, safety, and advantage.74 The final
words of the Melians—after invoking freedom, chance, and hope of
Spartan aid—are an invitation to Athens:
“prokalou/meqa de\ u9ma~j fi/loi me\n ei]nai, pole/mioi de\ mhdete/roij, kai\
e0k th=j gh=j h9mw~n a)naxwrh=sai sponda_j poihsame/nouj ai3tinej
dokou=sin e0pith/deioi ei]nai a)mfote/roij.”
“We invite you to be our friends, and to be enemies to neither side, and
that you make a treaty which seems appropriate to both sides and then
leave our land.” (5.112.3)
But the Athenians have already stated their objection to neutrality.
Friendship, they say, is associated with weakness (h9 fili/a me\n a)sqeni/aj)
and brings harm rather than hatred (5.95).75 Power alone has become its
own justification.
In terms of Thucydides’ History, the option of neutrality was first con-
sidered by the Corcyreans when they sought an Athenian alliance.76 They
concluded in retrospect that such a policy was a mistake (1.32) and suc-
cessfully pursued an alliance with Athens. The Corcyrean episode prior to
the war forces us to consider seriously when neutrality could be a viable
option. If an island at the northwest edge of the Greek world can argue that
a policy of isolation is foolish, what chance does Melos—without a navy
and located in the Aegean (Athens’ sphere of domination)—have for dis-
engagement? Archidamus later offered the option of neutrality to the
Plataeans, which would have removed Plataea from the Athenian alliance
(2.72). Yet neutrality was again rejected, as Plataea insisted on maintain-
ing its relationship with Athens.77 Athens now insists that Melos not
remain neutral, for Athens controls the sea and Melos is an island. The
issue is not whether neutrality is an option. The question is whether neu-
trality is a viable option for this weak island at this time.
The situation in the Melian episode is similar to these previous situa-
tions in some respects, significantly reversed in others. Like Corcyra,
Melos has had, or at least claims, a policy of neutrality; unlike Corcyra,
however, Melos wishes to maintain such a status. Corcyra was independent
and had a navy; Melos is virtually without defense. Corcyra came to con-
sider neutrality a mistake; Melos considers neutrality to be its best option.
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Like Plataea, Melos rejects the alliance offered by a threatening power.
Plataea hoped for aid from Athens, yet this was compromised by the fact
that Plataea was land-locked and Athens’ power lay on the sea. A compa-
rable situation arises for Melos, which hopes for assistance, yet as an island
cannot be confident in aid from the land power, Sparta.78 In these three
situations—Corcyra, Plataea, and Melos—we find that neutrality is not a
viable option for one reason or another. The Melian episode has the effect
of forcing the reader to ask whether neutrality can ever exist. Under what
circumstances would it be possible for any city to opt out of the struggle of
the Peloponnesian War?79
In a practical sense, cities were able to remain neutral. In his work The
Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece, Bauslaugh provides several exam-
ples, such as Argos, that prove the point.80 Thucydides even comments on
the advantages Argos gained from alliances with both sides (a)mfote/roij
de\ ma~llon e1nspondoi o1ntej e0kkarpwsa&menoi–5.28.2).81 Yet before the
war Corcyra had a navy; Argos had an army. The question is not whether
neutrality can be a viable policy, but rather whether it is possible or advis-
able for a weak, small polis to claim neutrality.82 The Melians’ only hope—
given that their only recource is debate—is to argue in a way that will
persuade Athens. The Athenians insist upon arguments in terms of expe-
diency, yet, as we have seen, the Melians fail to abide by this stipulation:
instead we find Melos appealing to morality. Thucydides’ account of the
war thus far has made clear that for Melos to persuade Athens, it has to
articulate clear advantages for Athens. As Bauslaugh argues, the Melians
are now confronted with a “newly evolved ethos of hegemonial, imperial
Greek states that refused to accept any restraints on the pursuit of self-
interest.”83
The view of the retrospective reader instructs us in assessing the valid-
ity and wisdom of Melian and Athenian argument and action. In fact, it
turns out that we cannot evaluate what happens in the Melian episode—
what goes wrong and why, the Melians’ failure to see the difference
between diplomatic discourse and actual motivation, the Athenians’
selective vision of past and future—without setting this episode in the
context of the rest of the History. Everything demonstrated in the first five
books puts the reader in an epistemological position superior to that of the
Melians and the Athenians. In earlier situations in the History (the
Corcyrean episode, for example), Thucydides guides, instructs, and makes
connections for the reader.84 By the end of book 5, Thucydides has set a
more challenging project for the reader. The Melian episode may have
many goals, but one of these is to test the reader regarding what the
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History itself teaches.85 One of the retrospective reader’s tasks is to exam-
ine lessons from the rest of the History and apply them in this new con-
text. Thucydides’ world suggests not only the interconnectedness of cities,
but also the ways in which conflict and argument found in one setting may
be relevant to new situations. Neutrality may exist in late fifth-century
Greece, but in the world constructed by Thucydides, only those who have
learned the lessons of history have a chance of pursuing such a policy suc-
cessfully.86
As previously noted, like Corcyra and Plataea, Melos is not central to
the outcome of the war itself. Thucydides uses these three cities for a vari-
ety of purposes. Corcyra in part is valuable for introducing “participatory
history.” Plataea offered an example of punctuated history in which the
reader must trace action to later consequences. Melos makes clear that the
retrospective reader’s task in part is to explore each episode in the context
of lessons learned elsewhere—learned at least by the reader if not by the
participants involved. Just as Plataea was cut off by siege from the world of
diplomatic discourse (such as Diodotus’ arguments in the Mytilenian
debate), so too Melos may be seen as being naïve due to its previous neu-
trality. Melos’ disengagement has prevented it from learning how cities
argue and behave. On this point, the reader has a superior appreciation of
true motivation and the importance of the past.
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6
The Comparison of Cities and
Individuals
n this chapter we explore the comparison of cities and individuals. The I previous three chapters focused on specific city-states; the goal was to
demonstrate how Thucydides challenged the reader to become engaged in
participatory history (Corcyra), to link action to consequence and juxta-
pose speech with action (punctuated history centering on Plataea), and to
extrapolate from a relatively isolated event (the Melian episode) to other
lessons found in the History. In chapters 6 through 8, our attention now
turns to comparisons, maxims, and metaphorical expressions found pre-
dominantly in speeches. The challenge to the reader is similar in several
respects to that of participatory and punctuated history. First, Thucydides
presents speeches in a non-authoritative manner with the goal of engag-
ing the participation of the reader; he generally does not comment in his
own voice on the validity of the arguments presented. Second, like punc-
tuated history, the reader must juxtapose and compare different sections of
the History; that is, part of the reader’s participation consists of recalling
earlier passages where a similar argument applies to a different situation.
A third and related point is that while it is the distant or retrospective read-
er’s experience that especially helps us to appreciate these overarching
connections, because much of this figurative language appears in speech-
es, the immediate, engaged element is never totally absent.
We also encounter a different sort of challenge: the task of comparing
local or domestic politics with international (or interstate) relations and
conflicts. In both speech and narrative, Thucydides explores the analogy
of cities and individuals. This comparative model proposes that a city 
is like an individual person in significant ways. Indeed, speakers in
Thucydides pass with great ease from the private realm to the public, from
the small-scale perspective to the large, invoking such ideas as imperial
slavery and imperial tyranny. What we know about human beings and
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human nature at the level of the individual may potentially be transferred
to the larger scale interaction between communities, helping us to learn
about the motivation and behavior of cities. While the comparison of
cities and individuals was not invented by Thucydides, this rhetorical
theme—evidently common in late fifth-century Greece—has become a
subject for historical analysis in the History.
The first part of this chapter surveys eight passages where this comparison
is explicitly made. Cities are likened to individuals in both speech and narra-
tive of Thucydides’ work. Although, at times, the comparison is merely assert-
ed, Thucydides continues to probe this idea. The second half of this chapter
considers the implications of comparing cities with individuals. In part, this
model helps the historian and his readers to analyze the past. The actions and
motivations of cities may best be understood by analogy with the actions and
motivations of individuals. In addition, a possible means for resolving conflict
between cities is also suggested. If cities, like individuals, may be thought of as
moral agents, this comparison implies that when the interests of cities collide,
considerations of justice may be relevant to resolving such conflicts.1
The idea that cities are like individuals is first articulated by
Archidamus. In book one, the Spartan king asserts the possibility of
resolving accusations made both by cities and by individuals.
“e0gklh/mata me\n ga_r kai\\ po//lewn kai\\ i00diwtw~~n oi[o/n te katalu=sai:
po/lemon de\ cu/mpantaj a)rame/nouj e3neka tw~n i0di/wn, o4n ou0x u9pa&rxei
ei0de/nai kaq ) o3ti xwrh/sei, ou0 r9a&|dion eu0prepw~j qe/sqai.”
“For charges—both by cities and by individuals—are capable of resolution.
But once we have all gone to war—for the sake of certain individual par-
ties—and it is impossible to know how it might turn out, it will not be easy
to settle matters honorably. (1.82.6).”2
Archidamus is responding to the Corinthians and Athenians who have just
spoken. At issue is whether—given recent Athenian actions—Sparta and
her allies should go to war. The Corinthians charge that the Athenians
have been enslaving Greece (1.68.3–4); the Athenians respond that this
gathering has no authority to judge its actions (1.73.1). Archidamus
asserts that it is possible to resolve such charges (enklemata) made by cities.
He goes on to say that if the confederacy under Sparta (ksumpantas) initi-
ates war for the benefit of a few individual states (e3neka tw~n i0di/wn—
Corinth and Megara, that is), it will become difficult to resolve conflict
between the two alliances under Sparta and Athens.
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Yet this is only half the equation. Archidamus states that the accusa-
tions of both cities and individuals are capable of resolution–kai\ po/lewn
kai\ i0diwtw~n.3 That is, he generalizes beyond the immediate circum-
stances to express a principle, which works at two levels: the small scale
perspective of individuals within a city (what we might call the domestic
or intrapolitical realm), and the larger scope of relations between cities
(the international sphere). Archidamus initiates the idea that cities and
individuals may profitably be compared. Here the point of similarity is the
issue of answering accusations, yet Thucydides returns to this comparison
in different contexts in order to probe the analogy. Rather than focusing
on the debate in book one, I will link this passage to other sections of
Thucydides’ History where the comparison of city and individual is further
developed.
Later in the first book, the Corinthians address the cities of the
Peloponnesian League, some of whom are reluctant to go to war.
“w#ste pantaxo/qen kalw~j u9pa&rxon u9mi=n polemei=n kai\ h9mw~n koinh=|
ta&de parainou/ntwn, ei1per bebaio/taton to\ tau0ta_ cumfe/ronta  kai\\
po//lesi kai\\ i00diw&&taij ei]nai, mh\ me/llete Poteidea&taij te poiei=sqai
timwri/an ou]si Dwrieu=si kai\ u9po\  0Iw&nwn poliorkoume/noij.”
“From every point of view, then, since you have good reason to go to war
and we recommend this for our common advantage, if indeed identity of
interest is the surest guarantee for both cities and individuals, do not hesitate
to bring aid to the Potidaeans, who are Dorians and are besieged by
Ionians.” (1.124.1)
Archidamus had suggested that war would advance the interests of only
certain cities (1.82.6 cited above). The Corinthians answer that view here
by pointing out that Athenian expansion threatens all cities. There is no
safety when a tyrant (that is, Athens) is on the loose.4 War is in everyone’s
interest (koine) provided that identity of interest (tau0ta_ cumfe/ronta) is
the surest guarantee for cities and individuals.5 This shared interest—secu-
rity in general and the rescue of Potidaea in particular—is the goal not only
of Corinth but of all the Peloponnesian cities. The Corinthians are con-
cerned in this context with the advantages of each city, but again a more
general principle is put forth. The second half of the equation (the coin-
cidence of advantage for individuals) is not explored.
Pericles links cities and individuals at the conclusion of two of his
speeches. At the end of book one, Athens considers the prospect of war.
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Pericles recognizes the risks, but argues that from such risk comes great
honor.
“ei0de/nai de\ xrh\ o3ti a)na&gkh polemei=n, h2n de\ e9kou/sioi ma~llon
dexw&meqa, h[sson e0gkeisome/nouj tou\j e0nanti/ouj e3comen, e1k te tw~n
megi/stwn kindu/nwn o3ti kai\\ po//lei kai\\ i00diw&&th|| me/gistai timai\ per*
igi/gnontai.”
“We must recognize that we are forced to go to war—but if we accept more
willingly, we will find our opponents less committed—and that from the
greatest dangers emerge the greatest honors for both the city and the individ-
ual.” (1.144.3)
This war is not, Pericles insists, of the Athenians’ choosing. Yet if the
Athenians bravely engage in it, they accomplish two things: dampened
enthusiasm on the other side, and—from such danger—the greatest hon-
ors, just as individuals win the greatest honors from the greatest dangers.
After the war has begun, in spite of the plague and the devastation of
the Attic countryside, Pericles argues that the Athenians must maintain
their original policy. It is important for Athens to respond to these afflic-
tions with intelligence and proper action.
“. . . oi3tinej pro\j ta_j cumfora_j gnw&mh| me\n h3kista lupou=ntai, e1rgw|
de\ ma&lista a)nte/xousin,  ou[toi kai\\ po//lewn kai\\ i00diwtw~~n kra&tistoi/
ei0sin.”
“ . . . in response to adversity, those cities and individuals who are hurt least
in judgment and who resist most in action are the strongest.” (2.64.6)
The strongest individuals and the strongest cities derive that strength from
comparable behavior. These are the final words of Pericles in the History.
In his first two books Thucydides asks to what extent a city is like an
individual, and in what ways a city behaves as an individual does. We find
the idea proposed in these speeches; Thucydides himself makes no defini-
tive judgment. The behavior of the community and of the individual is said
to be similar with respect to the arbitration of disputes, the path to secu-
rity, the winning of honor, and the appropriate response to adversity. We
find an almost formulaic phrase, “both of cities and of individuals,” sig-
naling the comparison (with variation of number and case ending): kai\
po/lewn kai\ i0diwtw~n.
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In book 3 the same comparison is introduced in somewhat different
language. As they plot rebellion against the Athenians, the Mytilenians
approach the Spartans at Olympia. Realizing that their actions may be sus-
pect, they seek common ground with the Spartans by comparing friend-
ship among private citizens (fili//an i)diw//taij) with an alliance between
cities (koinwni/an i0diw&taij).
“ei0do/tej ou1te fili//an i00diw&&taij be/baion gignome/nhn ou1te koinwni//an
po//lesin e0j ou0de/n, ei0 mh\ met 0 a)reth=j dokou/shj e0j a)llh/louj gi/gnoin*
to kai\ ta}lla o9moio/tropoi ei]en.”
“We know that friendship between individuals and alliance between cities can
in no way be permanent unless they are formed by those who recognize one
another as honorable and are like-minded in other respects.” (3.10.1)
In attempting to link themselves to the Peloponnese, the Mytilenians
explain that they previously helped the Athenians out of fear, not friend-
ship. They now wish to free, rather than enslave Greece (3.12–13). Due
to this shared goal, the Peloponnesians may trust in an alliance with
Mytilene, an alliance comparable to friendship among individuals.
After the Athenians put down the Mytilenian revolt, Diodotus argues
that appropriate penalties be brought against such rebellious cities. Yet
Athens must recognize the inevitability of mistaken judgments, since indi-
viduals and states share the same propensity to error.
“pefu/kasi/ te a#pantej kai\\ i00di//a|| kai\\ dhmosi//a|| a(marta&nein, kai\ ou0k e1sti
no/moj o3stij a)pei/rcei tou/tou.”
“Everyone both privately and collectively tends by nature to make mistakes,
and there is no law that will prevent this.” (3.45.3)
The phrase kai\ i0di/a| kai\ dhmosi/a| has various applications: here, the lat-
ter term demosia evidently refers to the actions of cities such as Mytilene.
Diodotus endeavors to offer an explanation not only of why Mytilene
behaved as it did, but also of what other subject cities are likely to do.
In chapter 7, I will examine at length Diodotus’ argument (3.42–48).
Yet it is worth noting at this point that the fullest argument for linking
cities and individuals derives from an examination of individual behavior.
In the past, Diodotus maintains, individuals broke laws. Yet when harsher
penalties were enacted, crimes were still committed. Even with the
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strongest possible punishments, individuals would behave without regard
for the likely consequences; indeed, no one risked a crime he did not think
he could succeed with (3.45.1–4). Diodotus begins at the small-scale per-
spective with how individuals behave. He then applies the same logic to
communities. Cities no less than individuals (kai\ ou0x h[sson ta_j
po/leij) are affected by unexpected luck (3.45.6). Like individuals, cities
are subject to the enticements of chance, desire, and hope.6
When the focus shifts to Sicily in the next decade, Euphemus of
Athens attempts to persuade Camarina not to join Syracuse. It is not
inconsistent, he argues, for the Athenians to enslave the Chalcidians in
Euboea, yet to allow the people of Leontini independence (6.84). With
great candor, he describes Athenian motivation in terms of advantage and
trustworthiness.
“a))ndri\\ de\\ tura&&nnw|| h22 po//lei a))rxh\\n e00xou//sh|| ou0de\n a!logon o3ti cumfe/ron
ou0d ) oi0kei=on o3ti mh\ pisto/n.”
“For a man who is a tyrant or for a city possessing an empire, there is nothing
unreasonable that is advantageous; ties of blood mean nothing if they can-
not be trusted.” (6.85.1)
These principles operate at the level both of the individual (a)ndri\ de\
tura&nnw|) and of a city (po/lei a)rxh\n e0xou/sh|).
These seven passages comparing cities and individuals appear in
speeches. In his own voice, Thucydides expresses this analogy in book
three. In describing the civil war at Corcyra, Thucydides examines the
judgment of cities and individuals in peacetime.
e0n me\n ga_r ei0rh/nh| kai\ a)gaqoi=j pra&gmasin ai33 te po//leij kai\\ oi99
i00diw~~tai a)mei/nouj ta_j gnw&maj e1xousin dia_ to\ mh\ e0j a)kousi/ouj
a)na&gkaj pi/ptein.
For in peace and prosperity, both cities and individuals have judgments that
are better, because they do not meet with pressures over which they have
no control.7 (3.82.2)
Thucydides goes on to discuss individuals in Corcyra who in the midst of
civil war choose revenge over self-preservation (3.82.7).
From these eight passages we can make several observations. Various
speakers endorse specific action by arguing that honor, power, or security,
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for example, are attained in the same ways for both cities and individuals.
The principles expressed have two applications: to individuals within a
community, and between cities themselves. The comparison could work in
either direction; most frequently, however, the impulse appears to be to
seek understanding of the international arena (the nature and behavior of
cities) by reference to knowledge of the intrapolitical or domestic arena
(that of individuals). The half of the equation focusing on the polis is
often further developed by indicating the consequences for Corinth,
Athens, or Mytilene. Thucydides himself expresses the analogy only once
in his own voice, but such repetition indicates the historian’s fascination
with the comparison. It is generally the case that the “winning” argument
makes use of the analogy: of the seven instances, only Archidamus and
Euphemus fail to persuade their audiences.
While the second half of the equation concerning individuals must be
supplied by the reader, the motivations and behavior of individuals are still
of interest to Thucydides. Archidamus has neglected the aspect of indi-
viduals’ accusations (1.82.6) because he is attempting to deal with the
issue at hand, namely, whether the Peloponnesian allies should go to war
against Athens. It is possible to deduce the other side: the analogy with
war between cities would presumably be civil war (stasis) between citizens
within a city, and the subsequent difficulty of judging accusations after cit-
izens have been split into warring factions. We have already noted that
early in the History Thucydides focuses on action and speech performed by
cities as political units. This is indicated by his choice to have cities speak
as a whole: “the Corinthians say . . . ,” “the Thebans say . . . ,” “the
Plataeans say . . .”8 Apparently one of Thucydides’ early goals is to estab-
lish this sort of political history. It is possible to view the city-individual
analogy as one productive avenue for understanding cities: speakers—and
Thucydides himself—suggest that the behavior of cities may be analogous
to that of individuals.9
Comparing cities with individuals is surely not original with
Thucydides. Not only is it fully developed a generation later in Plato’s
Republic where the search for justice in the individual is sought by con-
structing justice in the city,10 but it also underlies the thought and ideas
found in a number of Thucydides’ contemporaries. In Aristophanes’
Acharnians, Dicaeopolis proves himself equal to his name: this lone indi-
vidual (with his household) becomes a “just polis” as he makes a personal
peace with Sparta and her allies. Here the smaller acts like the larger, as a
man takes on the status of a political community. Knox remarks that when
Sophocles’ Antigone is called autonomos (Antigone 821), this word is gen-
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erally applied to cities, that is, to independent communities living under
their own laws. The tragedian likens his heroine to a sovereign state by
describing her in terms more commonly used to characterize a polis.11
In fifth-century Athens, the comparison of cities and individuals
undoubtedly became a conventional topos for writers and thinkers, as spe-
cific terms and metaphors appropriate to one arena were applied to the
other.12 It is worth emphasizing that it is from a democratic society that this
model arises. In fact, there should no surprise that in the rhetoric and lit-
erature of Classical Athens the private citizen—idiotes—should be elevat-
ed to the status of the city itself.13 By juxtaposing city and individual for
his own purposes, Thucydides has given us a model that evolves and
expands over the course of the History.
I would now like to speculate upon the significance of the city-individ-
ual comparison. The consequences are both analytical and practical, but
first, let us recall the sort of dynamic set up for the reader. We have already
examined how Thucydides praises the capacities of historians and states-
men to see likenesses and to foresee the probable course of events.
Thucydides uses the verb eikazein and related words, which mean “to com-
pare,” and “to make conjectures on the basis of comparisons.”14 In the pas-
sages cited above, Thucydides is challenging his reader to engage in this
very activity, to compare cities and individuals and to examine the possi-
ble points of similarity and difference.
Yet because Thucydides has not presented this claim in an authorita-
tive manner—that is, because all but one of these passages occur in
speeches and receive no direct comment by the historian—the reader
finds himself in the position of interpreter.15 We cannot say definitively
what Thucydides’ own views on the validity of the comparison are. Other
than his remark at 3.82.2, Thucydides does not explicitly endorse the
idea of comparing cities and individuals—this is left to the reader. Each
passage appears in a different speech so that (similar to punctuated histo-
ry) the reader must recall and juxtapose earlier episodes that employ this
memorable catchphrase and ask: What aspects of the city-individual
comparison were significant in the earlier sections? What is emphasized
in this context? It is the task of the reader (and re-reader) in a retrospec-
tive (or more contemplative) mode to construct such overarching con-
nections.
This comparative model is valuable in part for providing an analytic
tool for understanding the past. The reader may return to this model as a
basis for exploring a multitude of issues. Are cities, like individuals, uni-
fied in some sense?16 Do cities, like individuals, have a particular charac-
110 Chapter 6
Morrison_CH6_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:44 PM  Page 110
ter?17 When a city is likened to a tyranny, in what ways is this analogy
valid?18 As a political scientist, Thucydides has offered a potentially pro-
ductive avenue of approach to these questions. The statements linking
city and individual are not, as we have seen, limited to specific contexts.
Instead general principles are articulated that seek to link the behavior of
individuals within a community to that of cities toward one another. The
task of the reader is to examine critically the wide range of proposed sim-
ilarities, both in the specific context in which they are introduced and
with potentially broader application.
One is tempted to make a stronger claim for the importance of this
analogy. It could be said that the validity of portraying the city of Athens
as a tyrant, for example (discussed in chapter 8), can only be determined
after evaluating the city-individual analogy. That is, the analogy of city and
individual is of a higher order, which allows such subordinate ideas as a
city’s character and behavior to be explored at all. This analogy then pos-
sesses critical significance, because of the many key inquiries that depend
upon it. The next two chapters will explore general principles and
metaphors that are tied to the city-individual comparison in a less explic-
it manner. But first, I turn to the question of justice in international rela-
tions.
The reader’s assessment of the strength of the city-individual compari-
son will determine whether the idea of justice in international relations
should be considered in a new light. This recurring issue might also be
seen as deriving from the city-individual comparison. I would like to
sketch out the potential implications of the comparison, both for judging
events that occurred during the Peloponnesian War and for its value
toward international relations after 404 BCE.
The ethical implications of the comparison arise in the following way.
Individuals within communities may settle their disputes by going to court
before impartial judges. To the extent that cities are like individuals, the
resolution of disputes between cities might follow a path analogous to the
resolution of individual disputes. Hornblower has suggested that the city-
individual comparison implies that cities may be thought of as moral
agents.
It is passages like this [Archidamus on resolution of charges at 1.82.6]
which convince me that it came naturally to Th. to speak of states as
moral agents and that he thought that moral judgments could be made
about them: he uses the same vocabulary about both, and brackets them
as here.19
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It would follow that the principles prevailing in a domestic court system
might apply to the arbitration of conflict between Greek cities. It may
then be possible to judge the decisions and actions of cities by the stan-
dards of right and wrong as they exist within communities of individuals.
If the reader thinks that in international affairs justice is only relevant
between equal powers but that the weaker must follow the dictates of the
stronger, then the Athenians’ action against Melos, for example, might
not only be understood but also approved of. If, however, the reader
believes that, in fact, cities are like individuals to the extent that they
have an obligation to behave fairly and justly toward all other cities, then
those same actions would be condemned on moral grounds.20
Of course, the idea that cities act justly toward one another is strongly
opposed in the History, most consistently by the Athenians. Diodotus
argues that in domestic affairs citizens may look to justice, but in foreign
policy expediency is the only criterion (3.44, 3.46–47).21 This viewpoint,
however, is only a part of the dialogue. Thucydides allows two views to be
expressed. Each speech presents a particular perspective; the situation is
dynamic. Because the issue is not resolved wholly one way or the other,
the reader is forced to consider arguments in different situations and is left
to inspect the consequences of following one course of action rather than
another. The argument that cities might be constrained by moral values is
developed throughout the History and is worth pursuing. By building upon
the model of city and individual, we may investigate the two sides of the
argument about cities’ appropriate behavior toward each other and the
implied consequences.
Beyond its use for assessing the past, the comparison may suggest a
practical application for future conflict. What are the paths toward nego-
tiating international conflict? The war itself leads to a variety of models
for interaction between cities. There is the “overseer” model, when the
Athenians debate the fate of another city, Mytilene (3.36–49). Athens
not only has the final say, but the people who are judged are not allowed
to speak. Second, there is third-party arbitration. The Plataeans and the
Thebans trade accusations and defend themselves before the Spartan
“judges” (dicastai–3.52.3), who ultimately fail to render an impartial ver-
dict. As Thucydides says, the decision was determined by Thebes’ strate-
gic importance to Sparta (3.68.4). A third possibility is the “street fight”
model offered in the Melian Dialogue. Both Athenians and Melians man-
age to voice their viewpoints, the stronger city attempts to set the rules of
discourse, but ultimately neither side changes the other’s mind
(5.84–116). Not only is each model profoundly disturbing, but none func-
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tions as a satisfactory prototype for resolving future disputes between
cities.
In accordance with the city-individual analogy, however, conflict
between cities might best be resolved by looking at an intra-political
model, one of arbitration between individuals within a community. The
fullest one offered is that of the Athenian politeia articulated by Pericles in
the Funeral Oration, where it is said that Athenians help victims of injus-
tice, resolve private quarrels in accordance with the law, and—most
importantly—all citizens are equal before the law. The Athenian consti-
tution is even called a “model” for others (paradeigma–2.37). If we view
Athens as a microcosm—a model for all Greece—and if we consider its
constitution as an exemplar for some sort of international forum, one
comes to see the practical value for future readers in examining the city-
individual comparison.22 If no effective method of resolving disputes is
found, the alternative is war. Thucydides offers no blueprint for how cities
could peacefully resolve their disputes, nor the means of enforcing such a
scheme. But to say that the Peloponnesian War and others like it are
inevitable and that arbitration between cities remains impossible is
nihilistic and diminishes the enormous potential that underlies
Thucydides’ exposition.23
Again, I think the reader is challenged. What Thucydides has done is
to construct a situation in which it is the reader’s task to assess the practi-
cal possibilities for his or her own time and situation. The city-individual
comparison offers a point of reference for considering such a possibility. As
Thucydides has structured his narrative, the final act of the Athenians—
before war begins—is to call for arbitration where the parties involved are
on an equal footing (e0pi\ i1sh| kai\ o9moi/a|–1.145). While it is possible to read
Pericles’ words as cynically manipulative, the sequence offered by
Thucydides indicates that lack of success in the field of arbitration led to
the war itself. It may be that Thucydides is suggesting international nego-
tiation in the early fourth century as a peaceful and less disruptive modus
vivendi.24
One of Thucydides’ goals in his History of the Peloponnesian War is to
explore the nature of the polis.25 As an early political scientist, Thucydides
not only considers the leaders of communities, but he also examines the
community as a unified whole. He returns time and again to certain key
questions, such as how a polis or city behaves, in what sense a city is uni-
fied, and whether it is legitimate to speak of the character of a city. That
is, there are two aspects of a city: internal politics concerning the affairs of
individuals within a community, and external politics that require dealing
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with other states. Thucydides’ comparison of city and individual suggests
that these two spheres are not utterly distinct. Certain principles may
apply both to the individual within a city and to the polis vis-à-vis other
cities. The validity and the application of comparing cities and individu-
als must be determined by the reader. I have suggested that one value of
this comparison is purely analytical: the reader uses the model as a point
of departure in seeking to understand why events occurred as they did in
the late fifth century.26
The possibility of a practical application of the comparison should not
be dismissed. Of course, Thucydides tells a story of failed negotiation with
war ensuing. Yet his history seeks to do more than help the reader under-
stand the past; the author claims utility for his own work as well (1.22.4).27
Thucydides emphasizes the upheaval and human suffering involved in the
Peloponnesian War, and, given the constancy of human nature, the same
sort of conflicts between cities would likely recur. It was in the interests of
the Greek cities of the early fourth century (Thucydides’ immediate audi-
ence) to seek a less violent means of resolving potential disputes. No sat-
isfactory model was found to resolve the international conflict of the
Peloponnesian War, yet, as Thucydides says, in peacetime cooler heads
prevail (3.82.2).28
To those who remain convinced that such hopes constitute pure fanta-
sy, a review of the evidence is worth pondering. First of all, the recurrent
analogy itself asks the reader to consider the similarities between cities and
individuals in a variety of situations.29 Second, the ubiquitous use of legal
and judicial language throughout the History is applied in most cases to
cities’ interactions with one another.30 Finally, the conflict between cities
has an analogue in the political tension played out within the polis
between the competing claims of public and private goals. Pericles argues
that citizens must sacrifice private interest for the good of the whole city
(2.60–61). It is possible to extend this idea by thinking of Greece as a
whole, sharing common interests—at the very least, to avoid the suffering
occasioned by war—that overshadow the particular interests of individu-
als cities.31
Indeed, Thucydides begins the history itself with a look at more distant
history, when Greeks united for mutual benefit against Troy and later
against Persia.32 Price’s recent book, Thucydides and Internal War, argues
that Thucydides views the Peloponnesian War as a stasis (“civil war”)
between Greeks. At one point, he argues that Thucydides “through his syn-
tax . . . demonstrates that cities are organisms as much afflicted by stasis as
individuals.”33 This provocative idea leads us back to the comparison’s
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practical value. It is worth pursuing the city-individual comparison for its
many possible applications: to understanding how cities act, to judging
decisions which took place during the war, and also to approaching the
most difficult problem of how cities should behave toward one another in
the future. The next two chapters will build on potential extensions of the
city-individual comparison, as we examine maxims and metaphors that
also apply to both cities and individuals.
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7
Maxims and Assimilation in the
Mytilenian Debate
e now turn to maxims (gnomai) employed in the speeches of WThucydides. Dover remarks upon their frequency and function:
“Most of [Thucydides’] speakers make extensive use of generalizations
about the behavior of states and mankind to explain, predict or justify rec-
ommendations.” Negotiations are made, armies and navies are sent, and
the issues of war and peace are determined by arguments based, in part, on
generalizations about human motivation and behavior. Of particular inter-
est is how these general rules, once expressed, are applied to specific situ-
ations or conflicts. As Wassermann puts it: “this intertwining of the
concrete and particular issue with general ideas (and their popularized
reflections in catchwords) is one of the characteristics of an age in search
for the facts as well as the truth and the laws behind the facts.”1
Such maxims are founding overwhelmingly in speech. Meister notes that
of the approximately two hundred maxims in Thucydides, only two appear in
the narrative.2 This chapter will make a brief survey and then examine the two
speeches in the Mytilenian debate (3.37–48) in which maxims build implic-
itly on the idea of comparing cities and individuals (explored in the previous
chapter). We find that speakers, while discussing one relationship (interna-
tional conflict between cities, for example), turn to the ways in which indi-
viduals relate to one another in order to support their arguments. Analysis of
maxims will help us to recover the underlying assumptions by which arguments
assimilate one realm to another. As we shall see, Diodotus is particularly effec-
tive in arguing from the psychology of the individual to the behavior of cities.
Maxims and Universal Principles
Among generalizations, I would distinguish between maxims and univer-
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sal principles. I label as “maxims” those proverbial statements drawn from
experience or common sense, which describe general modes of behavior or
serve as rules of conduct (often introduced with gar or te).3 Universal prin-
ciples also articulate general rules of behavior (they are also maxims), but
in addition include a reference to something which happens “at all times,”
“in all situations,” or “for all people” (signaled by aiei or a form of pant-).4
For example, in the Corcyrean debate, the Corinthians attempt to dis-
suade the Athenians from accepting the Corcyreans as allies by arguing
that the Athenians will set a precedent for interference in others’ internal
affairs.5 A crucial point in the debate is whether war is imminent. The
Corinthians assert:
“to/ te ga_r cumfe/ron e0n w{| a!n tij e0la&xista a(marta&nh| ma&lista
e3petai.”
“For advantage follows the one who makes the fewest errors of judgment.”
(1.42.2)
It is hard to argue with such an obvious statement: of course, we think,
advantage results from avoiding mistakes. Whereas the Corcyreans
attempted to instill fear in the Athenians that war is coming, the
Corinthians argue that war is not certain. The implication here is that it
would be advantageous to Athens not to miscalculate (e0la&xista
a(marta&nh|) by assuming that war is inevitable.6
But the maxim itself is more abstract and has to do with the general
connection between miscalculation and advantage. Given the context of
the speech, this maxim refers to a decision by the city of Athens, yet it is
easy to see this idea as referring to an individual: “He who errs least gains
the most,” or something of the sort.7 In fact, such an adage most likely orig-
inated with reference to the wise individual; what Thucydides has appar-
ently done is to transfer this maxim to an international context with
relevance to the city of Athens and its potential intervention into what
the Corinthians regard as their own affair.
Of course, any maxim must first be examined in its specific context.
Does the principle apply to this particular argument—in this case, is antic-
ipating the war a miscalculation?8 But then, to the extent that a more gen-
eral assertion is expressed, Thucydides suggests application of this maxim
upon a broader field of play. Does this maxim illuminate other situations
elsewhere in the History? Might the connection between mistake 
and advantage have some sort of general validity that helps to explain 
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previous or later events?9 Because of maxims’ potential to illuminate mul-
tiple situations, the reader faces the challenging task of considering its rel-
evance both in its immediate context and elsewhere.10
Later in book 1, Archidamus counsels against precipitous engagement.
The Spartans should not count on the Athenians making mistakes; rather
they should rely upon their own abilities. Archidamus then expresses
another maxim.
“polu/ te diafe/rein ou0 dei= nomi/zein a!nqrwpon a)nqrw&pou, kra&tiston
de\ ei]nai o3stij e0n toi=j a)nagkaiota&toij paideu/etai.”
“We must not think there is much difference from one man to the next,
but the strongest is the one brought up in the severest discipline.” (1.84.4)
In introducing the idea of being raised by “severe discipline,” Archidamus
may be seen as referring to the rigorous training of the Spartans collec-
tively.11 As was true in 1.42.2 (cited above), the idea easily applies to the
individual (“the strongest individual . . .”) and likely derives from the
plane of an individual’s existence. Here the maxim—stated generally—
refers to the Spartans’ superiority due to their cultural upbringing.12
Universal principles differ from regular maxims only by the extent of their
application. At the first Peloponnesian Congress, for example, the
Athenians describe how they acquired their empire, emphasizing that they
have done nothing remarkable or “contrary to human nature” (ou0d a)po\
tou= a)nqrwpei/ou tro/pou) by accepting the empire when it was offered
(1.76.2). A universal principle is introduced to explain their domination:
“a)ll ) ai0ei\ kaqestw~toj to\n h3ssw u9po\ tou= dunatwte/rou katei/r*
gesqai.”
“But always it has been established that the weaker is held down by the
stronger.” (1.76.2)
This is not a moral argument; the Athenians’ assertion concerns power. In
this context, Athens, a city, is stronger than the other cities in the
Aegean. Yet as Andrewes argues, “The Athenians’ statement at Sparta
goes far beyond any topical need to answer the Corinthians or advise the
Spartans.”13 In particular, this formulation again has potentially broader
application: the Athenians say that it has always been the case that the
weaker is subject to the stronger. The form of expression implies that this
118 Chapter 7
)
Morrison_CH7_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:44 PM  Page 118
principle explains past events and presumably will continue to operate in
human society. The particular application here is to cities (Athens is
stronger than the imperial Aegean cities), but this universal principle
could also characterize relations between individuals.
Both Archidamus and Pericles employ universal principles. As the
Peloponnesian forces invade Attica in 431 BCE, the Spartan king antici-
pates the effect that the destruction of crops and property will have on the
Athenians.
“pa~si ga_r e0n toi=j o1mmasi kai\ e0n tw~| parauti/ka o9ra~n pa&sxonta&j ti
a!hqej o0rgh\ prospi/ptei.”
“For anger falls upon all people seeing suddenly, before their eyes, that
they are suffering something unaccustomed.” (2.11.7)
Again there are no qualifications here. The rule applies across the board:
literally, “anger falls upon all people (pasi).” The Spartan king goes on to
speculate that it is likely that the Athenians will be provoked to battle,
rather than watch their property being destroyed.14
Pericles’ principle applies to everything that is a part of nature (physis).
Even though the Athenian empire has the greatest name among men and
will leave an undying memorial, its power will not last forever.
“pa&nta ga_r pe/fuke kai\ e0lassou=sqai.”
“For everything must naturally be diminished, too.” (2.64.3)
Here Athens, a strong city, is subject to a law that governs all organisms;
such a formulation could easily apply to individual persons (who suffer
from the physical and mental decline of old age) as well as to other living
things.15
When speakers invoke a maxim or universal principle, they either
begin with a general statement and then turn to the argument at hand, or,
alternatively, begin with a specific proposal and then support it with a
maxim or universal principle.16 While there is nothing inherent in such
assertions that necessarily leads to the city-individual comparison, due to
their general nature maxims and universal principles lend themselves to
easy application in multiple situations. Arguments concerning past events
and predictions about the future seek specific confirmation (or correction)
in the narrative, yet maxims and universal principles—because they are
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stated so abstractly—may find potential instantiation or contradiction
many times in the History. Internal and external politics—individual
interaction within a community and cities vis-à-vis other cities—are
repeatedly probed in Thucydides’ work, making it inevitable that such
general rules will be invoked in many contexts.
Maxims are documented from the time of Homer and Hesiod.
Thucydides’ innovation is to apply them so extensively to politics, not
only domestic affairs but also international alliance and conflict. That is,
Thucydides is engaged in exploring truths that pertain to any human soci-
ety or interaction.17 I would point out that in Thucydides’ History it is not
simply a question of a general law on the one hand and a particular situa-
tion on the other. What Thucydides has done is to challenge politicians,
generals, citizens—and his reader—to determine when the general rule
applies and to which particular situations the rule holds valid. We note that
maxims appear overwhelmingly in speeches which generally require criti-
cal assessment by the reader; the effect of introducing maxims is to stimu-
late further engagement from the retrospective reader.
This survey has shown how natural it is in the rhetorical world of
Thucydides to articulate ideas with respect to the behavior and motivation
of cities. Often it appears that speakers appeal to how individuals react and
behave and then elevate those ideas to the level of city-state interaction.
It is certainly possible, however, that the comparison may work in either
direction. We may be able to learn something of individual encounters by
examining the actions of cities—this, of course, anticipates the argument
in book 2 of Plato’s Republic (368–69) where Socrates proposes that it is
easier to see justice on the large scale (in the polis) than at the level of the
individual. While I will not pursue this idea here, we may also learn some-
thing about individuals—Pericles, Brasidas, and Alcibiades, for example—
from studying cities such as Athens and Sparta.18
The Mytilenian Debate
We now turn to the maxims and universal principles employed by Cleon
and Diodotus in the Mytilenian Debate. As we shall see, Diodotus is
extremely skilled at integrating maxims and universal principles into
extended sections of his argument. He also employs the parallelism
between cities and individuals and explicitly marks out the interconnec-
tion between individuals acting within a community and cities involved
in international politics. While the focus is on Mytilene, a city that has
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just revolted from Athens, the underlying argument for Diodotus’ policy
recommendations is based to a large degree on individual behavior and
interaction within a polis. He may begin in the international realm, move
to the world of individuals within the polis, and then back to cities: this
crossing back and forth is repeated a number of times, thus apparently
reinforcing the overall validity of the city-individual comparison itself. In
context, Diodotus’ arguments apply to the behavior of cities, but because
the movement between a community and the international realm is trans-
parent, the two arenas’ similarities are clearly demonstrated, even without
explicit phrases such as “of both cities and for individuals” (kai\ po/lewn
kai\ i0diwtw~n).
We start, however, with Cleon. In his speech regarding Mytilene,
Cleon employs a number of maxims. He begins with broad political gen-
eralizations: a democracy is incapable of ruling others (3.37.1)19; an empire
is a tyranny which rules over those who plot against it (3.37.2)20; a city ben-
efits from following laws which do not change rather than good laws
which are not enforced (3.37.3). Cleon then expresses a maxim contrast-
ing lack of learning with cleverness.
“a)maqi/a te meta_ swfrosu/nhj w)felimw&teron h2 decio/thj meta_
a)kolasi/aj, oi3 te faulo/teroi tw~n a)nqrw&pwn pro\j tou\j
cunetwte/rouj w(j e0pi\ to\ ple/on a!meinon oi0kou=si ta_j po/leij.” 
“Ignorance combined with self-control is more beneficial than cleverness
combined with intemperance; compared with more intelligent men, the
less gifted usually run their cities better.” (3.37.3)
Cleon warns of the dangers of intelligent men, who are “wiser than the
laws” (3.37.4).21 The overall thrust of this opening section is to question
the need for further discussion regarding the Mytilenian revolt.
The next section deals with punishment: again Cleon introduces a
maxim concerning the danger of delaying punishment.
“o9 ga_r paqw_n tw~| dra&santi a)mblute/ra| th=| o0rgh=| e0pece/rxetai,
a)mu/nesqai de\ tw~| paqei=n o3ti e0gguta&tw kei/menon a)nti/palon o2n
ma&lista th\n timwri/an a)nalamba&nei.”
“For the sufferer [if he waits] proceeds against the perpetrator with a duller
passion, but revenge coming as soon as possible after the injury
exacts the most equivalent repayment.” (3.38.1)
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The statement here appears to be made with respect to the individual (o9
ga_r paqw_n), but the application is to Athens, the city which has “suf-
fered” from Mytilene’s revolt. Cleon then goes on to castigate Athenians
who focus more on the future than what has actually happened (3.38.4).
While in section 3.37 Cleon focuses on how decisions are made by
Athenians (within their city), section 3.38 examines how another city—
Mytilene—has injured Athens, an instance of city-city interaction.22
Cleon also uses maxims to support fine verbal distinctions. He insists
that what the Mytilenians have done is a “plot” or “insurrection” (epe-
bouleusan, epanestesan) against the Athenians rather than merely a
“revolt” (apestesan).
“ti/ a!llo ou[toi h2 e0pebou/leusa&n te kai\ e0pane/sthsan ma~llon h2
a)pe/sthsan (a)po/stasij me/n ge tw~n bi/aio/n ti pasxo/ntwn e0sti/n).”
“What else did they do but plot and raise an insurrection against us rather
than revolt (for revolt comes when someone suffers violence [which the
Mytilenians have not]).” (3.39.2)23
The reader should note that in the earlier narrative Thucydides has under-
cut Cleon’s distinction, for he uses both the noun and verb forms for
“revolt” (apostasies, aphistamai) rather than the more insidious “plot” or
“insurrection” (epebouleusan, epanestesan–3.2.1–3, 3.5.2, 3.35.1, 3.36.2,
3.50.1).24 Cleon’s claim does raise the question, though, of the
Mytilenians’ prior situation: if they were not suffering violence (bi/aio/n ti)
from the Athenians, what drove them to revolt (which in turn leads us
back to their speech at 3.9–14)? Regarding the Mytilenians’ plot, Cleon
emphasizes that they decided to use violence against the Athenians. If the
Mytilenians had no choice, their actions would have been understandable
and forgivable. But they acted deliberately.25
“a!kontej me/n ga_r ou0k e1blayan, ei0do/tej de\ e0pebou/leusan: cu/ggnw*
mon d  ) e0sti\ to\ a)kou/sion.”
“For they did not harm us involuntarily, but knowingly they plotted
against us. But [only] what is involuntary is pardonable.” (3.40.1)
Indeed, rather than being forced into military resistance, it was the
Mytilenians’ good fortune (eupragia) which led them to such arrogant
behavior (hubris–3.39.4).26 Ultimately, according to Cleon, the question
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comes down to how Athens should respond. The Athenians must not
show kindness or flexibility. In discussing the advantages of firm behavior,
Cleon argues:
“pe/fuke ga_r kai\ a!llwj a!nqrwpoj to\ me\n qerapeu=on u9perfronei=n,
to\ de\ mh\ u9pei=kon qauma&zein.”
“For even in other circumstances, man naturally despises conciliation and
admires firmness.” (3.39.5)
Cleon is concerned with how allies—that is, cities—will respond to
Athens’ attitude. His argument, however, is based on the idea of “man by
nature” (pe/fuke...a!nqrwpoj) as he insists upon unyielding action.27
These maxims operate on the assumption that familiar adages regarding
human behavior are pertinent to the arena of international conflict.
The lesson Cleon draws is that the Athenians must show no weakness.
In fact, he lists three things as presenting the greatest peril to empire: 
compassion, taking pleasure in argument, and “evenhandedness”
(epieikeia–3.40.2–3).28 A triple maxim outlines the appropriate times for
each of these responses—none of which applies to the Mytilenians.
“e11leo//j te ga_r pro\j tou\j o9moi/ouj di/kaioj a)ntidi/dosqai, kai\ mh\ pro\j
tou\j ou1t a)ntoiktiou=ntaj e0j a)na&gkhj te kaqestw~taj ai0ei\
polemi/ouj: oi3 te te/rpontej lo/gw| r9h/torej e3cousi kai\ e0n a!lloij
e0la&ssosin a)gw~na, kai\ mh\ e0n w{| h9 me\n po/lij braxe//a h99sqei==sa mega&la
zhmiw&setai, au0toi\ de\ e0k tou= eu] ei0pei=n to\ paqei=n eu] a)ntilh/yontai:
kai\ h99 e00piei//keia pro\j tou\j me/llontaj e0pithdei/ouj kai\ to\ loipo\n
e1sesqai ma~llon di/dotai h2 pro\j tou\j o9moi/ouj te kai\ ou0de\n h[sson
polemi/ouj u9poleipome/nouj.”
“For compassion is a just return to one’s peers, not to those who feel no pity
in return and whose position is both necessarily and permanently hostile;
the orators who charm by their words will carry their contest even in less
important situations, but not where the city will pay a heavy penalty for
brief enjoyment, while they themselves will receive fine treatment for fine
speaking; and evenhandedness is given to those who are sure to be friendly
even in the future rather than to those who remain as they were, no less
enemies than before.” (3.40.3)
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The Mytilenians do not even deserve human decency. We might see this
triple maxim applying more naturally (or originally) to individuals, yet the
reference again is to Athens’ attitude toward the city of Mytilene.
Finally, Cleon insists that by punishing all adult Mytilenian males, the
Athenians will be acting both justly and to their own advantage (ta& te
di/kaia e0j Mutilhnai/ouj kai\ ta_ cu/mfora a#ma poih/sete–3.40.4).
Because the Mytilenians are an example of those who have acted 
without reason (mh\ cu\n profa&sei) and under no compulsion (mh\ cu\n
a)na&gkh|–3.40.6—another maxim!),29 the only reasonable solution is to
make an example (paradeigma) of the Mytilenians to show other allies
that whoever revolts will be punished by death (3.40.7). Obviously
Cleon’s recommendation carried the assembly on the day before; even
after revisiting the issue, the vote will be quite close (3.49.1). To a large
extent, Cleon’s argument gains strength from ten maxims, applied to
Athens’ interstate conflict with Mytilene.
Diodotus’ speech employs maxims and universal principles to recom-
mend that only the leaders of the Mytilenian revolt should be held respon-
sible. Of particular interest is the way in which individual psychology is
used to explain the behavior of a city within the Athenian empire. The
repeated “transposition” between one realm and the other indicates how
tightly the various stages of Diodotus’ argument are interwoven.30 While
my focus will be section 3.45, I would first make several observations on
the opening paragraphs.
To start, in section 3.42 Diodotus employs a handful of maxims, argu-
ing that careful deliberation—without fear of personal attack—is in the
best interests of the city. Indeed, “haste and anger are the two things most
opposed [enantiotata] to good counsel [euboulia]” (3.42.1). Anyone who
says arguments are not the “teachers of action” (dida&skaloi
pragma&twn) is either stupid or seeking private gain (3.42.2). That is,
Diodotus begins by rejecting Cleon’s insistence on swift, unreflective
action.
Second, Diodotus emphasizes his opposition to Cleon—and his rejec-
tion of Cleon’s argument that justice and advantage coincide—by repeat-
ed use of “opposite” or “contrary” (enantion). As we saw above, haste and
anger are the two things “most opposed” (enantiotata) to good counsel
(3.42.1). Section 3.43 begins by pointing out that Athens is “doing exact-
ly the opposite” (w{n h9mei=j ta)nanti/a drw~men) of the behavior of a wise
city seeking advantage. And in section 3.44, Diodotus argues that the dis-
pute is not about injustice but about what is best for the city (ou0 ga_r peri\
th=j e0kei/nwn a)di/kiaj h9mi=n o0 a)gw&n, ei0 swfronou=men, a)lla_ peri\ th=j
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h9mete/raj eu0bouli/aj); although Cleon claims his policy will lead to fewer
revolts in the future, Diodotus maintains the opposing opinion (ta)nanti/a
gignw&skw–3.44.2).31 We will return to the question of justice and advan-
tage; let us now examine Diodotus’ intricate argument against the deter-
rence theory of punishment in 3.45.
I divide paragraph 3.45 into seven sections (A–G). At the end of each
passage I indicate the level at which each section is operating: either the
argument concerns individuals within a polis (the intrapolitical realm); the
argument concerns interaction among cities at the international realm; or
the argument expresses a universal principle that embraces both cities and
individuals.
A. Diodotus begins at the level of the individual with a discussion of
legal systems and the laying down of the death penalty. Such penalties,
however, do not eliminate crime.
“o3mwj de\ th=| e0lpi/di e0pairo/menoi kinduneu/ousi, kai\ ou0dei/j pw
katagnou\j e9autou= mh\ perie/sesqai tw~| e0pibouleu/mati h]lqen e0j to\
deino/n.”
“Yet people inspired by hope still take risks, and no one has yet faced dan-
ger without conviction that he would succeed in the attempt.” (3.45.1:
individuals)
Even when a city employs the death penalty, people—led on by hope (th=|
e0lpi/di e0pairo/menoi)—engage in risky enterprises.
B. At this point, Diodotus moves to the international issue at hand: the
actions of a city trying to revolt.
“po/lij te a)fistame/nh ti/j pw h3ssw th=| dokh/sei e1xousa th\n
paraskeuh\n h2 oi0kei/a h2 a!llwn cummaxi/a| tou/tw| e0pexei/rhsein;”
“And did any city in revolt ever undertake this with what seemed inferior
resources, whether its own or through alliance?” (3.45.2: cities)
Diodotus begins with legal systems within cities and notes that individu-
als continue to break laws even against the threat of the death penalty.
Then he applies that observation about individuals within a city to the
international situation: a city in revolt.
C. This leads to an explicit link between the behavior of cities and of
individuals.
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“pefu/kasi/ te a#pantej kai\\ i00di//a|| kai\\ dhmosi//a|| a(marta&nein, kai\ ou0k e1sti
no/moj o3stij a)pei/rcei tou/tou, e0pei\ diecelhlu/qasi/ ge dia_ pasw~n tw~n
zhmiw~n oi9 a!nqrwpoi prostiqe/ntej, ei1 pwj h[sson a)dikoi=nto u9po\ tw~n
kakou/rgwn.”
“Everyone both individually and collectively tend by nature to make mistakes,
and there is no law that will prevent this, since people have tried every
kind of punishment in succession, on the chance of lessening their injuries
at the hands of criminals.” (3.45.3: cities and individuals)
Obviously in context, the issue would be a city—Mytilene—“making a
mistake” (hamartanein). But this statement, expressed as a universal prin-
ciple, applies to both individuals and cities (a#pantej kai\ i0di/a| kai\
dhmosi/a|). Human nature explains this tendency to err, manifesting itself
at the level both of the individual and of the community.32
D. The argument now returns to individuals within a polis, exploring
factors that argue against the deterrence of capital punishment.
“kai\ ei0ko\j to\ pa&lai tw~n megi/stwn a)dikhma&twn malakwte/raj
kei=sqai au0ta&j, parabainome/nwn de\ tw~| xro/nw| e0j to\n qa&naton ai9
pollai\ a)nh/kousin: kai\ tou=to o3mwj parabai/netai. h2 toi/nun
deino/tero/n ti tou/tou de/oj eu9rete/on e0sti\n h2 to/de ge ou0de\n e0pi/sxei,
a)ll ) h9 me\n peni/a a)na&gkh| th\n to/lman pare/xousa, h9 d e0cousi/a u3brei
th\n pleoneci/an kai\ fronh/mati, ai9 d ) a!llai cuntuxi/ai o0rgh=| tw~n
a)nqrw&pwn w(j e9ka&sth tij kate/xetai u9p a)nhke/stou tino\j krei/sson-
toj e0ca&gousin e0j tou\j kindu/nouj.”
“Indeed, it is likely that long ago milder punishments were inflicted for the
greatest crimes, but when the laws were broken in the course of time, there
were many elevations to the death penalty. Yet this, too, was disregarded.
Either something still more frightening than this [the death penalty] must
be discovered or there is this [the death penalty], which is no restraint at
all; but while poverty brings about boldness through compulsion, abun-
dance brings about ambition through insolence and pride, and other
chance circumstances due to human passion (depending on how each of
these is ruled by some irresistible force) will lead men into danger.”
(3.45.3–4: individuals)
Diodotus speculates about the past. He surmises that long ago lighter pun-
ishments were likely (eikos) meted out for the greatest crimes; punish-
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ments then became progressively harsher, eventually leading to the death
penalty. Yet crimes were still committed, because of the effects of poverty,
insolence, and the unpredictable effects of passion. These emotional and
material factors refer most directly to individuals who break the law with-
out regard for the death penalty.33
E. Next Diodotus forcefully strengthens the link between section D
concerning individual criminals and the issue at hand—cities revolting—
by invoking a second universal principle.
“h3 te e0lpi\j kai\ o9 e1rwj e00pi\\ panti//, o9 me\n h9gou/menoj, h9 d ) e0fepome/nh,
kai\ h9 me\n th\n e0piboulh\n e0kfronti/zwn, h9 de\ th\n eu0pori/an th=j tu/xhj
u9potiqei=sa, plei=sta bla&ptousi, kai\ o1nta a)fanh= krei/ssw e0sti\ tw~n
o9rwme/nwn deinw~n.”
“In all situations [e0pi\ panti/], hope and desire—the one leading while the
other follows, the one thinking up the scheme while the other holds out
the ready assistance of fortune—do the greatest damage which, although
invisible, is still more powerful than visible dangers.” (3.45.5: cities and
individuals)
Diodotus states that hope and desire are influential “in all situations” (e0pi\
panti/).34 Just as an individual—not expecting to be caught—may hope for
success, so also a city (specifically Mytilene) desiring freedom may revolt;
both are impelled by the same factors.35 As always, such general statements
trigger associations with passages elsewhere in the History. The idea of
hope (elpis) may lead us back to the Mytilenians early in this book: they
had an expectation that the time was right to break away due to
Athenians suffering from the plague and the promised aid from the
Spartan navy (3.13.3); later they are hopeful that they need not engage in
negotiations with the Athenians (3.25.2) although they are soon forced to
come to terms (3.27.1).36 My primary goal, however, is to explore
Diodotus’ method of argumentation that builds on the city-individual
comparison.
F. Diodotus again explicitly links the intrapolitical and international
realms.
“kai\ h9 tu/xh e0p ) au0toi=j ou0de\n e1lasson cumba&lletai e0j to\ e0pai/rein:
a)dokh/twj ga_r e1stin o3te paristame/nh kai\ e0k tw~n u9podeeste/rwn
tina_ proa&gei, kai\\ ou00x h[[sson ta__j po//leij, o3sw| peri\ tw~n megi/stwn
te, e0leuqeri/aj h2 a!llwn a)rxh=j.”
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“And on top of these, fortune plays no less a part in creating confidence;
for sometimes she comes unexpectedly to one’s aid, and leads men to take
risks even in unfavorable circumstances, and this is no less true for cities, inas-
much as they are playing for the highest stakes—either for freedom or for
the power over others.” (3.45.6: cities and individuals)
The psychological portrait that Diodotus has sketched out regarding the
bold optimism of individuals is now transposed to cities that seek freedom
or power over others.37
G. Diodotus concludes this section with a look at individuals and a
broad statement about human nature, the strength of laws, and prevention.
“kai\ meta_ pa&ntwn e3kastoj a)logi/stwj e0pi\ ple/on ti au9to\n
e0do/casen. a(plw~j te a)du/naton kai\ pollh=j eu0hqei/aj, o3stij oi1etai
th=j a)nqrwpei/aj fu/sewj o9rmwme/nhj proqu/mwj ti pra~cai
a)potroph/n tina e1xein h2 no/mwn i0sxu/i h2 a!llw| tw| deinw~|.”
“And each individual, when acting with the rest of a community, irra-
tionally believes that his own powers are somewhat greater. Put simply, it
is impossible and most simple-minded if anyone believes that when
human nature is fervently set upon a certain course, there is some deter-
rent to stop it by force of law or any other threat.” (3.45.6–7: individuals)
Diodotus’ sophisticated sequence of thought has crossed the polis-individ-
ual boundary time and again. To understand the motivation and behavior
of cities such as Mytilene within the Athenian empire, he appeals to ideas
concerning individual motivation, especially those factors that lead to
reckless criminal activity. In Diodotus’ argument, poverty, hope, and
desire affect not only the individual but also cities.
Diodotus then applies his conclusions more broadly to Athens’ concern
for the future: other allies who may revolt (toi=j a)posta~sin).38
“Ou1koun xrh\ ou1te tou= qana&tou th=| zhmi/a| w(j e0xeggu/w| pisteu/santaj
xei=ron bouleu/sasqai ou1te a)ne/lpiston katasth=sai toi=j a)posta~sin
w(j ou0k e1stai metagnw~nai kai\ o3ti e0n braxuta&tw| th\n a(marti/an
katalu=sai.”
“Therefore, we must neither choose inferior policies by trusting in the
death penalty as a safeguard nor make it hopeless for rebels to have any
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possibility of repenting and atoning for the mistake as soon as possible.”
(3.46.1)
Indeed, if the Athenians are concerned about other cities revolting from
their imperial control, the time to act is not after the revolt but before
these cities make such an attempt (3.46.6). Again, the argument used to
recommend Athenian foreign policy originates at the level of an individ-
ual’s behavior understood from a psychological point of view. These con-
clusions are then applied to Athens’ relations with other cities.39
The whole question of collective psychology—especially the emotions
of the group or community—is naturally relevant to this inquiry. Groups
of citizens are said to experience feelings, such as hope, fear, or anger.40 The
idea that a city—or an entire citizen body—could feel fear, for example, is
of critical importance, since fear is cited as one of the motives which led
the Athenians to acquire their empire, and (along with Athenian growth)
was a critical factor in causing the Peloponnesian war itself (1.23.6, 1.76.2,
1.88).41 We note that two of these statements (1.23.6, 1.88) are made in
Thucydides’ own voice: not only speakers, but also the historian himself
attributes emotions to entire communities.
Yet while the psychology of cities and individuals may be similar, the
moral situation is not comparable, at least according to Diodotus’ argu-
ment. Several striking passages concerning justice reject similarities
between the domestic (or intrapolitical) and international realms.
Determining appropriate action toward Mytilene is not, Diodotus asserts,
like judging an individual in a lawcourt; the goal is to find Athenian
advantage.42
“h9mei=j de\ ou0 dikazo/meqa pro\j au0tou/j, w#ste tw~n dikai/wn dei=n, a)lla_
bouleuo/meqa peri\ au0tw~n, o3pwj xrhsi/mwj e3cousi.”
“But we are not judging them in court to get justice, but deliberating as to
how they might be useful to us.” (3.44.4)
Although Diodotus argues that psychological factors influencing an indi-
vidual are relevant to understanding cities, with respect to morality Athens’
relationship with Mytilene is not wholly analogous to individual interac-
tion within a city. Even if the Mytilenians have committed injustice, the
Athenians may do better to pretend they do not notice it.43 That is,
Diodotus maintains that the Athenians cannot do what Cleon claims:
129Maxims and Assimilation in the Mytilenian Debate
Morrison_CH7_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:44 PM  Page 129
“kai\ to\ Kle/wnoj to\ au0to\ di/kaion kai\ cu/mforon th=j timwri/aj ou0x
eu9ri/sketai e0n au0tw~| dunato\n o2n a#ma gi/gnesqai.”
“And Cleon’s punishment in which justice and expediency are one and the
same, both at the same time, is exposed as an impossible combination.”
(3.47.5)
Diodotus is not wholly consistent on the question of international jus-
tice. While clearly insisting that the Athenians should be guided by expe-
diency rather than justice, he does advocate that Paches send only the
guilty (adikountas) to Athens to be judged and let the others go (3.48.1).
Why?44 Because even Diodotus acknowledges that justice may be relevant
to foreign policy—or at least to other cities’ perception of Athenian
action against Mytilene. After remarking that Athens enjoys the favor of
the people (demos) in imperial cities (3.47.2), Diodotus hypothesizes that
if Athens were to destroy the demos of Mytilene as well—which initially
took no part in the revolt—the Athenians would commit an injustice:
“a)dikh/sete tou\j eu0erge/taj ktei/nontej.”
“In killing your benefactors you will commit an injustice.” (3.47.3)
At this point Diodotus employs language from a polis-based system of jus-
tice where guilt, innocence, free will, and justice are significant factors.45
If all adult males in Mytilene are executed, the popular elements in other
cities would be alienated, because the same punishment has been applied
equally to guilty and innocent (th\n au0th\n zhmi/an toi=j te a)dikou=sin
o9moi/wj kei=sqai kai\ toi=j mh/–3.47.3). At the very least, the perception of
unjust punishment—both guilty and innocent suffering the same fate—
will backfire with respect to attitudes on Athens’ foreign policy.46 To this
extent, even Diodotus acknowledges that moral issues should influence
how one city behaves toward another. Morality is therefore not inapplic-
able or nonsensical in international relations; in certain instances, how-
ever, a city’s advantage should be the overriding factor. While justice is
significant in dealing with individuals within a city, in international con-
flict moral obligations between two cities are of secondary importance.
Diodotus does not slavishly follow a formula. He makes fine distinctions
between motive, action, and advantage on the one hand and the more
complex issue of justice between cities on the other. Ostwald has called
Diodotus’ speech “one of the most profound and important speeches in
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Thucydides’ History.”47 As we saw in chapter 6, while other speeches artic-
ulate the city-individual analogy, both halves of the equation are general-
ly not developed. The implications of Diodotus’ speech are significant in
large part because the city-individual comparison is so extensively pur-
sued, covering areas of deliberation, criminal behavior, and psychology at
both levels.
The issue of international justice was addressed briefly in the previous
chapter.48 Without attempting to resolve this issue, it can be said that
Diodotus offers a sophisticated, nuanced approach to this problem.
Elsewhere we encounter differing views: the Athenians deny the rele-
vance of justice (e.g., 1.73–77, 5.89, 5.107), while the Corinthians and
Plataeans argue its importance (e.g., 1.68, 3.53–59). Rather than seek
consistency, we may do better to note the tensions that Thucydides has cre-
ated concerning the recurrent issue of morality in international politics. It
is striking that within Diodotus’ single speech we receive such contradic-
tory signals.
Conclusion
Thucydides makes the bold move of speaking of the collective—this has
rightly been called “the invention of political history,” the course of
human events told in terms of the communities involved.49 In ways some-
what evocative of the atomist Democritus, Thucydides moves effectively
between the microcosm and the macrocosm.50 Ideas, terms, and descrip-
tions that originally derive from the situation and behavior of an individ-
ual are transferred to the polis. Indeed, the city-individual comparison
manifests itself most strikingly at the rhetorical plane in speeches. The city
has been assimilated to multiple features of the individual, including moti-
vation, behavior, and character.51
The Mytilenian debate is significant for many reasons; I will mention
three. First, it makes extensive use of maxims with both local and more dis-
tant application; second, in many cases these maxims derive—directly or
indirectly—from city-individual analogy; and third, it anticipates issues
(responsibility, punishment, and what actually motivates a city) which are
addressed in the Plataean debate (chapter 4).
I suggest we think of an overarching idea: a city thought and spoken of
in similar ways as an individual. Each comparison or maxim which applies
to cities is based on this premise to some degree. As we shall see in chap-
ter 8, even metaphors (such as “the tyrant-city”) are supported by this larg-
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er idea and operate on the assumption that it is a legitimate and produc-
tive way of thinking. We should, of course, beware of oversimplification.
Thucydides presents a complex world where it is impossible to reduce all
that is said and done to a system. Certain manifestations of the city-indi-
vidual comparison derive from the household (slavery, for example); oth-
ers from the more public interaction of citizens (such as bringing charges
against someone).52 Still it needs to be recognized that the singular com-
parison of cities and individuals is a part of the rhetorical world of
Thucydides and such discourse provides insight into the most difficult of
political problems: the motivation and behavior of cities.
In Thucydides’ History, speakers begin with the behavior and motiva-
tion of an individual and apply that knowledge to foreign affairs. The task
of the reader is to determine where the application remains valid, where it
illuminates an obscure action, and when it oversimplifies a more complex
situation. Thucydides does not regularly expand upon an argument in
explicit terms or answer such questions overtly. Rather his speakers intro-
duce maxims and universal principles, as Thucydides presents the reader
with the task of applying these arguments both to the immediate context
and to other situations throughout the History.53 The value of studying the
Mytilenian debate is that we are able to appreciate how wide-ranging and
integral the city-individual comparison remains. We might even say that
Thucydides uses Diodotus’ speech to show the reader how such an argu-
ment comparing cities and individuals might work in some detail.
Diodotus’ speech—and the other examples cited above—do not necessar-
ily imply that Thucydides believes such rhetorical claims are legitimate in
every case. Sometimes undoubtedly Thucydides finds himself in agree-
ment, at other times he may distance himself. It is clear, though, that he
is fascinated with the possibility of understanding a city by reference to the
concerns, motivations, actions—and psychology—of the individual.54
132 Chapter 7
Morrison_CH7_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:44 PM  Page 132
8
Athens the Tyrant-City and the
Function of Political Metaphor
hapter 6 explored the explicitly stated city-individual comparison. CChapter 7 demonstrated how the city-individual analogy might be
applied to a specific action in foreign policy (Diodotus’ proposal). In nei-
ther case do we think of Thucydides unreservedly endorsing these com-
parative links; instead, he introduces them in speeches and offers a view
of possible similarities for the reader’s consideration. This chapter exam-
ines metaphors and other comparative language. Like maxims, many of
Thucydides’ metaphors and comparative expressions derive to some
degree from the city-individual analogy. And, like maxims, most of this fig-
urative language appears in speech rather than narrative. I will limit my
examination to metaphors and comparative language from the first two
books of the History (esp. 1.1–2.65) with a focus on domestic and inter-
national politics.
Thucydides’ portrait of the city of Athens consists in part of at least
eleven political metaphors and comparisons. For example, Athens is
described as a tyrant and an enslaver. Such metaphorical language may at
first glance appear simplistic, yet Thucydides evidently has chosen to offer
such metaphors for a number of purposes. First, these expressions may
reflect the political rhetoric of the time. Regarding the extremely difficult
question of the historicity of Thucydides’ speeches, I do not think there is
one answer for every speech. Some speeches undoubtedly reproduce some
of the actual language and arguments used on particular historical occa-
sions. Bosworth has recently argued that of all the speeches in the History,
the Funeral Oration of Pericles would have been heard by the most
Athenians and was the one most likely heard by Thucydides himself.1 This
raises the question: might Thucydides’ version be pretty close to what
Pericles actually said? Or could it at least echo many of the sentiments of
the great statesman? Pericles’ expressions were certainly memorable and it
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is at least plausible that Thucydides would preserve his more remarkable
metaphors and figures.2 In addition, interesting work by Tompkins and
Debnar has examined the different styles used to represent different figures
and cities when they make speeches.3 I do not expect to resolve this issue
with this brief discussion. But given Thucydides’ claim to “hold as close as
possible to the overall sense of what was actually said” (1.22.2), the for-
mulations examined here most likely reflect to some degree the political
rhetoric that was current at the time (and we can only deal with likelihood
in questions such as these).
A second reason for Thucydides’ introduction of metaphorical and fig-
urative language may be to unify the complex action of the History and
guide the challenging task of analysis performed by the reader. That is, the
use of metaphor may provide a basis for historical understanding. Given
all the detail in Thucydides’ work—the at-times bewildering recounting of
armament, strategy, geography, alliance, individual personality, etc.—
these political metaphors offer an anchor for the reader’s understanding of
the character and behavior of Athens and, more broadly, of the events of
the Peloponnesian War.4 Ultimately these metaphors may lead us to a
more profound understanding of politics and the ways in which domestic
and international politics might illuminate each other.
A third goal may be that such language offers an explicit invitation
for Thucydides’ audience to link and juxtapose various sections of the
History. The reader is invited to compare Athens, the tyrant-city—
which appears in speech—with historical tyrants referred to in the nar-
rative. Thucydides very often leaves implicit possible connections and
reverberations between early and later passages and between speech and
narrative. We have seen, though, that with the city-individual compar-
ison, Thucydides employed several times what almost amounts to a for-
mulaic expression (kai\ po/lewn kai\ i0diwtw~n —“of both cities and of
individuals”) to help the reader easily recognize the recurring idea.
Connections and parallelism between argument and conflict are some-
times explicit, but more often they lie implicit. I would argue that 
political metaphors such as “Athens the tyrant-city” offer explicit com-
parisons for the reader to examine and assess.5 One of Thucydides’ moti-
vations for introducing such metaphors may be to train the reader in
juxtaposition, comparison, and extrapolation—the activity of eikazein.6
My goal is to provide a context for understanding not only the metaphor
of the tyrant-city in Thucydides but also the function of such metaphor-
ical and comparative language more broadly.
Let me briefly characterize Thucydides’ metaphors and related compar-
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isons. These formulations are political in the sense that they describe the
city of Athens either with respect to internal politics (among citizens
within Athens) or interstate politics (Athens’ relations with other cities).
In 1.1–2.65, the city of Athens is described as a tyrant, a slave-master, and
an education, for example. To state the obvious, by portraying Athens in
this way, these metaphors set up comparisons employing strong—indeed
striking and memorable—language. The comparative aspect of these
metaphors invites juxtaposition and comparison between the city of
Athens and other familiar facts of life: tyranny, slavery, educating young
men, and so on. Drawing on the insights of Lakoff and Johnson, this chap-
ter argues that the obvious discrepancies between, say, imperial tyranny
and individual tyrants prove a point: because there is no comprehensive
correspondence between Athens and actual tyrants, Thucydides signals
the reader that such formulations may offer some insight into political
motivation and action, but such metaphors should not be accepted whole-
sale.7 Indeed, it is in the nature of metaphor to suggest only partial corre-
spondences. This does not, however, diminish their power to illuminate:
in fact, it may well be this partial correspondence that gives Thucydides’
political models their dynamism.
Many of these metaphors are introduced only in speeches. This fact
raises more questions for Thucydides’ readers. What is the relative status
of speech as opposed to narrative? Should we think of narrative as rela-
tively more authoritative or dependable than what is said in speeches?
Does an idea in speech ever reflect Thucydides’ own opinion? These are
difficult issues and, as we have already seen, Thucydides’ narrative is not
always authoritative—at times, it may be used to manipulate the reader’s
reactions.8 Here, too, there is no single answer for all speech and all nar-
rative, a narrative that contains quite different types of presentation. At
times, the narrative may confirm what is said in speech; elsewhere it may
provide an illustration of a general idea; in some cases, the narrative
appears to correct what is claimed by making clear how inaccurate a par-
ticular statement or prediction has been.9 There remains a tension
between what is said in speech and what is described as happening in the
narrative. For the following analysis, it is significant that political
metaphors appear predominantly in speeches; this may be seen as an
invitation to the reader to become actively engaged in exploring both the
comparison expressed within the speech itself and also in examining
those links between what is said in the speech and what is presented in
the narrative.
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Athens as Tyrant-City
I begin with the metaphor of Athens as tyrant-city, a model introduced five
times in speeches. At the Peloponnesian Congress where the metaphor is
first proposed, the Corinthians twice label Athens a “tyrant-city.”10 They
warn that, without a united front, Athens will conquer Greece city by city
(1.122.2). Their ancestors freed Greece, yet now such freedom is in jeop-
ardy.
“tu/rannon de\ e0w~men e0gkaqesta&nai po/lin, tou\j d e0n mia~| mona&rxouj
a)ciou=men katalu/ein.”
“We are allowing the establishment of a tyrant-city, yet we believe that
monarchy in a single city should be put down.” (1.122.3)
The Corinthians argue that Sparta’s opposition to rule by one man over a
city should extend to rejecting one city’s domination of many cities. The
comparison between the two political realms is obvious: in internal poli-
tics the Spartans oppose tyranny, yet in international politics they appar-
ently will allow a “tyrant-city” to dominate.11 This is the immediate
relevance of the model. At the close of their speech, the Corinthians
reassert the risk Athens poses to all Greeks. War against Athens, they
argue, is in the common interest of all (1.124.1), for only by going to war
now will they enjoy future security:
“kai\ th\n kaqesthkui=an e0n th|||=| | 9Ella&di po/lin tu/rannon h9ghsa&menoi e0pi\
pa~sin o9moi/wj kaqesta&nai, w#ste tw~n me\n h1dh a!rxein, tw~n de\ dia*
noei=sqai, parasthsw&meqa e0pelqo/ntej, kai\ au0toi/ te a)kindu/nwj 
to\ loipo\n oi0kw~men kai\ tou\j nu=n dedoulwme/nouj 3Ellhnaj
e0leuqerw&swmen.”
“And understanding that a tyrant-city has been established in Greece
against all alike, ruling over some already and plotting against others, let
us attack and overthrow it, and let us live in security for the future and free
those Greeks now enslaved.” (1.124.3)
In this speech—when Athens is viewed from the “outside” by non-
Athenians (in this case, the Corinthians)—the Athens-as-tyrant
metaphor is used to capture particular facets of tyranny: danger, threat to
freedom, expansionist tendencies, and the “enslavement” of others.
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The city-as-tyrant metaphor recurs in the third speech of Pericles, who
emphasizes the danger posed to Athens by subject allies. In admitting that
the empire is “like a tyranny,” Pericles qualifies the comparison, by assert-
ing not identity, but likeness.
“w(j turanni/da ga_r h1dh e1xete au0th/n, h4n labei=n me\n a!dikon dokei=
ei]nai, a)fei=nai de\ e0piki/ndunon.”
“For you now hold your empire like a tyranny, that seems unjust to
acquire, but to let it go is dangerous.” (2.63.2)
Here Pericles notes two similarities between empire and tyranny. In this
context—that of endorsing a continuation of Athens’ imperial strategy—
Pericles acknowledges both moral and strategic considerations, yet he
stresses the risk associated with abandoning Athenian control over other
cities.12
In the Mytilenian debate Cleon returns to the danger Athens faces
from its allies and asserts an equivalency between tyranny and empire:
“ou0 skopou=ntej o3ti turanni/da e1xete th\n a)rxh\n kai\ pro\\j
e00pibouleu//ontaj au00tou\\j kai\\ a!!kontaj a))rxome//nouj, oi4 ou0k e0c w{n a@n
xari/zhsqe blapto/menoi au00toi\\ a))krow~~ntai u99mw~~n, a)ll ) e00j w{{n a@@n i00sxu//i
ma~llon h2 th=| e0kei/nwn eu0noi/a| perige//nhsqe.”
“You do not see that the empire you possess is a tyranny over those who plot
against us and who are ruled unwillingly, whose obedience does not result from
the favors you bestow to your detriment, but from the superiority you enjoy
by your own strength rather than their goodwill.” (3.37.2)
At issue here once again is the relationship between subject allies and
Athens. Cleon argues that obedience comes from Athenian strength, not
from their allies’ loyalty—they are ruled “unwillingly” (akontes). He then
discusses how best to deal with revolt.13 The fifth instance of the compar-
ison, expressed somewhat differently, occurs when Euphemus addresses the
Camarinians on the connection between logic and imperial advantage.
“a)ndri\ de\ tura&nnw| h2 po/lei a)rxh\n e0xou/sh| ou0de\n a!logon o3ti cumfe/ron
ou0d  oi0kei=on o3ti mh\ pisto/n: pro\j e3kasta de\ dei= h2 e0xqro\n h2 fi/lon meta_
kairou= gi/gnesqai.”
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“For a man who is a tyrant or a city possessing an empire, there is nothing
irrational that is advantageous, ties of blood mean nothing if they cannot
be trusted, as it is necessary in each situation to become friend or foe
according to the circumstances.” (6.85.1)
Euphemus specifically links the individual tyrant to a city holding an
empire with respect to motivation: seeking advantage has priority over
previous alliances (or “friendships”). When the empire is viewed as a
tyranny from “within”—by the Athenians themselves—we find an
acknowledgment that the empire may be unjust; it is dangerous to relin-
quish power; the Athenians rule over unwilling subjects; and their chief
motivation is advantage.14
How would Thucydides’ contemporaries have understood the city-as-
tyrant metaphor? Clearly, a Greek ca. 400 BCE would be able to juxtapose
the idea of a city-as-tyrant with experience of historical tyrants from per-
sonal memory, family stories, or common knowledge.15 Yet Thucydides has
made it clear that he is critical of many such preconceptions (see 1.20,
6.54.2, for example). Another option available to Thucydides’ readers is
to compare the city-as-tyrant metaphor which appears in speeches with
Thucydides’ narrative discussion of actual tyrants. Thucydides has chosen
to return repeatedly to both imperial and individual tyranny in various
contexts. In fact, it is striking that many of the retrospective passages fea-
ture tyranny, including those on prehistory (the Archaeology and Sicily—
1.13–20, 6.1–5), the purification of Delos (3.104), and the Peisistratids in
book 6 (6.53–59).16 Even by limiting our analysis to Thucydides’ discussion
of archaic tyranny in the Archaeology, we learn that certain distinctive
aspects of actual tyrannies in part coincide with—and in part differ from—
the metaphorical tyrant-city of Athens.17
When Thucydides first discusses tyranny in his own voice, we
encounter a power matrix built on ships, tribute, and power (1.13).
Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, “on the strength of his navy brought
other islands under his control” (1.13.6).18 In addition, archaic tyranny
is associated with a lack of joint ventures (1.15.2–1.17)19; we also hear of
Spartan opposition to tyranny (1.18.1). There are obvious similarities
based on correspondences between Thucydides’ description of archaic
tyrants and the fifth-century Athenian empire itself which has been
metaphorically labeled a tyranny: sea power, tribute, and control of pre-
viously autonomous cities.20
Yet the contrasts are equally striking.21 Actual tyrants are characterized
as follows:
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“tu/rannoi/ te o3soi h]san e0n tai=j 9Ellhnikai=j po/lesi, to\ e0f ) e9autw~n
mo/non proorw&menoi e1j te to\ sw~ma kai\ e0j to\n i1dion oi]kon au1cein di )
a)sfalei/aj o3son e0du/nato ma&lista ta_j po/leij w!|koun, e0pra&xqh de\
ou0de\n a)p ) au0tw~n e1rgon a)cio/logon, ei0 mh\ ei1 ti pro\j perioi/kouj tou\j
au0tw~n e9ka&stoij.”
“The tyrants in the Greek cities, who looked no further than the person-
al interests of individual well-being and the enrichment of their house-
holds, ran their cities with the maximum security, and accomplished
nothing impressive except against neighboring peoples.” (1.17)
These tyrants’ goals are personal comfort and safety; they avoided risk and
accomplished “nothing impressive” (ou0de\n . . . a0cio/logon). On these
points, of course, we find a sharp contrast to the Athenian empire’s
polypragmosyne, risky wide-ranging adventures, and enduring monu-
ments.22
As the metaphor refracts, we are drawn in different directions.
Thucydides has chosen to return repeatedly to both imperial and individ-
ual tyranny in various contexts—in both speech and narrative—yet he
never offers his own definitive judgment. Thucydides’ presentation raises
the question: was Athens’ empire like a tyranny? The answer is at best a
qualified “yes,” for (as noted above) not every aspect of the “tyranny” of the
Athenian empire coincides with the qualities and habits of historical
tyrants.23 Indeed, it could be said that Thucydides has included sufficient
detail in his narrative about actual tyrants to make it clear that there is no
comprehensive, one-to-one correspondence between metaphorical and
actual tyranny. Commenting on these significant contrasts, Connor con-
cludes that Thucydides’ account “seems to discourage an unqualified accep-
tance of the parallelism between tyrannies and the Athenian empire. . . .
The contrasts are striking ones, and quite likely to be deliberate.”24
Thucydides has moved the interpretive onus to the reader, who must deter-
mine in what respects and to what degree this and other such comparisons
are valid and appropriate.25
In their analysis of metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson offer an illuminating
perspective on Thucydides and his frequent metaphors. First, according to
Lakoff and Johnson: “The essence of metaphor is understanding and expe-
riencing one kind of thing in terms of another.”26 The term “tyrant” origi-
nally designates a single ruler of a certain type within a city-state, that is,
a situation concerning internal politics.27 It is not immediately obvious
that we think of tyranny when considering Athenian foreign policy. These
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two situations—a tyrant within a city and Athens’ relations with other
cities—are dissimilar in many ways, as already noted. What the metaphor
suggests is that in spite of those differences, there may exist similarities—
often at a different plane of interaction (between cities rather than
between individuals)—which illuminate our understanding.28 Lakoff and
Johnson observe that “there is directionality in metaphor, that is, that we
understand one concept in terms of another.”29 The Athens-as-tyrant
model is designed to make us think of international relations between
cities as analogous to certain aspects of internal politics, such as unwilling
subjects who may plot against the tyrant but also respect the tyrant’s
strength.
Second, metaphors are built out of the cultural context.30 It should not
be surprising that speakers in Thucydides’ History use models which draw
on experience familiar to the Greeks of the fifth century—tyranny, slav-
ery, and other relationships—to debate domestic politics and internation-
al relations.
Third, “metaphorical structuring . . . is partial, not total.”31 This means
that because it is in the nature of metaphor to agree with its referent in only
certain respects, there will be significant differences between the two situ-
ations being compared. Lakoff and Johnson remind us that if the similari-
ty between the metaphor and the reality were total, “one concept [the city
of Athens, in this case] would actually be the other [a tyrant], not merely
be understood in terms of it.”32 Yet even if we recognize that imperial
tyranny and archaic tyrants are not identical, the differences between
them do not necessarily mean that Thucydides wholly rejects the
metaphor itself. In fact, this may be the wrong way of describing
Thucydides’ purpose. It is not so much a question of whether Thucydides
endorses the idea of Athens-as-tyrant; what he has done is deliberately
introduce in speeches a recurrent phrase applied to Athens and its empire.
Yet the narrative makes clear that Athens does not coincide with every
aspect of historical tyranny. By introducing such metaphors, Thucydides
invites the reader to discover how and to what degree this metaphor
becomes valuable in understanding the political situation. Because
metaphors work only partially, the reader is implicitly asked to explore
how and when the comparison may be legitimate and valuable.33
Thucydides employs metaphors to elicit forcefully the reader’s critical
engagement.
Fourth, according to Lakoff and Johnson, all metaphors are incomplete.
No single metaphor “is sufficient to give us a complete, consistent, and
comprehensive understanding [of a concept]. . . . Different metaphors,
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each of which partially structures a concept . . . [may] jointly provide a
coherent understanding of the concept as a whole.34 As we shall see,
Thucydides introduces a multitude of metaphors to illuminate Athenian
motivation and action.
Fifth, in a set of metaphors, we may speak of “coherence.” That is, there
may be overlap between two or more metaphors. Although two metaphors
may not be consistent (forming a single image), as Lakoff and Johnson put
it, “they nonetheless ‘fit together,’ by virtue of being subcategories of a
major category and their sharing a major common entailment. There is a
difference between metaphors that are coherent (that is, ‘fit together’) with
each other and those that are consistent” (emphasis in original).35 As we
shall see below, tyranny and slavery form part of a coherent set of
metaphors that mutually reinforce one another in certain respects.36
Sixth and finally, regarding the purpose of metaphor: “A metaphor
works when it satisfies a purpose, namely, understanding an aspect of the
concept.”37 The city-as-tyrant metaphor will be successful to the extent
that it sheds light on Athens’ relationships with other cities. By examin-
ing Lakoff and Johnson’s work on the nature and function of metaphor in
general, we apprehend that Thucydides’ tyrant-city metaphor behaves to
a great degree in typical fashion. Indeed, Lakoff and Johnson conclude
that human thought processes are largely metaphorical.38 To this extent,
Thucydides is engaged in nothing unusual. The differences between actu-
al and metaphorical tyranny should not surprise us, nor should the pres-
ence of competing models to which we now turn. What is of special
interest is that Thucydides uses metaphor to guide the reader’s exploration
of political and historical argument and conflict.
Other Political Metaphors for Athens in 1.1–2.65
Before speculating further upon the purpose and effects of Thucydides’
employment of metaphor, let us examine other metaphors and compara-
tive expressions from the first two books of the History. Six of these,
including the city-as-tyrant metaphor, are introduced to characterize
Athenian foreign policy. The first three recur in various contexts.
1. Athens, the city-as-tyrant (discussed above).
2. Athens, the city-as-defendant. A second array of metaphors—found in
speeches throughout the History—derives from what we might call the
courtroom model. This model, triggered by language from the Athenian
domestic system of justice, suggests that one city may “prosecute” another,
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bringing “charges” against a “defendant-city,” with “judges” determining
guilt and innocence. Like the tyranny metaphor, metaphorical language
deriving from the courtroom is taken from a phenomenon within a polis
(in this case, Athens) that originally describes how citizens relate to one
another in judicial matters: once again internal politics leads to a
metaphor applied to international relations.
Courtroom metaphors in the first book assign the role of defendant
almost exclusively to Athens.39 For example, the Corinthians, insisting
upon the injustice of the Athenians, bring forth “charges” (enklemata):
“o3sw| kai\ me/gista e0gklh/mata e1xomen u9po\ me\n Aqhnai/wn u9bri*
zo/menoi, u9po\ de\ u9mw~n a)melou/menoi.  kai\ ei0 me\n a)fanei=j pou o1ntej
h0di/koun th\n  9Ella&da, didaskali/aj a@n w(j ou0k ei0do/si prose/dei.”
“To this extent we have the greatest charges (enklemata) that we have
been outraged by the Athenians, and neglected by you. For if they were
somehow acting unjustly (edikoun) toward Greece without being noticed,
there would be a need to instruct those who do not know.” (1.68.2–3)40
While the Athenians adopt much judicial language in their discussion of
international relations, they reject the idea of other cities judging them.41
“ai0sqano/menoi de\ kataboh\n ou0k o0li/ghn ou]san h9mw~n parh/lqomen ou0
toi=j e0gklh/masi tw~n po/lewn a)nterou=ntej (ou0 ga_r para_ dikastai=j
u9mi=n ou1te h9mw~n ou1te tou/twn oi9 lo/goi a@n gi/gnointo).”
“While perceiving that the denunciation is not insignificant, we have not
come to answer the charges [enklemata] of cities (for you are not judges
[dicastai] before whom we or they could plead).” (1.73.1)42
The issues raised by courtroom metaphors are monumental. Thucydides
makes recurrent use of such expressions; the reader is repeatedly confront-
ed with international conflict described in the language of the Athenian
court system. The ubiquity of forensic language and disputes over its
applicability in particular situations force us to confront many questions,
the biggest of which is the relevance of justice to international conflict.43
Because such forensic language is applied to international relations
throughout the History, a challenge is posed to the reader. Are justice,
guilt, responsibility, equality, and fairness relevant to foreign policy? When
there is a dispute between cities, is there any forum which might adjudi-
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cate or resolve such conflicts? Whether or not the courtroom model itself
has such validity, the metaphorical language forces the reader to explore
these questions. No issue is more important, as Thucydides shows. In the
last episode before war begins, Pericles offers to go to arbitration—one
model of adjudication between cities (di/kaj . . . dou=nai kata_ ta_j
cunqh/kaj—1.144.2; cf. 1.145). Obviously, if some sort of resolution of
international conflict is not successful, war is the alternative.44
3. Athens-as-enslaver. Slavery originally refers to the ownership and
authority of a master over a slave—that is, it originates in the household
(oikos)—yet Peloponnesian propaganda consists of the theme of Athens
“enslaving” other cities; in fact, on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, the
Corinthians claim that much of Greece is “enslaved.”
“nu=n de\ ti/ dei= makrhgorei=n, w{n tou\\j me\\n dedoulwme//nouj o9ra~te, toi=j
de\ e0pibouleu/ontaj au0tou/j;”
“But now what need is there of long speeches? Do you see that some states have
been enslaved and that the Athenians are plotting against others?” (1.68.3)
I would make two observations. First, the slavery metaphor makes up part
of the freedom/slavery polarity. Given this, we might consider to what
extent the slavery model is truly metaphorical. By the late fifth century,
different senses of freedom existed (personal, political, etc.).45 To speak of
the freedom or slavery of cities may be obvious and straightforward, with-
out stretching the meaning of terms, as metaphor does. For the purposes of
this survey, nevertheless, I introduce the language of imperial slavery as
being on a par with the other expressions examined here, for it offers
another recurrent perspective on Athenian foreign policy.
Second, the idea of one city enslaving another is not expressed exclu-
sively in Thucydidean speeches; it is also found in Thucydides’ own nar-
rative. Note the following passage from the Pentecontaetia where a
distinction is apparently made:
Prw~ton me\n 0Hi/ona th\n e0pi\ Strumo/ni Mh/dwn e0xo/ntwn poliorki/a|
ei[lon kai\ h00ndrapo//disan, Ki/mwnoj tou= Miltia&dou strathgou=ntoj.
e1peita Sku=ron th\n e0n tw~| Ai0gai/w| nh=son, h4n w!|koun Do/lopej,
h00ndrapo//disan kai\ w!|kisan au0toi. . . .  Naci/oij de\ a)posta~si meta_
tau=ta e0pole/mhsan kai\ poliorki/a| paresth/santo, prw&th te au3th
po/lij cummaxi\j para_ to\ kaqesthko\j e00doulw&&qh, e1peita de\ kai\ tw~n
a!llwn w(j e9ka&sth| cune/bh.
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First, under the command of Cimon son of Miltiades, [the Athenians]
besieged and captured Eion on the Strymon river, which was held by the
Persians, and enslaved [endrapodisan] the inhabitants. Next, they enslaved
[endrapodisan] the island of Skyros in the Aegean, occupied by Dolopians,
and settled it themselves. . . . After this they fought against the Naxians
who had revolted and forced them back in by besieging them. And this
was the first allied city enslaved [edoulothe], contrary to what has been
arranged, but afterward this also happened to the others according to indi-
vidual circumstances. (1.98)
Hornblower comments on the use of two terms, andrapodizo and douloo,
noting the
important distinction in terminology: Eion and Skyros were “enslaved,”
h0ndrapo/disan, in the literal sense that their inhabitants were individu-
ally sold into slavery; Naxos was “enslaved,” e0doulw&qh, in the different (it
would be wrong to say “figurative”) sense that she was deprived of her
political liberty.
He concludes: “the concept of enslavement, doulei/a, is rather loosely used.”46
I would differ from Hornblower’s analysis by at least wondering whether one
city “enslaving” (douloo) another is yet one more metaphor, designed to stim-
ulate the reader’s exploration of similarity and difference between the familiar
domestic institutions and Athens’ control over other cities.
The next three comparisons, all voiced by Pericles, appear only once.47
4. Athenians-as-islanders. Athenian war strategy is best captured by the
model of the Athenians thinking of themselves as islanders. As Pericles
advises:
“me/ga ga_r to\ th=j qala&sshj kra&toj. ske/casqe de/: ei0 ga_r h]men
nhsiw~tai, ti/nej a@n a)lhpto/teroi h]san; kai\ nu=n xrh\ o3ti e0ggu/tata
tou/tou dianohqe/ntej th\n me\n gh=n kai\ oi0ki/aj a)fei=nai, th=j de\
qala&sshj kai\ po/lewj fulakh\n e1xein, kai\ Peloponnhsi/oij u9pe\r
au0tw~n o0rgisqe/ntaj polla_ ple/osi mh\ diama&xesqai.”
“For the power of the sea is great. And consider: if we were islanders, who
would be less liable to attack? And now we must hold as closely as possi-
ble to this plan: we must give up land and dwellings, guard the sea and the
city, and above all not fight against the more numerous Peloponnesians
even if we are angered by them.” (1.143.5)
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Pericles’ strategy itself is based on an idealization: if the Athenians were
islanders, they could rely wholly on their navy. As Parry puts it: “The
Athenians do not merely use sea-power to build their realm; they become
almost entirely identified with seapower; they ‘become nautical.’”48
Thinking of Athenians-as-islanders is a comparison designed to promote
Athens’ military strategy against Sparta and her allies. Like the metaphors
and comparisons previously analyzed, the idea of Athenians-as-islanders
occurs in a speech, yet it appears only once. Imagining Athenians-as-
islanders is, however, part of the more extensive opposition of land and sea
which is developed throughout the History and provides a key to histori-
cal analysis.49 Athenian strategy—and the idea of Athenians-as-islanders
that is designed to capture it—must be understood with reference to this
larger polarity. Thucydides places this formulation in Pericles’ first speech
immediately before the war narrative begins. The reader is now in a posi-
tion to test Pericles’ strategy with this easily memorable template: if
Athens were an island, then its ships could protect its territory. Connor
notes the danger: “Athens is not an island and will find it difficult to pre-
tend to be one.”50
5. Athens-as-model. In the Funeral Oration, Pericles asserts that rather
than copying other cities’ laws,51 the Athenians themselves set the stan-
dard: Athens is a model (paradeigma) which other cities emulate.
“Xrw&meqa ga_r politei/a| ou0 zhlou/sh| tou\j tw~n pe/laj no/mouj,
para&deigma de\ ma~llon au0toi\ o1ntej tisi\n h2 mimou/menoi e9te/rouj.”
“We have a form of government that does not emulate the practice of our
neighbors; rather we set an example [paradeigma] to some, rather than imi-
tating others.” (2.37.1)52
The specific context of this assertion is a constitutional one: other cities
with a democratic form of government are following Athens. In this sense,
the Athenian constitution (politeia) is a model (paradeigma) which is imi-
tated by others (mimoumenoi).
To Thucydides’ readers, a second meaning may lie here. The context of
this section of the Funeral Oration deals with the city and its laws; the idea
of comparison (eikazein) is signaled by use of the term paradeigma. Active
application by others is also suggested by mimoumenoi: Athens does not
imitate; it is rather the case that others copy by following Athens. Given
the various political models describing Athens—tyrant, enslaver, etc.—it
is possible to see a broader application for the term paradeigma used here.
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Athens may in some sense be the model par excellence in more than a
constitutional sense. Just as Naxos may be seen as paradigmatic for cities
which attempt to revolt yet become subject “allies” (1.98), and Corcyra
was paradigmatic for understanding civil war during the Peloponnesian
War (3.70–85), so Athens may be paradigmatic for other cities in the fol-
lowing sense. A great deal of the History’s metaphorical language is
attached to Athens, more than to any other city. Thucydides may have
applied such metaphors and comparisons to Athens, not only so that we
learn about Athens and its relations with other cities, but also to consid-
er more generally possible ways of viewing Greek cities, especially their
relationships with other city-states. Athens is associated not only with the
dominance of a tyrant and a slave holder, but may also positively influence
other cities, as the next model suggests.
6. Athens-as-education. Later in the Funeral Oration, Pericles claims:
“Cunelw&n te le/gw th/n te pa~san po/lin th=j 9Ella&doj pai/deusin
ei]nai.”
“In sum, I say that the whole city is an education [paideusis] of Greece.”
(2.41.1)
Once more a memorable expression appears.53 Education (paideusis) nor-
mally takes place within a city, yet here the idea is applied to Athens (as
educator) and to the other cities of Greece (which may learn). Xunelon
(“in sum”) looks back, although there are various opinions as to how far
the summation extends. The retrospective glance may reach to section
2.40 where Pericles discusses the Athenians’ love of beauty, their philo-
sophical inclinations, the contributions of both rich and poor, and
Athenian “bravery with calculation.”54 Or we might take the recapitulation
more extensively, as Rusten argues, “summing up the praise, first of the
city’s institutions in 37–9 (with pai/deusij here, cf. para&deigma in 37.1),
then of the Athenian character in 40.”55 This latter view suggests that
what Athens might teach the rest of Greece is more than laws and con-
stitutions in the narrow (and modern) sense of politics; Athens is also wor-
thy of emulation in teaching others the best way for citizens to relate to
one another in terms of freedom, tolerance, and even opportunities of
leisure. Athens-as-educator does not reject the tyrant and enslaver
metaphors, but may better be seen as a competing metaphor.56
The emphasis upon learning in this metaphor may be directed not only
to Pericles’ Athenian audience but also to Thucydides’ readers. In the pas-
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sage which follows, Pericles dismisses the need for a “Homer to sing our
praises” (2.41.4). Havelock has argued that Plato finds himself up against
the Homeric “encyclopedia” and the near-monopoly on knowledge and
education residing in Homer’s epics; we may find a similar tension at work
here between Thucydides’ new sort of political history and more tradi-
tional modes of education.57 Rather than recall the words of older epic,
Pericles calls upon his Athenians to “learn” from the city itself: its power,
its character, its political way of life—this is modern and will not be found
in Homer.58 At another level, Thucydides may be urging his readers to
learn from his portrait of Athens as presented in this innovative work, the
History. In any case, the Athens-as-education metaphor expands upon the
idea of Athens-as-paradigma by explicitly stating that Athens is a city we
may learn from.59
In addition to metaphors characterizing Athenian foreign policy, sev-
eral metaphors and comparisons—each occurring once—describe internal
Athenian politics. These expressions are frequently brief and emphasize
the intense and complex interaction among Athenian citizens or between
citizens and the city of Athens itself. The first two appear in Thucydides’
narrative.
7. Attic villages as independent poleis. One comparison describes the alle-
giance rural Athenians feel toward their local villages. During the evacu-
ation in the spring of 431, they are forced to leave their homes:
ou0de\n a!llo h2 po/lin th\n au9tou= a)polei/pwn e3kastoj.
It was not other than leaving one’s own city. (2.16.2)
This suggests what we might call a “microcosmic” political model, where-
in the polis of Athens—which embraces the entire Attic peninsula—in a
sense is made up of many little cities (poleis), each in some sense
autonomous.60 The pressure resulting from Pericles’ war strategy in 431 is
immediately apparent as the inhabitants, for example, of Acharnae, a
large deme with three thousand hoplites (2.19.2), watch from the walls and
see their land being destroyed (2.21.2). The younger men are upset and
wish to go out to fight. Since his strategy entails Athenians abandoning
their country residences, Pericles receives much blame for his policy
(2.21.3).
The idea of Attic “cities” is significant in that it undermines Pericles’
idea of the devotion of all citizens to a single object: the polis of Athens
(see models 9 and 10 below). Rural inhabitants may feel as strong an
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allegiance toward their local communities as to Athens itself.
Thucydides has chosen to place this model of potentially divided loyal-
ty here at the beginning of the war—during the evacuation and before
Pericles’ Funeral Oration. The effect is that the reader may now ques-
tion the validity of Pericles’ vision. Of course, Pericles is promoting an
ideal, in part, to counteract such “local” loyalty. Thucydides indicates
the seeds of tension here, as we discover a different sort of allegiance
undercutting Pericles’ later idealization.
8. The “arche” of Pericles. In the “obituary notice” of Pericles, Thucydides
employs an unusual description of Pericles’ leadership by using the term
“arche.”
e0gi/gneto/ te lo/gw| dhmokrati/a, e1rgw| de\ u9po\ tou= prw&tou a)ndro\j
a)rxh/.
What was said to be a democracy was actually the arche [rule? empire?
domain?] of the first man. (2.65.9)61
To describe Pericles’ dominance in Athens as arche is notable. Of course,
the term arche is used in several senses: it may simply mean “power,”
“authority,” or “sovereignty.” In Thucydides, however, it most commonly
refers to the Athenian empire and its domination of other cities, that is,
the reference is to international politics.62 Although most of the
metaphors examined thus far derive from internal politics, this metaphor
derives from external relations yet describes domestic politics.
Note also the context. This assessment of Pericles follows his third
speech which examined the Athenian empire: arche in the sense of
“empire” was mentioned there four times (2.62.1, 2.63.1 [2x], 2.63.3). In
the immediate context of the obituary notice itself, arche also refers to
empire (2.65.7 and 2.65.11). These associations will color the reader’s
reaction. Thucydides has apparently chosen to describe Pericles’ role in
Athens by resorting to a term with a flavor of international politics. This
is yet another illuminating comparison of domestic and international pol-
itics: in this case, a situation from external politics (Athenian imperialism)
is applied to one from internal politics—Pericles’ relationship with his fel-
low citizens.63 If this interpretation is correct, our appreciation of Pericles
becomes a bit more complicated. On the whole, Thucydides offers a glow-
ing tribute to Pericles, yet if his leadership of Athens was analogous to
Athens’ role as an imperial city, was Pericles then in some sense an
enslaver? Does he retain a touch of the tyrant? If Thucydides admires
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Pericles, does this suggest that Thucydides admires aggressive power fig-
ures? These possibilities are at least suggested by the application of the
term arche to the Athenian statesman.
9. Citizens-as-lovers. The complex interaction between individual citi-
zens and the community of Athens is built upon commitments from both
sides.64 One metaphor for this interaction—found in the Funeral
Oration—is that citizens should think of themselves as “lovers” (erastai) of
Athens.
“a)lla_ ma~llon th\n th=j po/lewj du/namin kaq h9me/ran e1rgw| qewme/nouj
kai\ e0rasta_j gignome/nouj au0th=j.”
“But rather gazing upon the power of the city each day, become lovers of
it.” (2.43.1)
The metaphor itself derives not from internal politics, but from the rela-
tionship between lovers—either heterosexual lovers or an older and a
younger man. The lover is attracted by the beauty of the beloved: within the
metaphor, Athens—and its power—arouses the citizen. Hornblower men-
tions the implication of “passive and mercenary homosexuality.”65 By way of
reply, I rely upon an article by Monoson, in which she finds that this
metaphor “projects an image of active, energetic, controlling Athenian cit-
izens.”66 While there is a hint of danger that the lover (erastes) of the city
will come to dominate the city (as eromenos), Monoson argues that in the
rest of the speech Pericles portrays the relationship between citizen and city
as reciprocal.67 In fact, “for the metaphor [of citizen as lover] to work, that is,
for it to deliver praise of both citizens and city, it must successfully evade sug-
gesting that the city plays this [submissive] role. It must successfully negoti-
ate Greek views of honorable and shameful sexual behavior.”68 Monoson
concludes:
The metaphor suggests . . . that interactions befitting free citizens and a
free city are those of reciprocal, mutual exchange, understood on the pat-
tern of benefaction and gratitude, which tie in with the compulsion of
honor, not power.69
The concept of citizen-as-lover, stated in such striking language, appears
only once, yet the idea of such passion returns in Thucydides’ narrative of
the Sicilian expedition in 415.70 Monoson argues that the passion
Athenians feel toward the Sicilian expedition
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is not the restrained, honorable love that Pericles refers to but a furious,
raging eros. The consequences are, of course, disastrous. Thucydides is
relying, I believe, on the cultural prescriptions against such eager, raging
eros to convey the manner in which the Athenians’ behavior on this occa-
sion was troubling and dangerous.71
Thucydides has set up a contrast between what Pericles recommends early
in the war and how in a later situation the idea—twisted and trans-
formed—becomes more dangerous. Thucydides introduces a concept in
remarkable language—citizens-as-lovers—which becomes relevant to his
later account of the war after Pericles’ successors attempt to guide Athens
to success.
10. The City as god. Also in the Funeral Oration, Pericles says that he
has “hymned” the city, suggesting that the city of Athens may be viewed
as a god or hero.
“kai\ ei1rhtai au0th=j ta_ me/gista: a$ ga_r th\n po/lin u33mnhsa.”
“And the most important things have been said, in which I have ‘hymned’
the city.” (2.42.2)72
This metaphorical language also suggests an attitude that citizens might
take toward the city of Athens, quite distinct from the lover model. Here
the implication is that of a mortal worshiping a god, goddess, or cult fig-
ure.73 Thucydides may be implicitly contrasting the reputed immortality of
the city itself (which is like a god) with the death and decay found in the
description of the plague (2.47–54) and Pericles’ final speech (esp. 2.64.3,
discussed just below).
11. City—and empire—as biological organism. A clear expression of an
organic metaphor is found in Pericles’ third speech. After describing the
impressive stature of Athens and its imperial might, he asserts that even if
the Athenians were to surrender, the memory of Athens would abide, for
they have ruled over the most Greeks, fought in the greatest wars, and
inhabited the greatest and wealthiest city (2.64). Parenthetically, he
acknowledges an inevitable decay.
“pa&nta ga_r pe/fuke kai\ e0lassou=sqai.”
“For everything must naturally be diminished too.” (2.64.3)74
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The primary reference may be to the Athenian empire (it will not last for-
ever), but this metaphor may also apply to the city of Athens. Reading this
maxim broadly, both city and empire are subject to nature (pephuke) and,
like biological organisms, will necessarily become weaker and decline over
time. The city of Athens is founded, grows, thrives, and withers in ways
similar to a living creature.75 In this connection—and given the context of
the immediately preceding description of the plague (2.47–52)—we may
consider a related implicit metaphor of the city as patient. The idea of
city-as-organism, in conjunction with the plague description, lends support
to the picture of the city as suffering from disease.76
In total, at least eleven metaphors or comparisons apply either to
Athenian foreign relations or domestic politics. Each comparison teaches
us something about the city—either domestically or in its relation with
other cities. They are for the most part introduced early in the History and
many continue to be developed as Thucydides’ account of the war goes on.
In one sense, each metaphor competes with the others, yet as we saw
above, Lakoff and Johnson discuss “coherent systems” of metaphor, sets of
metaphors that work together by virtue of sharing “entailments,” traits
held in common. Such entailments may be seen in the cluster of the
tyrant, defendant, and slavery metaphors, which overlap and reinforce one
another with respect to certain shared implied features: unrestrained
power, dependence on force, lawlessness, injustice, danger to others, arro-
gance, and rule over unwilling subjects. Alternatively, the metaphors of
Athens-as-model and Athens-as-education appear to reinforce one anoth-
er and contribute to a more positive portrait of Athens. The important
point, however, is that no single metaphor supplies a comprehensive
understanding of the city of Athens. If one metaphor held the key to
understanding—if the answer could be given so simply: Athens is a
tyrant—Thucydides could have supplied such a metaphor in his own
voice. Instead Thucydides uses speeches for the most part to introduce
these various models in different contexts, and leaves the testing and
examination as a task for the reader.
Thucydides’ Use of Metaphors
Thucydides’ political metaphors challenge his readers in a variety of ways.
One challenge concerns the status of such metaphors. Thucydides’ discus-
sion of historical tyrants is stated in his own voice more authoritatively,
yet he never gives us explicit instructions as to what we should conclude
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concerning the idea of Athens as a city-tyrant. It may be valuable to
examine the options the historian faced, for he had several choices regard-
ing his treatment of tyranny and the Athenian empire.
The historian could have expressed the metaphor of Athens-as-tyrant in
his own voice in the narrative. If he had done so, the effect would have been
in some sense to privilege the metaphor, though this may have encouraged
more passive acceptance on the part of the reader. Or he could have given
less attention to both individual and imperial tyranny. Instead Thucydides
has apparently chosen to promote the metaphor of imperial tyranny by
introducing it in speeches, yet his own discussion of individual tyranny
appears in the narrative. This choice is surely deliberate. Thucydides offers
the Athens-as-tyrant metaphor (and most other metaphors and compara-
tive expressions) in speeches as comparisons the reader must critically
examine.77 In offering political metaphors in speeches and discussing
tyrants and slavery in the narrative, Thucydides sets up an implicit juxta-
position that lends these metaphors a dynamic, rather than a static role. The
retrospective reader is asked to consider the extent to which a particular
metaphor is accurate in its immediate and in more distant and comparative
contexts.
In addition to placing political metaphors in speeches, I note the self-
evident: metaphors are challenging by virtue of the fact that they are
metaphorical.78 That is, metaphors captivate by appealing to the imagina-
tion; yet because metaphors suggest only partial correspondences and sim-
ilarities, there will never be a complete coincidence between metaphor
and reality. The reader must constantly test the metaphor, checking to
learn when it offers illumination and when and in what respects it is mis-
leading or irrelevant. To a large extent, metaphors work by implication,
and the reader must actively pursue any implied aspects of similarity and
difference. This open-ended characteristic of metaphor means that the
task of pursuing such implications is potentially limitless, leading to exten-
sive analysis. Indeed, it has been suggested that metaphors are intellectu-
ally challenging to the point of jeopardizing one’s sanity.79
Even if we maintain our mental equilibrium, disappointment may
ensue. There is a part of us, as readers, that naturally desires to know
whether Thucydides the historian viewed the metaphors positively or with
great reservation. Not having a definitive answer leads to some level of
frustration.80 Yet this is a common experience when reading Thucydides in
other respects. Gribble finds that even in the narrative there is often a “sug-
gestive vagueness of the interpretative language . . . [that] seems rather to
underline the desire not to employ the narrator’s voice to impose interpre-
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tations, unless in the sense of modes of interpretation according to broad
patterns of event and behaviour.”81 In analogous fashion the political
metaphors introduced in speeches are characterized by a similar “sugges-
tive vagueness,” thus lending an interactive aspect to the History; it is the
reader’s task to examine and assess these comparative models. Such com-
parative phrases and formulations are not unlike the narrator’s “interven-
tions” that Gribble believes do not produce “definitive authorial
judgement . . . [yet] their purpose is not to establish a definitive explana-
tion which will render subsequent analysis of events redundant, but to sug-
gest the underlying pattern revealed by the perspective of later events.”82
Clearly this is the sort of experience Thucydides has chosen to present us
with—a far different one than if he were to comment on these models in
his own voice. Instead he has given us sufficient coincidence and similar-
ity between metaphor and subject to convince many perceptive scholars
that these metaphors are viable, while introducing tantalizingly significant
differences which call into question their universal validity.
To explain Thucydides’ fondness for these political metaphors, we must
keep in mind what he has to say regarding comparison. At a very basic
level, Thucydides considers it important for the reader to recognize simi-
larity and difference. In his statement of method regarding the History’s
usefulness, Thucydides speaks not only of learning accurately about past
events, but also:
. . . tw~n mello/ntwn pote\ au]qij kata_ to\ a)nqrw&pinon toiou/twn kai\
paraplhsi/wn e1sesqai. . . 
. . . those events that in the future which, in accordance with human
nature, will be similar [toiouton] and will resemble [paraplesion]83 past
events . . . (1.22.4)
The History will prove “useful” (ophelima), Thucydides asserts, because the
reader will gain an accurate knowledge of what happened in the past—and
of similar sorts of events that will occur in the future. In effect, Thucydides
is challenging his reader to compare events from the past with subsequent
times. In fact, Thucydides himself compares events within the History,
although most often this is implicit.84
It is not merely the fact that similarity and resemblance exist between
past and later events; rather, the reader is asked to engage in the practice
of testing similarity and resemblance and to become adept at recognizing
such correspondences. We might even go so far as to say that Thucydides
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seeks to train his reader in the skills of juxtaposition, comparison, and
extrapolation (eikazein). How best to accomplish such training? In order to
practice these skills, the reader must employ his or her intellectual and
imaginative capacities in testing likeness and disparity. Yet this is the very
skill needed for grappling with political metaphors, metaphors that ask the
reader to set the characterization and action of actual tyrants (garnered
from Thucydides’ narrative) in dynamic comparison with metaphors
appearing in speeches. This is what has been done to a limited extent in
this chapter and, I believe, this is what Thucydides intends us to do.
Thucydides’ political metaphors serve the function of offering a kind of
guided, interactive training in the skill of juxtaposition and comparison.85
Conclusion
Thucydides’ introduction of metaphors is important for several reasons.
First, regarding the historical record, Thucydides seeks to reflect the polit-
ical rhetoric of the time. Those who opposed Athens used a variety of slo-
gans to rally support: Athens was enslaving Greece, Athens was a tyrant,
and so on. Conversely, Pericles was known for his memorable phrases, and
is likely to have used the sorts of expression Thucydides attributes to him
in characterizing Athens’ greatness and its citizens’ allegiance to such a
city. In fact, seven of the eleven metaphors and comparisons proposed
here are voiced by Pericles, five by him alone (islanders, model, education,
lover, city-as-god).86 Ancient witnesses other than Thucydides confirm
this picture of Pericles as a colorful, inventive, and memorable speaker. In
the Demoi fr. 102, the fifth-century comic poet Eupolis describes Pericles:
“kai\ mo/noj tw~n r9hto/rwn to\ ke/ntron e0gkate/leipe toi=j a)krow*
me/noij.”
“He alone of the speakers left a sting in his audience.”
Like a wasp or bee, the effect of hearing Pericles speak may have been
painful (this is part of the whimsical image), yet his words certainly stuck
in the listener’s memory.87
If we compare Pericles’ expressions recorded by Thucydides with those
found elsewhere, we note that Thucydides appears to have selected only
the ones most directly related to domestic and international politics. From
sources other than Thucydides, we learn that Pericles spoke of how “los-
154 Chapter 8
Morrison_CH8_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:45 PM  Page 154
ing the youth of the city is like a year robbed of spring” (Ar. Rhet.
1365a34). The Samians were “like children who cry while they accept
scraps [showing lack of appreciation]”; the Boeotians were compared to
holm-oaks that knock each other down (with continual internal con-
flict—Ar. Rhet. 1407a).88 These phrases and expressions are memorable
but are derived from the natural world (spring, oak trees) rather than the
political arena. Thucydides has evidently been selective in his presentation
of Pericles by sticking to politics.
The second point concerns Thucydides’ larger project of historical
analysis. While it may be true that politicians and speakers repeated such
slogans to crowds, Thucydides has also presented metaphors as a facet of
historical analysis. Macleod remarks that “the rhetorical commonplace
becomes a basis for historical analysis.”89 Generally, speeches contain the
more daring use of language while in the narrative a stricter denotation of
slaves, tyrants, etc. is employed. The effect of bold metaphor is to challenge
the reader—not only to remember and keep track of these comparisons,
but also to compare, probe, and test. To what extent are such metaphors
accurate? In what situations? Do such metaphors help us better to under-
stand the behavior of Athens and its empire or Pericles’ relationship with
the Athenian people? Leidl argues that “metaphor is necessary when a
new field of knowledge is to be organized, when new concepts have to be
designed for something which had not been talked about before.”90 To the
extent that Thucydides is engaged in a new sort of enterprise (“inventing
political history”), it makes sense to expand the use of familiar expressions
in this fresh area of investigation.
A third aspect concerns Thucydides’ audience and the various chal-
lenges Thucydides has proposed. But perhaps I should say audiences, for I
think that Thucydides envisioned both auditors and readers (see chapters
9 and 10). In both cases—either those hearing the History read aloud or
those reading a scroll, say, of book one—there would have been tremen-
dous difficulties in cross-referencing (the sort of activity modern scholars
regularly engage in, with their concordances, commentaries, and
codices).91 When Cleon calls Athens’ empire a tyranny, Thucydides could
reasonably expect his auditor and his reader to recall that Pericles said
something quite similar. Both Thucydides’ auditors and readers must rely
upon memory in order to reconstruct this echo, yet Thucydides aids this
process of recollection not only by the recurrence of metaphors, but by
using memorable expressions. Thucydides’ striking, figurative expressions
keep these images active in the audience’s mind.
While the Athens-as-tyrant metaphor is striking and memorable, to rely
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upon this one metaphor would be reductive. Indeed, as we have seen,
Thucydides introduces competing metaphors. These metaphors offer
“touchstones” to the reader—easily grasped and memorable—by which to
judge the often bewildering world of action and argument found through-
out the History. Such metaphors offer a framework within which we may
gauge Athens with respect to both domestic and international politics. The
internal political metaphors explore civic unity and interaction, suggesting
possible pressures upon the loyalties of citizens within the polis; this is a pre-
requisite for understanding domestic tensions that may lead to conflict and
civil war. The international political metaphors help the reader to assess
relations between cities in terms of alliance, domination, and war. Yet in
each case the interpretive onus belongs to the reader, who must determine
in what respects and to what degree such metaphors are valid and appro-
priate.92 While political models aid the reader, they also present challenges,
as Thucydides insists upon the critical assessment of the reader.
The skill of apprehending and analyzing likeness and difference is use-
ful not only for testing political metaphors, but also more generally for
comparing different situations within the History and for comparing the
reader’s own life and times with those recounted in the History.93
Thucydides’ presentation of the History, of course, suggests comparisons
which go beyond the realm of metaphor: Should we compare the portray-
al of Athens in the Funeral Oration with the picture of Athens found in
the description of the plague? To what extent are the interwoven situations
of Mytilene and Plataea in book 3 comparable—and is the rationale
Diodotus advocates for deciding Mytilene’s fate the same one followed by
the Spartans regarding that of Plataea (chapter 4)? Is the motivation for
the Melian and Sicilian ventures the same? If so, why is Athens successful
in one instance, and meets with disaster in the other (chapter 5)? In gen-
eral, Thucydides does not explicitly tell his reader to compare such situa-
tions. Such an invitation to juxtapose, compare, and extrapolate is
implicit throughout the History. Political metaphors are explicit in this
respect: they ask the reader to set data garnered from Thucydides’ narra-
tive regarding actual tyranny, slavery, and the judicial process (domestic
politics) in dynamic comparison with Athenian foreign policy and action
(interstate politics). Political metaphors overtly signal the task of juxta-
position that the reader must pursue: the reader thus gains a special kind
of training deemed valuable by Thucydides, namely, training in compari-
son and extrapolation.
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9
Thucydides’ Life and Work
he previous chapters have emphasized the experiences of the reader Tfor certain episodes: the participatory engagement for the Corcyrean
conflict, a retrospective attitude for the Melian episode, and the idea of fig-
urative language guiding the reader through the intricacies of “comparison
and extrapolation” (eikazein). At some level, every episode may be viewed
alternatively through the eyes of an engaged or a retrospective reader.
From an engaged perspective the reader may experience events from the
vantage point of figures who were living through them; indeed, it was
argued that Thucydides (like Plato) has successfully recreated the atmos-
phere of oral discourse and put his reader into the position of listener to a
debate, not unlike the internal audience of the History. Yet it is also valu-
able to consider from a more distant vantage point what might have hap-
pened, based on what is known later. Another way of talking about the
reader’s experience is to say that Thucydides has produced a text that
lends itself to experiential and participatory engagement, yet after an
episode is read (or heard) the arguments, events, and ideas may be reread,
discussed, and analyzed in a more dispassionate mode by scanning a broad-
er swathe of the past.
These final two chapters will explore Thucydides’ claims and motiva-
tions for writing history, various aspects of his own life, and a reconstruc-
tion of the History’s reception. In considering Thucydides’ goals beyond his
explicit claims, speculation will be required in order to recover possible
motivations for structuring his work as he did. It may also be valuable to
consider Thucydides’ biography: what he explicitly tells us, what we may
infer, and what we know of the historical context. We also turn finally to
Thucydides’ actual readers and auditors. The analysis in chapters 3–8 was
limited to an implied reader constructed from the text, based on the infor-
mation and guidance Thucydides presents in the History. My hope now is
to approach the difficult question of the reception of Thucydides’ work by
both ancient and modern audiences. How did Thucydides himself imagine
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his audience’s engagement? In the introductory chapter I described
Thucydides as sitting on the cusp of the divide between oral and written
culture. This means it is virtually impossible to pigeonhole Thucydides’
work exclusively in terms of either oral or literary culture: his sources for
the war itself were largely oral; he self-consciously refers to the status of his
work as a written document; and yet the reception of his account of the
Peloponnesian War may very well have included both readers and auditors.
Claims
Thucydides makes three significant claims for his work: the importance of
the subject, the accuracy of the account, and its lasting value. Let us
explore these in turn. In the opening paragraph of the History, Thucydides
claims that the war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians was
“most worth recording” (axiologotaton–1.1.1). He argues for this by magni-
fying his own subject (and his accomplishment in writing about it) and by
comparing his subject and work with that of others.
Almost in awe of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides is exceedingly
fond of superlatives. The disruption of the Greek world was the greatest
(ki/nhsij . . . megi/sth –1.1.2). The plague was the greatest in human
memory (2.47.3). The scope of the war and the extent of the suffering it
caused were so great that never before had as much suffering occurred in an
equal period of time: so many cities were destroyed, so many were driven
into exile, there was so much murder. All this was due to war and civil
strife. As if this were not bad enough, earthquakes, eclipses, drought,
famine, and disease were also more crowded into one period than in pre-
vious times (1.23.1–3).1
Thucydides also argues that the Peloponnesian War is the greatest war
in comparative terms, by seeking to demonstrate that “his war” is of
greater magnitude in terms of scope and suffering than the wars recount-
ed by Homer and Herodotus.2 One function of the Archaeology (1.2–19)
is to demonstrate that earlier wars could not have been of the magnitude
of the Peloponnesian War, due in part to lack of capital reserves, walled
cities, and sufficiency large navies.3 The great Panhellenic ventures of the
heroic age and even the early fifth century were of lesser scope and conse-
quence.
Thucydides’ second claim concerns accuracy: his work is reliable.
Again, he argues for this in part by comparing his accomplishment with
other histories and common knowledge. In the section on method,
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Thucydides asserts that his versions of speeches “hold as close as possible
to the overall sense of what was actually said” (e0xome/nw| o3ti e0ggu/tata
th=j cumpa&shj gnw&mhj tw~n a)lhqw~j lexqe/ntwn); his presentation of
events is offered “with the utmost possible accuracy in each case” (o3son
dunato\n a)kribei/a| peri\ e9ka&stou e0pecelqw&n–1.22.1–2). Thucydides
emphasizes the meticulous labor that was necessary on his part due to the
contradictory or biased reports he received:
Finding out the facts involved great effort [e0pipo/nwj de\ hu9ri/sketo],
because eye witnesses did not say the same things about the same events,
but [reported] according to favoritism or [lapses of] memory. (1.22.3)4
Thucydides also stresses clarity and truth in his work. For example, regard-
ing clarity (saphes), Thucydides’ audience will include “as many as wish to
look clearly at past events” (to\ safe\j skopei=n–1.22.4). With regard to
truth (aletheia), Thucydides promises to reveal the “truest (alethestaten)
cause of the war” (1.23.6).5
Thucydides claims preeminence by contrasting his own History with
the work of others and with people’s general knowledge. That is, in a
polemical tone, Thucydides asserts that others have failed to reach his
standards of clarity, truth, and accuracy. Indeed, others are likely to receive
reports uncritically.
oi9 ga_r a!nqrwpoi ta_j a)koa_j tw~n progegenhme/nwn . . . o9moi/wj
a)basani/stwj par ) a)llh/lwn de/xontai. 
For people accept what they hear from one another about the past . . . with
a uniform lack of testing. (1.20.1)
Many avoid the toil needed to attain the truth (1.20.3). Thucydides’ pro-
nouncements made in his section on method (1.20–23) repeatedly contrast
his own finished product with the less reliable and demonstrably false sto-
ries that people pass around.6
Thucydides makes a third claim: he announces that his work will have
lasting value. We might assume that an accurate history of the most note-
worthy war would be inherently valuable, yet Thucydides states that his
work will be useful because human nature is constant, so that events com-
parable to those he recounts will take place in the future.
o3soi de\ boulh/sontai tw~n te genome/nwn to\ safe\j skopei=n kai\\ tw~~n
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mello//ntwn pote\\ au]]qij kata__ to\\ a))nqrw&&pinon toiou//twn kai\\ para-
plhsi//wn e11sesqai, w))fe//lima kri//nein au00ta__ a)rkou/ntwj e3cei.
Yet if [my work] is judged useful by as many as wish to look clearly at both
past events and those in the future which, in accordance with human nature,
will be similar and will resemble past events, that will suffice. (1.22.4)
Below I will address the questions of how and to whom the History may be
useful.
Another aspect to Thucydides’ claim is that the value of his work will
endure. He introduces an unusual expression, referring to the History as a
“possession”:
kth=ma& te e0j ai0ei\ ma~llon h2 a)gw&nisma e0j to\ paraxrh=ma a)kou/ein
cugkei=tai.
[This work] is composed as a possession forever rather than a competition
piece to be heard for the moment. (1.22.4)
We find a suggestion here that one of the reasons Thucydides’ work will
be valuable and is a “possession forever” is that it is written. He does not
use a form of grapho in this particular passage, but states rather that his work
will not be a competition piece to be heard (akouein) for the moment. Does
this imply that Thucydides’ work must (or should) be read? I think not, but
again, I will argue this position below.7
Motivations
Based on these claims it is possible to speculate regarding Thucydides’
motivations. Let us consider three: rivalry, teaching, and exile. As we have
already seen, Thucydides often asserts claims for his work in comparative
terms: his war is a greater war than any other war; his account is more accu-
rate; this work will last forever (that is, longer than any other). Such rival-
ry is a defining characteristic of Greek culture. Indeed, the agonistic spirit
is a feature of most Greek artistic, political, and military endeavor, and it
certainly constitutes an essential element of Thucydides’ attitude. One
way of setting himself within a tradition of greatness is to recall other prac-
titioners, and he does so by remarks concerning the Trojan War
(1.9–10)—a nod to Homer—and the four major battles that essentially
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constituted the Persian war (1.23.1)—a shrug to Herodotus. After ceding
lesser events to these composers, Thucydides proclaims superiority for his
war and his work; indeed, he reveals his competitiveness by taking on the
greatest of rivals.8
Rivalry is not the only motivating factor. Beyond seeking to distinguish
himself from previous “writers” of war, Thucydides also views himself as a
teacher who offers something of value to his listeners and readers.9 One
benefit of recounting the story of the greatest war in Greek history—that
he distinguishes by his superior method, reliability, and soundness—is that
the lessons learned will be more valuable than those offered by earlier or
contemporary rivals.
What are the lessons? First, one goal is recognition of similar events in
the audience’s own time (1.22.4, quoted above; cf. 2.48.3). But there may
be more. We find admiration for brilliant statesmen who may serve as role
models. Themistocles is described as someone who excels at anticipating
what will happen given the present circumstances: he is “best at conjec-
turing” (a!ristoj ei0ka&sthj–1.138.3). Thucydides goes on to praise
Themistocles’ ability to improvise (autoschediazein).
kai\ to\ cu/mpan ei0pei=n fu/sewj me\n duna/mei, mele/thj de\ braxu/tati
kra/tistoj dh\ ou[toj au0tosxedia/zein ta\ de/onta e0ge/neto.
To sum up, this man by natural ability, with rapid deliberation, was cer-
tainly supreme in improvising what was necessary. (1.138.3)
We also find admiration for Pericles, whose final words in the History are
an exhortation that the Athenians think ahead (2.64.6).10 Thucydides, I
believe, wished to help prepare later statesmen and citizens to follow in the
paths of Themistocles and Pericles. From grappling with Thucydides’
account of what happened and what was said during the Peloponnesian
War, readers should be in a better position to anticipate what would be
likely to happen in new situations.
Given the disruption, suffering, and casualties of the Peloponnesian
War, we might believe that learning the lessons of the past could in some
way offer hope for avoiding future conflicts of such magnitude. The didac-
tic element in Thucydides’ work necessarily contains a kernel of optimism
for a better future: this is one reason people teach. In part, Thucydides is
teaching the basics of politics by offering an appreciation of rhetoric and
its political consequences. In terms of military and political conflict, a
reader with a keener appreciation for why people fight, why negotiations
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fail, and how cities interact for mutual benefit or harm may envisage—and
bring about—a world with less suffering.
Some speculation is necessary if we are to speak of Thucydides’ moti-
vations for writing this work and for constructing it as he did. To add a
third factor to these two probable motivating factors (competition with
rivals, enlightenment for his audience), we might ponder the profound
effect of exile upon Thucydides. In order to do so, I would like to place
Thucydides’ twenty years of exile (424–404 BCE) in the larger context of
what we know of Thucydides’ life and times.
Biography
In chapter 1, I argued that Thucydides should be seen as a transitional fig-
ure in terms of intellectual history, for he bridges the gap between the pre-
dominantly oral culture of the fifth century and the coming of a
book-reading public in fourth-century Athens. The world in which
Thucydides was raised consisted very much of an oral culture. Speeches
were spoken and heard in the courts and the assembly; tragedy and come-
dy were performed before Athenian audiences; Socrates interrogated
Athenians in the agora and elsewhere. During the war the so-called
“sophists” had come to Athens, promising to make young Athenians effec-
tive speakers.11 Yet by the time of Aristotle’s Lyceum in the mid-fourth
century (two generations later), we clearly encounter habitual readers.
Thucydides (and Plato) fall into the gap between these two more clearly
defined periods.
I would add that this was also a highly politicized time, politicized in
the sense that every Athenian living in the mid- and late-fifth century saw
the consequences of decisions and actions—of how they lived their
lives—in terms of how the polis of Athens would be affected.12 In order to
influence your city and shape the course of civic affairs, it was necessary to
be engaged by participating actively in public life. Citizens judged in the
law courts and proposed motions, debated, and voted in the assembly; they
addressed their fellow citizens and challenged their opponents; they
fought in the army and rowed in the navy. Given the scale of Athenian
greatness (2.64.3)—an empire whose power is comparable only to the
Persian empire—there is an almost tangible thrill Thucydides conveys in
having played a role in that project.13
I rehearse these features in order to give a sense of what Thucydides
lost—and missed—when he went into exile. No longer could he address
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(in live, face-to-face civic discourse) his fellow Athenians, point out the
proper course of action, or warn them on the spot in the assembly of a mis-
take. His contributions to the city of Athens as a citizen, as a soldier, as a
politician, and as a speaker vanished. I surmise that a possible—indeed a
likely—motivation for Thucydides’ project (especially his means of pre-
sentation) was the search for a substitute that could serve in some way for
that engagement in civic affairs, now no longer available to him. He could
still address his fellow citizens, but it was no longer in oral, living dialogue;
rather it was now with words written on papyrus with a goal both local (to
Athenians and other Greeks ca. 400 BCE) and for all time.
So much for the times in which Thucydides lived. He also offers some
unambiguous information about his own life. In general terms, the histo-
rian tells us that he was present at some of the speeches and some of the
events: au0to\j h1kousa . . . au0to\j parh=n . . .  (I myself heard . . . I myself
was present . . . –1.22.1–2). We immediately wonder: Which speeches and
events did Thucydides witness? Was he present at Pericles’ Funeral
Oration? Was he involved in the Athenian expeditions to aid Corcyra in
433 or to put down the Mytilenian revolt in 427?14
Regarding the plague, we know that Pericles died and Thucydides sur-
vived. In his account, Thucydides relies upon what he experienced and saw
with his own eyes.
au0to/j te nosh/saj kai\ au0to\j i0dw_n a!llouj pa&sxontaj.
I myself caught the plague and saw others suffering from it myself.
(2.48.3)15
Thucydides sketches out the relationship among the plague, suffering, and
memory. In his description, Thucydides recounts in detail the progression
of symptoms: fever, cough, diarrhea, disorientation, lapses of memory, and
so on (2.49). He also speaks of those who survived a bout of the plague:
some lost their extremities, their eyes, or their genitals (2.49.8), yet—
because they did not die from the plague—believed that they would live
forever (2.51.6). Did Thucydides’ lose the ends of his fingers or toes? Did
he lose his genitals? Did he entertain the illusion that he would live—if
not forever—at least a very long time? We wonder but cannot know the
long-term effects of the plague upon Thucydides.
Much of Thucydides’ information derives from someone’s memory,
largely that of his informants, who remember battles and speeches and
then recount those experiences to Thucydides in accordance with their
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recollections.16 Yet the historian acknowledges certain drawbacks to mem-
ory. It was hard, Thucydides tells us, for the historian and his informants
to remember precisely what people said (1.22.1). Indeed, Thucydides
asserts that memory may be faulty, for he also remarks that differing
accounts of the same events resulted from favoritism or lapses of memory
(1.22.3). To this extent, even memory of events that someone has partici-
pated in may be unreliable.
Particularly interesting in Thucydides’ account of the plague is the con-
nection between memory and suffering. There were two current versions
of an oracle: one version stated that “A Dorian war will come, and a
plague [loimos] with it”; a different version read “A Dorian war will come,
and a famine [limos] with it.” Disagreement ensued over which word—
”plague” or “famine” (loimos or limos)—was sung (2.54.2–3). In this case,
“plague” (loimos) prevailed and Thucydides remarks:
oi9 ga_r a!nqrwpoi pro\j a$ e1pasxon th\n mnh/mhn e0poiou=nto.
People shaped their memories in accordance with what they suffered.
(2.54.3)
Such a remark suggests that memory is pliable and may be adjusted with
respect to experience.17 This observation leads in turn to another question:
To what extent might Thucydides himself have shaped his account of the
Peloponnesian War in accordance with what he suffered? He suffered from
the plague; he endured the ignominy of exile. How might these experiences
have influenced him as a person and as an historian? Might this have
affected his overall goals in writing the History?18 Let us examine more
closely the account of his exile.
In the so-called second introduction, Thucydides lays out his creden-
tials for writing the History:
I lived through the whole [of the war] when I was of an age to observe and
had my mind engaged, in order to gain knowledge with some exactness; it
also happened that I was exiled from my city for twenty years after the com-
mand at Amphipolis and, being present at the activities of both sides,
especially that of the Peloponnesians because of my exile, I had leisure to
observe affairs better. (5.26.5)
Thucydides refers to an exile of twenty years’ duration after Amphipolis
(424 BCE), access to both sides, and the leisure of an extended sabbati-
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cal—the necessary conditions perhaps for writing accurate history.19
Thucydides says that during his exile, he had access to both sides and pre-
sumably time to test his various sources (5.26.5).
The circumstances that led to his exile (recounted in the History) were
as follows. In the year 424, Thucydides himself played a role in the events
leading up to the loss of Amphipolis. After mentioning himself as “the
other general, Thucydides, son of Olorus, who wrote this history”
(4.104.4), Thucydides describes his own actions upon hearing of the
Spartan threat to Amphipolis:
When [Thucydides] heard this, he sailed at once with seven ships which
were on the spot, and he wanted above all to get to Amphipolis before its
surrender, but otherwise to occupy Eion in advance. (4.104.5)
There were two consequences of Thucydides’ quick response. First, the
Spartan general Brasidas made a deal with the people of Amphipolis on
more moderate terms than he would have otherwise; and second, although
Thucydides arrives too late to save Amphipolis, he did save the city of
Eion. The contingent nature of this sequence of events is highlighted by
one of the counterfactual hypotheses analyzed by Flory.20
o9 de\ Qoukudi/dhj kai\ ai9 nh=ej tau/th| th=| h9me/ra| o0ye\ kate/pleon e0j th\n
0Hio/na.  kai\ th\n me\n  0Amfi/polin Brasi/daj a1rti ei]xe, th\n de\  0Hio/na
para\ nu/kta e0ge/neto labei=n: ei0 ga\r mh\ e0boh/qhsan ai9 nh=ej dia\
ta/xouj, a3ma e3w| a2n ei1xeto.
Thucydides and his ships sailed into Eion late on the same day. And
Brasidas had just taken Amphipolis and came within a night of taking
Eion; if the ships had not come to the rescue quickly, it would have been
his at dawn. (4.106.4)
Thucydides the general came literally one day too late to protect
Amphipolis. How different things might have otherwise been in his life
(and perhaps in the war). We note the emphasis on events that occur con-
trary to expectation (4.103.5, 4.106.1) and recall the many other times
Thucydides indicates the contingency of events. This close call—a failure
both personal and strategic—may have impressed upon the historian how
often the course of events may have followed a different path.21 In this sec-
tion, while Thucydides includes both praise for Brasidas and some degree
of exculpation for himself, there is no mention of his exile here—this
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gains notice only in book 5—nor is there any record of the discussion in
the Athenian assembly which resulted in Thucydides’ exile.22
The Pisistratids, Nicias, and Thucydides
Two other episodes relevant to Thucydides’ own life and work should be
investigated: the Pisistratids (6.54–59) and Nicias’ letter (7.8–15). In the
middle of book six, soon after the Sicilian Expedition is underway,
Thucydides expands upon his discussion of the mutilation of the Herms
and mocking of the Mysteries in 415 (6.53–61; cf. 6.27–29). Thucydides
criticizes the Athenians’ investigation into these crimes on several counts,
including the Athenians’ failure to gain accurate information, a failure
that results in part due to the unreliability of the informants.
After the fleet sailed, the Athenians in fact had not slackened in their
investigation (zetesin) of the acts committed regarding the Mysteries and the
Herms, but not testing the informers [ou0 dokima&zontej tou\j mhnuta&j],
they found everything grounds for suspicion, arresting and putting in
prison some very upright citizens because of their own trust in scoundrels,
since they felt it more essential to investigate exhaustively (basanisai) the
affair and make discoveries than to let anyone accused, however worthy
he seemed, escape examination (anelengkton) on account of an informer’s
baseness. (6.53.2)
We note that in this description, Thucydides employs terms that he also
uses in reference to his own labor as an historian (zetesis, basanisai, ane-
lengkton). Just as the historian interviews his informants, the Athenians
make an enthusiastic effort to investigate previous events by gathering
accusations. But in the end, because they did not “test” the informers (ou0
dokima&zontej tou\j mhnuta&j), the Athenians’ efforts fail to yield any
conclusive information or just rulings (6.60.5, 6.61.1)—this contrasts
pointedly with Thucydides’ own success as an historian.23
Thucydides moves from this investigation to the Athenian people’s
opinions about the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons. Just as the
Athenians in 415 relied on reports from informants, so they also relied for
their knowledge concerning the Pisistratids on oral report: e0pista&menoj
ga_r o9 dh=moj a)koh=|  . . . (“For the people knew from hearing . . .”–6.53.3;
cf. 6.60.1). Thucydides here expands upon a correction stated early in the
History: that Hippias, not Hipparchus, was the son who succeeded
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Pisistratus, the sixth-century tyrant of Athens (1.20.2). In Thucydides’
account of the Pisistratids, we encounter the familiar elements of collect-
ing information and evaluation of evidence. The evidence Thucydides
draws on is in part oral, in part written. Thucydides concludes that
Hippias was the elder brother by emphasizing that Hippias—not
Hipparchus—had legitimate sons. Inscriptions on the Altar of the Twelve
Gods and on a stele on the acropolis record no children for Hipparchus,
yet five children of Hippias are mentioned (6.54–55).24 It is no surprise that
Thucydides characterizes his account as more accurate:
In describing these events fully, I will demonstrate that neither others nor
the Athenians themselves are saying anything accurate [a)kribe\j ou0de\n
le/gontaj] about their own tyrants or about what happened. (6.54.1)
When Thucydides concludes this digression and returns to the situation in
Athens in the year 415, he comments that the people have now become
harsh and suspicious (6.60). As far as those in prison were concerned, no
reliable information had been obtained:
There is conjecture [eikazetai] in both directions, but no one then or later
could say anything definite [to\ safe&j] about those perpetrating the deed.
(6.60.2)
Here we note that the Athenians engage in “conjecturing” (eikazetai), a
word denoting the activity Thucydides uses in an admiring manner for
certain statesmen and historians. Yet in this case, one of Thucydides’ own
goals—“clarity” (to\ safe&j)—is not achieved, evidently due to a failure of
testing and extrapolation. Thucydides remarks that it is unclear whether
prisoners were unjustly put to death (6.60.5). Regarding Alcibiades in par-
ticular, all that Thucydides will say is that the Athenians thought they had
clear information about his guilt (6.61.1).25
Many aspects of this section deserve further reflection. Regarding the
Pisistratids, Thucydides promotes the accuracy of his own account with an
explicit reference to an oral source.
ei0dw_j me\n kai\ a)koh=| a)kribe/steron a!llwn i0sxuri/zomai.
I insist with more accurate knowledge than others through what I have heard
[akoe]. (6.55.1)
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As Connor remarks, an oral report “can be useful if subjected to careful
examination.”26 This Thucydides does, but the Athenian people have
failed to do with their informants regarding the Herms and Mysteries. But
there is the larger question: Why this digression? What is the connection
between the charges against Alcibiades in 415 and the Athenians’ faulty
beliefs about Hippias and Hipparchus? Why has Thucydides chosen to
juxtapose these two episodes?
Among other links, scholars have pointed to the shared themes of passion
(eros) and tyranny.27 In addition I would like to emphasize the Athenians’
readiness to listen to and believe false accounts. The Athenian people heard
Hipparchus was tyrant and they believed it, just as they listened to possibly
false accusations against Alcibiades and others in 415 and were persuaded
without effective testing. In both cases, we find the Athenians accepting mis-
leading or false reports. A third yet implicit point of comparison, I believe,
concerns the circumstances of Thucydides’ own exile. After Brasidas took
Amphipolis in 424, Thucydides was undoubtedly attacked in the Athenian
assembly—according to Marcellinus’ biography of Thucydides, it was Cleon
who denounced him.28 Although the grounds for his exile were presumably
presented in speeches made in the assembly, Thucydides does not maintain
that oral reports are necessarily inaccurate—much of the History is based on
oral report. Indeed, regarding the Pisistratids, Thucydides appears to assign as
great weight to his oral source (6.55.1) as to the inscriptions in Athens.
Thucydides, however, has tested and compared these reports and evidence.
On the other side, as Thucydides has demonstrated, regarding what it hears the
Athenian people—in its democratic institutions of the assembly and the
courts—repeatedly fails to engage in the sort of critical evaluation that
Thucydides has engaged in for his own work.
The Athenian assembly also plays a role later in the Sicilian
Expedition. In the winter of 414–413 BCE, Nicias sends a report to the
assembly by letter.29 It is of great interest that Thucydides records Nicias’
motivations for writing a letter rather than sending an oral report by mes-
senger. Nicias feared that an oral report would distort his message.
Because [Nicias] was afraid that the men he sent would not report the
facts, whether because of incompetence in speaking, failure of memory, or
speaking to please the crowd [h2 kata_ th\n tou= le/gein a)dunasi/an h2 kai\
mnh/mhj e0llipei=j gigno/menoi h2 tw~| o1xlw| pro\j xa&rin ti le/gontej], he
wrote a letter believing that this would be the best way for the Athenians
to learn his opinion—with no lapses in the transmission—and to deliber-
ate about the true situation. (7.8.2; cf. 7.14.4)
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This letter is only partially effective, for the Athenians leave Nicias in
command (against his wishes); this in turn leads to a disastrous outcome
in Sicily. What is emphasized here are the disadvantages of oral communi-
cation: the lack of proficiency in speaking, lapses of memory, and the
temptation to curry favor with a large audience. But we also might see this
passage (in which Thucydides infers Nicias’ motivations) as providing a
positive model for the advantages of written communication found lacking
in oral report: a “triad” of skill, fixed remembrance, and objectivity coun-
teracts the fallibility of memory and any inclination to play to a crowd of
listeners. Harris argues: “we may gain the impression here that both Nicias
and Thucydides had made a discovery”—namely, the superiority of writ-
ing over trusting to a messenger’s memory and later oral report.30
It is worth comparing Thucydides’ situation with the circumstances of
Nicias in Sicily. Nicias was away from Athens; Nicias was concerned
about unreliable speeches made in the assembly; when Nicias wrote his let-
ter in 414, he was writing to guarantee objectivity. He used a written doc-
ument to combat the sort of speeches often heard in the Athenian
assembly. Thucydides found himself in somewhat the same position after
his exile: he too relies on writing to convey the truth, but writing alone
does not confer accuracy. The reader (and audience) can rely upon the
History’s accuracy due to Thucydides’ research, testing and questioning of
sources, comparing of evidence, and laboring for untold hours.31 Although
Thucydides began his History at the start of the war, he apparently came
to appreciate how he might use the written word in order to speak to and
correct his fellow Athenians, whom due to years of exile he has been
unable to address.32 In the final chapter I will attempt to reconstruct that
audience.
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10
Ancient and Modern Audiences
hroughout most of this book I have referred to the experiences of the T“engaged” and “retrospective” readers. Yet these “readers” are artifi-
cial constructions implied by Thucydides’ History. Nevertheless, I have
deemed them useful for analyzing how Thucydides structures his presenta-
tion and challenges those who encounter it. It is now time to turn to the
question of actual audiences—real flesh-and-blood readers and auditors—
both in the ancient Greek world and in our contemporary world. This
chapter seeks to reconstruct Thucydides’ intended audience in antiquity
and then turns to modern readers and an example of the History’s relevance
to us today.
Reading Aloud: Oral and Written
There is a complex interplay between the written and oral aspects of
Thucydides’ work that is central to reconstructing the circumstances of the
History’s reception. Oral sources of both speech and action are of tremen-
dous importance for creating the History.1 Yet Thucydides emphasizes that
the History is a written document. Thucydides inserts “signatures” as he
brings a year of the war to an end with a near-formulaic sentence twelve
times in the History: for example, “And a second year finished for this war
which Thucydides wrote down” (o4n Qoukudi/dhj cune/grayen–2.70.4).2 The
repeated appearance of this basic expression serves not only as a regular
reminder of the authorship of this work, but also highlights the fact that
this is a written document. Because the History is explicitly proclaimed as
written, it comes to share in those advantages in Nicias’ triad spelled out
in the previous chapter. Indeed, Thucydides may be suggesting that the
value of his work—that it will endure as a “possession forever”—is based
on its reliability and its status as a written document.3
Scholars have not reached a consensus on the identity (and narrowness)
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of Thucydides’ intended ancient audience. Crane argues that Thucydides
“created a work designed primarily for—indeed, only fully comprehensible
by—the reflective reader.”4 Thomas, however, cautions that the difficulty of
Thucydides’ style does not necessarily imply a text for readers alone: “His
complex, antithetical style is closely akin to that of the contemporary
Sophists, for example Antiphon and Gorgias, and they certainly set great
store by performance and recitation.”5 It is true that modern readers and
scholars gain enormous insight in approaching Thucydides’ History as a writ-
ten document in book form, armed with concordances and commentaries. Yet
I think Thomas’ view better captures the times in which Thucydides lived.
Purely from a practical point of view, the sort of examination modern schol-
ars engage in—silent reading of a codex and flipping back and forth to check
cross-references—would have been tremendously complicated by a work
consisting of cumbersome papyrus rolls. We might instead imagine a group
listening together and discussing passages (and sharing recollections of earli-
er passages) in order to come to grips with Thucydides’ work.6
Although Thucydides refers to the written status of his work, he clear-
ly expects it to be heard. He candidly acknowledges the aural effect of his
type of history:
kai\ e00j me\\n a))kro//asin i1swj to\ mh\ muqw~dej au0tw~n a)terpe/steron
fanei=tai.
And the results, by my avoiding patriotic storytelling, will perhaps seem
the less enjoyable for listening. (1.22.4)7
Again I believe there is a link with Nicias’ letter. Nicias wrote a letter to
guarantee the triad of skill, fixed remembrance, and objectivity. But when
that letter arrived in Athens, it was read aloud by a secretary (grammateus)
and heard by the Athenians:8
o9 de\ grammateu\j o9 th=j po/lewj parelqw_n a)ne/gnw toi=j 0Aqhnai/oij
dhlou=san toia&de. . . . 9H me\n tou= Niki/ou e0pistolh\ tosau=ta e0dh/lou, oi9
de\ Aqhnai=oi a)kou/santej au0th=j to\n me\n Niki/an ou0 pare/lusan th=j
a)rxh=j.
The secretary of the city came forward and read it to the Athenians, dis-
closing the following.  .  .  .  So much the letter of Nicias disclosed, but
when the Athenians heard it, they did not release Nicias from his com-
mand. (7.10, 7.16.1)
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I would suggest that circumstances somewhat analogous to these may have
existed for the reception of Thucydides’ own work. In a group setting, one
of those present would read aloud from the text of Thucydides’ History; the
rest would listen. Naturally there would have been the opportunity for
someone to go back and reread (alone and silently or aloud to those pre-
sent) difficult passages that required a second or third perusal, but the
experience for the majority would be aural.9
Thucydides’ Ancient Audience
Several contrasts developed in the History help us in our search for the
identity of Thucydides’ audience. For one of these significant contrasts,
Thucydides opposes the pleasure of listening to certain works to the use-
fulness and truth of his own. As he concedes, his own work will appear ater-
pesteron— “less likely to give pleasure.” Yet it may be judged “useful”
(ophelima–1.22.4). Earlier he criticizes the logographers who compose
work “more attractive for listening than truthful” (e0pi\ to\ prosagw*
go/teron th=|| a)kroa&sei h2 a)lhqe/steron–1.21.1; cf. 6.8.2). Not only is
Thucydides’ work less than delightful to listen to but he emphasizes the dif-
ficulties he had to overcome, obstacles his audience also confronts.
This leads to a second contrast. In addition to promoting usefulness and
truth over pleasure, Thucydides suggests that his target audience will be
small. In several passages, Thucydides distinguishes between the few and
the many. For example, while “the many” are likely to receive reports
uncritically or avoid the toil needed to attain the truth, Thucydides insists
upon the extensive labor he has expended on analyzing his sources.
ou3twj a)talai/pwroj toi==j polloi==j h9 zh/thsij th=j a)lhqei/aj, kai\ e0pi\
ta_ e9toi=ma ma~llon tre/pontai.
The search for truth is so devoid of effort for the many, that they would
rather turn toward what is readily available. (1.20.3; cf. 1.1.3, 1.20.1,
1.22.3)
In part, these statements are polemical and serve to emphasize
Thucydides’ own critical examination of evidence. Edmunds has explored
these dichotomies—pleasure vs. utility; the few vs. the many—and reads
this latter contrast in political terms: “The words Thucydides uses to
describe those who are content with untruth [to plethos, hoi polloi] are
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unmistakably political.”10 Thus far our reconstruction posits that
Thucydides’ History was read aloud and heard by a select group—perhaps
of elite political and social standing—seeking valuable history as opposed
to a multitude in pursuit of delight.11
While Thucydides clearly recognizes the potential of written report and
proclaims his own work to be of that status, there is no compelling reason
to think that Thucydides felt access by a silent reader was superior to that
of a critical listener. In addition to the model of Nicias’ letter (read aloud
to the Athenian assembly) and Thucydides’ own explicit remarks on those
who “hear” his work, there is a third type of contemporary evidence that
may bear on this question: the reception of Plato’s dialogues.
Thucydides and Plato
Here I return to parallels between the historian Thucydides and the
philosopher Plato suggested in chapter 1. Both were raised in a culture
dominated by oral discourse; for somewhat different reasons both turned
to composing works meant to be read and, I think, read aloud. I have
argued that the works of both Thucydides and Plato sought the engage-
ment of the reader—and both did so successfully, in part, because the argu-
ments were not presented as authoritative by the author. The judgment of
the reader is invited. I believe another major parallel may exist between
Thucydides’ and Plato’s work—that of reception.
Plato’s works appear less than a generation after Thucydides’ History.
While we can only speculate regarding the reception of both these writ-
ers, there is evidence in Plato (and later testimonia) that Plato’s works
were meant to be heard and interacted with along the lines I have sug-
gested for Thucydides’ History. If the circumstances sketched out above are
correct, those in the group may listen, but would also have the option of
responding by joining in the debate, making a pointed objection that one
of Thucydides’ speakers (or one of Socrates’ interlocuters) fails to make, or
proposing a better argument or strategy. As teachers know quite well from
classroom experience, the words of Thucydides’ and Plato’s texts—both in
substance and style—are ideal prompts for discussion. It is not going too
far to imagine an interactive social setting, in some ways comparable to the
Athenian assembly, in which Athenian (and other) citizens would listen
critically (as they would to Nicias’ written report from Sicily) and then
engage in serious oral debate on the difficult issues at hand. This practice
apparently reflected Athenian culture at large.
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Plato’s works would very likely have been read aloud and discussed.
Socrates describes how he heard someone else reading aloud from
Anaxagoras’ book (Plato Phaedo 97b–c); Diogenes Laertius recounts that
both Antisthenes and Plato read aloud from their own written works
(Diogenes Laertius 3.35, 3.37; cf. Xenophon Memorabilia 1.6.14); in
Plato’s Parmenides, Zeno reads aloud from his written works to a gathering.
a)nagignw&skein ou]n au0toi=j to\n Zh/nwna au0to/n…to\n ou]n Swkra&th
a)kou/santa pa&lin te keleu=sai th\n prw&thn u9po/qesin tou= prw&tou
lo/gou a)nagnw~nai, kai\ a)nagnwsqei/shj, “ pw~j, ” fa&nai, “ w} Zh/nwn,
tou=to le/geij; ei0 polla& e0sti ta_ o1nta, w(j a!ra dei= au0ta_ o3moia& te
ei]nai kai\ a)no/moia, tou=to de\ dh\ a)du/naton: ou1te ga_r ta_ a)no/moia
o3moia ou1te ta_ o3moia a)no/moia oi[o/n te ei]nai; ou0x ou3tw le/geij;”
“ou3tw,” fa&nai to\n Zh/nwna.
So Zeno himself read aloud to them. . . . Socrates listened to the end, and
then asked that the first proposal of the first argument be read again.
When this had been done, he said:  “Zeno, what do you mean by this? That
if the things which exist are many, they must be both like and unlike,
which is impossible; for the unlike cannot be like, nor the like unlike? Is
not that your meaning?” “Yes,” said Zeno. (Plato Parmenides 127c–e)12
The historicity of this dialogue is not at issue—whether Zeno actually read
at Pythodorus’ house or whether Socrates was present. The important
point is that in the first half of the fourth century (when Thucydides’ and
Plato’s works would have been first available), this sort of interaction was
not exceptional.13 Not only does Zeno read aloud but Socrates also
requests that Zeno read a particular passage for a second time, provoking
an extended discussion. Looking at such evidence, Thomas comments: “A
single text may be read aloud to a gathering of people and discussed. . . .
Perhaps we are also glimpsing the peculiarly communal way in which ideas
were presented in classical Athens, which meant that reading to a group
was quite natural.”14
So who actually read, heard, and discussed Thucydides’ work? In an
article on the fourth-century and Hellenistic reception of Thucydides,
Hornblower surveys the various students, thinkers, and writers who were
influenced by Thucydides’ History. In addition to Xenophon (who con-
tinued the History) and Demosthenes, Hornblower argues that Thucydides
was studied in the Academy and the Lyceum. The best case for influ-
ence—and imitation—is found by comparing Thucydides’ account of the
176 Chapter 10
Morrison_CH10_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:46 PM  Page 176
Corcyrean civil war (3.82–83) with Plato’s discussion of constitutional
change in Republic book 8 of the Republic —in particular, the section on
the transformation of language as the soul changes from an oligarchical to
a democratic soul. In the Republic, the desires competing for the young
man’s soul rename familiar concepts:
“Doing battle and controlling things themselves, won’t they [the desires
competing for the young man’s soul] call reverence foolishness and modera-
tion cowardice [th\n me\n ai0dw~ h0liqio/thta o0noma&zontej . . .
swfrosu/nhn de\ a)nandri/an kalou=nte/j], abusing them and casting them
out beyond the frontiers like disenfranchised exiles? And won’t they persuade
the young man that measured and orderly expenditure is boorish and mean
[metrio/thta de\ kai\ kosmi/an dapa&nhn w(j a)groiki/an kai\ a)neleuqeri/an
ou]san pei/qontej], and, joining with many useless desires, won’t they
expel it across the border?”
“They certainly will.”
“Having thus emptied and purged these from the soul of the one
they’ve possessed and initiated in splendid rites, they proceed to return
insolence, anarchy, extravagance, and shamelessness from exile in a blaze
of torchlight, wreathing them in garlands and accompanying them with a
vast chorus of followers. They praise the returning exiles and give them
fine names, calling insolence good breeding, anarchy freedom, profligacy mag-
nificence, and shamelessness courage [u3brin me\n eu0paideusi/an kalou=ntej,
a)narxi/an de\ e0leuqeri/an, a)swti/an de\ megalopre/peian, a)nai/deian de\
a)ndrei/an]. Isn’t it in some such way as this that someone who is young
changes, after being brought up with necessary desires, to the liberation
and release of useless and unnecessary pleasures?”
“Yes, that’s clearly the way it happens.” (Plato Rep. 560c–561a)15
In Plato, we find a type of civil war (stasis) in the soul of the young man.
In Plato’s apparent model—book 3 of the History—Thucydides describes
civil war (stasis) in the city of Corcyra. Again language and what it refers
to undergoes a transformation.
kai\ th\n ei0wqui=an a)ci/wsin tw~n o0noma&twn e0j ta_ e1rga a)nth/llacan th=|
dikaiw&sei. to/lma me\n ga_r a)lo/gistoj a)ndrei/a file/tairoj e0nomi/sqh,
me/llhsij de\ promhqh\j deili/a eu0preph/j, to\ de\ sw~fron tou= a)na&ndrou
pro/sxhma, kai\ to\ pro\j a#pan cuneto\n e0pi\ pa~n a)rgo/n: to\ d'
e0mplh/ktwj o0cu\ a)ndro\j moi/ra| prosete/qh, a)sfalei/a| de\ to\ e0pi
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bouleu/sasqai a)potroph=j pro/fasij eu1logoj. kai\ o9 me\n
xalepai/nwn pisto\j ai0ei/, o9 d' a)ntile/gwn au0tw~| u3poptoj.
e0pibouleu/saj de/ tij tuxw_n cuneto\j kai\ u9ponoh/saj e1ti deino/teroj:
probouleu/saj de\ o3pwj mhde\n au0tw~n deh/sei, th=j te e9tairi/aj dia-
luth\j kai\ tou\j e0nanti/ouj e0kpeplhgme/noj. 
And men inverted the usual verbal evaluations of actions according to
their perception of what was justified.16 Irrational recklessness was now
considered courageous commitment, hesitation while looking to the
future was high-styled cowardice, moderation was a cover for lack of man-
hood, and circumspection meant inaction, while senseless anger now
helped to define a true man, and deliberation for security was a specious
excuse for dereliction. The man of violent temper was always credible,
anyone opposing him was suspect. The intriguer who succeeded was intel-
ligent, anyone who detected a plot was still more clever, but a man who
made provisions to avoid both alternatives was undermining his party and
letting the opposition terrorize him. (Thuc. 3.82.4–5)
Rutherford calls this “probably . . . the best candidate for actual imitation
of the history by Plato.” To be sure, the relationship between Plato and
Thucydides is not a simple one. Yunis has recently argued that Plato’s
Gorgias and Republic contain a critique not only of Pericles, but specifical-
ly of the Thucydidean Pericles.17 As far as Aristotle is concerned,
Hornblower mentions both Aristotle’s Politics and the Constitution of the
Athenians making use, in particular, of Thucydides’ account of the oli-
garchical revolution in book 8.18 All of this suggests that Thucydides’ work
was read, studied, and responded to by Plato, Aristotle, and their students.
The goal was not purely theoretical. In an article on the Academy,
Baltes maintains that these fourth-century schools were more than think-
tanks. Neither the Academy nor the Lyceum was divorced from the world
of active politics. As Baltes suggests:
Plato sought to win over Dionysius II of Syracuse for philosophy, and to
fashion from him the Platonic ideal of a philosopher king. Aristotle was
engaged as tutor for Alexander the Great. Various members of the
Academy had freed their homelands from tyranny, others gave new con-
stitutions to cities which requested them, and again others accepted pub-
lic office, and so on. We see that it was not feeble theoreticians who lived
together in the Academy at that time—they exerted powerful influence
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outside. The philosophy, then, of Plato and his associates was no bloodless
affair, but an extremely living thing.19
A primary goal of both Thucydides’ History (and Plato’s dialogues) may
well have been to provoke discussion and action from the audience.20 This
scenario envisions a sort of “feedback” loop: oral reports constitute the pri-
mary raw material of Thucydides’ History (just as Socrates’ conversations
inspired Plato’s dialogues); the work itself is superior to oral reports,
because it results from testing, years of work, and the permanence of writ-
ing; but access and reaction to the History may have been largely oral for
those who heard it and could respond to it in spoken discourse—in the
philosophical schools and elsewhere.21 Remember Thucydides’ original
characterization of the Peloponnesian War: it is “most worth recording”
(axiologotaton–1.1.1), or strictly speaking, it is the war “most worthy of
logos.” Given the historical context, he may mean that this war is most
worthy of speech, discussion, and analysis—both written and spoken.
Ultimately, then, it is valuable to distinguish between the status of the
History as a written document and its intended audience which may have
included both readers and auditors.
Given the political affinities of those reading (and hearing)
Thucydides’ work, I would not claim that writing itself is inherently
opposed to democracy. On the connection between writing and politics, I
find myself in agreement with Steiner: “It was not writing per se that was
anti-democratic; it was rather that the written text was the vehicle of
choice for individuals who rejected or were excluded from democratic pol-
itics.” To be sure, exile “excluded” Thucydides from participation in
Athenian politics; he turned instead to a self-consciously written history.
It is perhaps not surprising that students of Thucydides would have includ-
ed the so-called political “dissenters” that Ober examines: Xenophon,
Plato, Aristotle, and other critics of Athenian democracy.22
Types of Oral Discourse
It must be acknowledged that Thucydides employs an unusual expression to
describe what he has produced. He contrasts his “possession forever” (kth=ma&
te e0j ai0ei/) with a “competition piece to be heard for the moment”
(a)gw&nisma e0j to\ paraxrh=ma a)kou/ein). This may appear to suggest that
the permanence of writing allows the History to transcend the momentary
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existence of a competitive speech. How are we to understand the term agon-
isma which Thucydides employs to characterize other work but not his?
At this point, we need to distinguish among different types of oral per-
formance. One type was the display piece, the epideixis of the sophist—for
example, a performance by Prodicus of the choice of Heracles or an epi-
deictic speech by Gorgias or Protagoras. The goal of epideixis was to
impress and dazzle the audience, not to elicit discussion on the part of the
listeners. Thomas sees this as Thucydides’ target.
It was perhaps this agonistic, display-oriented mode of exchanging and
discussing ideas against which Thucydides reacted so energetically when
he declared that his work was going to be no mere agonisma, no competi-
tive piece for the immediate pleasure of the listeners. (I 22.4).23
This sort of display-oriented speech, I would argue, is quite different from
the sort of engagement Platonic dialogues elicit, which probably were read
aloud and discussed. Just as it is legitimate to distinguish between sophis-
tic epideixis and Platonic dialogue (although both are examples of oral per-
formance texts that were read aloud), in a similar way—by using the term
agonisma (competition piece)—Thucydides may be distancing his work
from such display pieces.24
Yet Thucydides might still expect that his work be read aloud. The dif-
ference would be the anticipated reaction from the audience. Unlike epi-
deixis or competitive oratory, Thucydides would expect parts of his work to
be read aloud, with oral response and debate to follow. Indeed, this dis-
tinction between epideixis and serious discussion appears in book 3 of
Thucydides’ History when Cleon condemns the Athenian assembly for the
pleasure (hedone) it takes in listening: they are like spectators of sophists
rather than being engaged in “deliberating about the city.”
“ a(plw~j te a)koh=j h9donh=| h9ssw&menoi kai\ sofistw~~n qeatai==j e00oiko//tej
kaqhme/noij ma~llon h2 peri\\ po//lewj bouleuome//noij.”
“In short, overcome by the pleasure of listening, [you are] like men seated
for entertainment by sophists rather than for deliberating about the city.”
(3.38.7)
In this one instance, Thucydides may well find himself in agreement with
Cleon, who argues against the mere “enjoyment” of listening when more
serious matters are at stake.
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The Difficulty of Thucydides
The question also arises about what was actually read—was it Thucydides’
History cover to cover (scroll by scroll) or is it more likely that excerpts
were read? This topic relates to the difficulty of Thucydides’ work. In order
to infer what may have been read to a particular audience, we should begin
by acknowledging the extreme difficulty of at least some of the passages in
Thucydides. Dionysius of Halicarnassus comments upon the fact that cer-
tain sections are almost impossible to understand.
I shall pass over the fact that if people spoke like this, not even their
fathers or mothers could bear the unpleasantness (aedian) of listening to
them: they would need an interpreter, as if they were listening to a foreign
tongue . . . for the number of men who can understand the whole of
Thucydides can easily be counted, and even these cannot understand cer-
tain passages without a linguistic commentary [e0chgh/sewj grammatikh=j].
(Dionysius of Halicarnassus On Thucydides 49, 51)25
So says Dionysius who comes four centuries after Thucydides, yet he is a
native speaker of Greek. Of course not all of Thucydides’ work is equally
difficult. We might distinguish between passages such as the archaeology
and maybe the Melian dialogue from tougher going found in the Funeral
Oration and elsewhere. In fact, this is what Dionysius does. He judges the
description of civil war (stasis) in Corcyra (3.82.3) to be “tortuous and dif-
ficult to follow” (29), while he praises the exchange between the Plataeans
and the Spartan King Archidamus (2.71–75) for its “purity, lucidity, and
brevity” (36).
Once again I propose a possible analogy with Plato’s work. In his book
Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, Kahn makes a compelling argument about
the varying degrees of difficulty of Plato’s dialogues. He points to the early
work of Plato, such as Protagoras, Meno, and Symposium, as:
sustained protreptic to philosophy. As the choice of interlocutors indi-
cates, Plato’s intended audience for these dialogues includes not only profes-
sional philosophers and beginners in philosophy but also the general public,
and in particular the young men in search of themselves, in search of knowl-
edge, or in search of a career, men who in the fifth century would have sat
at the feet of the sophists and who in Plato’s own day might be tempted by
the lessons of Isocrates or Antisthenes [my italics].26
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Kahn goes on to argue that the Phaedrus may perhaps be the last work that
Plato “designed for this wider public.” The works which follow, such as the
Parmenides and the Theaetetus, are “works of philosophy written for
philosophers.”27 Kahn thus contends that not all Plato’s works are of com-
parable difficulty, nor are they all intended for the same audience. We
might imagine a similar situation for the History. For a less experienced
audience, excerpts from the more accessible passages from Thucydides
might have been read aloud and discussed. For those with more experience,
readings might include the description of the Corcyrean civil war. So if we
ask: who is Thucydides’ audience?—there is not necessarily a single
answer. What was read and discussed could well have depended upon the
experience of the audience and its familiarity with Thucydides’ ideas and
style.28
We might even think of Thucydides’ work—at least much of it—neces-
sitating discussion because of its difficulty. Consider the sorts of readers’
tasks I have described in chapters 3–8: connecting events early in book 2
(the Theban invasion of Plataea) to speeches that reassess those events
midway through book 3; interpreting the Melian Dialogue in terms of
lessons learned elsewhere in the History; comparing Athenian imperial
behavior with that of actual tyrants, and so on. In addition, readers must
negotiate between competing views of the past, especially when con-
fronting passages that suggest certain events may be inevitable as well as
those that apparently emphasize how contingent events are—where wind,
a reversed decision, or a fortuitous arrival (or an arrival one day too late!)
not only affect the course of events, but demonstrate that such a sequence
of events might have turned out differently. These challenges are all
demanding, especially so when we imagine the difficulties (and unfamil-
iarity) of reading a text in the early fourth century. It may well be that
Thucydides’ goal was to provoke discussion—yet if serious discussion was
to take place, it might have required auditors working as a group and pool-
ing their recollections in order to debate these profound problems.
My hope is that the analogy between Plato and Thucydides sheds some
light on how Thucydides’ work may have been experienced in the early
fourth century. For both writers, then, a distinction should be made
between the status of the History—or the dialogues—as written docu-
ments and their intended reception. The difficulty of engaging with such
texts (consisting of writing on papyrus rolls without word division or punc-
tuation) may favor imagining the original reception as a group listening
together, discussing passages, and sharing recollections of earlier passages,
of juxtaposing, comparing, and extrapolating—eikazein!—from different
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sections of the History (or the dialogues) as a means of coming to grips with
Thucydides’ (or Plato’s) work.
One final idea concerning Thucydides and his audience. There are, I
think, cues in the text of Thucydides that support this “hybrid” reception
model.29 These markers guide the reader’s and auditor’s responses; that is,
Thucydides shows what is worth pursuing, comparing, and discussing.
Such cues include striking metaphors, such as “Athens-the-tyrant-city,”
polarities (such as land and sea or freedom and slavery), maxims, and
recurrent themes—all these provide a kind of unity to Thucydides’ work.
Markers of this sort would facilitate the apprehension of cross-references
in non-contiguous passages; suggest how both auditors and readers might
connect early and later sections of the History; and invite both reader and
auditor to appreciate deliberate juxtapositions. One of Thucydides’
achievements is to have created the type of work that remains accessible
to a listening audience, yet promises greater potential for those who read
and reread it—and hear and rehear it. Both readers and auditors are invit-
ed to return for a more profound appreciation of this “possession forever”
(1.22.4).
Thucydides’ Modern Audience
So where does all this leave us in the modern world? My hope is that this
discussion has been valuable in providing a plausible reconstruction of
Thucydides’ original intended audience. And yet I believe he is much
more ambitious, for he also includes us as his audience. What does our task
consist of? In part, our goal is to reflect upon the experiences of the
engaged and retrospective reader, in part, to ponder the circumstances of
an actual audience in late fifth- or early fourth-century Greece; but our task
is also to be engaged actively with respect to our own world. One challenge
Thucydides throws out for his reader—and auditor—is to apprehend
events and arguments of later times that are comparable to the events and
arguments of the Peloponnesian War. We too must engage in comparison
and extrapolation (eikazein).
Thucydides states that his work will be valuable (ophelima—1.22.4), yet
what sort of “use” is this work? Is it valuable only in terms of learning
about the past or is there a practical application? Rood wisely comments:
Scholars have long noted the fact that [Thucydides] does not say what sort of
advantage the narratee is meant to gain: is it simply a better understanding of
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the world or is it an understanding that has practical use? Thucydides’ lack of
precision is itself revealing. He leaves it to readers to make of his history what
they will.30
I, too, would like to keep the question open. If Thucydides had a narrow
view of the History’s value, he could easily have indicated as much. We
need not rule out practical lessons for citizens and leaders. It is true that
much of our analysis has focused on the apprehension of what happened—
or what might have happened—and how to understand it. While finding
a straightforward application of a Thucydidean lesson to a specific con-
temporary problem is hard to imagine, other works of history have clearly
influenced statesmen. Frankel has recently written about the influence of
Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August (1961—about the start of World
War I) upon Kennedy’s decision-making and diplomacy during the Cuban
Missile Crisis in 1962.31 I propose exploring a more recent set of events that
reverberates in a variety of ways with Thucydides’ History: the diplomatic
dispute that led up to the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War.
A recurring situation in Thucydides presents a powerful state attacking
a smaller, weaker state. In a few cases, before the attack negotiations under
threat of force take place. The Athenians’ conflict with Melos immediately
comes to mind (5.84–116) as does Archidamus’ negotiations with Plataea
(2.71–78). These scenarios suggest several similarities to the build-up
before the war against Iraq in 2003. My analysis will be limited to the
rhetoric in both the ancient and modern situations, specifically, the ulti-
matum and rationale presented by the larger power, and the response by
the weaker power in light of available options. I would anticipate four
areas worthy of comparison between the ancient and modern confronta-
tions: the situation, the outcome, the rhetoric employed, and—once we
step back—a method of analysis.
Melos, Plataea, and Corinth
I begin with a few highlights of events involving Melos, Plataea, and
Corinth. When the Athenians arrive at the island of Melos in 416 BCE,
before doing any damage to the land, they send ambassadors to speak to
the Melians in charge. As we saw in chapter 5, the Athenians make clear
their demands to the Melians: submit by joining the Athenian empire or
suffer attack (5.91.2). The rationale put forth by the Athenian ambas-
sadors covers quite a range. They assert their own power (5.89); they
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would become safer (5.97); the Athenians also suggest the advantages to
the weaker state, for the Melians would avoid suffering (5.93). The
Melians however insist they are confronting injustice (5.104) and ulti-
mately refuse to submit to Athens, basing their rejection upon the seven
hundred years of freedom they have enjoyed (5.112).
Earlier in the History—in 429 BCE—a coalition of Peloponnesian
allies marches on the city of Plataea. Again just as this force is about to
ravage the land, the Plataeans send ambassadors to make a plea (2.71.1).
But again, in spite of various options offered by Archidamus, the Plataeans
reject Archidamus’ overtures largely upon the Athenians’ promise of assis-
tance.
In both scenarios—Melos and Plataea—the weaker and the stronger
powers address one another in order to avoid bloodshed. The result, how-
ever, is the same: the negotiations are unsuccessful and the weaker power
is attacked and subdued. We do find several contrasts in the negotiations:
one of these is the Athenian exclusion of moral appeals in the Melian dia-
logue, while both the Plataeans and Archidamus insist on the justice of
their causes. The greatest surprise is the decision by the weaker state to
reject the stronger’s demands. Yet we find such responses even in modern
times. Before venturing there, it may be valuable to move backward in
time and examine briefly the Corinthians’ speech to the gathering of
Peloponnesian allies in 432 just before the war begins (1.119–124—I do
realize my analysis is moving backwards in time).
The primary thrust of the Corinthians’ remarks is to convince the
Spartans and their other allies that the time has come for war. The
Corinthians appeal to the allies’ “common interests” (ta_ koina_
proskopei=n–1.120.1, 1.124.1); cities away from the sea no less than
coastal states are threatened by Athens, the tyrant-city (1.120.2, 1.122.3,
1.124.3). After these justifications for war, the Corinthians insist that they
must not delay or disaster will ensue (1.124.1–2). The Corinthians’ final
call is for freedom—to rescue those Greek cities already enslaved and to
prevent further Athenian aggression. The alternative, they say, is “out-
right slavery” (1.122.2, 1.124.3).
So much for the Corinthian argument. It is not a case of a stronger
power threatening a weaker one during wartime; rather this is an internal
discussion by a coalition with one member, Corinth, urging the others to
make war. Following his presentation of the Corinthian argument, the
allies vote to go to war. The historian then comments:
Once they voted for war, it was still impossible for them to commence, for
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they were unprepared; but it was resolved that the different cities procure
what was needed without delay . . . in the meantime they sent embassies
to Athens bringing charges (e)gklh/mata), in order to obtain the greatest pre-
text [megi/sth pro/fasij] for war if the Athenians would not yield.
(1.125.2–126.1)32
These comments of Thucydides may be relevant to our analysis of the
2003 War.
The U.S.- Iraq Conflict (2002–2003 CE)
I turn now to the escalation in the years 2002–2003 that led to the U.S.-
Iraq War. At the time of writing (2006), the war continues between fac-
tions and between U.S. troops and various groups, yet I will limit my
discussion to the rhetoric put forth before the war itself began. First, a
few disclaimers. The situations described in Thucydides are not exactly
parallel to the modern scenario—I realize this. Before the March 2003
war, there was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the 1991 Gulf War, UN sanc-
tions, the establishment of no-fly zones, the oil-for-food program,
weapons inspections, and the attacks of 11 September 2001. In addition,
the negotiations in 2002–2003 took place over many months in differ-
ent venues with various spokespersons. Not for a minute do I assume
that the United States is identical to Athens (or Sparta) or that Iraq is
just like Melos or Plataea.
And yet Thucydides does invite us to examine similar situations in
later times which are comparable to both words and deeds from the
Peloponnesian War—not only what is said, but what “ought to be said” in
a given situation (ta_ deo/nta ma/list 0 ei)pei=n—1.22.1). My goal, then, is
to consider parallels from Thucydides’ work by examining the public
rhetoric used before the war. I will focus on two speeches: President Bush’s
address to the United Nations (12 September 2002) and Secretary of State
Colin Powell’s UN speech (5 February 2003). In order to provide a con-
text, I offer a timeline indicating some of the significant events before the
war began on 20 March 2003.
2002–2003 Timeline
Summer 2002 to March 2003: Movement of U.S. and Coalition Weapons,
Ships, and Troops into the Persian Gulf.
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12 September 2002: President Bush’s address to the United Nations.
8 November 2002: UN Resolution 1441.
November 2002–March 2003: UN Inspectors in Iraq.
8 December 2002: Iraq sends 12,000 pages of documents to the UN.
5 February 2003: Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the UN.
February and March 2003: Responses of the Iraqi government.
17 March 2003: UN Resolution authorizing force is withdrawn.
17 March 2003: U.S. ultimatum that within 48 hours Saddam Hussein
and his family unconditionally surrender or leave Iraq.
20 March 2003: The war begins.
President Bush’s Speech to the United Nations 
(12 September 2002)
Bush’s speech addresses a double audience, for it is aimed in part at the
Security Council and General Assembly, in part at Iraq. Early on Bush
asserts that all nations have been threatened.
Our common security is challenged by regional conflicts. . . . Above all, our
principles and our security are challenged today by outlaw groups and
regimes that accept no law of morality and have no limit to their violent
ambitions. . . . This threat hides within many nations, including my own.
In cells and camps, terrorists are plotting further destruction, and building
new bases for their war against civilization. And our greatest fear is that ter-
rorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime sup-
plies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale. [my italics, as
below]33
Bush emphasizes the link between terrorists and “an outlaw regime” and
then claims that these dangers reside in Iraq alone.
In one place—in one regime—we find all these dangers, in their most
lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the
United Nations was born to confront.
Bush then looks to the past, both Iraq’s previous aggression against Kuwait
and previous UN resolutions that demanded Iraq
stop development of all weapons of mass destruction [W.M.D.] and long-
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range missiles . . . [and allow] UN inspectors immediate and unrestricted
access to verify Iraq’s commitment to rid itself of W.M.D.
Bush claims that efforts thus far have been unsuccessful:
Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons
of mass destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has
nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one. We owe it to all our
citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that day from coming.
According to Bush, if Iraq wishes to enjoy peace, the Iraqi regime must
immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy
all W.M.D., long range missiles, and all related material . . . [and] imme-
diately end all support for terrorism.
While hoping that the UN will meet “our common challenge,” Bush’s
speech concludes with a threat of unilateral action:
But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security
council resolutions will be enforced—the just demands of peace and secu-
rity will be met—or action will be unavoidable.
As I mentioned above, President Bush is addressing more than one audi-
ence. The result is that some of what he has to say may recall what the
Athenians said to the Melians (the demand for certain actions under
threat of force) while other sections of his speech may echo the
Corinthians’ insistence on war (common interests are threatened, a dicta-
tor or tyrant is plotting against everyone else).
UN Resolution 1441 (8 November 2002)
On 8 November 2002, the United Nations voted to pass UN resolution
1441, insisting that Iraq allow weapons inspectors into their country and
give full cooperation. The key provisions concerned Iraq’s previous failure
to meet its obligations, yet Iraq is offered a final chance to comply.
Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations. . . . Iraq will
be afforded, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disar-
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mament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council.34
Iraq is given thirty days to make a full declaration to UNMOVIC (United
Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission), the
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), and the UN Security
Council of:
a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its pro-
grammes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. . . . Iraq shall
provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and
unrestricted access to any and all . . . areas, facilities, building, equipment,
records, and means of transports and to officials or other persons.
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s Speech to the UN
(5 February 2003)
In response to the demand for a full declaration, on 8 December 2002 the
Iraqi government sent 12,000 pages of documents to the UN. The inspec-
tion agencies evaluated these materials and then (following the inspectors’
assessment), U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the UN in a
speech on 5 February 2003. He begins by recalling that the purpose of
Resolution 1441 (from 8 November 2002) was:
to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. . . . [and to offer Iraq]
one last chance . . . to come into compliance or to face serious conse-
quences.35
Powell states that he has asked to address the UN on February 5th session
for two purposes: “First, to support the core assessments made by Dr. Blix
and Dr. ElBaradei.”36 His second goal was:
to provide you with additional information, to share with you what the United
States knows about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction as well as Iraq’s involve-
ment in terrorism. . . . What you will see is an accumulation of facts and dis-
turbing patterns of behavior. . . . The facts of Iraq’s behavior demonstrate
that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort—no effort—to dis-
arm as required by the international community.
Powell describes the various sources he has made use of in order to reach
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his conclusions: audio-tapes, video film, satellite photos, and human intel-
ligence sources among others.
His particular concern is not only that weapons of mass destruction
were being developed by Iraq but also that connections exist between Iraq
and terrorist organizations:
Our concern is not just about these illicit weapons; it’s the way that these
illicit weapons can be connected to terrorists and terrorist organizations that have
no compunction about using such devices against innocent people around the
world. . . . Iraqi officials deny accusations of ties with al Qaeda. These
denials are simply not credible.
In contrast to the denials of the Iraqi government that Powell labels as “not
credible,” he emphasizes the credibility of his own information:
My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid
sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving you are facts and con-
clusions based on solid intelligence. . . . Ladies and gentlemen, these are
not assertions. These are facts corroborated by many sources, some of them
sources of the intelligence services of other countries.
Powell returns to what he interprets as the original purpose of Resolution
1441 and issues a call to action:
My colleagues . . . we wrote 1441 not in order to go to war. We wrote
1441 to try to preserve the peace. We wrote 1441 to give Iraq one last
chance. Iraq is not, so far, taking that one last chance. . . . We must not
shrink from whatever is ahead of us. We must not fail in our duty and
our responsibility to the citizens of the countries that are represented by
this body.
U.S. Ultimatums
In both February and March 2003, the U.S. issued ultimatums, both to its
European allies and to Iraq. With a clear reference to France, Powell spoke
to reporters on 20 February 2003:
It is not a satisfactory solution to continue inspections indefinitely because
certain countries [like France that oppose swift military action against
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Iraq] are afraid of upholding their responsibility to impose the will of the
international community.37
Almost a month later, on 17 March 2003 the U.S. insisted that within 48
hours Saddam Hussein and his family surrender unconditionally or leave
Iraq. This day (17 March 2003) was also the same day that—before a
vote—the United States withdrew its request for a UN Resolution autho-
rizing force against Iraq. The war began three days later on 20 March
2003.
Allow me to make a few observations. First, the ultimatum made by the
U.S. United States shifts over time. Originally they insisted that Iraq
allow weapons inspectors in and fully comply with UN resolutions; then
the ultimatum became either Saddam and his relatives surrender or depart
from Iraq within two days. Second, the rationale arguing for such actions
covered a broad range. We might consider four major categories of argu-
ment: (1) violation of UN resolutions (non-compliance and material breach
of UN Resolutions; access denied to UN weapons inspectors); (2) the dan-
ger posed by Iraq (both in term of its weapons of mass destruction and its
links to terrorism); (3) regime change (Saddam Hussein’s tyrannical rule
was a threat to the Iraqi people and their neighbors; the flip-side was that
removing Saddam Hussein would lead to the liberation of the Iraqi peo-
ple); and (4) other reasons including “history calls the U.S. to action”; the
war would serve as a warning to other terrorists; removing Saddam
Hussein would transform the region; it would also conclude the 1991 war;
“because the U.S. could”; and in order to preserve peace. A valuable
inventory of twenty-one reasons voiced by various U.S. officials endorsing
war against Iraq has been compiled by Devon Largio, a student at the
University of Illinois.38
Iraqi Reponses
During fall 2002 and winter 2003, the Iraqi government made various
responses, which were to a large degree reactive. They also addressed mul-
tiple audiences: others in the Arab world, the UN, and the U.S. The Iraqis
claimed they were complying with UN demands, they were giving full
access, they did not have weapons of mass destruction (W.M.D.), and they
had no connections to Al Qaeda.
For example, in an interview with Dan Rather in Baghdad on 26
February 2003, Saddam Hussein said:
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We have never had any relationship with Mr. Osama bin Laden, and Iraq
has never had any relationship with Al Qaeda. And I think that Mr. Bin
Laden himself has recently, in one of his speeches, given such an answer—
that we have no relation with him.39
Saddam also spoke of the need for the Iraqis to protect themselves:
It is our duty, it is our responsibility to defend our country, to defend our
children, to defend our people, and we are not going to succumb, neither
to the United States nor to any other power.
Echoing a sentiment of the Melians, he refers to the long history of Iraq:
We hope that war will not take place, but if war if forced upon us, then
Iraq will continue to be here. . . . This country . . . the cradle of the first
civilizations for humanity, will not finish just like that, even though a
huge power may want it to be like that.
In the end, Saddam insisted that the Iraqis would fight for their freedom
and dignity:
We do not compromise our independence, or our dignity and our freedom.
And at the same time, we will continue to commit ourselves to what has
been decided by the Security Council.40
Ancient and Modern Conflicts
There are at least four features of Thucydides’ History deserving attention
that may be relevant to the recent U.S.-Iraq conflict, some specifically
regarding the Melian and Plataean conflicts, some with regard to rhetoric
and analysis more generally.
First regarding the situation itself, with Melos and Athens—and Plataea
and the Peloponnesian allies—we encounter a stronger state threatening
a weaker state, yet before an attack there is diplomatic negotiation. Before
the 2003 invasion of Iraq, President Bush was evidently persuaded to fol-
low the “diplomatic” route.
Second, we find a similar outcome, in which the weaker state rejects the
ultimatum. We should perhaps not be surprised when the weaker resists the
stronger’s demands. As Chuter points out in his discussion of twentieth-
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century ultimatums, others have threatened force for various ends:
The concept of military force [has been] exercised or threatened to bring
about the political collapse of a state, or the destruction of the morale of
its people, or even a modification in the policies of its government.41
But the odds that the threat of force will achieve those political goals are
not promising. Chuter identifies four criteria that must be met for success:
First, the identity of the decisive authority has to be established. Second,
exactly the right amount and kind of pressure has to be applied to achieve
the desired political effect. Thirdly, there has to be a transmission mecha-
nism to convey this pressure to the authority. Finally, the desired conces-
sion must be within the power of the authority to grant without
encompassing its own destruction. Any plan which is deficient in any of
these respects will fail.42
In the modern scenario, while the UN might be seen as a decisive author-
ity, in retrospect, it was difficult to apply the right amount of pressure by
an effective “transmission mechanism.” Finally though, the latest ultima-
tum to Saddam Hussein (surrender or leave) in fact dictated his own
destruction. According to Chuter, an offer that entails self-annihilation
precludes any chance for success.
In addition, in the case of both Melos and the 2003 Iraq war, we might
well consider the lack of flexibility on both sides. In the Melian conflict,
violence was perhaps inevitable, because “neither side [was] willing to give
in.”43 For the 2003 Iraq war, Hans Blix has said that factors such as pride
may have strongly affected Saddam Hussein, who viewed himself as a suc-
cessor of a glorious past. “Saddam Hussein saw himself as a modern King
Nebuchadnezzar, and had enormous pride in himself and in Iraq.”44 In
Blix’s view, Saddam Hussein was defiant and willing to call what he
thought was the United States’ bluff. Blix also notes “the unchanging
mindset of the West” leading up to the invasion itself.45
Beyond these specific parallels of situation and outcome, the rhetoric
employed by speakers in Thucydides continues to find its way into diplomat-
ic discourse—what was said and what should have been said, as Thucydides
puts it (1.22.1). There seems to be little question that similar types of argu-
ments are employed today to persuade a state to acquiesce to demands and to
get other states to go to war. The echoes of Thucydidean rhetoric include vio-
lation of previous treaties and resolutions (1.68), the claim that all concerned
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are in danger (1.120), the threat of an evil dictator or tyrant (1.122, 1.124),
and the ultimate goal of liberation (1.124). Yet in each particular situation,
politicians, political organizations, and the citizens of both nations and inter-
national groups face a very difficult problem. When are such claims valid?
When is the danger so great that war is the only option?46
It is possible to see the rhetoric found in diplomatic discourse presented by
Thucydides as providing a framework, a vocabulary, and a set of appeals that
may be—and are—introduced in later conflicts. It is particularly fascinating
when certain arguments are not made in the modern scenario. Motivations
and rationales—although unstated today, yet articulated by Thucydides’
speakers—may signal underlying motivations for war. For example, at Melos
the Athenians assert the will of the stronger (5.89, 5.105), prefer to conquer
without expense (5.89), and wish to avoid looking weak (5.95). I would sug-
gest that—although unstated by U.S. officials—Thucydides may be supply-
ing actual motivations that do not find public expression.
This possibility leads to a fourth area of common ground: analysis.
Allow me to explore just one of the more obvious instances: Thucydides’
distinction between the stated reason for war as opposed to the underlying
cause. Early in the History Thucydides contrasts the most visible com-
plaints triggering the Peloponnesian War with the truest cause.
As to the question why they broke the treaty, I write first of their grounds
of complaint and conflict [ta_j ai0ti/aj . . . kai\ ta_j diafora&j] so that no
one may ever have to ask the immediate cause which plunged the
Hellenes into a war of such magnitude. I consider the truest reason, though
least openly expressed in speech [a)lhqesta&thn pro/fasin, a)fanesta&thn de\
lo/gw|], was Athenian greatness and the resulting alarm among the
Spartans that forced them to war. (1.23.6)
Many moderns analysts make this same distinction between professed rea-
sons and underlying causes for the 2003 Iraq War. For example, Zizek dis-
tinguishes between three stated or openly professed reasons for the war
(W.M.D. posed a threat to all; Iraq’s involvement with Al Qaeda; and
Saddam Hussein as a ruthless dictator threatening neighbors and the Iraqi
people) and three underlying—but unstated—reasons:
First, a sincere ideological belief that the destiny of the United States is to
bring democracy and prosperity to other nations; second, the urge to bru-
tally assert and signal unconditional U.S. hegemony; and third, the need
to control Iraqi oil reserves.47
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In similar fashion but with a different emphasis, Mearsheimer and Walt
contrast the “immediate cause” with the “deeper root of the conflict”:
The immediate cause is likely to be Saddam’s failure to comply with the new
UN inspections regime to the Bush administration’s satisfaction. But this
failure is not the real reason Saddam and the United States have been on
a collision courses over the past year. The deeper root of the conflict is the
U.S. position that Saddam must be toppled because he cannot be deterred
from using weapons of mass destruction. [my italics]48
This has perhaps become a commonplace, but Thucydides’ fundamental
warning that the strongest cause may never be expressed continues to keep
us on the alert: we must be sensitive to possible unstated motivations.
I acknowledge that the ancient and modern situations are not precise-
ly parallel: there is no ancient analogue to the UN, although there were
Panhellenic gatherings of various sorts. My goal has been to suggest a
number of possible links between Thucydides’ work and more recent
events. My hope is that this sketch helps us assess the value of Thucydides’
presentation and analysis when applied to more recent conflicts. During
the cold war, Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War was seen to
be relevant to contemporary conflicts, in large part due to the parallels
between the two blocs: the NATO alliance of the twentieth century
(characterized by both its navy and democracy) was seen as analogous to
the fifth-century Athenian empire; the Warsaw Pact was comparable to the
Peloponnesian alliance under Sparta. Yet since 1989 and the end of the
cold war, Thucydides continues to have many applications.49 Thucydides
has asked us to compare his times with ours: it is our task to find the valid
and illuminating comparisons from the past for today.
Thucydides’ Achievement
We come at last to an assessment of Thucydides’ achievement as an his-
torian, rhetorician, writer, and teacher. By looking at Thucydides’ own
experience, we gain a better appreciation for the historian’s opportunities
and motivations. In 431 Thucydides decided that the impending conflict
would be a great event; he would devote himself to recording this war still
yet-to-come (1.1.1). When war began, he was a military man. He soon
became a general, and, to reach such a position, he must have been an
active politician and effective speaker. Thucydides may well have seen
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himself as one of Pericles’ successors. Yet seven years into the war, exile
removed him from political engagement and any chance of leading
Athens. Thucydides’ History becomes, as it were, a surrogate means for
addressing his fellow citizens and—given the nature of his project—future
leaders, generals, and citizens. I contend that this audience would have
included both readers and auditors, and that Thucydides intended his
audience to respond by continuing the dialogue and arguments that the
History presents. One of Thucydides’ goals was to encourage the group—a
listening and reading audience—to become engaged with the past (both
retrospectively and as vicarious participants) and to apply those arguments
and conflicts to the current day.
One final connection between Plato and Thucydides. It may be useful
to distinguish between the genesis of their works and the intention. In terms
of the genesis of the dialogues, Plato was inspired by the historical figure
of Socrates, who did not write himself, but engaged in question and answer
and serious debate on matters of concern to the city (ta politika). Plato’s
goal was in part retrospective: to recreate Socrates arguing in the agora, to
bring him back to life—now on the page, yet heard by members (and
potential members) of the Academy. Plato’s purpose, however, was not
purely retrospective. He also sought to advertise the Academy and to
teach others how to do philosophy—there’s a forward-looking aspect as
well.
In a similar way, we might say that Thucydides was inspired and pro-
voked by debate in the Athenian assembly, by diplomatic negotiation, and
by military strategy. In part, these activities are the impetus for the History,
and to some degree, we might think of Thucydides as striving to recreate
the world of debate, politics, and warfare of the late fifth century. That is,
like Plato, one of Thucydides’ goals is backward-looking: he seeks to
recapture the figure of Pericles and to record the achievements and fail-
ures of the Athenian polis and its empire. But Thucydides is also looking
ahead. Like Plato, Thucydides wishes to provoke his readers and auditors,
so that they also become engaged in historical analysis and the business of
politics.
Ancient Athenian democracy—and modern representative systems—
share the premise that in order to balance public and private interests, the
citizens affected must weigh in with their judgment. Yet to participate
intelligently in the affairs of their community, these citizens need valuable
instruction as to what is at stake and what the potential conflicts will be.50
There is a seed of optimism in Thucydides’ work, for it encourages his
readers and listeners to be engaged in critical issues, to discuss them, and
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to continue that debate and dialogue—guided by Thucydides’ History.
Thucydides never tells us in his own voice why speeches are included
in the History. Yet surely their inclusion helps to recreate the atmosphere
of a political assembly’s discussion, courtroom conflict, and diplomatic dis-
course—to say nothing of a general addressing his troops. In Thucydides’
History, there are speakers—and there are internal audiences listening,
either the Athenian assembly, representatives from various city-states, or
the army. These audiences act in some sense as models for the audience lis-
tening to and reading Thucydides’ own work.51 In his work Thucydides
seeks to explore the issues and difficulties inherent in the politics of any
age, yet these issues demand our participation as well. We, too, must join
in that exploration, because we, as citizens, must rethink current problems
with reference to knowledge of past conflicts, their potential resolutions,
and their ultimate outcomes.
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Notes
Chapter One
1. White (1984), 88. Kitto (1966, 298) labels this Thucydides’ “method of
immediacy.” Connor (1984, 16) adds that “readers had to be led to reexperience
the war, to live through it again.” Orwin (1994, 4) remarks on the “vicarious expe-
rience of the events that he describes.”
2. As Connor (1985, 12) puts it: “The historian’s job is to investigate, com-
pile, select, edit and present. The reader’s half, the greater half, is to react, to assess,
and thereby to learn.” Kitto (1966, 349) describes the reader’s task as “kind of col-
laborative, less purely intellectual and more imaginative.”
3. I recognize that Thucydides began his enterprise while still in Athens and
that he lived as a citizen (and general) for seven years before his exile (1.1.1,
4.104–8, 5.26). The question I am raising is whether the ultimate form of the
History may reflect the motivations suggested here. Pondering Thucydides’ possi-
ble motivations is certainly a speculative venture and brings us dangerously close
to the question of composition, which I will not address.
4. Here, too, we may find shared ground with Plato and what led him to com-
pose written dialogues. After Socrates was condemned to death by a democratic jury
in 399 BCE, Plato left Athens, his polis, to go to Megara. When he returned to the
city, he may well have felt that—given the consequences for Socrates—it was too
dangerous to engage in the sort of dialogue and aggressive interrogations Socrates
practiced upon his fellow citizens. However much Plato may have emulated
Socrates, it was clearly risky to do what Socrates had done. Plato was no longer in
exile, but he did set up his school outside the walls of the city, apart from where the
courts and the assembly met. This is not where Socrates engaged his fellow
Athenians (see Phaedrus 230d). Plato distanced himself geographically from the cen-
ter of politics and of power. He also distanced himself by using written dialogue
rather than spoken conversation to engage his fellow citizens outside the Academy.
When the world had changed in ways beyond their control, both Plato and
Thucydides turned instead to a larger audience and to later generations.
5. Yet Homer’s narrative may not be wholly consistent: on the inevitability
of events, see Morrison (1992, 1997); on causation in Herodotus, see Lateiner
(1989, 189–210).
6. See Flory (1988, 49, 55). From the number of these hypotheses and the
high degree of speculation, Flory infers Thucydides’ “sensitivity to possible alter-
native sequences.” See also Stahl (2003, especially 90–93). 
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7. It is notable that in the past decade some fascinating work along these lines
has explored more recent events under the rubric “virtual history.” Ferguson
(1997) speaks of thinking “counterfactually” by imagining possible alternatives to
what has actually happened in the past. In his introductory essay, Ferguson seeks
to limit counterfactual thinking—and the idea of “virtual history”—to those cases
where “options and data were actually available to figures in question at the time”
and only when explicit mention is made of such a possibility in contemporary doc-
uments (12). For example, in the early days of World War Two, individuals—and
the governments of several countries—anticipated a successful German invasion
of England: see Roberts and Ferguson, “Hitler’s England” in Ferguson (1997,
281–320). As Ferguson notes, a classic essay of this sort is Bury (1964). 
8. There were actually two systems of writing; before the alphabet in the
eighth century, there was a syllabic system used by the Mycenaean Greeks in the
Bronze Age (1600–1200 BCE). By the 1950s scholars had deciphered these linear
B tablets as Greek. Its use was evidently restricted to a group of professional scribes
who kept palace inventory accounts. With the collapse of Mycenaean civilization
(after 1200 BCE), this system of writing vanished.
9. Three types of evidence endorse this view of Homer’s epics as growing out
of an oral tradition: internal evidence such as scenes in the Odyssey of singers
(Phemius and Demodocus) performing before audiences; stylistic evidence, such as
Parry’s work on noun-epithet pairs (see M. Parry 1971); and modern comparative
studies of twentieth-century oral (often illiterate) singers; see Lord (2000). 
10. See Robb (1994, 253).
11. Nicias’ letter sent to the Athenian assembly (7.8–15) is discussed in chap-
ters 9 and 10. On the interconnections between literacy and education and law,
see Robb (1994). Certainly many fascinating questions arise concerning the Greek
alphabet, literacy, and the development of democracy (the alphabet is easily
learned with its small set of letters and the fact that it is phonetic); for an inter-
esting argument in this regard, see Steiner (1994).
12. Robb (1994, 140); see 209 n8. Havelock (1963, 47–48) distinguishes
between non-literacy (primary orality), craft literacy, semi-literacy, and full literacy.
13. Robb (1994, 253).
14. Havelock (1963, 38).
15. Robb (1994, 218).
16. In fact, Havelock (1963, 123) claims that Thucydides’ project requires a
shift in consciousness, for in an oral culture, “strictly speaking, an historical time
sense is impossible.” Havelock (1986, 17) posits that by the time of the fourth cen-
tury, not only had “Greek literacy changed . . . the means of communication, but
also the shape of the Greek consciousness.” These claims regarding a different sort
of consciousness must remain speculative. Havelock (1982, 10) also remarks that
the speeches in Thucydides “provide a fascinating study of the interweave between
oral and written styles of vocabulary and syntax.” He then asserts that Thucydides
“confirms by his position in the chronology of the transition the thesis that Athens
was becoming ‘literate’ only as late as the period of the Peloponnesian War” (21). 
17. Robb (1994, 235–36) says that the Platonic dialogues should be thought
of as “textbooks” which put students in direct contact with the methods of
Socrates and notes that the dialogues might be seen as “transitional texts.”
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Nightingale (1995, 5) argues that Plato is “introducing and defining a radically dis-
cursive practice, which he calls ‘philosophy.’” Havelock (1963, 56 n16) remarks
that “Thucydides was the first Attic author to extrapolate written memoranda into
continuous written discourse, just as Plato and Isocrates were the first to adapt sus-
tained oral teaching to the same end.” He also argues that Thucydides’ remark at
1.22.4 about his “possession forever,” “surely identifies the permanent influence of
a manuscript stylistically composed for readers, as against the more ephemeral
effects of a composition designed for recitation at an oral ‘competition’” (54 n8).
Havelock (1986, 16) speculates about “the historians whose methods of managing
prose surely offered an alternative, and perhaps a rival, to Plato’s own type of dis-
course.” See Turasiewicz (1990, esp. 85) on Thucydides’ “nouvelle forme de
présentation.” 
18. Havelock (1963, 46) argues that it is “roughly down to the death of
Euripides [406]” that Greek poetry “enjoyed an almost unchallenged monopoly of
preserved communication,” noting that “the first magisterial composition in Attic,
equaling in length the achievements of epic poetry, was the history of Thucydides.
Thus, while the last half of the fifth century begins to see the acceptance of prose
as a viable means of publication, acceptance does not become complete until the
fourth.” Plato’s work comes at a time when “Greek orality was giving way to Greek
literacy and . . . an oral state of mind was to be replaced by a literate state of mind”
(Havelock [1986], 8). More recently Thomas (1993, 2000, 2003) has explored
these problems with respect to Herodotus and his contemporaries. For proposed dif-
ferences between oral and written discourse, see Ong (1982, 31–77). 
19. Especially valuable have been Connor (1984, 1985), Gribble (1998),
Hornblower (1994), and Rood (1998a). I will make references to Stahl (2003), the
revised and somewhat expanded English version of Stahl (1966, 1973). Work by
de Jong (1987, 1997, 2001, 2002), while directed at Homer, Herodotus, and Greek
tragedy, has also suggested application to Thucydides’ work. (For a fuller bibliog-
raphy on narratology applied to ancient literature, see de Jong and Sullivan [1994],
282–83.) Because my approach focuses on the reader’s experience, I have also
found reader-response criticism such as Iser (1974) valuable (full bibliography in
de Jong and Sullivan [1994], 284–85).
20. Blondell (2002), Hershbell (1995).
21. In addition to Flory (1988), see also Bernstein (1995), Cowley et al.
(1998), Ferguson (1997), Gould (1989), Kagan (1995), Stahl (2003), and
Varnadoe (1990). Some of my own work on Homeric epic along these lines has
guided the current exploration; see Morrison (1997). There is also the “What If”
history series; see Cowley (2001), for example.
22. Recent work offering a broader view of literacy in the ancient world
includes W. V. Harris (1989), Robb (1994), and Thomas (1989, 1992, 1993,
2003). For the issue of literacy in Thucydides, see Loraux (1986b), Edmunds
(1993), Marincola (1997), and Morrison (2004). Also valuable have been the vol-
umes from the biennial Orality meetings that began in 1994, e.g., Mackay (1999)
and Mackie (2004).
23. While I do explore several passages from book 6 in chapters 9 and 10, the
Sicilian Expedition is intelligently discussed by Stahl (2003, 173–222).
24. Havelock (1982, 148) reminds us that “the historian of the Peloponnesian
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War, while still a bard in the sense that he is a celebrant of the great deeds of
heroes, is himself modernized and literate, a singer no more but now a self-styled
writer.” While Havelock (1963, 186) also comments, it is “only the reflective mind
of the sophisticated reader, who rereads and reviews the text,” I will attempt to
modify this view in chapters 9 and 10.
Chapter Two
1. Hornblower (1994, 134) defines focalization as “different perspectives or
points of view from which events are viewed [or more generally, I would add, are
experienced] or interpreted.” The point here is that we are given a view or per-
spective from someone other than the narrator, Thucydides, although we do
encounter a complicated situation in book 4 where Thucydides the historian (nar-
rator and primary focalizer) may present events through the perspective of an indi-
vidual involved, namely, Thucydides the general (4.102–8).
2. De Jong (1987, esp. 38–110), refers to “embedded focalization” (or sec-
ondary focalization—she uses both expressions interchangeably) which in her
scheme includes perception, thoughts, emotions, feelings, and indirect speech.
Schneider (1974) does a superb job of showing how the report of perceptions,
thoughts, and intentions constitute “a uniform principle of Thucydides’ narrative”
(28). For an interesting parallel situation in the history of Polybius, see Davidson
(1990, 13), who says, “Polybius, then, can be seen writing through the eyes of oth-
ers. . . . These different views of the same episode . . . take their own place as events
within the history he is composing.”
3. I fully agree with de Jong (1987, 113) that the “narrator-text does not con-
sist of a succession of events only, but is interspersed with short ‘peeps’ into the
minds of the characters participating in those events.” For her discussion of indi-
rect speech, see 114 ff. We may also distinguish between explicit and implicit
focalization; de Jong (1987, 118) remarks that implicit embedded focalization is not
marked by a verb of perceiving, thinking, or feeling.
4. Of course, it is possible to construct the readership Thucydides had in
mind by considering the information he chooses to include. For example, a broad
readership is implied by his decision, in ignoring parochial state calendars, to base
his chronology on the natural division of summer and winter. In identifying
Athenians by his use of patronymics rather than demotics, he reaches out to non-
Athenian readers—as well as by including other information. All this indicates a
vision of his audience as Greeks of the post-war period, not limited to the princi-
pal cities of Athens and Sparta. See Gomme HCT 1: 108 on chronology and the
lack of demotics, though Gomme notes the lack of explication for Athenian con-
stitutional practice which suggests that Thucydides expected his readers to be
familiar with such institutions (24–25). Ridley (1981, 41) sees the information on
Western Greece and Chalcidike as possibly reflecting where Thucydides’ own
interests or expertise lie; still, he argues that Thucydides was writing for all of
Greece. Hornblower (1994, 164) points out that since Thucydides calculates the
beginning of the war from the Spartan invasion of Athens, this would be an exam-
ple of Athenian “focalization.” 
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5. This has been noted by ancient critics as well; on such “vividness”
(enargeia), see Walker (1993).
6. According to Davidson (1991, 15–16), reading Polybius offers a very sim-
ilar experience. He distinguishes “two general tendencies. One the gaze of
su/gkrisij, or comparison, takes a remote view of things, assessing, contrasting,
and placing into a context . . . The other tendency of the gaze shares a lot with the
gaze of comparison, but its process is much more involving, entailed the ‘projec-
tion’ (metafere/sqai) of the sufferings of others onto one’s own circumstances.”
7. Thucydides explicitly connects the Corcyrean conflict with the outbreak
of war and compares the battle of Pylos with that of Syracuse: 1.23.6, 1.55.2 (cf.
1.146), 7.71.7.
8. The phrase “significant reminiscence” comes from Macleod (1983, 146)
where he discusses the literary technique of echo and reminiscence which “draws
attention to causes and motives as well as pointing up ironies.” Hornblower
(1991–96, 2: 16) calls these “deliberate cross-references.” Kitto (1966) says that
Thucydides expects his readers to see the parallels for themselves (285) and must
seize on the significance of such “to and fro” references (349). Connor (1984, 12)
describes this as “the activation of the reader’s own evaluative capacities.” Farrar
(1988, 136) says that the “many echoes and recurrent patterns . . . [are meant to]
. . . challenge [the reader] to assess the genuine differences and similarities between
two contexts, to think historically.” Arnold (1992) comments: “The reader . . . is
not likely to be allowed to remain a passive eavesdropper on historical debates”
(45); Thucydides “places his readers on guard and challenges us to integrate, as he
himself has, the lo/goi and e1rga. Although we stand as rational and objective
judges of arguments in the debates, the active, intellectual involvement demand-
ed by the style of Thucydidean speeches requires us to become more participants
in and less passive witnesses of not only the debates, but also the historian’s analy-
sis of the war” (57).
9. That is, the reader may also find significant parallels in more recent his-
tory and in contemporary events. We might distinguish three types of analysis:
local, distant, and extra-textual. For local analysis, the focus is limited to the pas-
sage or episode in question. At this level, we wish to understand the past—what
happened, why, and how it is significant—and to see how events may have been
experienced from the perspectives of the participants involved. Distant analysis
involves juxtaposing the issues, ideas, and events from the local passage with other
sections of the History. Extra-textual analysis leads to setting the problems raised
in the text with other contexts, including the reader’s own world. This book focus-
es primarily on local and distant analysis; still it is valuable to ponder the play
between a particular episode and extra-textual political phenomena (see chapter
10).
10. Rabinowitz (1987, 22) uses the concept of the “authorial audience” that
comes close to the sense of my implied, hypothetical reader. His hypothetical
authorial audience “allows us to treat the reader’s attempt to read as the author
intended . . . [by] the joining of a particular social/interpretive community . . . to
read in a particular socially constituted way that is shared by the author and his or
her expected readers.”
11. Connor (1985, 9). On this recreation of the historical past, see, e.g.,
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Connor (1985): Thucydides “creates the illusion that we are ourselves present,
witnessing events” (10); he quotes Hobbes: “[Thucydides] maketh his auditor a
spectator” (11). Connor continues: “We are as far from the historian’s study as we
can possibly be; we are in the war itself. We see; we hear; we even know the plans
and thoughts of the participants” (15). In commenting on the vividness of the nar-
rative, Arnold (1992, 44) quotes Plutarch Moralia 346A: Thucydides tries “to
transform his reader into a spectator and to let the sufferings that were so dazzling
and upsetting to those who beheld them have a similar effect on those who read
about them.” Cf. Gorgias Helen 9 on the tremendous power of language (here of
poetry specifically): “For those who hear poetry comes fearful fright and tearful pity
and mournful longing, and at the successes and failures of others’ affairs and persons
the mind suffers—through speech—a suffering of its own (e0p ) a)llotri/wn te prag*
ma&twn kai\ swma&twn eu0tuxi/aij kai\ duspragi/aij i1dio/n ti pa&qhma dia_ tw~n
lo/gwn e1paqen h9 yuxh/ [I include the Greek for the italicized section]).” This
translation comes from MacDowell (1993). 
12. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 33) translates eikazein as “form our conjectures.”
Gomme (HCT, I: 111—s.v. 1.9) defines it as “imaginative inference and interpre-
tation or reconstruction of the past.” Hunter (1973a, 27) offers a fuller definition
for eikazein: “It is the ability to relate past and present experience, find their essen-
tial similarities, and then conjecture or predict what is most likely to occur under
the given circumstances. It is reasoning based on probability” (see her discussion
at 23–41).
13. Cf. proaisqo/menoj. . .proew&ra (“perceiving ahead of time . . . he fore-
saw”—1.136.1, 1.138.3). Themistocles is able to do this without preparation: note
au0tosxedia&zein ta_ de/onta (1.138.3) which Hornblower (1991–96, I: 223) trans-
lates: “to improvize the right thing to be done.” On Pericles’ abilities, see prog*
nou\j. . . proe/gnw (“knowing in advance . . . he knew before”—2.65.5, 2.65.13;
cf. 2.60.1, 2.64.6). Cf. Thucydides’ comparison of the small and large battles of
Sphacteria and Thermopylae: . . . w(j mikro\n mega&lw| ei0ka&sai (“in comparing
small to great”—4.36.3).
14. Whether Thucydides fully anticipated in 431 the scope of the coming war,
he did have reasons for suspecting a “great” war and “cites the evidence (tek-
mairomenos) . . .” (1.1.1). On contemplating the fifth century from a future (post-
404) perspective, see 1.10.2.
15. Translations throughout this book are adapted from Lattimore (1998). Of
course, future historians may makes mistakes, as Thucydides acknowledges:
0Aqhnai/wn...diplasi/an a@n th\n du/namin ei0ka&zesqai a)po\ th=j fanera~j o1yewj
th=j po/lewj h2 e1stin (“one would conjecture from the visible appearance of [the
ruins of] the city that the power of Athens was double what it actually was”—
1.10.2).
16. It has been argued that Thucydides is writing for the politically active
reader, i.e., the statesman; see, e.g., Macleod (1983, 146): “to educate future states-
men”; cf. Hornblower (1987, 133); Orwin (1994, 4); and White (1984, 88).
Lessons of lasting value are offered to those like Themistocles and Pericles who
must lead their cities against the backdrop of political uncertainty—Thucydides
certainly has much to teach such readers—but I would like to broaden our con-
ception of Thucydides’ audience to include the more general reader, or perhaps we
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should rather say the “citizen,” an engaged reader who is also involved in his or her
own world (outside the text) so that what Thucydides says finds a context for
application within that reader’s place and time.
17. Yunis (1991, 180); this argument is expanded and given a broader context
in Yunis (1996). Yunis (1991, esp. 190–200) distinguishes the instructional
rhetoric of Pericles from the demagogic rhetoric of Cleon, emphasizing how impor-
tant it is that the best political leader not only recognize the best policy, but be able
to explain it (note gnonai and hermeneusai–2.60.5); see Yunis (1991, 180–86 and
189 n26).
18. Yunis (1991, 199). This slippage between political and literary exchange
is also found with the term “exposition” or “demonstration” (apodeixis).
Hornblower (1991–96, I: 148) comments that Thucydides’ use of apodeixis at
1.97.2 (where he begins his account of the growth of the Athenian empire) is
“surely intended to recall the famous use of the word in the preface of Herodotus.”
Note that the other use of the term is political, describing Pericles’ explanation of
policy to the Athenians (2.13.9).
19. On the importance of decision-making, see Yunis (1991, 185, 199).
Arnold (1992, 56) comments: “Without directly interceding as narrator, therefore,
by including debates within the history Thucydides asks his own audience to con-
sider the factual, ethical and psychological factors that led to crucial decisions per-
taining to war—factors that were and are likely to play similar roles in the future.”
Given that the reader’s situation is different from that of the fifth-century citizen,
we need to contemplate how the experience of a citizen living through the war,
engaged in debate, voting, and fighting, is significantly distinct from a modern
reader experiencing Thucydides’ work. 
20. Of course, the decision to show the war from different sides may have been
reinforced by Thucydides’ exile and his access to sources in Sparta and elsewhere
(5.26.5).
21. At times, Thucydides is nothing if not authoritative, magisterial even, in
passing judgment, criticizing ideas, strategies, and statesmen. These well-thumbed
exceptional passages include 1.20–23, 2.65, 3.82–84, 5.26.
22. Translation by Halliwell (1987, 59–60).
23. Flory (1990, 194). Hornblower (1987) argues that, in opposing “flattering
traditions” (85 n50), Thucydides may be reacting to “overtly partisan use . . . of
antiquarian material” (85); cf. his remark on Thucydides’ lack of narrow partisan-
ship or attachment to one city (27).
24. Athenian arguments maintaining the irrelevance of morality to foreign
policy are found at 1.73–77, 2.62–64, 5.89, 5.107; cf. Diodotus at 3.44, 3.46–47
(discussed in chapter 7). De Ste. Croix (1972, 16–17) maintains Thucydides’ view
is that in “relations between states . . . moral judgements are virtually inapplicable
. . . force [is] the sole ultimate arbiter in international affairs.” Still he admits that
Thucydides never makes this fundamental distinction explicit.
25. Newman (1988, 45) articulates the dialogic principle as “all dogmatic and
would-be final formulations are betrayals.”
26. Newman (1988, 45) remarks that “twin speeches occurring in real life
called for the judgment of an audience. Set now in the record, thesis and antithe-
sis have to be synthesized by the reader for himself.” Paradoxically Thucydides has
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produced a “possession for all time” by the lack of closure for arguments which con-
tinue to sound familiar to us today.
27. On Thucydides’ choices for inclusion, see Hornblower (1987, 34–44).
28. Although such cross-references and juxtapositions may be multiplied end-
lessly, I mention several examples. Various sections in the opening 23 chapters pre-
pare the reader for issues relevant to the Corcyrean conflict, such as sea power
(Minos, Agamemnon, and the development of the trireme at 1.4, 1.9.3–4,
1.13–14); civil war (1.2.4–6, 1.12.2, 1.18.1); and motivation by fear (1.9.3; cf.
1.23.6). Looking ahead, the Corcyrean conflict anticipates the land/sea antithesis
(1.35.5–noted by Hornblower [1991–96], II: 79); the strategic value of Italy and
Sicily (especially in books 6 and 7); and the idea of arbitration instead of armed
conflict (e.g., 1.28.4–5; cf. 1.71.5, 1.78.4, 1.144.2–1.145). 
29. This of course is criticized by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who condemns
the episodic nature of Thucydides’ History. In ch. 9, Dionysius asserts that
Thucydides’ seasonal division of the narrative has led to greater obscurity (dus-
parakolouthetotera): “it is surprising how he failed to see that a narrative which is bro-
ken up into small sections (ei0j mikra_j katakermatizome/nh toma&j), describing the
many actions which took place in many different places will not catch ‘the pure
light shining from afar’” (a quotation of Pindar Pythian 3.75). Dionysius also
objects that many episodes have been left “half finished” (hemiteles), concluding
“the continuity [to\ dihneke/j] of the narrative is destroyed” (ch. 13). Yet
Thucydides is certainly aware of how he has organized the History: he not only
defends his chronological framework (5.20.2–3; cf. 2.2.1); he even points out his
“digressions” (ekbole–e.g., 1.97.2).
Chapter Three
1. For the Corcyrean conflict as programmatic, see Crane (1992b, 4). I see
the Corcyrean conflict as comparable to the programmatic encounter between
Croesus and Solon in book 1 of Herodotus’ work; see Shapiro (1996) with bibli-
ography. For the Archaeology as programmatic, see, e.g., Connor (1984, 27) and
Hornblower (1991–96, I: 8). 
2. Connor (1985) and Arnold (1992). I have also found the essays on
Thucydides in Macleod (1983) extremely valuable.
3. Connor (1985, 8, 10); Arnold (1992, 45). Arnold says she will explore how
the “history creates such an experience” and “how the demands Thucydides places
on his audience shape their reception of the text” (45).
4. I owe this formulation to Rosenbloom (1995); cf. the discussion in Turasiewicz
(1990, esp. 88) on the “polyphonic mix” of Thucydides’ work.
5. The difficult question is: when is a detail a telling one? That is, when is a
detail intended to set up a parallel, contrast, or comparison, and when is it simply
a matter of what happened with no larger significance? Of course, Thucydides is
highly selective in using speeches as a way of highlighting certain issues or con-
flicts, but it is tougher to determine his criteria for inclusion in the narrative. For
the question of what Thucydides does not tell us, see HCT, I: 1–29; Kitto (1966,
259–79); and Hornblower (1992b). Crane (1996) points to Thucydides’ elimina-
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tion of the importance of family and kinship connections: the effect is to make the
polis and the individual predominant, “minimiz[ing] all social ties that mediate
between individual subject and the collective city-state” (24).
6. Non-Greeks are involved as well: the Taulantians on the mainland are
Illyrian by “tribe” (ethnos–1.24.1).
7. Epidamnus’ location on the entrance to the Adriatic begins the episode
(1.24.1); later the Epidamnian isthmus is indicated and Actium is located
(1.26.5, 1.29.3). Distinctions among Greeks are also made: the Dorian ethnos at
1.24.2; kinship (suggeneia) is appealed to at 1.26.3. On suggeneia, see Hornblower
(1991–96, II: 61–80).
8. Noted by Hornblower (1991–96, I: 67). Summer is mentioned later
(periio/nti to\ qe/rei–1.30.3; cf. 1.31.1). On chronology, see HCT, I: 196–98, and
Wilson (1987, 31–32).
9. The speakers addressing the Athenians at 1.32ff. are unnamed, implying
that the ambassadors speak for the entire communities. As White (1984) notes,
while “the principal figures in this world are the individual cities, regarded as
units” (64), this premise, “the unity of each city, is challenged by the civil war in
Epidamnus” (68). See Strasburger (1954); Macleod (1983, 84); and Hornblower
(1987, 61). The subject of civil war here is prepared for in the Archaeology: see
1.2.1, 1.12, 1.18; cf. 1.23.2. 
10. w(j le/getai, a)po\ pole/mou tino\j tw~n prosoi/kwn barba&rwn
e0fqa&rhsan. On the function in this passage of the expression, “it is said,”
Westlake (1977, 357) thinks the phrase “indicate[s] that Thucydides is using a
written source, though he may have felt some uncertainty because of the vague-
ness or brevity of this source.” Hornblower (1991–96, I: 68) guesses Thucydides’
source to be “oral informants.” 
11. We note repeated use of participles to reveal motivation in narrative sec-
tions, especially for the battle of Sybota. Lang (1995, 53) calls participial motiva-
tion “a narrative technique which links actions and actors chainwise.” She
concludes that its appearance in Thucydides is a “continuing elaboration of the
Herodotean narrative technique” (56). On motivation more generally, see
Hornblower (1987, 78–79), who suggests that while motives and intentions may
be inferred by Thucydides (who uses it as a literary device), this is not necessarily
inconsistent with a truthful account. See also Westlake (1989a).
12. On justice, see discussion below. Again note the participial motivation,
“believing” (nomizontes–1.25.3).
13. HCT, I: 159 contrasts Thucydides’ political and economic motives (1.23)
with the “sentimental” motivation here. Crane (1992b) calls this view into ques-
tion. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 69) comments: “As so often, Th. is very confident
about motive.” Kagan (1995, 7–8) emphasizes the triad of motivation articulated
by the Athenians regarding their empire: “honor, fear, and interest” (1.77), and
argues that honor prevails as a factor for the Corinthians (37–41).
14. No ethnographic information concerning customs, courtship rituals, etc.,
is forthcoming, such as we might expect from Herodotus. Other omissions are
noted by Hornblower (1991–96, I):  no mention that Apollonia is a joint
Corinthian-Corcyrean colony (76); “very little about the Corinthian northwest-
ern expansion in 480–435 which formed the background to the Corinthian-
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Corcyrean tension described in chs. 24–55” (66); Hornblower also comments on
the absence of references to the Cocytus River (which joins the Acheron) and the
reputed entrance to Hades (1.46.4): “note the absence of any of this interesting
material in Th.” (91). Kitto (1966, 261) captures the process of Thucydides’ delib-
erate elimination of possible material with the metaphor of a carver or sculptor who
pares away the “excess” and notes that (for the finished product) Thucydides wrote
only twenty pages a year.
15. Cf. the earlier involvement of the Ambracians and Leucadians (1.26.1–2;
cf. 1.30.2).
16. Wilson (1987, 33–34) explains the Corinthian intransigence as an effort
to maintain her prestige among her western allies.
17. For anger as motivation, cf. also the Corcyrean anger at 1.26.3.
18. Wilson (1987, 31).
19. Regarding the topographical description of Ephyre and Cheimerion,
Wilson (1987, 38) comments that the reader is “no doubt ignorant of this non-
Greek coastline.” Still, we should conceive of Thucydides’ audience broadly—
some of his readers may be from this area. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 73) says that
the naming of the Corinthian generals with patronymic at 1.29 “is hard to account
for except by assuming that Th. intended in some sense to be comprehensive.”
HCT, I: 182 notes the omission of the Corcyrean commanders’ names in contrast
with the Sybota narrative (1.47.1). Still, the battle is fought by “the Corinthians”
and “the Corcyreans” (1.29.3ff.), that is, each general’s involvement is not speci-
fied. The Corcyreans bring 80 ships (40 more are engaged in the Epidamnian
blockade–1.29.4); the Corinthians bring 75 ships and 2,000 men (1.29.1; cf.
1.27.2).
20. As Kagan (1995, 19) puts it: “No one could have predicted that an inter-
nal quarrel in this remote city on the fringes of the Hellenic world would lead to
the terrible and devastating Peloponnesian War.” Hornblower (1991–96, I: 72)
notes the “first appearance in the narrative proper” of the Spartans (the ambas-
sadors mentioned at 1.28.1) and finds significant their ineffective role as negotia-
tors. Athens itself is implied at 1.28.3. 
21. See discussion of Flory (1990) in chapter 2.
22. For what may be an analogous situation in “welcoming” the audience early
in Homer’s Iliad—and the problems with reconstructing such an audience—see
Scodel (1997).
23. Thucydides does not, however, allow the Epidamnians to speak on their
own behalf. HCT, I: 162–63 comments that it is “as though Epidamnus were not
an independent state which might have some say in the matter itself.” White
(1984, 305 n5) says that denying the use of discourse to a city is “the most drastic
step a system of rhetoric can take.”
24. In this case Thucydides himself may very well have been present in the
assembly—he may have spoken himself, as noted by HCT, I: 166. Stadter (1983)
emphasizes the Athenian desire to weaken both the Corcyrean and Corinthian
navies (1.44.2). On Pericles’ role and why Thucydides does not explicitly mention
him, see Plutarch Pericles 29; Kitto (1966, 292–94); Kagan (1969, 237–45); Orwin
(1994, 60 n60); and Bloedow (1994).
25. Thucydides has adapted sophistic practice to historical circumstance by
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allowing each side to make its best case; see Newman (1988). The challenge for
the Athenians—and for the reader—is to determine which argument is actually
preferable in this particular situation.
26. Ober (1993, 86) lays emphasis on the term antilogia (1.31.4), which
“reveals that the speakers will take diametrically opposed positions. By implication,
there is no possibility of a genuine compromise in this dispute; either the
Athenians make an alliance with Corcyra or they do not.”
27. The postscript at 1.44 has particular relevance to the challenging problem
of speech-narrative correspondence. In explicitly noting the decisive reasons for the
Athenians’ second choice (they believed that war with the Peloponnesians would
take place, the Corcyrean navy would be useful, and Corcyra was strategically
located (kalw~j… kei=sqai) on the trade route to Italy and Sicily [1.44.2–1.44.3]),
Thucydides makes clear that these factors coincide with three points made by the
Corcyreans in their speech: war would come (1.33.3); their navy would be useful
(1.33.2, 1.36); and Corcyra was on an important trade route (1.36.2). This first
episode with speeches offers an example of how speech can influence action, as
Thucydides emphasizes Athenian motivation (in the postscript) with deliberate
echoes of the arguments made in the Corcyreans’ speech. The very proximity of
postscript and speech allows the reader easily to juxtapose argument and coincident
motivation. See Morrison (2006).
28. This decision appears also to reveal a caution on the Athenian side which
is not necessarily found in the years after 431 BCE. As Thucydides later states, bet-
ter judgments (gnomai) occur in peacetime (3.82.2; cf. 1.78.3, 1.82.6). Kagan
(1995, 71) argues that the Athenians have found “an inventive policy aimed at
steering a middle course that would frustrate Corinth’s aims without bringing on a
general war.” As Stadter (1983, 133) puts it, “Rather they attempted to go between
the horns of the dilemma, satisfying neither party completely.” Other moderate
decisions by Athens, according to Kagan (1995), occurred with respect to
Potidaea, “Athenian action should be understood as a diplomatic response to a
looming problem, a moderate choice between unwelcome extremes” (49), and the
Megarian decree, “once again, the Athenian action should be seen as a middle
path” (50). Wilson (1987, 138) says that the tone of Pericles’ policy (1.140ff.)
“takes a middle path between aggression and backing down. In just such a spirit
the Athenians at Sybota tell the Corinthians that they are not starting a war and
not breaking the treaty, but that they will not retreat from their commitment to
defend Corcyra.”
29. Connor (1984, 34) characterizes the major themes in these speeches as
“the introduction of what is to be a major theme in the Histories—the conflict
between right and advantage; the second is Corcyra’s significance as a naval
power.”
30. See 1.34.2, 1.35.3–4.
31. The Corinthians feel they must respond to the idea that “we are behaving
unjustly” (adikoumen–1.37.1). On further invocations of justice on the
Corinthians’ part, see 1.37.3, 1.37.5, 1.38.4. The Corinthians use the term hamar-
tia in the sense of “crime” for the Corcyreans’ actions, rather than simply “mistake”
(1.39.2, 1.39.3): the Athenians risk joining in such unjust activities. Kagan (1969,
231) says that the Corinthians have little or no grounds for their involvement in
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Epidamnus and choose instead to attack the Corcyreans’ character.
32. In the Archaeology and Method (1.2–23) we find virtually no moral
terms: only the “virtue” (arete) of the soil (1.2.4) and lack of shame (ais-
chune–1.5.1). In the first section of the Corcyrean conflict (1.24–31), there are a
few instances: kata_ . . .to\ di/kaion (1.25.3); enklemata (1.26.1); and three phras-
es connected with potential arbitration: di/kaj dou=nai (1.28.2), dikazesthai
(1.28.4), and dike (1.28.5).
33. White (1984, 65–66).
34. Connor (1984, 34–35, n37)  finds the Corcyreans’ portrayal of themselves
as victims of injustice to be weak. Still, they must have felt that their case would
have been weaker if they had not made such appeals. For the prevalence of con-
cepts associated with the idea of justice, consider, for example, the “accusations”
(or “indictments”–enklemata) at 1.34.2, 1.40.1, and 1.42.3. The Corinthians
describe the process of arbitration as “to be determined by justice” (di/kh|
kri/nesqai–1.39.1); the “laws of the Greeks” are also appealed to (kata_ tou\j
9Ellh/nwn no/mouj–1.41.1). For a survey of such legalistic language in Thucydides,
see Darbo-Peschanski (1987).
35. The Corcyreans first mention their fleet at the opening of their speech
(1.33.1).
36. The Corinthians preface their remarks by saying they will show that the
Athenians will not irrationally reject the offer of the Corcyreans (th\n tw~nde
xrei/an mh\ a)logi/stwj a)pw&sesqe–1.37.1); cf. the claim at 1.43.4: the Athenians
will be acting rightly and in their own interests (ta_ a!rista bouleu/sesqe u9mi=n
au0toi=j; see also 1.42.1, 1.42.4). The Corinthians have no response to the advan-
tages of Corcyra’s location, the importance of which the retrospective reader will
appreciate in connection to the Sicilian expedition.
37. Both justice and advantage of course pertain to such international rela-
tionships.
38. The Corcyreans tell Athens, “The way the Corinthians treat us, their
kinsmen (pro\j h9ma~j tou\j cuggenei=j), should be taken as a warning to you”
(1.34.3; cf. 1.34.1). The Corinthians respond by asserting that they are honored
and loved by their other colonies, although no examples are given (1.38.1–3;
Corinth is later helped by three colonies–1.46.2). Hornblower (1991–96, II: 73)
comments on “kinship” (suggeneia), saying it was “stretched until it had become
almost a metaphor for a relationship of obedience and control”; see de Ste. Croix
(1972, 71).
39. On the treaty of 446/445, see 1.35, 1.36.1, 1.37, 1.40.4; cf. 1.32.2, 1.45.3.
40. On “friends” and enemies” (echthroi and philoi), see 1.33.3, 1.35.4,
1.41.1–3; cf. 1.50.1, 8.48.4. HCT I: 176 remarks: “echthros has wider import than
polemios (which implies ‘being at war with’).”
41. In the Archaeology and Method (1.2–23) we find mention of collabora-
tive efforts (based in part on coercion): the Greek expedition to Troy and the bat-
tle against the Persians (both Panhellenic ventures), and the Athenian and
Spartan alliances.
42. Hornblower (1987, 162) calls the speeches “treacherous evidence” for
Thucydides’ own opinions.
43. The idea of the Corcyreans teaching the Athenians is balanced at the end
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of their speech, when they boil down their argument (braxuta&tw| . . .
kefalai/w|) so that the Athenians may “learn” (mathoite–1.36.3) the importance
of the Corcyrean navy.
44. The Corinthians’ phrase “keep in mind first of all” (mnhsqe/ntaj
prw~ton–1.37.1) answers the Corcyreans’ first “lesson” (a)nadida&cai prw~*
ton–1.32.1); their goal is to give Athens a clear view of the approaching situation
(proeidh=te–1.37.1). The Corinthians also introduce the idea of learning based on
a model of experience: “the younger also learns from the older” (kai\ new&tero/j tij
para_ presbute/rou au0ta_ maqw&n–1.42.1). Cf. the later need, in the Corinthians’
eyes, of teaching the Spartans (didaskalias–1.68.3).
45. The Corinthians wish to have made clear (dedelotai) the grounds for their
complaints and the violent, grasping nature of the Corcyreans (1.40.1).
46. “Evidence” (tekmerion–1.1.3, 1.3.3, 1.9.4, 1.20.1, 1.21.1); “clarity” (delos
and cognates–1.3.1, 1.5.2, 1.10.4 [twice], 1.11.1, 1.11.2, 1.21.2; cf. saphes at
1.22.4); a “sign” (semeion–1.6.2, 1.10.1, 1.21.1); “evidence” (martyrion–1.8.1);
“investigate” (skopein–1.1.3, 1.20.5, 1.21.2, 1.22.4); and “demonstrate” (apodeik-
numi–1.6.6). See also Hornblower (1987), 100–107. As Ober (1993, 90) puts it,
“The speakers thus claim to do just what Thucydides claims his history will do—
teach about interest and power and offer an understanding of past events and the
probable course of the future.”
47. The “good service” (euergesia) of the Corinthians gains points with the
Athenians in contrast to the Corcyreans’ inability to point to past service—which
they acknowledge in their opening remarks (mh/te eu)ergesi/av mega/lhv–1.32.1).
On past service (euergesia), see 1.41–43 and Crane (1992b, esp. 14–17).
48. This notion of helping friends and hurting enemies is spelled out at 1.41.1
in accordance with the laws (nomoi) of the Greeks; cf. 1.41.3, 1.43.2, and see
Crane (1992b, 14–17, 22). Missiou (1998) argues that the Athenians are not
much swayed by such conventional notions of reciprocity.
49. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 77) translates: “instead of being wisdom, as we once
thought, [our policy of neutrality] has now proved to be folly and weakness.” Note the
perfect tense of tunchano at 1.32.3: tetucheke (“it has turned out that . . .”).
50. The Corcyreans say that this help would be gained without expense (charis
is mentioned three times–1.33.1–2, 1.36.1); cf. the gratitude that will be preserved
as “ever memorable proof” (met' ai0eimnh/stou marturi/ou–1.33.1).
51. On such contradictions, see Calder (1955, 179) and HCT, I: 169.
52. For the Corcyreans’ and Corinthians’ deficiencies as teachers, see Ober
(1993, 87–90).
53. Ostwald (1988, 65), citing de Romilly (1988, 43–44). He also says that
“growth and fear created a situation in which no viable alternative in human terms
[existed] to either side but to go to war” (19). See 21–32 on the “concatenation of
circumstances leading to the outbreak of war” (26). The first four steps in this
chain are found in the Corcyrean conflict. Wilson (1987, 29) says that
“Thucydides certainly writes as if it [i.e., the war] were commonly regarded as
imminent.”
54. Ober (1993, 88) remarks that “one might go so far as to suggest that Athens’
making of the alliance . . . was the act that fulfilled the Corcyrean prophecy.”
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55. Arnold (1992, 45).
56. Certainly the reader may employ a more distant, less engaged perspective:
these two perspectives may coexist in some sort of tension or alternation. For an
analogous situation, see Macleod (1983, 77) who describes how the “elegant
polemic” of Alcibiades in book 6 may be “satisfying perhaps to an audience, [but]
must give the reader pause.” Connor (1984, 36) says that “the effect of this sec-
tion, then, is to intensify the discrepancy between the analysis of power in the text
and the reader’s knowledge of the outcome of the war”; see Connor (1984, 39) on
the “reader’s knowledge” of a long and difficult war.
57. See Kitto (1966, 339) on the uncertainty of the future; he also remarks:
“we watch and listen as actors peer ahead into the dark,” having to guess what will
happen (299).
58. Farrar (1988, 145) says that Thucydides shows how things happened and
why, but also suggests that it was not inevitable. Kagan (1995, 10) raises the ques-
tion more generally on the origins of war: “What choices were available, and more
importantly what choices did they [the participants] believe were available?” We
are more likely to discover the answer by employing the open-ended perspective
of 433 BCE rather than remaining at a distance and judging with hindsight. Stahl
(2003, 53) wonders whether Thucydides saw any possibility of averting war and
points to Archidamus’ speech (1.80–85) as the last chance for peace.
59. Kagan (1995, 58); see his discussion of options at 68–74.
60. Ibid., 70. Alternatively the reader is confronted with considering what it
may mean when Thucydides says the Athenians and Spartans were “forced” to go
to war (1.23.6). Connor (1984, 32 n31) says of ananke that it is “strong pressure in
one direction, not philosophical determinacy or practical inevitability.”
61. Kagan (1995, 46) remarks that the “defensive alliance was a precisely
crafted diplomatic device meant to bring the Corinthians to their senses without
war” (see n28 above).
62. Stahl (2003, 75–77) notes that other speakers, such as Pericles and
Archidamus, try to anticipate the future. For discussion of (wrongly) seeing the past
as inevitable, see Gould (1989) on evolution, Varnedoe (1990) on modern art,
Bernstein (1995) on literature and history, and Ferguson (1997) on history.
63. Thucydides informs the reader of the names of generals (1.46.2, 1.47.1),
the contributors and number of ships (1.46.1), and the geography of the city of
Ephyra and its harbor (1.46.4). HCT, I: 179 comments: “This careful description
[1.46.4] of a not very important locality suggests to me autopsy or information from
a special source.”
64. Thucydides does not explicitly comment on the fact that the Athenians
are facing the Corinthians. Wilson (1987, 45) remarks that Corinth may have
“wished to put the Athenians diplomatically on the spot, as it were, by forcing them
to fight against the Corinthians themselves rather than against their allies.”
65. Wilson (1987, 47–48) notes the “apparent contradiction” between
Thucydides’ comment that there were no “breakthroughs” (diekploi–1.49.3), yet
diekpleontes appears at 1.50.1; see Hornblower (1991–96, I: 92). Thucydides later
makes several comments: this was the biggest sea battle ever fought between two
Greek navies at that time (naumaxi/a . . . new~n plh/qei megi/sth|–1.50.2); it was
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fought with “more enthusiasm than skill” (a)lla_ qumw~| kai\ r9w&mh| to\ ple/on
e0nauma&xoun h2 e0pisth/mh||–1.49.3; cf. 7.63.4 on skill versus enthusiasm).
66. A possible additional focalization would be the Corcyreans’ pursuit of the
Corinthians (1.49.5).
67. Athenian fear of a Corcyrean defeat serves as motivation (deisantes–1.50.5).
On fear as a motivating factor, see de Romilly (1956b).
68. Hornblower (1991–96, I) comments on the “cinematic” technique of this
description, for Thucydides “lets us see how individuals react” (93) and calls the
upcoming section 1.52 “exceptionally vivid” (95). For the analogy with cinema,
see Hornblower (1987, 192).
69. This omission is noted by Hornblower (1991–96, I: 94): there must have
been a third Athenian assembly resolving to send an additional twenty ships.
Hornblower’s explanation is that this silence “minimize[s] Athenian aggressiveness
by leaving in the reader’s mind the impression of scrupulousness created by
[1.]45.3.” On this point more generally, see Badian (1993, 125–62, 223–36).
70. On Corcyra’s “bloodthirsty” nature in demanding the killing of the
Corinthian embassy (1.53.3), see Wilson (1987, 31). Yet again the Athenians try
to find a third, moderate path. As de Ste. Croix (1972, 77) points out, the
Athenians and the Corcyreans could have destroyed or captured the entire
Corinthian fleet on the second day, yet they refrain from doing so (see n28 above).
71. Orwin (1994, 59–60) notes that 21 of the 146 chapters in book 1 (one in
seven) concern charges against the Athenians and their responses. Cf. Thucydides’
comment on the goodwill toward Sparta in “freeing Greece” when war begins
(2.8.4).
72. HCT, I: 190 notes that this is “normally a sign of victory, that they did not
have to obtain them under a flag of truce (cf. 63.3).”
73. Of course the Corcyreans do so with the help of the second Athenian con-
tingent.
74. Thucydides does comment more authoritatively on the Corcyreans’ suc-
cess (note perigignetai–1.55). HCT, I: 196 comments on Corinth’s failure: “Corinth
had neither secured the freedom of Epidamnos nor reduced Kerkyra [Corcyra] to
obedience.”
75. Wilson (1987, 120). Kitto (1966, 294) comments on Thucydides’ decision
not to anticipate the later course of events concerning Corcyra. The Corcyreans
do provide Athens with fifty ships in 431 (2.25.1), 15 in 426 (3.94.1), and 15 in
413 (7.31.5; cf. 7.44.6, 7.57.7). Of more immediate significance, Wilson asks why
Corinth failed to make another attack on Corcyra if Athens did not keep a per-
manent fleet in the area (63).
Chapter Four
1. As Cogan (1981, 4) notes, while the city of Plataea is “of little or no
material consequence, Thucydides treats it with a care and emphasis reserved for
only a very few events in the course of the war . . . [there must be] some crucial
non-material consequence or significance.” Gomme HCT, II: 3 notes that
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“Thucydides says nothing of the military importance of Plataea to either side.” In
raising the question why Plataea is dealt with at such length, Cartwright (1997,
154) concludes it was “perhaps this very insignificance of Plataea in the scheme
of things and the disproportionate hostility of the Peloponnesians to it that
aroused Thucydides’ interest.”
2. Rusten (1989, 97) believes that Thucydides “gives it [Plataea] the foremost
place only chronologically, not causally . . . yet it is paradigmatic in many ways for
the Peloponnesian War: careful planning is ruined by lateness at crucial moments
. . . the co-operation of minor stasiotai and greater powers bring to local disputes an
international dimension . . . instead of concluding these disputes, the greater pow-
ers may be infected by their savagery.” Gomme HCT, II:  354 speaks of Thucydides’
interest “in the political and moral issues raised by Plataia’s alliance with Athens,
her obliteration, and the cold-blooded execution of the survivors.” 
3. Badian (1993, 109).
4. On what seems “more than coincidence,” see Aristotle Poetics ch. 9,
1452a. Rusten (1989, 102) compares the rain at 2.5.2 with the second “rescue” at
2.77.6. Is there possibly an echo of the rain which saves Croesus on the pyre in
Herodotus 1.86–87? Gomme HCT, II: 211 remarks: Thucydides “did not at once
believe all that he was told, including a story that Plataea was saved in much the
same way as Croesus had been.” 
5. Stahl (2003, 67) comments on the movement from disorientation to ori-
entation.
6. Connor (1984, 53) says that Thucydides “encourages the reader to act like
a contemporary with surprise at the unexpected form taken by the outbreak of the
war.” Stahl (2003, 66) believes this “shows the psychological interest of the
author”; cf. 69 on the reader who experiences events simultaneously with the par-
ticipants.
7. Many key figures are unnamed including the Plataean who, by shutting the
city gate, pens the Thebans in (tis . . . 2.4.3); the woman who gives the axe to the
Thebans (2.4.4); and the Athenian herald who arrives to find the Theban prison-
ers dead (with the final focalization–2.6.3). Those who are named include the
leaders at the start (the Thebans Pythangellus and Diemporus; the Plataean
Naucleides) and the Theban go-between Eurymachus (2.2.3; also mentioned when
he dies at 2.5.7). Thucydides provides information such as the distance from
Plataea to Thebes (80 stades–2.5.2) and the reasons for the slowness of the auxil-
iary force (in the rain, the journey is slower, and the Asopos in flood is difficult to
cross–2.5.1). 
8. As Hornblower (1991–96, I: 241) notes: “People in Thucydides who think
things can be done ‘easily’ tend to be wrong.” Kagan (1969, 46) comments on the
oligarchic Plataeans who “more accurately estimate[d] the mood of their fellow cit-
izens, believing they would surely attempt to resist the Thebans once the shock of
the coup had worn off. Their advice was ignored.”
9. Connor (1984, 52) comments that this is “as surprising to the reader as to
the unwary Plataeans.” 
10. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 242) considers this a “paragraph of exceptional-
ly vivid description.” On 2.4.4, Brunt (1993, 403) remarks: “each phrase can be like
a camera shot.” 
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11. Connor (1984, 52 n1) comments on the technique of “postponed infor-
mation”: “Throughout the Plataean episode Thucydides shows a tendency to post-
pone the introduction of important material until very late in the narrative.” Cf.
Hornblower (1991–96, I: 237) regarding the fact that the invasion was made dur-
ing the sacred time of the month (3.56.2, 3.65.1)—more delayed information.
12. Connor (1984, 53) remarks that the “element of the unexpected remains
prominent” throughout book 2; cf. Stahl (2003, 94).
13. Rood (2004, 120) offers a valuable discussion of this passage (2.5.6). Stahl
(2003, 72 n3) astutely remarks: “Is it likely that the Theban army would actually
have given up its human collateral in exchange for the mere prospect of ‘negotia-
tions’?” I have suggested elsewhere (Morrison 2004, 98) that the effect is to give
the reader a sense of what Thucydides’ own experience as an historian must have
been like when he confronted conflicting eye-witness accounts (1.22.3). It is not
even clear how much of 2.5.5 is the Thebans’ account: only the end—the promise
to give back the prisoners—or the whole report from the herald? 
14. Lateiner (1977, 100) notes that “heralds are prominent in the Plataean
narrative because, in the earliest phase of the war, diplomacy was as important as
warfare for achieving political objectives.” Indeed, “heralds have punctuated
Plataea at each major incident.” See Stahl (2003, 69) on self-deception and what
cannot be foreseen. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 236) finds this to be the “first event
of the war proper.” See the valuable discussion in Price (2001, 277–89).
15. Connor (1984, 52–53) notes that the Thebans and Plataeans were not
prominent in book 1.
16. Later the issues arise whether the Thebans took Plataea by force (3.52.2,
5.17.2); regarding the Spartans’ sense of guilt at the transgression (paranomema) of
the Thebans who invaded Plataea while the treaty was still in effect, see 7.18.2 (cf.
1.85.1). 
17. The invasion of Plataea is used for dating purposes: 2.10.1, 2.19.1. Rusten
(1989, 216 [s.v. 2.71]) notes, “Thucydides continues in detail the story he began in
2.2–6.” We are reminded that the Plataeans sent their women, children, and elders
to Athens (2.72.2, 2.78.3).
18. Badian (1993, 111) thinks that Archidamus “shows himself willing to
abate the rigour of that demand, evidently in accordance with a Spartan policy ear-
lier decided upon, and to accept something less than strict fulfillment.” Bauslaugh
(1991, 131) notes that neutrality served useful propaganda purposes (2.77.5). 
19. Pausanias, of course, is cast in a different light at 1.128–135.
20. Connor (1984, 57–59).
21. Kagan (1969, 102). Connor (1984, 54) remarks that the best strategy of the
Peloponnesians is to draw Athens into land battle; see Connor (1984, 57) for his dis-
cussion of the “commander narrative” of Archidamus and Pericles in book 2.
22. Kagan (1969, 104–105, 174). Gomme HCT, II: 206 calls Archidamus’
final offer “generous.” Cf. Badian (1993, 111) on neutrality.
23. Kagan (1969, 105); Badian (1993, 111). Gomme HCT, II: 206 believes
that while it is surprising that Athens set so much store on Plataea, Athenian strat-
egy dictated such a move. Bauslaugh (1991, 132) surmises that the Athenians were
worried that neutrality for the Plataeans might set a precedent. See Stahl (2003,
81) on Plataea being caught in the middle.
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24. Rusten (1989, 217); Kagan (1969, 174).
25. See Stahl (2003, 82).
26. The situation of some working while others ate or slept is echoed when the
second Athenian trireme is sent to Mytilene (3.49.2); see Gomme HCT, II: 207–8
and Hornblower (1991–96, I: 360).
27. Note the double labor (e0n a)mfibo/lw| –2.76.3); cf. Rusten (1989, 21).
28. Flory (1988, 50–51) remarks: “Fire, wind, night, and the weather in gen-
eral thus constitute a significant pattern in the external contingencies about which
Thucydides hypothesizes.” 
29. The second half of this section is in fact quite difficult for the reader to fol-
low: in addition to the many technical terms, a diagram is practically required to
keep clear the tactics of siege and counter-siege operations. Would Thucydides
expect his reader to draw one? Gomme HCT, II: 209 remarks: “The care with
which Thucydides relates all the details proves at least a comparative novelty.”
30. Also we note the contrast between the anonymous (and collective) feel to
the Plataean resistance. No Plataeans are named: none of the ambasssadors to the
Spartans, no speakers, no couriers to Athens are identified. Once again the effect
is that the Plataeans are viewed very much as a collective, though there is a dis-
tinction between the ambassadors to Sparta and Athens and the populace. On the
other side, Archidamus is the only Spartan named other than references to
Pausanias.
31. Spence (1990, 93) remarks that for Athens the “navy and long walls pre-
cluded an effective siege of the city. . . . Most Greek cities could not afford to lose
more than one harvest without being forced to import food to avoid starvation.”
Later, after the fortification of Deceleia, the city of Athens (polis) has become a
fortress (phrourion–7.28.1).
32. See Connor (1984, 75 n56) on Pericles’ obscure role.
33. Thucydides mentions 220 volunteers (3.20.2); cf. the account in
Demosthenes 59.103 on the drawing of lots to determine who might escape so that
the remaining food might last longer. On Thucydides’ knowledge, see Gomme
HCT, II: 283; on page 287, he remarks that all the details could have been told to
Thucydides by one or more of those who escaped on their arrival in Athens, except
about the half dozen turning back who believed all were lost. Thucydides would
have had to wait for this information, perhaps questioning the Spartans at a later
time.
34. Their success is marked at 3.24.3 by esothesan; cf. soteria at 3.20.1.
35. On the task and position of these 300, see Harrison (1959, 30 n1).
36. As Harrison (1959, 30) points out: “The considerateness [of the
Peloponnesians and the Boeotians] was misguided, as events proved, since progress
round the top of the wall was now possible only by passing through these towers;
and the capture of two adjacent towers by a small party would mean that the wall
was effectively breached.”
37. Harrison (1959, 33) comments on the “smoothness and precision which
characterizes the whole enterprise, making it seem almost too good to be true.”
38. Lateiner (1977, 100) notices that “only here in Thucydides a herald discovers
that there are no dead. The fruitless mission underlines dramatically, as does the con-
cluding formulaic sentence, the fortunate peripety for part of the Plataean garrison.”
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39. See Gomme HCT, II: 280–281 on their measuring for the length of the
ladders: “exactness was necessary: the ladders must be short of the top of the wall,
or the defenders will be able to push them over, but only just short, or it will be
difficult to get from the top rung onto the wall; and they must be put against it at
an angle not so steep that it may fall backward, or, with a very slight effort, be
pushed over, and not so steep that, with many men mounting at a time, it may
break.”
40. Gomme HCT, II: 286 comments: “the success of their flight was due pri-
marily to this same storm.” The leaders of the escape are named at 3.20.1: one is a
general, the other, Theainetes, is a seer; Ammeas is the first one up the ladder
(3.22.3).
41. The Spartan archon at 3.52.2 is unnamed; the Plataeans, however, are
personalized: Astymachus and Lacon (3.52.5). This contrasts with those who
negotiated earlier with Archidamus (2.71–74) and those who escaped.
42. Cartwright (1997, 154) remarks that in contrast to Mytilene, there is no
dramatic reversal; what appears to be an advantage to Plataea (the right to speak
on its own behalf—again contrasting with the Mytilenians) proves fruitless.
43. The Plataeans say that if they thought they were being given over to the
Thebans, they would have chosen starvation (3.59.3).
44. Yet the original question posed by the Spartan suggests that past actions
are not pertinent; see Hornblower (1991–96, I: 463).
45. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 465). Note the remark at 3.57.4 that no ally has
come to help.
46. Cf. Gomme’s remark at HCT, II: 212 on how “Thucydides deserts his nor-
mally strict chronological order . . . in order to finish with Plataea for this year.”
Alternatively, Hornblower (1991–96, I: 466) explains the omission of the subse-
quent status (as Athenian citizens) of the Plataeans who did escape, for
Thucydides did not wish “to take away from the emotional power of his ending by
recounting the hospitality and improved status accorded to the Plataians at
Athens after 427.”
47. Cf. 5.17.2, where the Thebans resist handing over Plataea. Connor (1984,
93) comments that “the reader, of course, already knows that the Plataeans’ appeal
will be unsuccessful, for every Greek was aware of the fate of Plataea . . . there is
no suspense in the Plataean debate, for the outcome is well-known.” This of course
represents the perspective of the retrospective reader. Contrast the comment by
Macleod (1983, 227) on uncertainty: “the speakers cannot even say they know for
sure how badly off they are”—this coincides with how the engaged reader may
experience this situation.
48. The Plataeans’ speech makes explicit mention of knowledge and igno-
rance: if the Plataeans and Spartan judges were “not familiar” with each other
(a)gnw~tej me\n ga_r o1ntej a)llh/lwn–3.53.4), the Plataeans could bring in new
evidence (martu/ria w{n a!peiroi h]te–3.53.4). As it is, they speak to those who
know (pro\j ei0do/taj–3.53.4).
49. Arnold (1996, 108) remarks that the Thebans were ignorant about “the
degree to which the fate of the Plataeans has already been decided.”
50. Note that surrender in both cases results from lack of food (sitos–3.20.1,
3.26.4) and lack of hope (elpis–3.20.1, 3.32.3). See the discussion of parallels in
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Macleod (1983, 118–22) and Connor (1984, 91–93). The rationale of Diodotus’
argument (expediency “trumps” justice in foreign policy–3.44) apparently endors-
es the Spartans’ decision concerning the Plataeans (3.68.4).
51. At one level, the Plataean debate may be thought of as a set of nested
speeches, which becomes a component in the larger pattern of interwoven
episodes; see Rood (1998a, 120–21) and Morrison (2006). Another example of
interwoven episodes can be found in books 6 and 7 where several strands—
Athenian, Syracusan, and Spartan—are introduced in turn. On the weaving
metaphor for historical narrative, see Polybius 1.4 and 3.32.2, discussed in
Walbank (1975). de Jong (2001, 589–90) describes the technique of interweaving
episodes in Homeric epic as an “interlacing technique.” 
52. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 445) remarks that the “theme [of the Persian
war] is developed in much more ‘traditional’ ways than is usual in a Thucydidean
speech . . . it is safe to say that the elaborate appeals to tombs and ancestors are
done in a style which Thucydidean speakers often reject with impatience.”
53. Cf. the Thebans’ words at 3.63.3–4.
54. This is contrary to the Plataean claims regarding the actions of the
Spartan ancestors (3.58.4, 3.58.5). At 3.58 in particular, they invoke the philia of
Pausanias (3.58.5); the Plataeans are not hostile, but well-disposed (not echthrous,
but eunous—3.58.2). Macleod (1983, 110) cynically but realistically comments:
“the past, and the values a living memory guarantees, mean nothing in war.” See
Cogan (1981, 15) on the hope for “Spartan willingness to consider Medism or
fidelity to the Hellenic side [as] the primary distinction to be made in determining
the moral character of nations.” In Plato Republic book 1 (332d–336a) helping
friends and hurting enemies is proposed as one definition of justice, though this is
rejected: cf. Iliad 9.613–14, Thucydides 2.40.4, and discussion in Creed (1973),
Missiou (1998), Pearson (1957), Seaford (1994), and Whitlock Blundell (1989).
55. The Plataeans reveal their expectation that they did not anticipate such a
brief interrogation, but something more customary (ou0 toia&nde di/khn oi0o/menoi
u9fe/cein, nomimwte/ran de/ tina e1sesqai—3.53.1). It is “just” (dikaion), they
believe, that if the Plataeans do not persuade the Spartans, they should put the
Plataeans back in the same situation as before they surrendered the city (3.59.3).
56. Nor have the Plataeans themselves acted unjustly in refusing to desert the
Athenian alliance (ou0k h0dikou=men—3.55.3), because the Athenians helped the
Plataeans in the past—again, an appeal to conventional morality: they were
helped by Athens, so the Plataeans should be loyal to them.
57. Later the Plataeans insist that it is not the followers, but the leaders who
are responsible (aitioi–3.55.4).
58. Macleod (1983, 108) remarks that this law is “scarcely more than a law of
nature . . . The very word no/moj is revealed as ambiguous.” Note the Plataeans’
appeal to Spartan reputation and the common laws of the Greeks: e0j ta_ koina_
tw~n  9Ellh/nwn no/mima (3.59.1); cf. Gomme HCT, II: 341 (s.v. 3.56.2): the exe-
cution of the Theban prisoners is “a matter over which the Plataean speakers
hurry, the Thebans dwell.” 
59. Macleod (1983, 109) comments: “The Plataeans invoke the ‘law’ that
those who surrender in battle should be spared. But the Thebans can justly retort
that the Plataeans themselves flouted it (66.2–3, 67.6). This reveals the shakiness
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of such a ‘law.’” On suppliants (hiketai) invoking the Spartans’ fathers’ graves and
“we are suppliants of your good faith” (th=j u9mete/raj pi/stewj i9ke/tai o1ntej), see
3.59.2, 3.59.4. 
60. Gomme HCT, II: 345 translates: “gods worshipped by us and you and all
of Greece”; cf. 3.58.1, 3.58.5. 
61. Cogan (1981, 12) remarks that even if Diodotus is not offering an inno-
vation in Athenian policy, “we would still have to conclude that it is presented to
us as one by Thucydides.”
62. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 445) sees the Plataean speech as “exceptional in
Thucydides for the detailed way it dwells on the past.” The reader is made aware
of several of these past actions presented earlier in the History.
63. Also the Plataeans remind the Spartans of the unpredictability of the
future: w(j a)sta&qmhton to\ th=j cumfora~j(3.59.1; cf. the Corinthians at 1.42.2).
Macleod (1983, 111) remarks: “Not only are we reminded how useless appeals to
the past are; we also see that appeals to the future, i.e., to loss of reputation (cf.
59.4 fin.) are equally so.”
64. See also th\n du/skleian (3.58.2) and Spartan doxa (3.59.1; cf. 3.57.1); cf.
the use of paradeigma elsewhere (cf. 2.42.3, 2.63.2, 3.40.7, 3.40.4) and the
Thebans’ response at 3.64.4, 3.67.6.
65. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 446) says that both speeches show a “freedom
with tenses and moods,” desiring “to roll together past, present, and future on the
one hand, and hypothetical and actuality on the other.” Rather than seeing all time
collapsed, I would argue that the Plataeans are desperately trying to show that the
past and future are relevant to the impending decision of the Spartans.
66. Macleod (1983, 111) comments: “The richest resources of Thucydides’
style are employed as the Plataeans try in vain to make a bridge between the past
and the present.”
67. Gomme HCT, II: 342 calls this “a somewhat specious argument.” 
68. See Debnar (1996, 97) on the Thebans’ reputation “for being incompetent
speakers.” Hornblower (1991–96, I: 454) notes that the “first three words” recall
Sthenelaidas’ remark at 1.86.1. 
69. In book 2, there was no indication to what extent the Plataeans debated
the fate of the Theban prisoners.
70. Macleod (1983, 119) asserts that, “The result is that self-interest dominates
again, but it is not enlightened, so far as that is possible, by open and rational dis-
cussion, and it limits its view to the ‘present war’ (52.4, 56.3, 68.4).” 
71. Debnar (1996, 99) thinks the “overall impression of the opening of the
exordium is that the Thebans object more strenuously to the Plataeans’ speaking
than to their having done anything wrong or even to their having failed to do any-
thing good.”
72. The Plataeans’ role as benefactors during the helot revolt is passed over.
73. Cf. the Athenian claim to have fought alone at Marathon (1.73.4; cf. the
Thespians at Hdt. 9.27.2, 5).
74. Debnar (1996, 100–101) is quite explicit on the connotation: “for all the
scorn they intend to convey with the word ‘atticize,’ the force of this taunt depends
on an implicit condemnation of its model ‘medize.’”
75. On consistency in action, see also Pericles and Cleon’s echo (2.61.2,
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3.37). Hornblower (1991–96, I: 455 [s.v. 3.62.3]) notes that the Thebans empha-
size that the circumstances are different (e0n oi3w| ei1dei). 
76. For such reverberations, see Hornblower (1991–96, I: 461).
77. Macleod (1983, 114) comments: “What is implied here is that political
rights—above all the right to vote on questions of national policy—were denied
to citizens at large.”
78. In fact, the Athenians also offered to help Sparta (1.101–2). Does this
reinforce the Theban charge that Plataea only followed Athens?
79. Macleod (1983, 120) says: “Past deeds count for nothing because they
serve only to frame moral arguments, which both tend to entangle themselves and
can easily be reversed.”
80. Macleod (1983, 120) argues: “If moral credit and blame are to be assigned,
there must be free will. But the speeches concerning both Mytilene and Plataea
show how difficult it is to establish free will in political action, just as in broader
terms they show the futility of moral conventions in war.”
81. The Plataeans fear the Spartans will betray them in spite of their past ser-
vice (prodou=nai tou\j eu0ergh/taj–3.57.1). The Thebans have no answer to this.
Debnar (1996, 99) comments: “because the Thebans refer to their own kaki/a and
the Plataeans’ do/ca before they appeal to the truth, however, the immediate
impression is that they acknowledge the validity of both reputations”; and later
says: “Clearly the Thebans view themselves as one of the liberators . . . [yet] the
Thebans make strange spokesmen indeed for a group from which they were exclud-
ed because of their collaboration. By referring to the oaths the Thebans once again
draw attention to their ignominious role in the Persian wars” (103). 
82. See Cogan (1981, 15–17).
83. Macleod (1983, 115) argues: “This contradiction is the mirror-image of the
Plataeans”: they wanted what they did in the Persian Wars to be reckoned to their
credit but what they did as Athens’ allies to be excused as involuntary (55.4). The
Thebans in 65.2, when discussing their entry into Plataea, then turn the argument and
wording of 55.4 against their adversaries; and this connects for the reader the ques-
tions concerning a city’s free will when there is faction within it and those when there
is pressure from outside; elsewhere he maintains that Thucydides “see[s] the historical
meaning of the rhetorical contradictions. External necessity or internal strife not only
remove moral scruples (cf. 3.82.2); they also remove the conditions for actions to be
judged morally. But that does not stop men using such judgments for their own pur-
poses (cf. 3.82.2), as constantly happens in Thucydides’ speeches” (240). This is the
first time the term attikismon is found extant in Greek literature. See Cogan (1981,
16) on this “neologism”: “Thucydides seems to imply that this debate was either the
occasion of its invention [the slogan of Plataea as ‘atticizing’] or the first instance of
its use to determine policy.” Cf. Macleod (1983, 116). 
84. Debnar (1996, 105) remarks: “Once again their response does not ade-
quately address the Plataeans’ charge, since it makes no reference at all to the
peace or the festival. By mentioning these details the Thebans appear to concede
their opponents’ point and may, in fact, admit their own impiety.” Cf. Hornblower
(1991–96, I: 459).
85. Debnar (1996, 107) finds this inconsistent: “The Thebans cannot disguise
the illogic of first contending that the Plataeans’ treatment of Theban prisoners
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transgressed Greek law (3.66.2) and then asking the Spartans to preserve this same
law by transgressing it in return (3.67.6).”
86. Such an argument has persuaded the Spartans in the past (see
Sthenelaidas’ claim at 1.86.1).
87. Cf. Cleon’s argument against emotion (3.40) and Diodotus’ analysis
(3.45). Cogan (1981, 15) comments on the Plataeans’ direct appeal for mercy; cf.
Gomme HCT, II: 343 and Hogan (1972, 247).
88. See another echo at 3.57.1.
89. Macleod (1983, 118) comments that “the Thebans’ cocksure anticipation
of the future is in striking contrast to the Plataeans’ hopeless attempt to revive the
past in chs. 58–59.”
90. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 446). 
91. Macleod (1983, 113; cf. 117). Cogan (1981, 20) argues that the true sig-
nificance of debate is not the result but speeches “as political events in their own
right.”
92. Macleod (1983, 110) makes the following distinction: “in rhetorical
terms, this is a forensic speech to a body of deliberators” (who are concerned with
expediency).
93. See Gomme HCT, II: 343.
94. As Macleod (1983, 104) notes: “we have already seen them [the Spartans]
hear and reject such a speech in 2.71–72.” Cf. also the Plataeans’ hope in 429 that
Athens would come to their aid and the realization in book 3 that such help was
not forthcoming (3.57.4). Connor (1984, 92 n30) says this “calls attention to the
Athenians’ ineffectiveness in aiding Plataea or even to their unwillingness at one
point (3.36.1) to explore a possible way of saving Plataea.” Kagan (1969, 174) says
“the fall of Plataea and its abandonment by the Athenians were inevitable,” in part
because it was “strategically untenable,” yet notes that in 429 they “could have
yielded on reasonable terms had not Athens held her to the alliance and promised
help.”
95. Connor (1984, 91) finds the following parallels: both cities are under siege
(2.78.1, 3.18); one great power is in control while the other great power is
unable—or unwilling—to render significant aid; supplies run out (3.20.1, 3.27.1);
capitulation follows; then an antilogy in direct discourse; decisions are made in the
immediate interests of the major power (based on advantage, not right); casualties
are listed; the disposition of land is announced (and put under foreign control); a
dedication (3.50.2, 3.68.3); and finally, a “rounding off” sentence (3.50.3, 3.68.4).
Gomme HCT, II: 337 believes, “the sentence, tou/j te a)di/kouj kola&zein, para_
di/khn de\ ou0de/na, reminds one of the Athenians’ meta&noia, 36.4, of Kleon, 40.7,
and of Diodotos, 48.1.” See also de Romilly (1988, 146–49) and Hornblower
(1991–96, I: 462). In addition to the intertwined narratives, note the reminder
before the Mytilenian debate that Plataea is still under siege (3.36.1); also the goal
of survival (soteria—3.20.1, 3.24.3), lack of readiness on the part of the
Mytilenians (3.4; cf. the surprise attack on Plataea at 2.2), the refuge to altars—
and divine protection—by both sides (3.28.2; cf. 3.59.2), and the role of chance
(kata_ tu/xhn—3.49.4; cf. 3.45.6). See Connor (1984, 92 n31) on the themes of
supplication, benefaction, and betrayal.
96. Spartan judges (dicastai) are so named at 3.52.2, 3.52.3; other legalistic
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language includes kategoria (3.53.4) and the appeal to the impartiality of judges (mh\
ou0 koinoi\ a)pobh=te—3.53.2; cf. 3.44.4, 3.46.4).
97. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 457) believes this boils the issue down to “free
will versus force majeure.”
98. Connor (1984, 93–94).
99. Macleod (1983, 105).
100. Connor (1984, 94) remarks that this calls to mind the Corcyrean alliance:
the basis for that decision proved useful to the addressees of the speeches (compare
the codas—1.44, 3.68—and see also 3.61.2 on the founding of the city). On neu-
trality as an option for Corcyra or Plataea, see discussion in chapter 5. 
101. In episodes 2 and 3 no individual Plataean is mentioned; much of the
activity in episode 1 is attributed to “the Plataeans.” See also Hunter (1986, 1988).
It should be noted that focalization occurs not only for the individuals involved,
but also for various factions and cities as we saw in chapter 3.
102. Stahl (2003, 114) comments on the reminder at 3.36.1 and then compares
the promise of help from the Spartan Salaithus to Mytilene and that of Athens to
Plataea (2.71–78), noting that we look back to the opening of the tragic drama and
the death of the Theban prisoners when the Plataeans are put to death.
103. Debnar (1996, 109) argues that the Plataean debate shows “the irrele-
vance of the past to Spartan policy,” while “in book 5 the Athenians will exclude
from their debate with the Melians all arguments concerning the future (5.87).”
See Parry (1981), 190 on how the Plataean debate anticipates the Melian
Dialogue.
104. For recurring phenomena in different guises, note Thucydides’ remarks on the
subject of civil war: such phenomena will continue to happen but “they are more or
less severe and differ in form with every new combination of circumstances” (toi=j
ei1desi dihllagme/na, w(j a@n e3kastai ai9 metabolai\ tw~n cuntuxiw~n e0f*
istw~ntai–3.82.2; English translation from Hornblower [1991–96], I: 481).
Chapter Five
1. Another unusual feature is that we encounter a rhetorical dispute in
which the goal of each side is to convince not a third party, but the other speak-
ers: in the first set of speeches, the Corinthians and Corcyreans attempt to persuade
the Athenians; later the Thebans and Plataeans argue before the Spartans; indi-
viduals, such as Cleon and Diodotus, work to persuade the Athenian assembly.
2. As Meiggs (1972, 345) remarks: “Thucydides’ treatment of the Melian
episode cannot be satisfactorily judged in isolation.”
3. De Romilly (1988, 290). Andrewes HCT, IV: 168 states: “Thucydides’ pre-
sentation has the effect of weighting the sympathies of most readers in favour of
Melos.”
4. Bosworth (1993, 33). Andrewes HCT, IV: 185 remarks that in contrast
with other massacres (Torone 5.3, Scione 5.32), here the Athenians are giving the
Melians a choice of “peaceful surrender instead of useless resistance.” The
Athenians’ decision to talk things over first with the Melians rather than simply
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attack must be seen as humanitarian in a qualified sense, as Bosworth (1993, 43)
acknowledges: “Humanitarian it certainly is in the limited sense that it is designed
to force the Melians to accept the most advantageous terms from Athens and
avoid bloodshed.” Bruell (1974, 16) believes that the policy of Athens “is indeed
compatible with, and to some extent conducive to, a remarkable gentleness.” De
Ste. Croix (1972, 14) argues: “the whole purpose of the Athenians is to persuade
the Melians that they would be well advised to surrender, because resistance would
be futile. It would be a bad mistake to say that Thucydides is “on the side of the
Melians in any sense. The fact that they are being foolishly over-optimistic is made
very clear by the Athenians.” Connor (1984, 151) comments: “there is virtually
no overt sympathy for the Melians.” Cartwright (1997, 221) says that “the victims
. . . were given the opportunity to save themselves from destruction. They reject-
ed it, and the significance of this episode for Thucydides lies in part in the think-
ing behind this decision.” Here Athenian action and rhetoric are consistent, as
noted by Andrewes HCT, IV: 179–80: “There is almost a sincerity in this appeal
to the Melians to ‘behave sensibly,’ to give up an opposition which can do them
no good, and surrender.” Stahl (2003, 165) describes the Athenians as “almost
imploring” the Melians. For examples of miscalculating the likelihood of surrender
in the twentieth century, see Chuter (1997). Even de Romilly (1988, 291)
acknowledges that “from a rational and political point of view, one fact stands out
immediately: the Melians were wrong to resist.”
5. See Stahl (2003, 169–70). Thucydides refuses to tell the reader why
Athens attacks Melos at this particular time or whether the Melians have done
anything to provoke it. Amit (1968, 217) points out that Thucydides omits the
“entirely Athenian debate in the Assembly” to determine the manner of punish-
ment after the city is taken; we could add he also omits the debate in the assem-
bly which originally sent the expedition. On Thucydides’ omissions, see Herter
(1954, 316–19); Andrewes (1960, 2); and nn44, 70, and 71 below.
6. Westlake (1968, 5).
7. Wasserman (1947, 27).
8. I find myself very much in agreement with Wasserman regarding
Thucydides’ balanced presentation, basing this interpretation partly on
Thucydides’ own remarks where he says that his work will lack “patriotic bias” (to\
muqw~dej–1.22.4)—this is discussed in chapter 2. Thucydides is claiming that he
will avoid chauvinism; he will offer no biased or exaggerated stories of patrio-
tism—Athenian or otherwise. In the case of Melos, Thucydides does not neces-
sarily endorse the arguments of either side. I conclude that the reader is
encouraged to look without prejudice at the dialogue from both the Athenian and
Melian points of view. For the difficulty of deriving Thucydides’ own opinions
from speeches, see Hornblower (1987, 155–90) and his conclusion (185): “noth-
ing can be straightforwardly extracted from the Melian Dialogue . . . about
Thucydides’s own position.”
9. Another possibility other than Athenian success or defeat is simply giving
up (cf. 3.91); see n67 below. Liebeschuetz (1968, 73) sees the outcome as inevitable:
“In the first half of the dialogue the speakers discuss the expediency of forcing Melos
into the Athenian Empire, in the second they discuss the likelihood of the Melians
resisting successfully. But since the Melians are offered no alternative to becoming
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subjects except complete destruction, and since they are clearly not ready to choose
the safe but dishonoring alternative, even though they have no chance of defend-
ing their city successfully, the inevitable destruction of Melos casts its shadow over
the whole of the negotiations.” Macleod (1983, 57) remarks that “this cannot mask
that what is possible for Athens is conquest whereas what is possible for Melos is
surrender and that the Athenians are the real agents whereas the Melian must sim-
ply endure.”
10. Cleon and Diodotus have previously pointed out the value of intact cities
at 3.39.8, 3.46.3; cf. Sparta’s motivations at 2.77.2 (discussed in chapter 4) and
Stahl (2003, 162). Amit (1968, 224) asserts that the business of the Athenian
troops “was to implement the decisions already taken by the Assembly, with the
minimum of casualties, expenses, and harm to Athens.” On the Athenians’ will-
ingness to negotiate, cf. 3.3–5.
11 Cartwright (1997, 220) remarks: “The two sides are as far apart at the end
of the debate as they were at the beginning” (see 5.112.2). We may compare the
Plataean debate and how the Spartans ask the same question before and after the
Plataean and Theban speeches (3.68.1). See also Wasserman (1947, 22–24).
12. “The Melians did not bring them before the common people but told
them to speak to the officials and a small group” (oi9 Mh/lioi pro\j me\n to\ plh=qoj
ou0k h1gagon, e0n de\ tai=j a)rxai=j kai\ toi=j o0li/goij le/gein–5.84.3). Andrewes
HCT, IV: 159 comments that “a)rxai/ in Greek would include the council, often
the most powerful organ in an oligarchy, as well as magistrates in the more famil-
iar sense; and o0li/goi will be the privileged voters.”
13. Cartwright (1997, 222) points out that those in power fear that the
Melian people may support Athens: see 5.84, 5.116.
14. Yet see the brief exchanges at 1.53, 3.113, 4.97–99.
15. This distinction between dialogue and set speech would have been famil-
iar to Thucydides’ fifth-century audience. While there were long speeches in the
law courts, assembly, and dramatic productions, dialogue (or brachyologia) occurred
in sophistic displays (prominently recreated in Plato’s Protagoras) and the sti-
chomythia of tragedy. Cartwright (1997), 220 remarks upon Thucydides’ experi-
mentation in featuring dialogue as part of the History. On the dialogue form, see
Hudson-Williams (1948). Macleod (1983, 67) notes that one of the reasons for the
dialogue is that it allows for “the peculiar privacy of the negotiations . . . [which]
gave the opportunity for a dialectical treatment of some major historical themes.”
16. In particular, the reader may be led back to the Mytilenian debate where
the value of debate is questioned by Cleon (3.37–38).
17. Cf. 5.89 on the untrustworthiness of long speeches (lo/gwn mh=koj a!pis*
ton) and Andrewes’ comment (HCT, IV: 162): “the combination seems to imply
that a very long speech is, as such, less credible or persuasive than a short one.”
Macleod (1983, 54) (with references) remarks on the “deceptiveness of the unin-
terrupted speech and the superior precision of dialogue.” Beyond this, there is a
challenge to Athenian institutions as well. The basis of decision-making within the
assembly (and in the law courts) is voting based on speeches: this feature of
Athenian democracy is itself under attack. On Thucydides’ criticism of Athenian
democracy, see Ober (1998, 78) where he concludes (for the Corinthian-
Corcyrean debate): “Thucydides’ implicit lesson is that democratic knowledge
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does not provide an adequate grounding for assessing the truth value of rhetorical
discourse. And thus, badly—or at best indifferently—instructed by speech, the
Athenian Assembly was likely eventually to fall into error and, as a result, to make
bad policy.”
18. Macleod (1983, 56–57) argues that “while the Athenians are claiming to
give the Melians the chance of a free, rational and practical decision . . . the
Melians know what is in store for them.” Monoson and Loriaux (1998, 292) find
that “language is not used for purposes of deliberation but as an instrument of
siege.” Regarding the Athenian restrictions on discourse, see Gomez-Lobo (1989,
12–23).
19. Wasserman (1947, 21) comments: “If Thucydides had had his Athenians
refute their opponents by a speech in his usual way, we would not have had the
dramatic intensity of a prizefight in which the Melians, though outmatched on the
battle ground of expediency, rise again and again with new objections against the
striking force of the apparently irrefutable Athenian arguments.” Orwin (1994, 98)
sees “in their choice of format the [Athenian] envoys reveal sovereign confidence
in the power of their arguments.” For an analysis of the Dialogue as exemplifying
a “formal disputation” consisting of “move and countermove possibilities,” see
Alker (1988).
20. Macleod (1983, 54) asserts that the “stipulations” that there be no suppo-
sitions about the future and that the subject for discussion must be established are
required by the methodology of practical deliberation and the principles of
rhetoric.
21. swthri/a: 5.87, 5.88, 5.91.2, 5.101, 5.105.4, 5.110, 5.111.2; cf. “not to be
destroyed” (mh\ diafqei/rantej–5.93), and the idea of avoiding danger at 5.99.
22. a)sfalei/a: 5.97, 5.98, 5.107, 5.111.4. By ruling more, the Athenians will
be “safer” (5.97).
23. ai9 fanerai\ e0lpi/dej, literally, “visible expectations,” by which the
Athenians evidently mean reasonable—or likely—expectations of the future, as
opposed to “invisible hopes” (e0pi\ ta_j a)fanei=j–5.103.2; cf. 5.102, 5.111.2,
5.113).
24. 5.89, 5.101, 5.111.4.
25. Allison (1997, 55) notes that “soteria has little to do with Athenians and
Athens for the first half of the war even as a consideration of policy”; of the 37 uses
of soteria, seven appear in the Melian Dialogue, yet here “soteria will only apply to
Melos” (57); “as Book 6 gives way to Book 7 and the disaster in Sicily become pal-
pable, soteria figures prominently in Athenian thought” (56).
26. 1.73–77, 2.62–64, 3.44–47. In building on what was implied at 1.73–77,
Diodotus states quite bluntly that, when it comes to international issues, Athens
is simply not interested in hearing about justice (3.44, 3.46.4, 3.47.4–5).
Liebeschuetz (1968, 74) remarks that “the argument of Diodotus applied to the
Athenian case at Melos suggests that the Athenian determination to press home
their attack on the independence of Melos to the point of destroying that city
completely is based on a misguided view of Athenian interest.” The reason given
for the rejection of justice’s relevance is that Athens and Melos are not equal in
power: “justice (di/kaia) is judged from equal [power of] compulsion (a)po\ th=j
225Notes to Chapter 5
Morrison_Notes_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:46 PM  Page 225
i1shj a)na&gkhj kri/netai) . . . the strong do what they are able, while the weak sub-
mit” (5.89). There may be a qualification on the prohibition against appealing to
justice. The Athenians are not necessarily saying that justice is irrelevant to for-
eign policy or relations between cities (or at least to the discourse between cities);
what they are maintaining is that when one power is much greater than another
(as in this situation), discussion of justice is not applicable (see discussion in chap-
ter 7).
27. This is, the Athenians assert, both a divine and a human law. Regarding
divine aid, the Athenians believe they may count on the gods as much as the
Melians (5.105.1).
28. Note that when the Athenians address the idea of shame (aischune), it
boils down to the Spartans considering “what is pleasurable as fine and what is
advantageous as just” (5.105.4; cf. 5.107), thus imputing moral reductivism to the
Spartans. It is noteworthy that the Melian oligarchs’ appeal to freedom and honor
shows a sensitivity to popular morality and discourse, while the Athenians—a
democracy—dismiss such concepts as mere words. Thucydides has already ana-
lyzed the collapse of such conventions in the plague at Athens and the civil war
in Corcyra (2.52–3, 3.82–4). When Athens instructs the Melians to focus on expe-
diency, they also play the role of a “violent teacher” (bi/aioj dida&skaloj–3.82.2);
on such “schooling” metaphors, see Pouncey (1980, 3).
29. Andrewes HCT, IV: 161 comments: “In the privacy of this conference, the
Athenians give up hollow pretense.” Kagan (1981, 150–51) notes the “blunt” lan-
guage of the Athenians. As Coby (1991, 76) puts it: “The Athenians are honest
even about the deceptiveness of rhetorical speech. . . . The peace that is latent in
the new morality depends on forthright communication between parties, not on
deception of the weak by the strong.” Liebeschuetz (1968, 76) goes so far as to call
it “repulsive” and the Athenians as “bullying and arrogant to the weak, boundlessly
self-confident, lacking humility even towards the gods.” Pouncey (1980, 92) finds
that “the tone of hardness is adopted prospectivally to match the final outcome of
the confrontation;” see also Bruell (1974, 14). Bosworth (1993, 31), however,
believes that if the Melians capitulate, that would be “a decision which minimises
suffering on all sides.”
30. Diodotus’ speech is an exception, but it is part of an internal discussion
among Athenians, not diplomatic discourse between cities.
31. I reject the idea of de Ste. Croix (1972, 19) and Bruell (1974, 15) that
appeals to justice always come from the losing side; cf. the Corcyreans at 1.32–36
and the Thebans at 3.61–67.
32. Andrewes (1960, 9).
33. Bosworth (1993, 37) believes that “by the time of the Melian dialogue
Thucydides has given us a surfeit of propaganda. Now it is time for realities.” Coby
(1991, 73) argues that “relative and temporary peace is the promise of the new
morality, which is judged to be more realistic than exhortations to virtue.” As
Forde (1992, 378) says, “The Athenians may wish to make the Melians better real-
ists.” 
34. Williams (1998, 198) states that the Melians are “quite lacking in pru-
dence, moderation, foresight, a willingness to negotiate or even to bend at all,
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good planning, and the ability to consider reasonably both sides of an issue . . . in
the unjust world of the fifth-century Greeks, the non-rational and unyielding pos-
ture of the Melians helped ensure their own destruction.” For Realism in
Thucydides, see Doyle (1991), which distinguishes between three types of Realism
(minimalism, fundamentalism, and structuralism) and argues that Thucydides’
own methods and lessons follow only the minimalist form of Realism, in which
choices “depend upon a prior consideration of strategic security” (170). This the
Melians fail to do. Forde (1992, 373) argues that while Thucydides is a Realist in
international affairs, he “tried to defend the theoretically more difficult position
that international realism need not entail universal moral skepticism.” Garst
(1989, 21–22) also finds that “Thucydides’ history directs attention to the confu-
sion underlying neorealist debates over power in international politics,” for “in
neorealism, this leadership [of hegemonic powers] lacks the moral dimension so
heavily emphasized by Thucydides”; cf. Alker (1988).
35. At the very least, the Melians feel it is reasonable and understandable that
they should have recourse to all kinds of arguments and points of view (ei0ko\j me\n
kai\ cuggnw&mh e0n tw~| toiw~|de kaqestw~taj e0pi\ polla_ kai\ le/gontaj kai\
dokou=ntaj tre/pesqai–5.88).
36. Pericles earlier argued against the “calculation of advantage” (ou0 tou=
cumfe/rontoj . . . logi/smw|–2.40.5).
37. See Radt (1976, 35) on the reading ta_ ei0ko/ta kai\ di/kaia, although I do
not agree with his conclusions.
38. Andrewes HCT, IV: 165 remarks: “the Melians seek to turn the Athenian
position by claiming that the observance of conventional justice is in fact a gen-
eral advantage, cumfe/ron.” Amit (1968, 230) feels that “the problem is to find
what is xrh/simon to both sides . . . it is the Melians who conduct the debate.”
Crane (1998, 239) observes that “the Melians . . . argue that justice, fairness, and
interest are all interlinked.” Coby (1991, 77) believes that “the Melians are
attempting to make common cause with the Athenians, to connect their interest
as a weaker state today with Athens’ interest as a weaker state tomorrow”; cf. Alker
(1988, 812).
39. In war, the situation and attitudes of people change, which leads to a new
application of words (dikaiosis): see esp. 3.82.4–8.
40. Macleod (1983, 61) notes “a still more striking departure from the ‘rules’
. . . in chs. 100–11; for here the Melians are constantly appealing to those moral
sanctions and those speculations about the future which the Athenians had ruled
out.” See also Andrewes (1960, 1) and Orwin (1994, 103).
41. Amit (1968, 234) argues that in the rhetorical contest, the Melians have
“the upper hand.” Crane (1998, 293) observes that by their actions the Melians
prove that the Athenians are wrong in their contention that the weak always yield
to the strong (5.89, 5.111.4).
42. Connor (1984, 153) points to the Melians’ thesis that “restraint could be
in the long term interest of the more powerful”; see also Crane (1998, 240).
Liebeschuetz (1968, 75) comments: “The Athenians were also perfectly right that
the Melians’ own interest required that they should yield to the Athenians since
they had not the strength to resist successfully. But ironically, as far as their own
interest was concerned, the Athenians were wrong and deluded.” Macleod (1983)
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captures the conflicted essence of Athens with their “characteristic combination
of forethought and folly” (65), concluding that “in attacking their puny neigh-
bours, the Athenians are ruthless, realistic and yet also paradoxically blind” (67);
cf. Forde (1992, 384). Pouncey (1980, xiii) sees Athenian action as proof of
“Thucydides’ essential pessimism,” which he defines: “The conviction that human
nature carries within itself drives that are destructive of its own achievements, that
they are in fact the same drives as those that build historical achievements in the
first place.”
43. Debnar (1996, 109).
44. Andrewes HCT, IV: 168 speculates that past actions of Melos may have
included making contributions to Alcidas in 427, resisting Nicias in 426, ignoring
the assessment of 425, and perhaps some provocative action immediately before
416, but again Thucydides has told us nothing beyond the resistance in 426 (3.91).
On possible contributions to the Spartan war fund, Loomis (1992, esp. 65–66,
74–75), argues that the Melians must have made a contribution in 427 (IG V 1.1);
Seaman (1997, 401) argues that the contribution came from those who survived
the Athenian expedition in 416; cf. Meiggs (1972, 314).
45. See de Ste. Croix (1972, 14) on the likelihood of divine aid or Spartan
help. 
46. The Melians at 5.102 state: 0All ) e0pista&meqa ta_ tw~n pole/mwn e1stin
o3te koinote/raj ta_j tu/xaj lamba&nonta h2 kata_ to\ diafe/ron e9kate/rwn
plh=qoj. Andrewes translates (HCT, IV: 170) koinote/raj as “more impartial.”
Amit (1968, 231) translates more fully: “it happens that the odds are more even
than could be expected from the difference in numbers.” Reasons given for favor-
ing the likelihood of Spartan aid include the proximity of Melos and Sparta’s kin-
ship ties with Melos (5.104, 106, 108).
47. Cf. Diodotus’ words on the deceptive but irresistible power of hope (3.45).
48. Wasserman (1947, 29) remarks: “it is tu/xh e0k tou= qei/ou, a sign of divine
grace and justice, of help and protection beyond human planning and expectation.
The sceptical and disillusioned mind of the Athenians sees only the blindness of
chance.” De Romilly (1988, 294) articulates a broader sequence: “On each occa-
sion the Athenians admit that this danger [the fall of the empire] exists but are
quite willing to accept it. On the first occasion, they only discuss how serious such
a defeat might be; on the second, they mention only the people of whom they
would be most afraid; and on the third and last occasion they simply reply by a
threat.”
49. Williams (1998, 199) criticizes Athenian efforts in subjugating the small
island of Melos as “an action which suggests not only a fondness for brutality, but
also a lack of moderation, self-control, and even of the foresight to consider the
adverse impression such an action would cause.”
50. Amit (1968, 229) observes that the Athenians “now indulge in fancy
about the future and put instead of war, destruction of the city.” Connor (1984,
150) sees this as prediction: “within the speech itself the outcome is foretold: the
Melians will resist; the Athenians will conquer; the city will be destroyed.”
Lattimore (1998, 295) notes that—in spite of their prohibition at 5.87—“the
entire situation is the result of Athenian ‘suspicions about the future.’”
51. We should note that in the narrative frame—while the siege is still going
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on—Thucydides tells us that the Spartans did not break their treaty with Athens,
even though the Athenians had extensively plundered Spartan territory (5.115.2).
That is, the Athenians’ prediction in the dialogue about Spartan aid to Melos is
correct: the Spartans do nothing, even when provoked by further Athenian aggres-
sion. Again the reader has a superior vantage point than do the Melians. On the
accuracy of Athenian predictions, see Pouncey (1980, 93).
52. Regarding “this sort of misguided hopefulness,” Ober (1998, 105) remarks
that “as Thucydides’ reader soon learns, the Melian oligarchs and the post-
Periclean Athenian demos have much more in common than the Athenian gen-
erals supposed.”
53. See Stahl (2003, 163). Garst (1989, 15) argues that “from beginning to end
it is the Melians who put forward the ideas and proposals while it is the Athenians
who reply. Because they have a response to everything, the Melians are constant-
ly foiled and sent off to find another argument.” Williams (1998, 201) notes that
“The Dialogue stresses the need for compromise but neither side is willing to give
in.”
54. Macleod (1983, 58); he continues: “a concern for the future is also char-
acteristic of statesmanlike forethought (cf. further 1.138.3; 2.65.6), and so to con-
centrate on the present may be simply shortsighted.” See Edmunds (1975a, esp.
7–88).
55. For Themistocles’ abilities, see 1.90–93, 1.136.1, 1.138.1; cf. Pericles
(2.65.5, 2.65.13), and see discussion in de Ste. Croix (1972, 28–33). Monoson and
Loriaux (1998) is more critical of Pericles’ foresightedness.
56. Whether Thucydides considers the History to have a practical purpose is a
vexed issue. De Ste. Croix (1972, 32) comments on the possibility of intelligent
foreknowledge; see also Connor (1985, 11), Stahl (2003, 99), and Rood (2004,
123); cf. the more restrictive views of de Romilly (1956a) and Flory (1990, esp.
206–8). I discuss this further in chapter 10.
57. Bosworth (1993, 43) calls the Melian government “pig-headed” in refus-
ing to acquiesce.
58. Melos advances the idea that Athens may be an example
(paradeigma–5.90) to others in the future: if they abolish any notion of the com-
mon good and their empire falls, they would be left without any recourse. The
Athenians use paradeigma in the present tense: “hatred of power is a clear proof to
the ruled” (to\ mi/soj duna&mewj para&deigma toi=j a)rxome/noij dhlou&*
menon–5.95). Williams (1998, 200–201) comments: “Idealism by itself, without
the addition of foresight, intelligence, planning, and above all power, is incapable
of survival. . . . As the Athenians discover in Sicily, if rational planning, action at
the appropriate time, sufficient resources, unity, and military strength (all of which
together can give confidence) are lacking, then military action based only on hope
and fear is unable to succeed . . . Thucydides could not help but see some of the
flaws in the Melian, as well as the Athenian, position.”
59. Cartwright (1997, 220) comments that like Plataea, Melos was chosen
“not because of its importance to the course of the war but for the issues raised in
the accompanying negotiations.” See Leibeschuetz (1968, 74); on page 74 n12, he
argues that “The Melians are a perfect illustration of Diodotus’ thesis.” Orwin
(1994), 112 believes that “indeed the very arguments of Diodotus would seem to
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point to clemency in this case as well”; see Macleod (1983), 58, Connor (1984)
149–50, and discussion in chapter 7. Connor (1984), 154 argues that “for the read-
er . . . the Melian counterattack . . . changes the perspective from the narrow con-
centration on the events of 416 to the broader development of the war.” This is
the view of Kagan (1981), 149 n47. See Orwin (1994), 107–8 on the explicit men-
tion of Brasidas (5.110), which looks back to book 4.
60. Williams (1998, 199) speculates: “if the Melians had possessed some sort
of military advantage—if for example, the Spartans were already present on the
island in a strong force, or if the Melians had developed a great fleet such as the
Syracusans do later, or if the Melians had some sort of technological advantage that
would give them the edge in warfare, or if they had united with many islanders who
had fleets, unlike Sparta, then the Melians perhaps would have had good grounds
for their confidence in their ability to withstand a siege.”
61. Wasserman (1947, 30) asserts that “The most dynamic and most danger-
ous example of this indulgence in wishful thinking is the Sicilian Expedition with
which the Melian Dialogue is so closely connected that it has to be regarded as its
prelude.” Kagan (1981, 167) believes both the Sicilian and Melian expeditions
resulted from the same motive: to restore the balance of power after the Spartan
victory at Mantinea and regain Athenian prestige; see also Cornford (1907,
182–85); Herter (1954, 330–32); and Amit (1968, 219–23). In linking Sicily with
Melos, Gomme (1967, 187) comments: “The course of events may itself be dra-
matic, and the truthful historian will make this clear.” On the links between Melos
and the circumstances in 404, see de Romilly (1988, 275): “the characters made to
speak by Thucydides show a strange foreknowledge of the events which marked the
end of the war”; cf. Liebeschuetz (1968, 75–76). Connor (1984, 155–57) compares
the Melian episode with the Persian war which forced Athens to become nautical
(1.18.2, 1.93.3): the Athenians “confronted in that struggle precisely the prepon-
derance of power and apparent hopelessness that Melos now faced”; cf. Crane
(1998, 246–54). For the episode as a meditation on the nature of Athenian impe-
rialism, see Andrewes (1960, 3–6) and de Romilly (1988, 274), who comments on
Thucydides’ “desire to give his own treatment of the question of imperialism as a
whole.”
62. Cartwright (1997, 221).
63. Connor (1984, 155). Allison (1997, 59) notes that “In this case greater
force is given to the climax of Book 7 because the reader had not been accustomed
to associating soteria with the Athenians. The absence from the Athenian program
only becomes evident when the term recurs so often in the Melian Dialogue.” 
64. On the importance of eikazein, see chapter 2. Gribble (1998, 45) believes
that “Thucydides imagines them [i.e., his readers] as motivated by the same intel-
lectual and historical goals as the narrator-historian himself (1.22.4), like him pos-
sessed of highly developed intellects and sensibilities.”
65. Garst (1989, 15) thinks that “the debate at Melos is about whether the
Melians can maintain their neutrality. In rejecting the neutral status of Melos, the
Athenians betray a new and urgent anxiety about their control over their allies and
empire.” Regarding evidence from the Athenian Tribute List (IG I3 71) and
whether Melos actually paid tribute, see Treu (1954), answered by Eberhardt
(1959) and Keirdorf (1962). I am in agreement with Amit (1968, 221) regarding
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the “‘minimalist’ view of Eberhardt, i.e., that the inclusion of Melos in the Cleon
assessment of 425 (cf. ATL A9) does not prove that Melos was ever a member of
the Athenian League or paid any tribute.” 
66. For a comparison of these two passages, see discussion in Eberhardt (1959,
303–7) and Keirdorf (1962, 255–56).
67. Williams (1998, 200) remarks that “it is possible that the Athenians’ lack-
luster earlier performance contributed to a Melian confidence that the Athenian
threat was mere empty talk and may have caused them to have greater trust in the
ability of their island’s defenses to deter the Athenians.”
68. They are called “ambassadors” (presbei=j) throughout (5.84.3, 5.85, 5.114.1).
For the status of these envoys, see the brief discussion in Bosworth (1993, 32 n12).
69. This is Andrewes’ conclusion (HCT, IV: 157). Seaman (1997, 388) argues
against this interpretation: “First there is no supporting evidence which suggests
that the Melians ever went to war with the Athenians (not to mention that doing
so would have been quite foolish). Second, if the Melians had decided on war with
the Athenians (and their allies) they would likely have concluded a treaty with the
Spartans, an alliance for which there is again no evidence.” Bauslaugh (1991,
116–17) argues that there was not necessarily any action of Melos which provoked
the attack in 426; rather with Athens’ desperate search for revenue the Melians’
“refusal to contribute to the cost of the war hindered Athenian efforts to procure
revenue from every possible source.”
70. In endeavoring to “discern the reasons why the Athenians found it neces-
sary to suppress the island in 416 B.C.,” Seaman (1997, 386) maintains that “in
spite of a clash of arms in 426, the Melians maintained their neutrality.” For the
Athenians’ motivations, see Andrewes HCT, IV: 156–58 which concludes: “on
balance, however, it seems likely that the attack in 416 was due solely to an
Athenian whim, without any immediate antecedent quarrel . . . [still] if there were
specific grounds for the attack in 416, we cannot now expect to discover what they
were.” Pouncey (1980, 88) comments: “the narrative is deliberately cleared of all
contextual information, any record of grievance or politics attending the event, so
that the Athenian action is made to appear a perfectly gratuitous act of aggression.”
71. As Pouncey (1980, 88) points out, many facts pertinent to this specific sit-
uation are omitted by Thucydides: “we are not told how much tribute Melos would
have to pay, whether they would have to give hostages, or whether an Athenian
garrison would be posted there.”
72. Seaman (1997, 388) concludes that “in fact Melos emerges from the
Melian Dialogue as a neutral state never having injured Athens”; Melos was “in
fact both independent and neutral, just as Thucydides tells us” (409). 
73. Seaman (1997, 390) thinks that “as Thucydides tells the story, Athens is guilty
of unprovoked aggression against a harmless neutral”; “the motive for the expedition was
in all probability Athenian imperialism, plain and simple” (414). Pouncey (1980, 97)
suggests that “the notion that one must constantly expand to maintain national securi-
ty seems patently false, yet Thucydides seems partly inclined to believe it.”
74. In support of neutrality, the Melians assert that they have nothing to do with
the Athenians, being colonists of the Spartans (tou/j te mh\ prosh/kontaj . . .
a!poikoi o1ntej–5.96).
75. Regarding the Athenians’ argument at 5.97, Seaman (1997, 390) believes
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“the clear import is that successful resistance by a weak island would be especially
dangerous.” See Cleon’s view on the hatred and fear of subjects at 3.40 and com-
ments by de Romilly (1988, 287–88) on fear as motivation for the Athenians and
Pouncey (1980, 98–101), who calls fear “the first impulse to imperialism” (99).
76. The prevalence of neutral states is preemptively dismissed by Thucydides,
although see Bauslaugh (1991, 109): “Thucydides’ self-promoting statement that
the entire Greek world was involved in the war, some joining in immediately and
other intending to do so (1.1.1), should not be taken as a pronouncement of defin-
itive fact. The truth is that Thucydides knew full well that the situation was far
more complicated, and he did not hesitate to acknowledge the existence of neu-
trals at the outset of the war.”
77. Bauslaugh (1991, 132) notes that due to their rejection of neutrality, “the
Plataeans gave their enemies a perfect legal pretext for annihilating them.”
78. The islander status of Melos is emphasized at 5.84.2, 5.97, 5.99; cf. 5.109.
79. Bauslaugh (1991, 28) observes: “it seems that Thucydides considered this
anomalous policy [i.e., neutrality] as a double-edged sword, simultaneously dan-
gerous, even potentially fatal, for those who pursued it, and yet also useful, even
necessary, for belligerents, whose interests, indeed whose very victory or defeat,
were served by convincing uncommitted states, whose polarization might prove dis-
astrous, that it would in fact be the best and securest policy (i.e., sophrosyne) to
abstain from the conflict and remain at peace.”
80. See Bauslaugh (1991, esp. 110–24, 146–60, 162–63).
81. See discussion of this passage in Bauslaugh (1991, 71–72).
82. Seaman (1997, 415) observes: “It is indeed ironic to consider that it was
in fact her longstanding neutrality which left Melos as prey for Athens during the
Peace of Nicias.” Williams (1998, 306) finds a broader lesson: “The incident [of
Mycalessus—7.29–30] also indicates that any state which has a powerful ally that
can come to its aid has an important advantage. This is particularly true in the case
of a small city-state that cannot defend itself well. Thucydides illustrates this point
over and over in the History: States which act without allies, such as Plataea,
Mytilene, and Melos frequently come to grief.”
83. Bauslaugh (1991, 146).
84. For example, Thucydides explicitly links the Corcyrean conflict to the
outbreak of the war (1.23.6, 1.55.2; cf. 1.146); this is discussed in chapter 3.
85. Connor (1984, 15–19, 233–40) discusses the development of the reader’s
reaction.
86. Bauslaugh (1991, 117) notes that all the previously neutral states “even-
tually became involved in the war,” which “emphasizes how terribly difficult it was
to remain uncommitted in a time of general conflict between powerful hegemoni-
al alliances. Failure did not mean that no abstention was possible, only that it was
difficult to maintain.” 
Chapter Six
1. Hornblower (1991–96, I) considers this comparison in certain key pas-
sages noted below; in his earlier book (Hornblower 1987, 178), he emphasizes pas-
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sage 3.82.2 because Thucydides introduces the comparison in his own voice (see
discussion below). Farrar (1988, esp. 153–58) is extremely insightful.
2. This translation owes much to Stahl (2003, 54).
3. While more commonly idiotes contrasts with polites (a person in his private
station as opposed to a citizen in his public capacity), here idiotes contrasts with
polis. This is complicated by the immediately following expression e3neka tw~n
i0diw~n which refers to the separate interests of individual states as contrasted with
the common interests of the Peloponnesian League. On the range of meaning for
idiotes, see Gomme HCT, II: 192.
4. 1.122.2–3, 1.124.2–3. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 200–201) remarks that
the term tyrannos is applied to a city, yet “a tyrant is essentially an individual.” The
tyrant-city metaphor is explored in chapter 8.
5. Gomme HCT, I: 417–18 translates with expansion: “if it is true [as of
course it is] that identity of interests is the safest ground for action for states as for
private individuals.” He explores various readings and possible interpretations of
this passage.
6. Hunter (1988, 26) comments: “In Diodotus’ view the city is very like a per-
son, experiencing all the errors and feelings of the individual, including insolence,
pride, hope, and greed.” 
7. This translation is based on Connor (1984, 248–49).
8. This is discussed in Strasburger (1954, 402–3).
9. Cf. also the Corinthians’ contrast between Spartans and Athenians at
1.70–71. While there are prominent individuals in books 1 and 2 (Pericles,
Archidamus, et al.), it may be that too much focus on individual leaders’ person-
alities early on would detract from Thucydides’ establishment of cities as actors.
Westlake (1968, 317–319) notes that the first half of the History focuses on com-
munities—this far I am in agreement. He also argues (15) that Thucydides may
have altered his judgment about historical causation and focused on individuals’
personalities more extensively in the second half, yet here I am not convinced that
introducing an evolution in Thucydides’ ideas (and the whole composition ques-
tion) is needed. It is interesting, though, how Alcibiades describes himself (an
individual) as worthy of rule (6.16.1), possessed of glory (6.16.1), and outstanding
in brilliance (lamprotes–6.16.5), for all these attributes have been assigned to the
city of Athens (cf. 1.76.3, e.g.). 
10. Especially Republic 368–69, 434–35, 544; cf. Aristotle Politics 1253, 1261,
1323–24.
11. See Knox (1964, 66). Both Protagoras and Democritus may have pursued
the city-individual analogy. It is said that the whole of Plato’s Republic was
sketched out in Protagoras’ Antilogikoi (see DK80 B5) though it is impossible to
determine whether Protagoras pursued the analogy with respect to justice.
Democritus was fascinated by the interplay between small and large: regarding
political language and the individual, see DK68 B245, B250, B259.
12. On the recycling of rhetorical topoi, see Hudson-Williams (1948).
Regarding similar modes of expression in Thucydides and Isocrates, he says that
they both “are following a well-established rhetorical tradition of taking old or
conventional dianoiai and expressing them in their own words” (77).
13. The comparison is not limited to democratic Athens: cf. Herodotus 1.5.4 on
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power and influence that changes over time; this may well refer to both individuals
and cities (or empires). It is interesting that Thucydides does not use the term for cit-
izen (polites). While idiotes may connote a looser interaction with other citizens, it is
also possible that Thucydides may be thinking of apolitical or pre-political individ-
uals such as Homeric and tragic heroes and heroines, who seek their own preemi-
nence and autonomy and fail to subject their desires and ambitions to the good of
the community (note especially 1.144.3 on honor). On this reading, cities will pur-
sue communal action only after giving up their heroic pretensions.
14. See discussion in chapter 2. Given the significance of the city-individual
comparison both in Thucydides and Plato’s Republic, we should note the sharp
contrast in the status of “extrapolation and comparison” (eikazein—or at least the
use of this term): in Thucydides this ability is highly honored, while in Plato’s
Divided Line eikasia is found on the lowest part of the divided line, farthest from
apprehension of reality (Rep. 509d–511e). 
15. Farrar (1988, 136) says that the “many echoes and recurrent patterns . . .
[are meant to] . . . challenge him [the reader] to assess the genuine differences and
similarities between two contexts, to think historically.” She describes one of
Protagoras’ goals as “securing the audience’s imaginative participation” (127); this
could apply to Thucydides as well.
16. Farrar (1988, 155–57) says that Thucydides assumes “that the behavior of
the political community is appropriately characterized both as the behavior of per-
sons, of a collectivity, and as the behavior of a unit, an entity.” Loraux (1986a,
270–74) analyzes the shift between depicting the city as a unity and as a plurality
of individuals. While it is valuable to speak of communities as units, the key events
leading up to the war, both at Epidamnus and Plataea, belie the notion of una-
nimity within a polis (see 1.24.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.2; cf. also 1.2.5–6, 1.12.2, 1.18.1,
1.23.2, e.g., and the generation gap at 6.18.6).
17. See esp. 1.70–71, 2.36–46, 6.16–18, 8.96.5. The possibility is also
expressed that certain communities are hostile to one another by nature: see
Hermocrates’ remark that Sicilians are the natural enemies of Athens: to\ fu/sei
pole/mion (4.60.1). For a treatment of such “political” characteristics, see Crane
(1992a).
18. 1.122.3, 1.124.3, 2.63.2, 3.37.2, 6.85.1 (discussed in chapter 8).
19. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 127; cf. 131). White (1984, 64) supports this
notion: “it is apparent that the principal figures in this world are the individual
cities, regarded as units, which can speak to each other through representatives in
certain established places and modes. They are capable of making agreements and
breaking them, hence of moral action.”
20. The issue of cities unequal in power may be illuminated by examining
individuals of unequal status in society, whether the disparity is brought on by slav-
ery or poverty. While a comparable inequality among cities surely exists, see note
32 below.
21. Cf. 1.73–77, 2.62–64, 5.89, 5.107. See the interesting discussion in Heath
(1990). When the Athenians say that the gathering of Peloponnesian allies has no
authority to judge its actions (1.73.1), this raises the question: Does anybody have
the power or legitimate authority to do so? If so, what would such a body be like?
In any case, Diodotus’ argument is not wholly consistent: see chapter 7.
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22. It is also said that Athens is a teacher for the rest of Greece (2.41.2—dis-
cussed in chapter 8). On paradeigmata, see Hunter (1973a, 85–94); later she says:
“For the reader earlier events exist as paradeigmata, model situations, the outcome
and possibilities of which he knows. By bringing this knowledge of the past with
him into the present, he is equipped to compare and judge, even to predict” (180).
Regarding the feasibility of a Panhellenic forum, cf. the fourth century develop-
ment of Panhellenism in Isocrates, for example, as discussed by Jaeger (1945, III:
74–82).
23. Farrar (1988, 145) maintains that while Thucydides shows how things
happened and why, he suggests that it was not inevitable. On the question of con-
tingency, see Flory (1988).
24. Arbitration is referred to a number of times in the History (1.82, 3.53,
3.56, e.g.; cf. the offer made by Sparta at 4.19–20 and the Peace of Nicias itself at
5.14–24). While in retrospect the Spartans rue their refusal of the Athenians’ orig-
inal offer in 432 BCE, they come to view the Athenians’ rejection in 413 BCE as
auspicious (7.18). See the discussion in HCT, IV: 394–95 and de Ste. Croix (1972,
290–92). 
The suggestion has been made that Thucydides lived perhaps a full decade
after the end of the Peloponnesian War; this reinforces the likelihood of his inter-
est in the future of relations between Greeks cities. If Lichas, son of Arcesilas, is
the proxenos of Argos and Thucydides knew of his death (in 397 BCE), then
Thucydides himself of course lived past 397. See Pouilloux and Salviat (1983 and
(1985); for a cautious reading of this evidence, see Cartledge (1984).
25. Jaeger (1945, I: 384) says that for Thucydides, “the central problem is the
nature of the state.” An extremely valuable account of the beginnings of political
analysis is found in Strasburger (1954).
26. Of course, the terms of the comparison may work reciprocally. This is sig-
nificant for the potential application of such models to the resolution of political
conflict, both between citizens within a polis and between city-states. Among oth-
ers, Connor (1991, 53) suggests that “war . . . is an analogue to stasis, the disinte-
gration of community through internal tensions”; see also Price (2001).
27. On the utility of Thucydides’ History, see chapter 5 n56. 
28. White (1984, 63) endorses this idea (citing 1.34.2): the proper occasion
for invoking the practice of arbitration is before resorting to arms. Pearson (1957)
describes the degeneration of moral values as the war proceeds. Connor (1984,
250) says that while the History demonstrates the sufferings of mankind and that
they are rooted in human nature, nevertheless he sees the “simultaneous insistence
that they are mistakes to be avoided.” It is up to later generations to find ways to
avoid such mistakes, because “the work provides no resolution to this tension.”
29. The fit is not always precise, for the differences have to be examined and
reexamined, as Plato admits in his work exploring this same analogy (Republic
434e–435a).
30. The language of the judicial system (dika&sthj, di/kaj dou=nai,
e0gklh/mata, a)pologe/w , etc.) is applied to international conflict and attempted
negotiation throughout the History. See the valuable discussion in Darbo-
Peschanski (1987).
31. Farrar (1988, 161) discusses the importance of the collectivity. By extension,
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we find all Greece suffering during war, when cities insist upon their own separate
needs in opposition to those of other cities. Cf. also the case of Sicily where cities
contemplate uniting for a common cause: for example, consider the situation
described at 6.80, discussed in Connor (1984, 121): “At the center of his
[Hermocrates’] speech is the idea of Sicily as a unit” (see 120–22). For the idea of
Attic villagers viewing their villages as their own cities (2.16), see chapter 8.
32. 1.2–19, esp. 1.3.1, 1.10.5, 1.15.2, 1.17, 1.18.2. The Plataeans argues that
the Greeks are joined in significant ways, including a shared set of laws (3.58–59;
cf. 1.41.1, 3.67.6) and common religious beliefs (3.59). They emphasize the impor-
tance of Greek unity (3.54, 3.59); see Price (2001, 333–77). Creed (1973, 219–20)
analyzes the various obligations a Greek might have to a friend, to his city, or to
Greece itself (on loyalty, see 224). White (1984, 91) poses the following question:
“But could equality be seen not as the factual precondition of the discourse of jus-
tice, but as its product, as something that it creates and makes real in the world?
Could Athens, that is, have recognized that even cities unequal in power may have
an equal interest in maintaining the discourse that gives them identity and com-
munity, that indeed makes their life and competition possible?” 
33. Price (2001, 26); he also remarks that in some ways “stasis is basically dif-
ferent from a polemos” (5); cf. the caution in Kallet (2004).
Chapter Seven
1. Dover HCT, V: 396 (see also 436); Wassermann (1956, 30); cf. J. H. Finley
(1967, 114–16). Gomme HCT, II: 167 remarks on the Athenian “passion for gen-
eralization in rhetoric such as we find it difficult to appreciate.” Parry (1970,
14–15) locates the language of Thucydides at the third of five stages of abstraction
where “abstract words are the staple of argument, yet they always have a human
and dramatic reference”; cf. 12–13 on “proverbial abstractions.” 
2. Meister (1955, 13). For the range of meaning of gnome, see Rusten (1989,
148); cf. Edmunds (1975a, 7–14) and Huart (1973).
3. See Meister (1955, 23) on particles and conjunctions introducing maxims.
Although maxims introduce general concepts, it is valuable to recall that
Thucydides has no fixed terminology, describing each situation in a new way; for
this point, see Stahl (2003), 120.
4. On adverbs such as aiei, pollakis, etc., see Meister (1955, 19–20); on gen-
eral laws using a form of pant-, see 30–31.
5. In fact, the Corinthians argue that such an alliance would lead to war, not
peace (1.40.1–2). The Corinthians cite the cases of Samos and Aegina when
Corinth either acquiesced to Athenian dominion or helped the Athenians
(1.40.5–1.41.3).
6. On Athenian mistakes, see Hornblower (1991–96, I: 129).
7. This proverbial quality is akin to sentiments such as “Early to bed and
early to rise makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise.” The Corinthians also intro-
duce a maxim at 1.42.4 (to\ ga_r mh\ a)dikei=n tou\j o9moi/ouj—“to avoid wronging
equals”). Later they support their claim concerning the question of responsibility
for the enslaving of Greece: surprisingly it is the Spartans who are “responsible” or
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“guilty” (aitioi). ou0 ga_r o9 doulwsa&menoj, a)ll ) o9 duna&menoj me\n pau=sai peri*
orw~n de\ a)lhqe/steron au0to\ dra~| (“It is not the one who enslaves who more truly
commits the act, but the one who was able to stop it but overlooked it”—1.69.1).
Surprisingly the one who was able to stop such a deed is in fact the perpetrator. As
Hornblower (1991–96, I: 113) remarks, the criticisms of Corinthians are “unrea-
sonable.”
8. Thucydides, of course, influences how his readers react to this argument,
for he has already announced the coming of war several times in authorial state-
ments, especially “the Athenians forced the Spartans to war” (a)naka&sai e0j to\
polemei=n—1.23.6).
9. We may well find an echo in Pericles’ warning: “I have come to fear our
own mistakes (hamartias) more than the enemy’s planning” (1.144.1); cf. also
2.65.7–13, esp. 2.65.11:  h9marth/qh . . . a(ma/rthma.
10. Meister (1955, 50–90) outlines three levels of application for the maxim:
within the passage, the maxim must be tested with respect to the specific argument
that it supports; it may be gauged with respect to the speech as a whole; and the
reader may apply the maxim to other situations found elsewhere in the History. See
also Hammond (1973).
11. Gomme HCT, I: 251 translates 1.84.4 as “one educated in the necessary,
and only in the necessary, virtues,” or—what may amount to the same thing—“one
brought up in the hardest school.”
12. For a maxim on skill and courage, see 2.87.4. When the Spartans negoti-
ate with Athens regarding the possibility of peace on more moderate terms than
might be expected, they invoke a maxim on yielding and holding out (4.19.3).
13. Andrewes (1960, 5–6). Gomme HCT, I: 236 cites Democritus fr. 267:
fu/sei to\ a!rxein oi0kh/ion tw~| kre/ssoni (“Rule belongs by nature to the stronger”). 
14. See Rusten (1989, 112–13); he remarks that Archidamus’ “generalisation
accurately predicts the Athenian reaction to the divination in 2.21.2.”
15. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 339) comments: “An organic view of the state is
implied here.” According to Meister (1955, 42), one-fifth of all maxims are found
in Pericles’ speeches. Other universal principles concern innovation (1.71.3) and
the deluding effect of extraordinary good luck (4.17.4). 
16. See Meister (1955, 17–49).
17. For comments on human nature in speech, see 1.76.2, 3.39.5, 3.45.3,
4.61.5, and 5.105.2; in narrative, see 1.22.4, 3.82.2, and discussion in Topitsch
(1943–47) and Price (2001, 27–28). Further work on maxims in Thucydides might
be carried out along the lines of Lardinois (1997), which applies modern “paroemi-
ology” (emphasizing social and linguistic contexts) to Homeric gnomai.
18. The analogy, that is, may be thought of as reciprocal. To understand the
cities of the classical Greek world, it would be valuable to look at the individuals
of Thucydides’ work. See chapter 6 n9.
19. See Meister (1955, 27) on the use of kai\ nu=n as a connective at 3.37.1 and
3.39.6.
20. Wassermann (1956, 29) finds confirmation for Cleon’s description of sub-
ject allies in the characterizations voiced by Pericles and the Mytilenians them-
selves (2.63.2, 3.9–14).
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21. See Meister (1955, 47–48) on the comparatives used in 3.37.3–4. As has
been noted, Cleon speaks of “laws” (nomoi), when the issue at hand is a decree of
the assembly to execute all adult male islanders. See Gomme HCT, II: 300 on
decrees (psephismata) vs. laws (nomoi); cf. Macleod (1983, 93). Winnington-
Ingram (1965, 71–72) translates nomoi as “tradition” and “principles.” 
22. See Macleod (1983, 94) on the “fact/word” contrast in this section. On
Cleon’s maxim at 3.38.1, Gomme HCT, II: 302 comments: “a direct, but not quite
an open, claim that in such circumstances at least o0rgh/ and not logismo/j should
guide our action”; and on 3.39.4, “another case of love of generalization making its
way into a speech” (II: 307). 
23. Meister (1955, 25) calls this maxim “parenthetical.” 
24. In their speech the Mytilenians also use the terms for revolt (apostaseis—
3.9.1–3 [4x], 3.13.1 [4x]); see Macleod (1983, 90). See Winnington-Ingram (1965,
74) on the distinction between revolt and insurrection. Gomme HCT, II: 307
thinks “the definition of a)po/stasij is very forced, as though it were something
which could not be helped.”
25. Meister (1955) compares 4.98.6.
26. Once more Thucydides has anticipated Cleon’s assertion—this time in
the Mytilenians’ speech in which they claim they were not truly “autonomous and
free” (3.10.5–3.11.1). Again we might think of the proverbial “To err is human.”
Hornblower (1991–96, I: 425) finds much in common here with ideas of retalia-
tory justice.
27. On 3.39.5, Gomme HCT, II: 308 remarks: “another wide generalization,
but more to the point than the last [3.39.4].” Hornblower (1991–96, I: 429) notes:
“The admission, that what the Mytileneans have done is natural, sits uneasily with
Kleon’s claim earlier in the ch. that their behavior is exceptionally bad.”
28. See Meister (1955, 40–41) on this “three-fold variation.” Of course, this
is an odd combination: the Athenians must resist enjoyment in argument and such
“soft” feelings as pity; see Winnington-Ingram (1965, 75). Macleod (1983, 72)
considers this a form of rhetorical amplification and offers parallels elsewhere in
Thucydides. Winnington-Ingram (1965, 75) finds a range of meaning in epieikeia:
“reasonableness,” “fairness,” and “decency.” Gomme HCT, II: 309 links epieikeia to
all persons, while oiktos or eleos refer only to particular individuals.
29. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 432) finds Cleon’s suggestion about the Mytilenian
attack “gratuitous” and notes that this argument is “hardly consistent with [Cleon’s]
view that Athens is a hated tyranny.” Gomme HCT, II: 312 concurs: “it is another
gnw&mh not particularly apt to the context.”
30. The term transposition is itself a metaphor deriving from mathematics and
music, although both fields endorse its usage here. To transpose in mathematics is
to transfer from one side of an equation to the other: this is precisely what happens
with the city-individual analogy, for when something is said about individuals (one
side of the equation) it is then transferred to the other side relating to cities. In
music, to transpose means to rewrite a musical composition in a different key, and
again this sheds some light on transposing ideas in a new political context.
31. See also 3.46.5 (“now we are doing the opposite [tounantion]”) and cf.
pro\j tou\j e0nanti/ouj(3.48.2); indeed, Diodotus calls his debate with Cleon a
“competition” (agon—3.44.1). We might contrast this with Cleon’s use of
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homoios—especially at 3.40.3, on which Macleod (1983, 96) comments, “The last
ironic twist of the knife is the repetition of tou\j o9moi/ouj; for these words refer in
40.3 first to notional friends and equals, who would be worthy of pity, but then to
the unchanging hostility of Athens’ actual subjects.”
32. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 436) observes: “Note that in this ch. Diodotos
moves without embarrassment between the behaviour and appropriate treatment
of cities on the one hand and of individuals on the other.” He then cites Knox’s
observation that while the gods are frequently mentioned by speakers in
Thucydides, this is not true of Pericles, Cleon, Diodotus, or Alcibiades, and com-
ments: “These four are perhaps represented as more interested in generalizing, as
here [3.45.3], at a purely human level.” Macleod (1983, 75) analyzes 3.45 in terms
of Diodotus’ contribution, namely, that human nature is what lies behind the
behavior Cleon has condemned. Scanlon (1987, 294–95) thinks “the psychologi-
cal schema . . . is conversely applicable as a description of motivation at the levels
of both states and individuals and in the cases of both the rulers and the ruled”; see
Lintott (1992, 29–30) and Hussey (1985, 120). Bodin (1940, 41–42) characterizes
3.45.3 and 3.45.7 as two aphoristic generalizations (“deux généralisations de car-
actère aphoristique”). Note that Diodotus at this point prefers hamartanein and its
cognates to adikia, which he reserves almost wholly for Cleon’s policy recommen-
dation (this is noted by Gomme HCT, II: 318 who translates hamartanein as: “to
make a mistake in judgment,” not “to break a law”). Bodin (1940, 41) sees the idea
of adikia being absorbed into hamartema. Conversely Cleon has used adikia and its
cognates to characterize what Mytilene has done (3.38.1, 3.39.1, 3.39.3, 3.39.6,
3.40.5), but reserves hamartia to condemn the Athenians’ mistaken act of recon-
sidering their decision (3.37.2). Wassermann (1956, 38) remarks: “A balanced
view of man shows that he acts as he does under the necessity of a natural law
whether as an individual or as a political group (Plato’s later picture of the state as
the individual writ large is already implied by Thucydides).” See also Hunter
(1988).
33. Gomme HCT, II: 319 comments: “The external circumstances and inter-
nal passions, of individuals or states, are distinguished, and in the first two sen-
tences particular circumstances and passions are mentioned, in the last both are
generalized.” It is of course extraordinary that Diodotus can claim that because
sometimes crimes are committed in spite of the death penalty, either a harsher
penalty must be discovered or the death penalty is no restraint at all (h2 toi/nun
deino/tero/n ti tou/tou de/oj eu9rete/on e0sti\n h2 to/de ge ou0de\n e0pi/sxei). Surely,
this does not follow. See Stahl (2003, 120–21) on this point and on Diodotus’
argument in general.
34. It is difficult to determine whether the phrase e0pi\ panti/ is meant to be
taken temporarily (at all times?) or for all situations (for both individuals and
cities?); given its ambiguous formulation, it might be taken in both senses.
35. Winnington-Ingram (1965, 79) argues that these powers (hope, desire,
chance) are “too strong to be resisted.” Wassermann (1956, 30) finds “desire” and
“hope” (eros and elpis) to be rooted in human nature, while “chance” (tuche) refers
to external conditions and opportunities. Orwin (1994, 155) argues that “what
earlier Athenians have offered as a defense of their empire [Diodotus] invokes as
equally an excuse for rebellion against it. So, for instance, he adds freedom to
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empire as one of the ‘greatest things’ that nature bids cities pursue. . . . The thesis
thus proves, on reflection, to imply the sympathy of the strong for the very resolve
of the weak to oppose them.”
36. Regarding desire (eros), Diodotus’ sketch might be applied to the Sicilian
expedition (discussed briefly in chapter 8).
37. Again Diodotus’ formulation applies both to the city and to the individ-
ual: a tyrant may hold power over citizens just as a city may hold power over other
cities. Given the context, he is thinking of Athens’ power over other cities, but
one also speaks of the power (arche) over other individuals. Diodotus’ remarks on
unexpected luck may echo Cleon’s words about unexpected success (eupragia)
coming to a city and leading it to hybris (3.39.4). See Meister (1955, 41–42) on
3.45.4–6. Debnar (2000, 176 n57) notes “Diodotus’ shift from the singular ‘city’ at
3.45.2 to ‘cities’ at 3.45.6.”
38. Cf. Cleon’s point at 3.39.7. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 429–30) distin-
guishes between Diodotus’ argument that concerns individuals within a rebel state
and Cleon’s that argues “severity for crushed revolts”; indeed, the two situations
are not precisely parallel.
39. Wassermann (1956, 37) comments on the discovery of Thucydides and the
Sophists that “politics, like everything that has to do with man, is a natural as well
as a moral science. Political attitudes and actions, such as the Mytilenean case under
consideration, obey the unchangeable laws of human psychology, of a)nqrwp*
ei/a fu/sij. . . . Thus, the art of politics consists in observing the fact and conditions
of human behavior and in both recognizing and applying the general law in the par-
ticular case (the integration of the general and the particular being one of
Thucydides’ most vital concepts).” Meister (1955) finds four broad categories for
maxims: human psychology, the state, empire, and war; on maxims concerning
human psychology, see 78–81. Orwin (1994, 156) oddly characterizes this as extend-
ing Diodotus’ thesis from cities to individuals, rather than the other way around. 
40. Hunter (1986) considers the collective psychology of armies, audiences of
speeches, mobs, and cities. In a second article (1988), she remarks that “for a brief
time [the crowd is] mentally homogeneous” (18); “the crowd has a personality and
emotions of its own and is almost a single individual, thinking as one” (25); she
goes on to argue that “in Diodotus’ view, the city is very like a person, experienc-
ing all the errors and feelings of the individual, including insolence, pride, hope
and greed” (26). She concludes that Thucydides’ “analysis remains at the level of
the psychological” (30).
41. For fear as a motive for war, see Hornblower (1991–96, I: 32–33, 86, 120).
Fear also keeps the Mytilenians in the Athenian alliance (3.11.2). On anger in a
group, see Hunter (1988, 22); for courage (e.g., 6.63), see Hunter (1988, 23 and
23n28).
42. To this extent, Diodotus agrees with Cleon that the issue concerns expe-
diency for the city of Athens (3.40.4, 3.44.2; see also peri\ po/lewj
bouleuome/noij–3.38.7); they both also exclude emotion or mercy, yet Cleon con-
siders both the Mytilenian oligarchs and the people guilty (3.39.6). Gomme HCT,
II: 322 remarks that Diodotus’ remark (3.47.2) “cannot be reconciled” with
Thucydides’ own view on pro-Spartan sentiment expressed at 2.8.4–5.
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43. dei= de/, kai\ ei0 h0di/khsan, mh\ prospoiei=sqai (“Even if they were guilty, we
must pretend they were not”—3.47.4). On his earlier statement about not need-
ing to be strict “judges” or “jurors” (w#ste ou0 dikasta_j o1ntaj dei= h9ma~j ma~llon
. . . a)kribei=j—3.46.4), see Arnold (2000, 175): “The Greek word order . . . cre-
ates the initial impression that Diodotus advises the Athenians not to act as jurors.
. . . But Diodotus does not ask the Athenians not to be jurors; rather he advises
them as jurors not to be overly strict in their punishment.” 
44. See the ingenious solution by Debnar (2000, 170), who lays great empha-
sis on Diodotus’ claim that all speakers must lie (3.43.2–3): “By alerting his audi-
ence to the possibility that here may be a distance between what he says and what
he believes, Diodotus allows those Athenians inclined toward moderate punish-
ment to detect in his words opinions that reconcile their sense of what is civilized
with their notions of sound political counsel. The paradox allows these Athenians
to assure themselves that although Diodotus appears to take into account only
expedience, in reality he offers advice that he also believes is just.”
45. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 438) notes: “here only does Diodotus explicitly
invoke considerations of justice.” Macleod (1983, 77) remarks that the argument
here “leads to an appeal to considerations of justice, in spite of his declared pref-
erence for ones of expediency.” Winnington-Ingram (1965, 77–79) explains that
“Diodotus argues as Cleon’s speech allows him to argue . . . [this is the] only place
where [an appeal to justice] will help his cause.” See Orwin (1994, 151).
46. Yet see Gomme HCT, II: 308 on 3.39.6: “there is no sign in Thucydides
that the commons, at least in Mytilene . . . objected to what the ruling class was
doing until defeat was certain”; cf. Orwin (1994, 142). The distinction between
guilty and innocent has been anticipated in Thucydides’ introduction to the
speeches: po/lin o3lhn diafqei=rai ma~llon h2 ou0 tou\j ai0ti/ouj(“to destroy a whole
city rather than the guilty ones”–3.36.4). 
47. Ostwald (1979, 5).
48. On the topic of justice between cities, we find the concepts and terminol-
ogy of judgment and punishment (which derive from within the polis itself)
brought onto the international stage: cities accuse one another (katagoreuo,
enklemata), defend (apologeo), judge (dicastes, dikazomai), are guilty (aitios), and pay
the penalty (di/kaj dou=nai). Such an exploration is of the greatest importance not
only for understanding the course of the war but also for contemplating the possi-
bilities of peace (even if these opportunities are not taken advantage of). For this
idea, see Darbo-Penschnski (1987), Sheets (1994), and Price (2001).
49. See especially Strasburger (1954).
50. See Hussey (1985).
51. On group psychology, Wassermann (1956, 39) remarks: “These emotions
[desire, hope, daring], while already affecting the individual as part of human
nature, play an even more vital part in the political sphere (Thucydides’ foremost
interest); here the controls and restraints of reason are even more endangered by
the pressures of group psychology—a field which is one of the great discoveries of
Thucydides”; in his discussion of Cleon and Diodotus’ speeches, he continues: “on
an even more general and higher level, where the historian turns into the politi-
cal scientist and philosopher, politics presents itself as the supreme battleground
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between the forces of reason and of emotion in human nature” (40; see also 40
n19). Meister (1955, 74) notes that the speeches in books 6 and 7 contain rela-
tively few maxims. 
52. Debnar (2000, 176) thinks it is Diodotus’ paradox (all speakers must
deceive) which has “stimulate[d] further analysis . . . [and] force[s] us to scrutinize
more closely those concepts that underlie the debate.” 
53. Once again we are back to Thucydides’ emphasis on the art of finding
comparisons (or “extrapolating”–eikazein). This is precisely the skill needed of the
reader, who is asked to consider in what situations such an analogical process is
valid. When is it useful to speak of a city as being like an individual? When it is
accurate to do so? Is it legitimate to speak of a city as having a character (e.g.,
1.70–71, 8.96.5)?
54. Kagan (1975, 77–78) claims that the speeches are used for various pur-
poses: “To express points of view with which Thucydides agrees, to expose the
weaknesses in positions with which he disagrees, to set forth the character and ideas
of major actors in the historical drama.” Develin (1990, 58–60) puts it well:
“Thought and speech, if not always logical, are logically prior to action. It is in the
analysis of thought, intentions, attitudes, words that the real task of the historian
lies . . . [Thucydides] saw the use of speeches in their context as his major con-
centration of interpretative focus” (60).
Chapter Eight
1. Bosworth (2000, 16) advances the idea that even the generalities of
Pericles’ Funeral Oration “are not timeless platitudes but sentiments totally appro-
priate to the contemporary political climate . . . there is much in the historical
record of 431 that gives real bite to the rhetoric.”
2. See below for a discussion of the historical Pericles’ penchant for memo-
rable language. 
3. Tompkins (1972, 1993) and Debnar (2001).
4. Thucydides appears to be pulled in two directions. He does not wish to
appear obsessed with the importance of Athens: this work will not be an Athenian
history, but a history of the war, taking many perspectives into account; see Flory
(1990). Yet Athens is important, not only for understanding the causes of the war
and the course of the war, but also for understanding the development of human
civilization: the significance of Athens derives in part from its standing at the
height of power (1.1.1). For these reasons, the metaphors introduced early offer the
reader a framework against which he or she may contemplate the complexity of
democratic and imperial Athens.
5. Much of what Gribble (1998, 62) has to say about “narrative interven-
tions” may be said of Thucydides’ political metaphors: “Their purpose is not to tell
the reader what to think . . . but to shape reader reaction in a wider sense. They
highlight crucial analytical threads in the work, or preview issues which are to be
explored more deeply by the future narrative as a whole.” 
6. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 223) comments that Themistocles’ skill of
improvisation (1.138.3) “is obviously and deliberately echoed by Pericles’ claim to
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be able to ‘devise and explain a sound policy’” (2.60.5). On eikazein more general-
ly, see discussion in chapter 2.
7. On metaphor, in addition to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), see also Black
(1962, 25–47); Boys-Stones (2003); Danesi (1999); and Stanford (1972). Nogales
(1999) offers a theory of metaphor in terms of “reconceptualization” and provides
a valuable bibliography. While many metaphors apply to Athens, cf. 2.43.3 (and
the comment of Parry [1972, 61]), 3.82, and 6.13.1 (and comment by Hornblower
[1991–96, II: 294]). For other sorts of comparison, see, e.g., 5.11.1 and 7.75.5. 
8. See my discussion of Thucydides withholding information in chapter 3
and misleading the reader (at 2.5.5–6) in chapter 4.
9. As Stahl (2003, 174) puts it, “we allow [Thucydides] to correct his speak-
ers by his own presentation of the events”; this amounts to “elucidation of speech-
es by the ensuing (or preceding) narrative of events.”
10. On the tyrant-city, see Barcelo (1990, esp. 419–24); Connor (1977);
Hunter (1973b); McGrew (1993); Raaflaub (1979, 2003); Scanlon (1987);
Schuller (1978); Stahl (2003, 132–34, 141–43); and Tuplin (1985). 
11. Here we find an allusion to Sparta’s well-known hostility to tyranny: ai0ei\
a)tura&nneutoj, “forever free of tyranny” (1.18.1). This negative adjective first
appears here in extant Greek literature—could Thucydides have coined the term? 
12. Scanlon (1987, 288) comments: “Pericles rejects the ‘slavery versus free-
dom’ slogan as facile, but accepts the Corinthians’ tyrant analogy. The appearance
of injustice and the danger of abandonment are typically a tyrant’s burdens”; the
tyrant-state is “a regrettable necessity whose consequences are to be endured.”
13. Scanlon (1987, 289) notes in both Pericles’ and Cleon’s speeches a “recog-
nition that there is an inherent danger for the tyrant-state in either relinquishing
its rule or growing weak in its adminstration.” On 3.37.2, Gomme HCT, II: 299
explains that Athens’ empire is a tyranny “because it is a rule (archen) over unwill-
ing subjects who are always conspiring against it.” Winnington-Ingram (1965, 76)
maintains that for Cleon to describe the empire as a tyranny is to imply that jus-
tice has nothing to do with the case: “it cannot be unjust for subject [as enemy] to
harm the tyrant.” Tuplin (1985, 355) argues that Cleon “is deducing what he
wants from a presupposition that empire equals tyranny which is not explicitly jus-
tified.” I do not think Thucydides supposed the Athenian empire to be equal to
tyranny (as I will argue below), though Cleon may be pressing that point here.
14. On Euphemus’ remarks (6.85.1), Scanlon (1987, 290) sees a “total inte-
gration of tyranny with expediency.” 
15. For tyranny and its associations in the fifth-century historical context, see
Raaflaub (2004, 89–102). Crowther (2003, 90) comments: “To be a metaphor is to
posit an objectively significant connection, but in a way which provokes the con-
nection to be made via avenues of imaginative, and thence, in part, personal asso-
ciation, rather than immediate logical relations.” On Athens the tyrant in Attic
Comedy, see note 28 below.
16. Sicilian tyranny is associated with injustice, dislocation, and exile
(6.4–5; cf. 1.14.2, 2.30); the Peisistratids were marked by virtue and intelligence
(6.54.5) and their rule followed the constitution and was not burdensome—
injustice only came later (6.53–59; cf. 1.20). We find tyranny elsewhere:
Pausanias imitated tyranny rather than generalship (1.95.3); Alcibiades was
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accused of aiming for tyranny (6.15.4; cf. 6.60.1, 6.89.1); see also 1.120.2–3,
1.126, 3.62.3, 3.104.
17. Beyond this, it is possible to juxtapose imperial and actual tyranny on the
one hand with other descriptions of Athenian action as a way of testing the
Athens-as-tyrant model.
18. dunatwte/raj . . . xrhma&twn . . . proso/dwn meizo/nwn . . . nautika&
–(1.13).
19. By contrast, in the early fifth century, the united Greeks faced the
Persians: tw~n cumpolemhsa&ntwn 9Ellh/nwn...koinh==|| te a)pwsa&menoi to\n
ba&rbaron (“The Greeks in common fought together and drove out the barbar-
ian”—1.18.2; cf. 1.99.2).
20. Tuplin (1985, 366) notes that “direct characterizations of tyranny . . . most-
ly dwell on the illegitimacy, lawlessness, unrestrained power, dependence on force and
arrogance of the tyrant, that other metaphorical uses of tyranny evidently derive from
such characteristics, and that there is no good reason to require more of its applica-
tion to empire.” Scanlon (1987, 291) remarks that “as the narrative proceeds, we rec-
ognize that other typical characteristics of historical tyrants, especially violence and
arrogance, do apply” to Athens. For references to tyrants in both Thucydides and
other literature from the classical period, see Tuplin (1985): hubris, impiety, lawless-
ness, injustice at 361 n46; theft, greed, and wealth at 352 n17 (cf. 361 n46); tyrants
are unable to trust anyone (354 n25); they rule over unwilling subjects (355 n27); they
pursue their own self-interest (361 n46). Tuplin also notes (364) the correspondence
between the tyrant as an anti-aristocratic benefactor of the demos and imperial
Athens’ favoring of democracies. See also Schuller (1978, 12–13). On the status of
the cities of Athens’ empire, see Type 8 of dependent poleis in Hansen (1997, 29): “a
polis which is a member of a hegemonic league (symmachia) which has developed into
an ‘empire’ (arche), e.g., the hypekooi poleis in the Delian League.”
21. Barcelo (1990, 425) discusses the polarities within which the tyrant oper-
ates: power and obedience; serving state and self; oppression and tolerance; plea-
sure and risk; insolence and resistance; strength and weakness.
22. Fifth-century imperial Athens personified risk, sacrifice, and boldness: on
risk, see the Athenians’ description of themselves at 1.73.2, 1.74.2, 1.74.3 1.75.1;
on sacrifice, see 1.74.2, 1.73.4 (cf. 1.70, 1.75.4–5, 1.76.1). De Romilly (1988, 266)
notes that the boldness of Athens which had been criticized by the Corinthians
(1.70.3) has been transformed into a compliment (1.73–4). In the Pentecontaetia,
Stadter (1993, 59) finds a similar attitude toward danger: “Thucydides’ staccato
account forces the reader to note again and again Athens’ resolve and acceptance
of risk in mounting individual and multiple operations,” and concludes: “In
Thucydides’ narrative, the Pentecontaetia is dominated by a strong, aggressive,
and ceaselessly active Athens” (48). On polypragmosyne, contrast the picture of
Athens at 2.41.4 with the tyrants’ limited accomplishments (cf. also 1.10.2). On
the tyrants’ fear and desire for safety, see also 6.59.2. 
23. Scanlon (1987, 301) concludes: “The dynamics are identical at the level
of individual and state so that the tyrant-state is not a mere metaphor but the
macrocosmic phenomenon corresponding to the microcosm of historical tyrants.”
Connor (1977, 106), however, finds “Thucydides is disassociating himself from
this facile characterization of Athens as a new form of tyranny.” Tuplin (1985,
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366) notes the relative rarity of the tyrant-as-city metaphor and finds slavery to be
a more “natural” metaphor for imperial authority.
24. Connor (1977, 105–106); only for the juxtaposition of the Peisistratid
digression (6.53–59) with Athenian action concerning the profanation of the mys-
teries do we find that “Thucydides seems for once to be accepting the analogy
between Athens and tyranny” (108).
25. See Macleod (1983, 69).
26. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 5); specifically, “we tend to structure the less
concrete and inherently vaguer concepts (like those for the emotions) in terms of
more concrete concepts, which are more clearly delineated in our experience”; also
“we typically conceptualize the nonphysical in terms of the physical” (59).
Aristotle Rhetoric 1412a5 says that the use of metaphor involves the perception of
similarity in apparently dissimilar things; see his discussion of metaphor at Rhetoric
1404ff. Black (1962) labels the non-metaphorical reference as the principal sub-
ject, while the metaphorical term is the secondary or subsidiary subject. 
27. Parker (1998) traces the semantics of the term: for Solon, tyrannos desig-
nates “someone who . . . takes power which does not belong to him . . . a usurper,
someone who grasps power, someone who wrongfully vaunts himself to the pinna-
cle of the state” (156). Parker then argues that “it is Attic speech which makes a
sharp semantic distinction between tyrannos and basileus, a distinction which did
not exist elsewhere and in other dialects,” attributing this special difference in
Attic to the fact that in Athens “tyrants never pretended to be kings” (170–71).
In fact, Parker believes that “Thucydides distinguished first with absolute consis-
tency between tyrants and kings . . . [and] is thus the first author who evinces a
clear and consistent concept of ‘tyranny’ as opposed to kingship” (164). 
28. Applying the label of tyrant to Athens is not original with Thucydides; see
Aristophanes Knights 1111–14 (cf. 1330, 1333), Wasps 620, and discussion in de
Romilly (1988, 126); Macleod (1983, 98–100); and Henderson (2003). On
Athenian tyranny in tragedy, see Knox (1966, 59–66). Yet, as Scanlon (1987, 287
n4) comments: “the preexistence of the tyrant-state topos does not, however, pre-
clude Thucydides’ selective quotation of it . . . nor does it prevent an artistic, the-
matic use of the commonplace to characterize Athens and her subjects.”
29. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 112).
30. Ibid., 7–9, 22–24, 67; one of the modern examples they examine is “time
is money.”
31. Ibid., 13; on the “partial nature of metaphorical structuring,” see 52–55.
The metaphor does not “fit” the reality in all respects: if it did, it would be “iden-
tity,” not “metaphor.” They later stipulate that “our criteria for metaphor were (a)
a difference in kind of activity and (b) partial structuring (use of selected parts)”
(84).
32. Ibid. Connected to the notion of partial metaphorical structuring is the
idea of highlighting and downplaying: Lakoff and Johnson observe that all
metaphors, “by virtue of their entailments, pick out a range of experiences by high-
lighting, downplaying, and hiding” or suppressing certain aspects (152); “every
true statement necessarily leaves out what is downplayed or hidden by the cate-
gories used in it” (163). 
33. On the innate capacity to see likenesses, see Ar. Poetics 1459a7–8; cf.
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Rhetoric 1405a9–10. Crowther (2003, 85) comments: “The basic predicative struc-
ture of language is simultaneously and manifestly affirmed by form and denied by
content. Metaphor is, in ontological terms, inherently tensional.”
34. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 89).
35. Ibid., 44.
36. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 94) remark: “The overlap of entailments
between two metaphors . . . defines the coherence between them.” On coherence,
see 20–21. They note that metaphors are “more likely to involve coherence than
consistency” (96).
37. Ibid., 97.
38. Ibid., 6.
39. See Orwin (1994, 59–60) on charges against the Athenians.
40. Cf. 1.69.6, 1.82, 1.84, 1.119; see also 1.72.1. In another context,
Hornblower (1991–96, II: 274 [s.v. 4.83.5]) notes the “metaphorical use” of dicas-
tes (cf. 6.87.3).
41. The Athenians acknowledge adjudication between cities, both within the
empire between Athens and its subject allies (e0n toi=j cumboli/aij pro\j tou\j
cumma&xouj di/kaij, “in contract suits against our allies”–1.77.1; cf. 1.77.3–4) and
between Athens and Sparta in accordance with the arbitration clause of the
446/45 treaty (ta_ de\ dia&fora di/kh| lu/esqai kata_ th\n cunqh/khn, “to resolve our
differences justly in accordance with our agreement”–1.78.4). This raises the ques-
tion of when it is appropriate for one city to judge another.
42. On Athens’ rejection of such an international “court,” see also 3.44, 5.89,
6.87.
43. See White (1984, 59–92).
44. See discussion in chapter 6. Cf. also 1.37.3, 3.46.4, 3.53, 3.68, 4.83.3–5,
6.87.3, and the Spartan dicastai at Plataea (3.52.2–3; cf. 3.56.3). For a full survey
of “judicial” language, see Darbo-Peschanski (1987). On notions of international
justice in Thucydides, see Cohen (1984), Nakategawa (1994), and Sheets (1994).
45. The sense of eleutheros as political freedom appears historically in the later
sixth and fifth centuries; the “enslavement” of Greek cities by Persia has now been
transferred to Athenian imperial behavior. For evolving senses of freedom,
Raaflaub (2004) traces its meaning in interstate relations (118–165) and its use in
propaganda (166–202); cf. Patterson (1991, 47–164). Scanlon (1987, 287) com-
ments on Sparta as a “liberator”; see also Diller (1968). On polarities in
Thucydides, see Connor (1991, 67): “Thucydides builds his work on a series of
polarities—Greek and barbarian, justice and expediency, logos and ergon, reason
and passion, land and sea, Athenian and Spartan. These are the foundation of his
narrative, but the narrative reveals them to be constructs, not unchanging or
inevitable realities.”
46. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 150, 152). Cf. 2.8.4. Hornblower also remarks on
the Corinthians’ rhetorical attack (1.122.2), noting the “non-literal sense of ‘slav-
ery’” (I: 200). In his commentary on 1.98.1–2, Gomme HCT, I: 282 views
e0doulw&qh, as “a rhetorical word, here it means something very different from
h0ndrapo/disan just above.” Cartwright (1997, 59 [s.v. 1.98]) remarks: “the Greek
. . . means ‘was enslaved,’ though this is not to be taken literally.” Stadter (1993,
61 n93) also recognizes that Athens’ actions lead to two types of slavery—sale of
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captives (1.91.1f., 113.1) and subjection of allies (1.98.4)—but emphasizes the
international plane (50): “The enslavement of Naxos was not unique, but as the
first was a powerful paradigm, like the Corcyrean stasis.” For enslaved individuals,
see, e.g., 1.55.1, 1.98, 1.101.2, 1.103.1, 1.139.2, 2.78.4, 3.73. On one city “enslav-
ing” another, see, e.g., 1.69.1, 1.121.5, 1.122.2, 1.124.3, 2.71.2–2.71.3,
3.10.3–3.10.4, 3.13.6, 3.58.5, 3.64.3 (in narrative, see 1.8.3, 1.98.4, 3.70.3,
3.71.1). Generally andrapodizo and its cognates designate slavery of individuals
(2.68.7, 3.28.1, 3.36.2, 5.3.4, 5.32.1; but cf. 6.62.3) while douleia/douleuein/douloo
refer to the enslaving of a polis (1.8.3, 1.121.5, 5.9.9, etc., but cf. 1.101.2, 5.23.3,
7.85.4). Thucydides does not maintain a distinction between metaphor in speech
and literal use in narrative. See the valuable note in Rood (1998, 238–39 n50).
47. Flory (1993, 117) comments that Pericles is “known for his bold
metaphors.” Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 157) remark: “people in power get to
impose their metaphors.”
48. Parry (1972, 60). On the Athenians-as-islanders, see “The Old Oligarch”
2.14–16. Gomme HCT, I: 461 notes the differences between this and the passage
in Thucydides: “the latter [Old Oligarch] adds the freedom from sta&sij [civil war]
that an island ruling the sea would enjoy.” De Romilly (1988, 116) notes: “They
must strive toward achieving the perfect condition that would be theirs, if Athens
were an island.” Spence (1990, 106) believes that 1.143.4–5 “represents an over-
simplication of Perikles’ ultimate strategy.” The Athenians-as-islanders model dif-
fers from the previous models in this respect: it is not derived from a situation
within a polis, such as slavery or tyranny, but is built on geography, as Wickersham
(1994, 66) notes: “The power of Athens is so surpassingly wisely designed, that it
can be said to spring from geography; it is limited not by politics but by nature.”
On the connection between the Athenians as “sea people” and democracy, see
Amit (1965, 57–71).
49. See esp. 1.83, 2.62; cf. “The Old Oligarch” 2.2. Hornblower (1991–96, I:
8) calls the importance of sea power one of the two theses Thucydides attempts to
establish in the Archaeology, remarking that the first expression of land and sea
(1.2.2) “is surely programmatic,” and anticipates the “great programmatic impor-
tance for the wartime narrative which is to come” (I: 55). See also Cawkwell
(1997, 43–44). In Lakoff and Johnson’s terms, the islander model would be a sub-
category of the major category land and sea. 
50. Connor (1984, 51). Syracuse, however, which is many ways is compared
to Athens, is actually on an island. To what extent does this factor lead to
Syracuse’s victory in 413 over Athens, weakened by attacks from Decelea (a
Spartan land base)?
51. A dig presumably at Sparta, which was said to have modeled its constitu-
tion on the Cretan constitution (see Herodotus 1.65.4). For a more detailed dis-
cussion of the contrast between Athens and Sparta, see E. M. Harris (1992,
162–63).
52. Connor (1984, 66) translates: “We enjoy a style of civic life that does not
copy the nomoi of our neighbors and is more a model to some than an imitation of
others.” 
53. Cartwright (1997, 110) notes this as “one of the many striking expressions
in this speech.” See discussion below.
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54. Cartwright (1997, 110) argues: “The context suggests that Pericles has in
mind the character of the Athenian citizen and the organization of the Athenian
state.” Hornblower (1991–96, I: 307 [s.v. 2.41.1]) comments on xunelon as an “odd
formula because Pericles is not in fact summing up, but introducing a new idea:
Athens as an education to Greece” and limits the reference to “a narrower front
than culture generally.” Wickersham (1994, 68) believes that “For Pericles,
Athens ‘sets the example’ and demonstrates to the rest of Greece what a state
ought to be (paideusis tes Hellados).” In noting that the image of Athens in the
Funeral Oration neglects the architecture of the building program, Stambaugh
(1974, 311) concludes: “what is important is the quality and conditions of life
rather than the merits and effects of architecture. The image of Athens which
emerges is based not on bricks and mortar . . . but on the principles of conduct, the
administration of government, and the character of the people.” 
55. Rusten (1989, 158).
56. Pericles goes on to say that their city is worthy of admiration (a)ci/an . . .
qauma&zesqai–2.39.4). Scanlon (1987, 300–301) remarks: “The proper balance of
justice and force is the lesson of Pericles which is ignored by his successors.” Williams
(1998, 122) believes the recapitulation embraces the idea of “self-sufficiency, the
opening theme of 2.36.3.” Other paedagogical metaphors appear later in the History
(e.g., 3.82.2; cf. 3.42.2, 5.30, 8.45.2). Within the Funeral Oration we learn that
speech (logoi) is not an impediment to deeds; rather we must “learn ahead of time”
(prodidachthenai–2.40.2; cf. didaskalion–2.42.1). Hornblower (1991–96, I: 432) notes
that “Th. always uses dida&skaloj metaphorically.”
57. Havelock (1963).
58. Consider Thucydides’ earlier dismissal of what poets have sung about
(1.21.1; cf. 1.22.4).
59. See Loraux (1986a, 338) on Athens as a model; she distinguishes between
the senses of paradeigma as example and as model (298). 
60. Athenians in rural Attica lived with local “independence” (au0tono/mw|
oi0kh/sei–2.16.1). In fact, Bétant (1969, I: 168) lists this as the only instance of the
word autonomos meaning liber et solutus; see also Hansen (1995). Bosworth (1992,
124 n7) discusses metaphorical uses of the term autonomia. Mackin (1991, 253) dis-
cusses rural citizens’ sense of alienation. On the idea of a microcosmic polis and its
relation to the philosophy of the atomist Democritus, see Hussey (1985). 
61. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 346) translates: “something that was a democra-
cy in name, but actually was a rule by the first man.” Cf. Herodotus 3.82.4. Gribble
(1998, 53) believes this paragraph “marks the culmination of the issues of the first
two books.”
62. In the History, arche refers to empire in 81 of 110 instances.
63. Pericles dominated, led, and brought to glory his fellow citizens much as
Athens dominated, led, and perhaps brought to a kind of glory the cities of the
Athenian empire. Williams (1998, 136) finds Pericles in some ways like a tyrant
which raises the question: are all tyrants bad? Yet Pericles is legitimately elected
each year.
64. See esp. 2.37–8, 2.42–4, 2.60–61.
65. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 311).
66. Monoson (1994, 257); she finds the suggestion that the beauty of “Athens
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is capable of stirring the passions of individual citizens, moving them to choose to
seek an intimate relationship with this particular city” (257).
67. Monoson (1994, 260–70). Lattimore (1998, 95) (note to 2.43) cites a
paper by Kathryn Morgan which calls “attention to Thucydides’ startling choice of
words: ‘lover’ is overtly sexual and denotes the aggressor in relationships, so that
Athens (whose power has just been mentioned) becomes a passive object.” Again,
the metaphor found in Thucydides does not appear to be original; see
Aristophanes Knights 732, 1340–44, Birds 1279, and Connor (1992, 97 n14). 
68. Monoson (1994, 261).
69. Ibid., 267.
70. See 6.24.3; cf. 6.54.2. For the association between tyrants and eros, see
Connor (1984, 178–79 n53).
71. Monoson (1994, 276 n81). See Connor (1984, 176–80) on the conspira-
cy against the Peisistratids, calling it “an act of erotic boldness [which] link[s] the
digression to the theme of eros so prominent in the work” (178); more specifical-
ly, “both the conspiracy against the Pisistratids and the invasion of Sicily, for
example, are presented as acts of inappropriate or misdirected boldness, tolma”
(179). See also Ober (1998, 113–15).
72. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 310) translates: “I have sung the city’s praises.”
Gomme HCT, II: 130–31 remarks that the cluster of eulogia, hymnesa, and katas-
trophe—“all with a poetical colour . . . introduce one of the most elaborate, care-
fully phrased and difficult passages in Thucydides.” See also Loraux (1986a,
271–72).
73. Gomme HCT, II: 128 observes: “It is interesting that just below, 42.2,
Perikles says th\n po/lin u3mnhsa, a word normally used of poets, later of eulogists
in prose (Plato Rep. 1.364A).” Kakridis (1961, 64) argues that the change in style
to the language of a hymn of praise begins at 2.41.3. Loraux (1986a, 444 n39)
emphasizes “the religious sense” of the term hymnos. Interestingly, if the city is the
object of this religious song of praise, Pericles play the role of singer.
74. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 339) translates: “For everything living must
eventually wither.” 
75. For the decline of cities, see Herodotus 1.5. Hussey (1985, 120) argues:
“Body, soul and city are all taken to be analogous structures.” 
76. If Pericles has described Athens as a city in its healthy state in the Funeral
Oration—citizen and city engaged in fulfilling mutual obligations and rendering
benefits and respect to one another—with the plague, the city as a whole has
become a victim of a disease, now sick and in need of treatment. On such “bio-
logical metaphors,” see Hornblower (1991–96, I: 6) on akmazontes (1.1.1): “lit. ‘in
their prime’; a biological metaphor. Such metaphors are frequent in Th. and tell
against attempts to argue that he distinguished between the behavior of states and
the behavior of individuals” (cf. 134, 339). I agree with this assessment. Nicias
introduces the medical model in the debate over the Sicilian expedition: “Become
a doctor of the city: rule well, help your country, and do no harm” (th=j
po/lewj...i0atro\j a@n gene/sqai–6.14).
77. Wickersham (1994, 32) notes that Thucydides “practices reticence and
saves the deepest material for the speeches.” Parry (1970, 20) comments:
“Thucydides distills the world into abstractions . . . [yet they] are never quite 
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commensurate. They resist the intellect which wants to put them into order”; all
this makes Thucydides’ style a “struggle.” Regarding the possibility of recovering
Thucydides’ own opinions, Hornblower (1991–96, I: 114) cautions that “speeches
cannot be used as a statement of Thucydides’ views except when they correspond
to an explicit authorial judgment”; see also Pope (1988, 286). 
78. Much of Thucydides’ historical analysis is metaphorical. Parry (1972, 51)
describes his method: Thucydides “writes an exposition in which ideas and events
are strongly marked by key terms. These key terms are semi-abstract nouns and
verbs designed to distill the elements of experience into an articulate pattern.”
Scanlon (1987, 286) describes this as Thucydides’ “method of explaining by recur-
rent paradigms,” and claims that the metaphorical approach “provide[s] a key to
the character of Athenian rule and to Thucydides’ historical philosophy in gener-
al” (292 n16). On the didactic nature of paradigms, see Scanlon (1987, 300 n41)
and Hunter (1973a). 
79. Stanford (1972, 98) quotes Murry, The Countries of the Mind (1931):
“Discussions of metaphor—there are not many of them—often strike us at first as
superficial. Not until we have ourselves made the attempt to get farther do we
begin to realize that the investigation of metaphor is curiously like the investiga-
tion of any of the primary data of consciousness: it cannot be pursued very far with-
out our being led to the borderline of sanity. Metaphor is as ultimate as speech itself,
and speech as ultimate as thought. If we try to penetrate them beyond a certain
point, we find ourselves questioning the very faculty and instrument with which
we are trying to penetrate them. The earth trembles and yawns beneath the
explorer’s feet.”
80. E.g., Connor (1977, 95) seeks “to determine the extent to which this com-
parison reflects his [i.e., Thucydides’] own view of Athenian imperialism.” While
I am certainly not arguing that Thucydides does not have opinions, e.g., regarding
tyranny, the fact is that we find that certain expressions—such as Athens the
tyrant-city—appear in speech rather than narrative. Thucydides has chosen to
explore this comparison in depth, returning to both actual tyranny and imperial
tyranny in different settings, both in speech and narrative.
81. Gribble (1998, 56).
82. Ibid., 55.
83. As a definition of paraplesion, LSJ offers “about equal.”
84. On occasion, Thucydides makes the juxtaposition explicit: see, e.g.,
1.55.2, 1.146, 4.36, 7.77. For a valuable discussion of such echoes and anticipations,
see Rengakos (1996). Thucydides openly tells his reader that the description of the
plague is presented so that should the disease appear again—outside the period of
the Peloponnesian War—it may be recognized and its course anticipated (2.48.4;
cf. 2.51.6, 3.82).
85. Thucydides introduces the model of Athens as tyrant-city, asking the
reader to explore the similarities between Athens’ relations with other cities and
a tyrant’s with his fellow citizens. Gribble (1998, 45) describes this task:
“Thucydides demands a sensitive and intelligent audience capable of responding
to the complexities of a work of literature (rather than a compliant one, as in ora-
tory).”
86. Two appear in the narrative alone: Attic villagers and the arche of Pericles.
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87. Storey (2003, 133–34) discusses this fragment; his translation is found on
page 14.
88. On Pericles’ memorable expressions, see also Aristophanes, Acharnians
530–534; Aristotle, Rhetoric 1365a34; and Plutarch, Life of Pericles 8, 28. As Connor
(1977, 97 n14) remarks: “The extravagance of the language is fully appropriate to
Pericles’ love of the vivid phrase.”
89. Macleod (1983, 97 n45).
90. Leidl (2003, 53).
91. See Rhodes (1998).
92. On the tyrant model, Macleod (1983, 69) comments: “Thucydides is seek-
ing not merely to record that attempt [of e.g. ‘Cleon and Pericles . . . seeking to
persuade an audience’], but to show us how and why they succeeded or failed, to
help us understand, and so also to judge, the speaker and his public. This purpose
we can achieve in two main ways: by sifting the arguments and by examining their
relation to the narrative.”
93. On recognizing the similarities between events in Thucydides’ History and
those from the reader’s own time, see de Ste. Croix (1972, 28–33).
Chapter Nine
1. It is interesting to compare this with Pericles’ wave of superlatives in his
description of Athens’ greatness: me/giston . . . plei=sta . . .  megi/sthn . . .
plei/stwn . . . megi/stoij . . . eu0porwta&thn . . . kai\ megi/sthn (2.64.3).
2. Thucydides expected the war to be great from the start (1.1.1, 5.26).
3. See Connor (1984, 23–26).
4. Elsewhere in the History Thucydides claims to “judge from evidence
which I am able to trust after my most extensive inquiry” (e0pi\ makro/taton
skopou=nti/ moi pisteu=sai–1.1.3). Regarding accuracy (akribeia), see also 5.26.5;
Hornblower (1991–96, I: 60) comments: “there is also present the idea of precise
conformity with reality.”
5. Cf. “what was truly said” (tw~n a)lhqw~j lexqe/ntwn –1.22.1; cf. 7.14.4). On
the opposition between what is true and what is pleasant, see Edmunds (1993,
847–48).
6. For an explicit criticism of Hellanicus, see 1.97.2. To be sure, Thucydides
acknowledges difficulties: his own lapses of memory (1.22.3); the difficulty of dis-
covering events from the distant past (1.1.13, 1.9.2); even the difficulty of pro-
ducing an accurate eye-witness account (7.44.1). One is left with no other choice
than to conjecture based on the evidence (xrh\ ei0ka&zein –1.9.4), but success is not
guaranteed (cf. 1.10.2). 
7. In the Funeral Oration, Pericles very deliberately says that the remem-
brance of Athenian greatness that will last forever is not dependent on writing
(2.43.2–3): this memory—set free from writing altogether (a!grafoj mnh/mh )—
will guarantee eternal glory and praise which never ages (cf. Pericles’ “unwritten
laws” [a!grafoi no/moi]–2.37.3). Loraux (1986a, 51) remarks: “the resemblance
between the kleos aphthiton (imperishable glory) of the aristocrats . . . and the
athanatos mneme (immortal memory) of the city is too evident to be gratuitous.”
251Notes to Chapter 9
Morrison_Notes_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:46 PM  Page 251
Yet Thucydides may be implicitly criticizing Pericles’ assertion regarding what
endures. Thucydides’ audience is able to appreciate that the preservation of
Pericles’ words—and the idea of this unwritten memory—yet this is possible only
by means of Thucydides’ written history; see Morrison (2004, 115–16). 
8. Again, this is common in the classical period: on Plato’s competition with
Homer, see Havelock (1963). The Sophists, such as Protagoras, tried to “one-up”
Homer by pointing out mistakes (almost word by word) in the opening of Homer’s
Iliad. On Thucydides’ relationship with Herodotus, see Hornblower (1992a),
Hornblower (1991–96, II: 19–38, 122–45), and Scanlon (1994). On the influence
of political debate on science and historiography, see Lloyd (1979, 226–67) where
he concludes: “this very paradigm of the competitive debate may have provided the
essential framework for the growth of natural science” (267).
9. Cf. the teachers in Aristophanes’ Clouds who claim they are better teach-
ers; these competitive assertions also appear in the Hippocratic corpus. On the
competition among intellectuals, see Lloyd (1987, 87–102).
10. Both Themistocles and Pericles had the ability to foresee (prognous, proeg-
no–1.138, 2.65.5, 2.65.13).
11. See Wallace (1998).
12. See Pericles’ sentiments at 2.40.2.
13. On comparing the empires of Athens and Persia, see Rood (1999) and
Price (2001, 363–71).
14. Regarding Thucydides’ attendance at the Funeral Oration, see Bosworth
(2000). 
15. Hornblower (1991–96, I: 321) comments: “a rare autobiographical statement
followed by an emphatic claim to autopsy (note the repeated use of ‘myself’).”
16. Thucydides says explicitly that he remembers (e1gwge me/mnhmai) that
many said the war would last twenty-seven years (5.26). Memory is often con-
nected to events of great magnitude: 1.23.3, 2.8.3, 2.47.3, 5.66.2, 8.41.2. Edmunds
(1993), 850 argues that “when Thucydides speaks of memory, he is usually dis-
paraging, never favorable,” and concludes that ultimately the historian rejects “not
only the poets’ account but also their traditional authority, namely, memory”
(851). Surely this goes too far, given the importance of recollection for
Thucydides’ informants’ reports. 
17. Cf. the speech of the Peloponnesian leaders, describing the effect of pow-
erful emotion on memory: fo/boj ga_r mnh/mhn e0kplh/ssei (“For panic strikes out
memory”–2.87.4).
18. Thucydides notes that everyone thinks that the war in which he or she par-
ticipates is the greatest war (1.21.2). Surely the historian attempts to transcend
such tendencies, but is Thucydides wholly immune from such an inclination? 
19. Westlake (1989b, 99) remarks that Thucydides may be anticipating objec-
tions that he was “too young to embark on historical research at the outbreak of
the war”; similarly his remarks on having had the plague himself and observing oth-
ers (2.48.3) might be seen as preempting any skepticism regarding his description
there; see also Westlake (1962, 277 n1).
20. As Flory (1988, 53–54) remarks, “Thucydides . . . does seize this opportu-
nity to make three significant hypotheses which touch intimately on his own par-
ticipation [in the war against Brasidas].”
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21. Flory (1988, 53) speaks of Thucydides’ “sensitivity to the unpredictability
of even trivial events.”
22. Although Marincola (1997, 182–84) argues that “there is no overt justifi-
cation or defense of his action” (183), see Westlake (1962); Ellis (1978); and
Hornblower (1991–96, II:  338). On the possibility that Brasidas was Thucydides’
source for this account, Hornblower (1991–96, II: 334) comments: “surely the two
men talked between 424 and 422.”
23. The term dokimazo certainly has a formal connotation familiar to
Athenians from the various “vettings” of magistrates and other officials (Ath. Pol.
59.4, e.g.).
24. Hippias’s name is listed (gegraptai) immediately after his father, Pisistratus
(6.55.2). In interpreting this epigraphical material, Thucydides also reveals some-
thing of his method in making deductions and arguing from probability (ei0ko/j . . .
ou0de\ tou=to a)peoiko/twj —“it is likely . . . nor is it unlikely”–6.55.1–2).
Thucydides also tells us that the text of the inscription (epigramma) on the Altar of
the Twelve Gods “even still now is legible in faint letters” (e1ti kai\ nu=n dh=lo/n e0stin
a)mudroi=j gra&mmasi–6.54.7). Dover HCT, IV: 331 remarks, “Thucydides is not
above pride in the trouble he has taken.” Fortuitously, the inscription has survived:
see Meiggs and Lewis (1989, 19–20) (#11). Thucydides also quotes another inscrip-
tion, the monument (sema) in Lampsacus that commemorates the death of
Archedike, Hippias’ daughter (6.59.3).
25. Dover HCT, IV: 273–88 discusses the comparative evidence on these inci-
dents from Andocides’ On the Mysteries and Plutarch’s Life of Alcibiades.
26. Connor (1984, 178 n52). For a discussion of Thucydides’ sources, see
Dover HCT, IV: 323–25. 
27. The Athenians’ lust for Sicily (6.24.3, cf. 6.13.1) is linked to the erotic tri-
angle in the sixth century (6.54.1). Alcibiades’ alleged aim at tyranny (6.61.7)
may have triggered the Athenian people’s nervous recollection of earlier Athenian
tyrants. See Connor (1984, 178–80) and Stahl (2004, 121).
28. i0ste/on de\ o3ti strathgh/saj e0n  0Amfipo/lei o9 Qoukudi/dhj kai\ do/caj
e0kei= brade/wj a)fike/sqai kai\ prolabo/ntoj au0to\n tou= Brasi/dou e0fugadeu/qh
u9p ) 0Aqhnai/wn, diaba&llontoj au0to\n tou= Kle/wnoj (“It should be known that
Thucydides was general in Amphipolis and was thought to have arrived there
slowly—Brasidas took it in advance—so he was banished by the Athenians with
Cleon attacking him”–Marcellinus Life of Thucydides 46). Cf. Nicias’ fear of slan-
derous attacks in Athens if he were to withdraw from Syracuse (7.48.3).
29. Letters are also written by Pausanias, Themistocles, and Alcibiades. The
verb grapho may also refer to inscriptions, stelai, and treaties. 
30. W. V. Harris (1989, 78), and he goes on to say that Thucydides is merely
“explaining it [i.e., this discovery] to the public.” Edmunds (1993, 849) believes
that “Nicias’ view of the Athenians as presented by Thucydides, is exactly the
same as the one that can be attributed to Thucydides himself on the basis of his
methodological statements.” 
31. Connor (1985, 6–7) argues that Thucydides’ authority derives in part from
the demonstration of his historical method found in the Archaeology. See also
Loraux (1986b, 147–53).
32. If we think of Thucydides’ intended audience, certainly what many
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Athenians would remember about Amphipolis was what Cleon said in the assem-
bly against Thucydides. Hornblower (1987, 27) quotes Syme’s remark: “exile may
be the making of an historian.”
Chapter Ten
1. For example, all the events and speeches in Athens from 424–404 must
have been reported to Thucydides by others due to his exile. More generally, oral
sources are referred to with phrases such as: a)koh=| i1smen and a)koh=| lego/mena ( “we
know from oral report,” “spoken in hearsay accounts”–1.4.1, 1.23.3, 7.87.5; cf.
1.20). M. I. Finley (1956, 296–99) examines Thucydides’ confrontation with older
oral tradition. W. V. Harris (1989, 80) remarks that Thucydides “still preferred oral
testimony to written”; cf. Momigliano (1977, 192) on “the preference for oral tra-
dition and visual observation.” 
2. See also 2.103.2, 3.25.2, 3.88.4, 3.116.3, 4.51, 4.104.4, 6.7.4, 6.93.4,
7.18.4, 8.6.5, 8.60.3; cf. 1.1.1, 2.1, 4.104, 1.22.2, 1.97.2. Dover HCT V: 390 notes
the exceptions (2.47.1, 4.116.3, 5.24.2), but argues against the label of “signature.”
Related to this sort of self-reference, Ford (1985, 85) presents a fascinating inter-
pretation of Theognis’ “seal” (sphragis) as “an assertion of ownership rather than
authorship,” and goes on to explore the political dimension of the poet as “the
Muses’ spokesman and as a political envoy” (92–93). 
3. Edmunds (1993, 837) uses grammatical tense to analyze Thucydides’ use
of the verb grapho. The primary tenses (present and perfect) allow Thucydides to
speak “of his writing from the point of view of an ideal present time—his work is
a possession e0j ai0ei/. If the adverb ai0ei/ is understood in its distributive sense, the
work is a possession for each successive occasion.” Marincola (1997, 185 n52)
examines grapho by distinguishing between first- and third-person statements: “the
first person is used for statements of opinion, reasoning, inference, autopsy, and
methodology, that is, anything that affected the history qua history. The third per-
son, on the other hand, is used by Thucydides for formal openings and closings.”
On the presence or effacement of the historian in his own work, see Loraux
(1986b). 
4. Crane (1996, 7); see now Yunis (2003).
5. Thomas (1992, 104).
6. As Rhodes (1998) notes, any sort of cross-referencing from one roll of
papyrus to another would be extremely impractical. In addition, papyrus was an
expensive import; the copying alone of such a long work would have encouraged
such “sharing.”
7. A tremendous problem for those studying the question of orality and lit-
eracy in the fifth century is that the terms for “speak” and “listen” (legein,
akouein) may at times be used interchangeably with those for “write” and “read”
(graphein, anagignoskein). Gomme HCT, I: 136 posits that “oral reports”
(akoas–1.20.1) go beyond “hearsay” to include “all that has been said and writ-
ten of the past,” “all that we have heard or read of it.” On the phrase “it is said”
(legetai), Westlake (1977, 356) acknowledges that “the legetai phrase may point
to the use of a written source.” See further references in Thomas (1993, 234 n29
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and 236 n31). In this case, however, “listening” (akroasin–1.22.4) does appear
to mean listening and not reading, though Thucydides does contrast “a posses-
sion forever” (kth=ma& te e0j ai0ei/) with “a competition piece to be heard for the
moment” (a)gw&nisma e0j to\ paraxrh=ma a))kou//ein–1.22.4); see discussion on
this passage below.
8. Dover HCT, V:385 surmises that this official, the grammateus, may be the
same one referred to in Ath. Pol. 54.5, yet he believes that composing a message in
writing “was still a comparatively unusual procedure in 414.” But Nicias refers to
“many other letters” he has sent (7.11.1)—perhaps this practice was more common
than Dover would allow, given the importance of reports and documents in the
administration of the Athenian empire. See Rood (1998, 189–91) on 7.8.2. 
9. It is hard for me to believe that Athenians would not have wanted to hear
the speeches in the History (see Cleon’s remarks at 3.38). Edmunds (1993, 840)
remarks that “the illusion of the presence of the writer would have been strength-
ened by the practice of reading aloud.” Flory (1980) argues that Herodotus proba-
bly read aloud only excerpts (14) and believes that both Herodotus and
Thucydides had a “relatively exclusive audience” (26). Though focusing on
Herodotus, Thomas (1993) argues for the “context of intense argument, and a
careful assumption that there is an audience which listens” (234), and concludes
“oral performances were not merely a survival of a primitive ‘oral culture,’ but con-
tinued, in different forms, as an important medium for the presentation and trans-
mission of knowledge in the latter half of the fifth century” (244). For the limits
on reading, see Woodbury (1976); on silent reading in the fifth century, see Knox
(1968). In thinking of Thucydides’ audience as readers, Arnold (1992) offers a
provocative discussion, proposing that even if Thucydides could have remembered
all the words of a speech (cf. 1.22.1), he would need to make significant changes
in the nature of the language employed in order to “accommodat[e] rhetorical
speech to his contemplative work” (47). The quality of the language—the style
itself—must change. To achieve this, “Thucydides complicated the logic of the
speeches and disguised the defects in their arguments even for an audience who can
study, contemplate and reread his work at leisure” (46). A density of ideas and a
greater difficulty of argument is required, on this view, if Thucydides is to repro-
duce something in a written medium for a contemplative reader equivalent to the
aural experience of political oratory. Still I remain unconvinced that Thucydides
would have envisioned his primary audience as those who read his work silently to
themselves. 
10. Edmunds (1993, 847). 
11. Edmunds (1993, 847) comments that “democracy is given to the pleasures
of the moment”; see also de Romilly (1966). Wallace (1996, 230–31) discusses the
“political isolation of Athenian intellectuals.” It is possible that as sections of the
History were written by Thucydides in exile, these “chapters” might have been sent
back to family and political friends in Athens. Even though Thucydides could no
longer influence affairs directly in Athens, he might have provoked discussion
among those friends and followers who themselves could still particpate in
Athenian politics (see note 21 below). 
12. This translation comes from Perseus 2006.
13. While Plato often seeks to recapture the golden days of fifth-century
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Athens in his dialogues (the dramatic date of the Parmenides must be ca. 450), in
this instance he may well be projecting into the mid-fifth century a fourth-centu-
ry practice of reading aloud and consequent discussion. 
14. Thomas (2003, 166). Hershbell (1995, 37) believes that one function of
written works was to stimulate oral discussion: “Plato nowhere wrote down his
most serious thoughts, and his negative views on the usefulness of writing may
explain his choice of the dialogue form: written works need the ‘help’ from verbal
discussion, oral debate, and a lively exchange of ideas.” For a key difference
between Plato and Thucydides, see Nightingale (1995, 52): “The politician, in
short, is inside the system, whereas the philosopher is an outsider. Only a person
who is completely disembedded from the social and political economy of the city
can act in a disinterested manner.” Thucydides’ reader, I believe, was expected to
be fully engaged with his polis—his social and political community—in a way
which Plato’s philosopher was not; cf. Rowe (1998).
15. This translation is based on Grube (1992).
16. The phrase “according to their perception of what was justified” comes
from Price (2001, 39–45). 
17. Rutherford (1995, 67); Yunis (1996, 136–71).
18. On the constitution of the 400, see Ath. Pol. 29–33; for a discussion of
Pericles and Cleon, see sections 27–28.
19. Baltes (1993, 18); see also Hornblower (1987, 121–24).
20. That is, I would question the assertion in Loraux (1986a, 288) that
“Thucydides rejects all forms of oral expression.” On possible performances of
Plato’s dialogues, see Blondell (2002, 23–25); on Plato’s intended audience, see
Blondell (2002, 25–27); on stimulating the audience’s engagement, see Blondell
(2002, 47–48). 
21. In addition to those in the philosophical schools, we might even go on to
speculate that the homes of rich aristocrats, such as Callias’ house described in
Plato’s Protagoras, would have provided a sympathetic audience for Thucydides’
ideas. A further step would have been to voice those ideas in political institutions
(the assembly or the council) and then transform them into political action.
22. Steiner (1994, 227); Ober (1998). 
23. Thomas (2000, 267); see also Thomas (2003, 174): “Whether we call this
oral style or epideictic style, or even simply early rhetoric, we seem to be dealing
with an identical phenomenon—a style suitable for oral delivery to a live audience,
lively, clear, argumentative, demonstrative, syntactically uncomplicated, possible
even rhyming, with a strong first-person presence.” For a valuable exploration of
oral “style,” see Gagarin (1999).
24. Thucydides’ target may also have been a rhapsode such as Plato’s Ion, who
was so successful at provoking an emotional response from the audience.
Thucydides—and Plato—may well have hoped to distinguish themselves by elic-
iting a more dispassionate reaction; see Robb (1994, 166–68).
25. Translation from Usher (1974).
26. Kahn (1996, 381).
27. Ibid., 382.
28. Dionysius remarks that “the author was not composing these writings of
his for the man in the street, the workman at the bench, the artisan or any other
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person who has not enjoyed a liberal education, but for those who have passed
through the standard courses to the study of rhetoric and philosophy, to whom
none of these usages will seem strange” (50).
29. See Yunis (2003, 189) on what he calls the problem of the “absent author”
who must anticipate the reader’s burden and guide the reader’s pursuit of meaning.
30. Rood (2004, 123).
31. Frankel (2004, 19); see also Neustadt and May (1986, 1–16).
32. Price (2001, 282) interprets megi/sth pro/fasij as the “most compelling
occasion”—they have already resolved on war, but are seeking the best possible pre-
text. Gomme HCT, I: 425 translates pro/fasij here as “openly expressed reason
or motive”; Hornblower (1991–96, I: 203) considers this to be “their grounds for
going to war,” yet earlier (s.v. 1.118.1) he translates this term as “reasons publicly
alleged” (194).
33. A transcript of Bush’s speech may be found at Bush (2002).
34. See UN (2002).
35. See Powell (2003a).
36. Powell then quotes selections from Blix’s and ElBaradei’s reports to the UN
Security Council. 
Blix: “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of
the disarmament which was demanded of it.” 
ElBaradei: “[Iraq’s declaration of December 8] did not provide any new informa-
tion relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998.” 
Blix (2004, 111) later comments that the large number of documents delivered by
Iraq on 8 December 2002 were “rich in volume . . . but poor in information and
practically devoid of new evidence.”
37. See Powell (2003b). This same release notes that dozens of countries
objected to war with Iraq and declared that they detected a willingness by Saddam
to cooperate with weapons inspectors. For example, the South Africa UN ambas-
sador, Dumisani Kumalo, said: “The inspection process in Iraq is working and Iraq
is showing clear signs of cooperating more proactively with the inspectors.”
Several security council countries (Mexico and Chile) said privately they would
abstain in a vote on the resolution to go to war. 
38. See Largio (2004, 18). Blix (2004, 266) refers to the “now famous inter-
view [in which] U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense [Paul] Wolfowitz said that Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction were chosen as the rationale for the war for ‘bureau-
cratic’ reasons, implying that while there were many other reasons, this was the
only rationale that could rally broad support in U.S. public opinion and that stood
a chance at having appeal outside the U.S. and inside the United Nations.”
39. See Hussein (2003b). 
40. In a statement to a delegation of Russian lawmakers on 20 February 2003,
Saddam Hussein said that if the United States carried out its threat to attack, Iraq
will “triumph over it, God willing . . . Iraq doesn’t want war . . . [but peace] at any
cost [was unacceptable]. . . . We will not relinquish our independence, our dignity
and our right to live and act freely.” See Hussein (2003b).
41. Chuter (1997, 381).
42. Ibid., 385.
43. Williams (1998, 201).
257Notes to Chapter 10
Morrison_Notes_3rd.qxp  9/28/2006  2:46 PM  Page 257
44. Blix (2004, 265). Much theoretical analysis has to do with rational choic-
es, but irrational factors, such as the Melians’ hope in divine aid or Saddam
Hussein’s pride, should not be discounted. In this regard, we note that the
Athenians call into question frequently invoked motivations and speak scornfully
of men who are seduced by the name “shame”: “In many cases, the men who see
what they’re rushing into, let the thing called shame [to\ ai0sxro\n kalou/menon], by
the mere power of its seductive name, lead them on to a point at which they
become so enslaved by the phrase as in fact to fall willfully into hopeless disaster,
and incur shame more shameful as the companion of error, than when it comes as
the result of misfortune” (5.111.3).
45. The view that a lack of flexibility on both sides led to war is reinforced by
the report that in mid-February 2003—a month before the invasion—the Iraqis
broached (through Lebanese-American businessman Imad El Haje) the idea of
allowing U.S. experts and troops into Iraq to verify the absence of weapons of mass
destruction; see Landay and Strobel (2003). 
46. Blix (2004, 263) finds the failures of intelligence to be a “deficit of criti-
cal thinking” on the part of the U.S. See Bulletin (2005).
47. Zizek (2004, 43–44).
48. Mearsheimer and Walt (2003, 51–52). See Clarke (2004, 263–64) on the
various factors influencing the U.S. government. Interestingly, Jervis (2003, 84)
points to “the combination of power, fear, and perceived opportunity [which] lead
it [the United States] to seek to reshape global politics and various societies around
the world.” It is difficult not to see this as a version of the Athenian rationale for
empire: honor, fear, and advantage (1.76.2).
49. Theorists have found elements of realism, neo-realism, and constructivism
in Thucydides’ work: on realism and neo-realism, see Crane (1998), Doyle (1991),
Forde (1992), and Garst (1989); on constructivism, see Lebow (2001); for valuable
discussions on theory, see Johnson Bagby (1994) and Snyder (2004). Others have
found useful lessons for U.S. foreign policy and commentary on the United States’
role in the world: for example, see Hanson (2001) and Lebow and Kelly (2001).
50. See Yunis (1991, 180) on the notion of “instructional rhetoric.” 
51. On bystanders and listeners (internal audiences) in Plato’s works, see
Blondel (2002, 52).
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